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ABSTRACT
Debate about the status of the intoxication excuse as a legal 
defence is rooted in lay theories, or common sense
assumptions, about the effects of alcohol on rationality and 
intentionality. There has been less concern to clarify the 
controversial use of information about defendants* 
intoxication or alcoholism as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing.
A literature review leads to the conclusion that academic 
theories of alcohol-related crime are deterministic to an 
extent unsupported by the empirical research. Alcohol
expectancy theory is identified as a perspective which may 
illuminate the alcohol-crime relationship without denying 
intentionality in offending behaviour. It is suggested that 
the alcohol expectancies comprise a set of lay theories about 
the effects of alcohol on mood and behaviour; that these may 
provide the bases for techniques of neutralisation and
rationalisation which facilitate offending; and that such 
techniques may be adapted in courtroom mitigation.
An empirical study of a magistrates' court examines the use of 
information about defendants' intoxication or alcoholism in 
sentencing decision making. Such information is found tc 
facilitate rapid information processing and provide rationales 
for sentencing decisions by appealing to lay theories about 
alcohol's effects on mood and behaviour, and its role in crime 
causation. However, mitigation invoking intoxication or 
alcoholism are constrained by factors concerning types of 
offence and offender, and the availability of alternative 
explanations of crime.
The study compares theories of crime and criminal justice held 
by magistrates and probation officers. Discrepancies are 
identified between these lay and professional perspectives 
which obstruct the sentencing decision making process.
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It is concluded that mitigations invoking intoxication or 
alcoholism are uniquely flexible in constructing judgements of 
criminal responsibility. The general applicability of the 
analysis of sentencing decision making may be constrained by 
factors specific to the court studied.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE INTOXICATION EXCUSE:
THE PROBLEM AND THE PURSUIT OF UNDERSTANDING
This chapter examines the legal dilemma over the intoxication 
excuse, suggesting that it is based on unquestioned, but 
questionable, common sense assumptions about the effects of 
alcohol on the human mind and will. It considers a theoretical 
and empirical approach to clarification of, arguably, the most 
common motive for invoking the intoxication excuse: to achieve 
mitigation of punishment for a deviant act.
THE PROBLEM 
The legal dilemma
The legal attribution of criminal responsibility serves a 
vital social function in securing and maintaining order 
(Schafer 1968) . The law sets standards of behaviour to which 
most citizens manage to conform for most of the time because 
they are minimum, and not maximum standards (Shiner 1990). 
Judgements of legal responsibility assume the freedom of will 
(Fitzmaurice and Pease 1986). While there may be limits to the 
freedom of the will, the law requires that such freedom as the 
individual has in any situation will be exercised in 
accordance with its standards (Schafer 1968).
The law is concerned primarily with the regulation of external 
behaviour, and not of internal states of moral integrity 
(Shaver 1985) . Nor does the law seek to punish those who break 
the law involuntarily.
11 If order requires that conduct be regulated, 
justice requires that sanctions be applied only to 
those who truly deserve them."
(Shaver 1985, p.68)
The just application of sanctions, therefore, requires that 
deliberate law breakers are distinguished from those whose 
offences are caused by some interference with the freedom of
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will. To achieve this, however, the law must address itself to 
internal states after all, and consider individual intentions 
and capacities for exercising free will. This is the basic 
legal question of mens rea: the intention to commit a prohibited 
act, or recklessness as to the likelihood of a prohibited 
outcome of an act (Smith and Hogan 1982? Williams 1978).
"The fundamental substantive question that the 
criminal law properly faces here is whether, in a 
particular case, the defendant’s capacity to act 
rationally in regard to the criminal significance of 
the act has been so impaired as to have rendered him 
nonresponsible at the time of the act."
(Fingarette and Hasse 1979, p.193)
There are two aspects to the judgement of criminal 
responsibility: the legal and the moral. The legal aspect
concerns whether the individual can be said to have acted with 
sufficient rationality and intentionality that he may 
justifiably be held responsible for his act. The moral aspect 
concerns the quality of the response to the act.
Judgements of legal responsibility are intrinsically connected 
with their practical implications for further judgements about 
punishment, recompense and rehabilitation. The anticipation of 
these consequences shape the initial judgements of legal 
responsibility themselves (Feinberg 1970? Lloyd-Bostock 1983) . 
Decisions about the practical consequences of the judgement 
rest on considerations, not of legal, but of moral 
responsibility (Feinberg 1970). Thus, the moral judgement of 
the offender mediates the response to the legal judgement, by 
implying censure and retribution if the offence is seen to be 
committed by choice, but mercy or treatment if the cause of 
the offence itself is seen to be beyond the person's control 
(Freidson 1966).
The intoxication excuse affects both aspects of judgement. 
Firstly, it requires judges to be satisfied that the capacity 
for rational and intentional behaviour has not been destroyed
14
by intoxication. Secondly, it requires a decision about the 
appropriate response to the crime. Should the moral degeneracy 
of the intoxicated state attract greater punishment? Should 
the impairment to powers of moral reasoning wrought by 
intoxication mitigate punishment? Should rehabilitative 
treatment inculcate greater responsibility in the use of 
intoxicants?
The criminal law has primarily been preoccupied with the first 
aspect: the legal grounds for holding individuals responsible 
for their intoxicated crimes. The extent of its preoccupation 
with this question is surprising, given that it is a basic 
rule of criminal law that intoxication does not excuse 
criminal behaviour (Mosher 1981). The reason for this rule is 
essentially pragmatic. It is feared that acceptance of the 
claims of defendants to have been incapable of intentional 
action through intoxication would bring about wholesale 
acquittals on these grounds because of the difficulty of 
disproving such assertions. This would conflict with the 
public's need for the protection of the law against the 
depredations of intoxicated law breakers (Mitchell 1988; 
Mosher 1981; Shiner 1990). In the public interest, therefore, 
the intoxication excuse is prohibited. Thus, the judgement of 
legal responsibility for intoxicated crime is shaped by the 
anticipated disastrous consequences of allowing defendants 
unrestricted access to the intoxication excuse.
"Voluntary or self-induced intoxication not
amounting to insanity is not generally a defence 
even where it negatives the mental element. The
reason why the courts have been fearful of giving
the defence too wide a scope is the possibility that 
those who inflict serious injury to the person or 
damage to property, or who bring about dangerous 
situations, would escape the sanctions of the
criminal law by relying on a defence of 
intoxication."
(Criminal Law Revision Committee 1980, p.Ill)
Nevertheless, courts have repeatedly given serious 
consideration to defendants' claims to have been prevented
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from rational and intentional action at the time of their 
offence through intoxication. Academic legal argument and 
judicial decisions have accepted that intoxication can cause 
automatism (Mitchell 1988), insanity (Howard and Clark 1985; 
Mitchell 1988), violence (Mackay 1990; Mitchell 1988) and can 
negate murderous intention (Kittrie 1971). Contrary to the 
expectation of the basic rule asserting the invalidity of the 
intoxication excuse,
11 [c]ourt decisions and review articles assert the 
legal relevance of intoxication with little critical 
comment and even less hard evidence."
(Mitchell 1990, p.79)
The cause of this sometimes blatant disregard of the basic 
rule lies in the apparent injustice of denying defendants* 
rights to have their state of mind at the time of the offence 
taken into account.
"[T]he present law requires an intoxicated person to 
be convicted of an offence which as it is defined by 
statute he has not been proved to have committed, 
because there was no proof that he had the necessary 
mental element."
(Criminal Law Revision Committee 1980, p.Ill)
Shiner (1990) observes that the continuing tension between the 
public interest and defendants' rights has produced no less 
than seven different legal strategies for dealing with the 
problem. It is unnecessary here to examine these different 
solutions in detail, but only to remark on the lengths to 
which the law has gone in the attempt to deal with the 
problem. However, it is ironic that all of the strategies, 
save one, involve further rationalisations for the denial of 
defendants' rights in order to pursue the public interest 
(Shiner 1990). Two examples show how this is achieved:-
a) The Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (1975) 
recommended the creation of a new offence, proposing that a 
defendant achieving an acquittal on a main charge through the
16
intoxication excuse would automatically be convicted of 
"dangerous intoxication". The Committee reasoned:
"There would be no injustice to the defendant in 
providing for the possibility of conviction of 
dangerous intoxication as an alternative charge, 
because the evidence of intoxication would have been 
produced by him at the trial in answer to the main 
charge."
(Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders 1975, p.237)
There is a curious optimism in the assumption that defendants 
would see no injustice in securing their own conviction for an 
offence by proffering the evidence for acquittal on another. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that courts would be able to 
distinguish between behaviour caused by the will of the 
defendant and behaviour caused by intoxication even when the 
observable action is essentially the same. It is also 
apparently assumed that evidence of intoxication, whilst 
negating the criminal intent of the defendant, establishes the 
cause of the offending behaviour.
b) The Criminal Law Revision Committee (1980) recommended 
that self-induced intoxication be defined as a form of 
recklessness. This Committee appears to have found it an 
attraction of their proposal that conviction for some offence 
on grounds of intoxication would follow even in cases which 
would lead to outright acquittal in cases where intoxication 
was not an issue.
"For example, a householder who mistakenly believes 
that a police officer, who has entered his house to 
look around on finding the front door open, is a 
burglar about to attack him and strikes him down in 
self-defence would probably be acquitted on the 
indictment [for murder]. But if his mistaken belief 
was due to voluntary intoxication the effect of our 
proposals would be that he would be acquitted of 
murder but convicted of manslaughter."
(Criminal Law Revision Committee 1980, p.117)
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This proposal has large implications for the freedom of 
individuals to become intoxicated in their own homes, and, in 
such a condition, to defend themselves against intruders, who 
may subsequently turn out to be zealous policemen. Of 
particular interest here, however, is the apparent assumption 
that intoxication can induce a mistaken belief which in a 
sober individual appears to be an unfortunate but 
understandable misinterpretation of the visible evidence. Why 
should such a mistaken belief be attributed to the effects of 
alcohol?
The reasoning of these two committees demonstrates the real 
power of the intoxication excuse to impede legal judgements of 
responsibility. The intoxication excuse appeals to a common 
sense presumption that alcohol diminishes the capacity for 
rational, responsible behaviour. This underlying presumption 
has bedevilled legal arguments over the intoxication excuse, 
and yet has been so much a part of "common knowledge" about 
alcohol that its veracity has largely been unchallenged. 
Mitchell complains of legal argument about intoxication:
"The legal logic of the doctrine is frequently 
attacked but its factual premises are seldom 
questioned...As a consequence, both judicial 
pronouncements and learned commentaries are 
populated by imaginary creatures - 'blind drunks' 
who can see, 'dead drunks' who move openly among the 
living, intoxicated 'automatons' who perform 
complex, purposeful tasks and 'mad drunks' who 
knowingly focus their aggression on specific 
targets."
(Mitchell 1988, p.77)
Common sense presumptions about alcohol's effects on the human 
will have not only underpinned lawyers' unease about the 
refusal to consider intoxicated offenders' mental states, but 
have also provided the basis of rationalisations for this 
refusal. For example, the treatment of intoxication as a 
special form of recklessness has been justified by the 
argument that a defendant's knowledge of the risks incurred by 
intoxication is demonstrated by the fact that it is "common
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knowledge" that alcohol precipitates aggressive behaviour 
(Mackay 1990). The Criminal Law Revision Committee made the 
following observation about intoxicated aggression:
"The drunken man who kicks and punches a publican 
who tries to eject him from his establishment may 
not know what he is doing; and even if he has enough 
understanding to appreciate that he is punching and 
kicking out, he may not be able to appreciate that 
he is exposing the publican to risk of injury."
(Criminal Law Revision Committee 1980, p.112)
No evidence is cited to substantiate this claim, which is 
expressed as a statement of the obvious. Nevertheless, from 
this unquestioned assertion about the effects of alcohol on 
self-awareness and appreciation of consequences, the Committee 
was forced to generate complex legal arguments in order to 
justify the conviction of intoxicated offenders.
Legal thinking reflects the prevalent social and moral 
attitudes of its time.
"Legal doctrine on intoxication cannot be understood 
without reference to the political, social and 
ideological context in which judges render their 
decisions, despite the fact that the decisions 
themselves are almost totally devoid of background 
information."
(Mitchell 1990, p.4)
Part of this context concerns societal disapproval of drunken 
behaviour. Notwithstanding the common belief in alcohol's 
power to deprive the drinker of rational and moral faculties, 
the unrestrained behaviour of the intoxicated individual 
offends societal values of self-discipline and decorum. Thus, 
the Criminal Law Revision Committee was unperturbed by the 
prospect of convicting intoxicated offenders in cases in which 
their sober counterparts would be acquitted, taking the view:
"What calls for punishment is getting intoxicated 
and when in that condition behaving in a way which
19
society cannot, and should not, tolerate."
(Criminal Law Revision Committee 1980, p.112)
Mackay (1990) observes that such moral outrage has "tainted" 
judicial decision making in cases in which the excuse 
proffered is one of general validity, but in which evidence of 
intoxication is produced. Despite acceptance of the 
intoxication excuse by courts in some cases, in others 
defences have failed when evidence of intoxication is 
produced. Defences of provocation, mistake, duress, insanity 
and automatism have been rejected, despite their foundations 
on evidence of these conditions which would generally satisfy 
the courts in cases of sober crime. Mackay argues that "the 
courts have over-zealously allowed their attitude towards 
self-induced incapacity to taint and infect alternative 
methods of exculpation which might be otherwise open to the 
accused" (1990, p.37). Thus, moral judgements are not 
suspended until legal responsibility is established, but 
themselves inform the determination of legal responsibility.
Legal thinking on the intoxication excuse, therefore, has been 
based upon assumptions about the effects of alcohol on the 
human mind and will, drawn from the stockpile of "common 
knowledge". The law's interpretation has also been influenced 
by societal disapproval and censure of intoxication, and the 
perceived need for the full armoury of the law to be weighed 
against the depravity of the intoxicated offender.
The intoxication excuse in mitigation
The legal status of the intoxication excuse has dominated 
debate, to the neglect of two further issues.
Firstly, the basic rule of denying the intoxication excuse as 
a defence does not illuminate fully its proper treatment. The 
application of that basic rule, and the sheer weight of 
numbers of defendants convicted of, or admitting to their 
intoxicated crimes suggests that it is in the realm of
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sentencing that the intoxication excuse is most commonly 
invoked. The judgements of culpability which inform decisions 
about consequent punishment have less to do with the strictly 
legal attribution of responsibility than with the moral 
appraisal of offenders and their actions.
Thomas informs us:
"The overwhelming majority of offences which come 
before criminal courts arise from factual situations 
which conform to a recurring pattern and which can 
be categorized by reference to particular elements.
This recurring pattern of common factual situations 
provides a basis for a corresponding pattern of 
sentences, which can be adjusted to accord with the 
detailed variations of particular cases. The 
conventional relationships between frequently 
encountered factual situations and corresponding 
levels of sentence constitute the foundations of the 
tariff."
(Thomas 1979, p.30)
Circumstances involving alcohol are possibly the most 
"frequently encountered factual situations" in which offenders 
claim to commit their offences. Indeed, we sometimes appear to 
become inured to the constant repetition of this information. 
So, for example, Shapland (1981) presents without comment the 
finding that intoxication was the most frequently mentioned 
item of information proffered in mitigation speeches. Yet the 
law is somewhat reticent as to the implications of this 
information for sentencing decisions. Thomas merely observes 
that "[d]runkenness, while having little or no independent 
mitigating effect, may add some marginal weight to other more 
substantial mitigating factors" (1979, p.209). But the reasons 
why this may be so are not clear. Nor is the extraordinary 
persistence of the intoxication excuse in mitigation explained 
by this directive. Thomas further observes that "[t]he victim 
of alcoholism will normally be considered a candidate for 
individualized treatment, if there are any reasonable 
prospects of success" (1979, p.210). Thomas cites cases in 
which probation orders have been substituted for substantial
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terms of imprisonment on these grounds. However, Thomas also 
identifies alcoholism as a basis upon which "the sentencer may 
impose imprisonment rather than an individualized measure in 
order to provide an opportunity for treatment, and he may 
ignore mitigating factors in determining the length of the 
sentence so as to ensure that the period of confinement is 
sufficiently long for treatment to take place" (1979, p.44). 
Thomas does not remark on these paradoxical sentencing 
paradigms, nor explain how sentencers are to distinguish 
between an alcoholic ripe for probation and one requiring 
unmitigated imprisonment for the purpose of treatment.
This brings us to the second neglected issue: that sentencing 
decisions in cases involving intoxication may be as vulnerable 
to the vagaries of common sense reasoning about alcohol1s 
effects on the human will as judgements of strict legal 
responsibility. Perhaps, given the relative lack of guidance, 
such decisions may be even more vulnerable. In an effort to 
develop rational guidelines for sentencing intoxicated 
offenders, Felker instead graphically demonstrates the curious 
assumptions that may underpin judgements of culpability for 
intoxicated deviance.
"[IJntoxication should be available as a mitigating 
factor to the extent that intoxication impaired the 
offenders [sic] capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the 
crime. However, if the offender*s intoxication has 
repeatedly resulted in criminal conduct to the 
extent that defendant *s [s ic] decision to become drunk 
is equivalent to a decision to commit crime, then 
the offender's intoxication can be an aggravating 
factor unless the offender is otherwise a good 
candidate for rehabilitation."
(Felker 1990, p.3)
How are we to identify, or distinguish between these different 
consequences of drinking? How might we recognise "a good 
candidate for rehabilitation" from an untreatable miscreant? 
Such qualitative considerations are not necessarily self- 
evident from the observable offender or his behaviour.
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Moreover, how can we be sure that the changes in the 
offender's will which Felker postulates are truly caused by 
intoxication?
THE PURSUIT OF UNDERSTANDING
This thesis is based upon a particular premise. Since it would 
appear that the power of common sense wisdom confounds legal 
direction on the intoxication excuse, then it is necessary to 
understand that very common sense wisdom itself if we hope to 
influence the judgements of responsibility which spring from 
it. This thesis, therefore, is a theoretical and empirical 
exploration of the foundations of the intoxication excuse in 
mitigation and the mechanisms by which an appeal to 
intoxication or alcoholism may influence the judgement of an 
offender's culpability, and thereby, the sentencing decision.
In the theoretical exploration, 3 types of theory which may be 
brought to bear on the judgement of intoxicated responsibility 
are identified and examined: academic, lay and professional 
theories of deviance and responsibility. Answers are sought to 
the question why neither the plethora of academic research and 
theory on the subject of alcohol, nor the accumulation of 
experience by professionals involved in the treatment of 
drinking problems, have resolved the legal dilemma over 
intoxicated responsibility. The relationships between lay 
theory, or common sense wisdom, and judgements of 
responsibility are also explored. Lay theories about alcohol's 
effects on rationality, intentionality and behaviour are 
identified as powerful tools in the explanation of crime: both 
by offenders themselves in the construction of neutralisations
t
and rationalisations for their deviance? and by those who pass 
moral and legal judgement upon their behaviour. Finally, the 
process by which mitigation achieves its purpose of reducing 
punishment through the appeal to these very lay theories is 
explored.
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The empirical study involves observations of sentencing 
hearings in a magistrates' court, supported by interviews with 
magistrates, those lay theorists upon whose judgements of 
culpability rests the punishment of many offenders, and with 
probation officers, who bring their professional theories to 
bear on the attempt to influence sentencing decisions. The 
study exposes the richness of the intoxication excuse in 
mitigation and considers its variety, complexity and nuances 
in the context of the total sentencing exercise.
Certain points of detail should be made clear from the outset. 
Firstly, the thesis concerns itself only with male offenders. 
This limitation follows from several theoretical and practical 
observations: there is mounting evidence of gender differences 
in drinking attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Bardo and Risner 
1985? Blane 1979; Cappell and Greeley 1989? Greeley, McCready 
and Theisen 1980? Harford 1983? Marsh, Dobbs and White 1986? 
Wechsler 1979? Wilsnack and Wilsnack 1979? Wilson 1987)? there 
is controversial evidence of gender differences in crime (e.g. 
Heidensohn 1985? Morris 1987)? there is evidence of gender 
differences in the courtroom constructions of crime and 
sentencing decisions (e.g. Allen 1987? Eaton 1984? Edwards 
1984)? and there were very few female defendants relevant to 
the nature of the empirical enquiry. Since the interests of 
particular groups are not served by implying that conclusions 
based on data from which they are excluded may be extended to 
them, offenders are explicitly masculine in both the 
theoretical and empirical discussion. In the latter, however, 
care has been taken to refer to other participants in the 
courtroom process in terms which are neutral as to gender or, 
indeed, to any characteristic which might result in personal 
identification. In particular, the term "magistrate” is used 
not only to refer to any member of the bench, but also to the 
particular magistrate chairing it on any occasion, thus 
avoiding both the gender specific "chairman" or "chairwoman" 
and the unfortunately inanimate "chair".
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Secondly, the theoretical discussion was initially hampered by 
the lack of a formal term for the academic study of alcohol. 
Surprisingly, given the plethora of multi-disciplinary 
research and theory in the topic, the study of alcohol is not 
embraced by a generic title, as, for example, are the 
disciplines of criminology and gerontology. The variable use 
of phrases such as "alcoholism research" and "theories of 
intoxication" incurred the possibility of semantic and 
conceptual confusion. The issue has been resolved for the 
purposes of this thesis by the adoption of the title "academic 
alcohol theory" to denote the total enterprise of academic 
study of alcohol. "Alcohol-crime theory" has also been invoked 
to denote the study of the particular relationship between 
alcohol and crime, on occasions when alternative phraseology 
would be cumbersome. Contributory disciplines, such as 
medicine and psychology, are specified as appropriate.
Thirdly, considerable convolutions of phraseology have been 
avoided by the ungrammatical expedient of referring to 
"intoxicated crime". It has been pointed out to me that crime 
does not drink. However, the prospect of constantly repeating 
phrases such as "crimes committed after the offender had been 
drinking alcohol" throughout this thesis overcame my scruples. 
Furthermore, common phrases such as "crimes committed under 
the influence of alcohol", often imply precisely those effects 
of intoxication on behaviour which are at issue in this 
thesis. Finally, adoption of the phrase "intoxicated crime" 
suggested the equally ungrammatical, but graphic, "sober 
crime", which appeared to me to be infinitely preferable to 
"crimes committed when the offender had not been drinking 
alcohol". In short, while it is acknowledged that crime is 
neither intoxicated nor sober, on this occasion I have 
embraced a common sense approach to grammar.
25
CHAPTER TWO 
ACADEMIC, LAY AND PROFESSIONAL THEORIES
OF
DEVIANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY
This chapter compares academic, lay and professional theories 
of deviance and responsibility. The links between these 
theories and judgements of responsibility are explored. It is 
suggested that relationships between these different types of 
theory influence the forms that each ultimately take. In 
particular, the pervasiveness of lay assumptions and styles of 
reasoning is demonstrated.
ACADEMIC THEORIES OF INTOXICATION AND ALCOHOLISM 
Characteristics of academic theories
Could the legal dilemma over intoxicated responsibility be 
resolved by an appeal to the "true facts" of the matter, 
established through academic research into the nature of 
intoxication and addiction? Academic theories seek to 
establish formal principles about the nature of, and 
relationships between, objects and events in the world, 
abstracted from knowledge derived from the application of 
scientific research methods. However, four characteristics of 
academic theories have a critical bearing on this attempt to 
abstract and synthesise from concrete knowledge: the function 
of academic theories; their relationship to cultural beliefs 
and values? academic values? and the influence of academic 
conceptualisations themselves.
1. Function
The academic acquisition of knowledge about social phenomena 
rarely, if ever, reflects the academic pursuit of knowledge as 
an end in itself. Academic theories about social phenomena are 
often purposefully constructed and expressed in order to 
achieve desired goals. Thus, academic theories about 
intoxication and alcoholism seek to influence social policy to 
reflect more closely their wisdoms. Academic alcohol theory,
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in this sense, is not simply an abstraction from factual 
observations, but a purposeful attempt to influence public 
opinion and policy. This does not imply that the sole purpose 
of academic theorising is the self-aggrandisement of the 
theoreticians - an accusation which has frequently been 
levelled at the medical profession in particular (Fingarette 
and Hasse 1979; Heather and Robinson 1985; Kittrie 1971; Peele 
1990; Pfuhl 1980). This accusation implies that academic 
theorists may have cynical regard for their own theories, 
subverting the search for "truth" into the advancement of 
self-interest. Gusfield cautions against such a view.
"It is not that Science is ’reduced' to Rhetoric and 
thus rendered corrupt and useless. It is rather that 
the rhetorical component is unavoidable if the work 
is to have a theoretical or a policy relevance."
(Gusfield 1981, p.107)
Academic theoreticians can influence a lay audience by 
persuasive communication. Five examples of such persuasive 
techniques may be given
a) Appeal to curiosity
Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) point out that lay people are 
avid consumers of academic output, albeit in forms adapted for 
that audience.
"This public is a consumer of discovered scientific 
notions, an assiduous reader of popular magazines or 
books and a passionate follower of scientific news.
Such knowledge is gained from contacts with 
physicians, psychologists and technologists, or 
information is gleaned from politicians' speeches 
about economic and social problems."
(Moscovici and Hewstone 1983, p.108)
b) Appeal to certainty
The authority of scientific explanation lies in its confident 
public expression. The fruits of academic study are presented 
confidently to a lay audience, often stripped of the
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uncertainties recognised by academics themselves. Gusfield 
advises:
"In the effort to persuade skeptical, recalcitrant, 
and indifferent people to a way of action involving 
cost, inconvenience, and displeasure, the appearance 
of certainty is an essential rhetorical device."
(Gusfield 1981, p.79)
Thus, Gusfield explains:
11 [A] s the raw data of knowledge about drinking- 
driving are processed through fictions of scientific 
research, a step is taken to convert ambiguity into 
certainty"
(Gusfield 1981, p.78)
Such a device may convert public ambivalence into harder 
attitudes, favouring a particular view. Moscovici and Hewstone 
remark that "lay people tend to overestimate the certainty and 
consistency of science" (1983, p.113).
c) Appeal to self-interest.
Academic theory may provide perspectives which serve 
individual interests. In particular, theories which have a 
bearing on the attribution of responsibility and blame may 
offer useful defences against harsh judgements. Academic 
theories which explain intoxication as "time out" from 
conventional moral standards of behaviour (Macandrew and 
Edgerton 1969), or alcoholism as "disease" (Jellinek 1960) 
exemplify the potential appeal of academic theories to self- 
interest.
However, it is too simplistic to "blame" academic theories 
entirely for generating the intoxication excuse. Academic 
research does not engage only in transforming common sense 
wisdom, but also in ordering its established stockpile of 
assumptions (Moscovici and Hewstone 1983). The intoxication 
excuse itself springs from the well of lay wisdom about the 
effects of alcohol. Thus, for example, Macandrew and Edgerton
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(1969) developed their "time out” theory of intoxication from 
the accumulation of ethnographic observations of drinking 
behaviour in natural settings. Their academic theory, however, 
developed and legitimised the language for the expression of 
the excuse.
d) Appeal to social conscience
A notable example of this is the success of the disease theory 
of alcoholism in humanising traditionally harsh social 
responses to alcoholics. Despite their criticism of "medical 
imperialism", Heather and Robertson acknowledge, albeit 
perhaps grudgingly:
"[T]here can be no doubt that the effort to have 
alcoholism recognised as a disease has succeeded in 
keeping many alcoholics out of prison and has 
indisputably added to their welfare compared with 
the situation before this effort began."
(Heather and Robinson 1985, p.122)
Once the conceptual connection has been made between 
alcoholism and disease, it is very difficult to sustain 
entirely punitive attitudes towards alcoholics, even though 
complete exoneration of their intoxicated misdeeds is unlikely 
(Critchlow 1985? Orcutt 1976).
e) Appeal to metaphor
Schneider remarks:
"Because physicians represent the dominant healing 
profession in most industrialized societies, they 
have control over the use of the labels ' sickness' , 
‘illness', and 'disease', even if they are sometimes 
unable to treat those conditions effectively."
(Schneider 1978, p.361)
Similarly, Scully and Marolla (1984) attribute the pervasive 
assumption in academic literature that rapists are sick to the 
domination of the field by the psychiatric and medical 
disciplines. Such allegations overlook the appeal of such 
conceptualisations to popular figures of speech and metaphors
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in which "sickness" is invoked to describe the most 
unattractive, distasteful and frightening aspects of social 
life. Wiseman exemplifies the pervasive imagery of sickness.
" [T]o social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists, 
and many sociologists, Skid Row is seen as a prime 
manifestation of social pathology. Like a cancer 
embedded in healthy tissue, Skid Row is viewed as a 
potential danger to an entire city. The physical 
deterioration of the buildings and resultant 
lowering of property values of adjacent areas is but 
one aspect of this threat. The social and 
psychological deterioration of its residents, 
inevitably resulting in added cost to the city for 
police surveillance and humane care, is the other."
(Wiseman 1970, p. 5)
2. Cultural beliefs and attitudes
Academic theories are embedded in the culture in which they 
are formed. Gusfield remarks that it has been, mistakenly, 
"typical of much social and political commentary to conceive 
of scientific work as standing outside the culture and society 
of its time" (1981, p.52).
Heather and Robinson (1985) trace the emergence of disease 
theory in the late 18th century to a period of substantive 
shifts in traditional assumptions about individual free will 
and moral responsibility, generated by the discoveries in the 
developing physical sciences of laws governing events in the 
natural world. Recognition that human behaviour might itself 
be subject to influences beyond the wilful control of the 
individual had consequential implications for attitudes 
towards deviant behaviour such as intoxication and crime. Of 
parallel Canadian developments, Ajzenstadt and Burtch observe:
"The central function of medical discourse in the 
process of shaping public and official attitudes 
towards alcohol consumption is rooted in broad 
transformations and developments in the notions of 
responsibility, causes of criminal and deviant 
behaviors, and relations between the individual and 
society."
(Ajzenstadt and Burtch 1990, p.127)
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Contemporary interest in the application of economic theory to 
human behaviour has led to the emergence of a "rational 
choice" perspective which has guided theoretical developments 
in diverse disciplines such as criminology (Cornish and Clarke
1986), academic alcohol theory (Fingarette 1988), political 
science (McClean 1987) and philosophy (Hollis 1987). 
Economists themselves have extended the range of their 
discipline into the theoretical examination of crime 
(Lattimore and Witte 1986? Phillips and Votey 1981). Becker, 
celebrating the new economic paradigm, asserts that it
"is applicable to all human behaviour, be it 
behaviour involving money prices or imputed shadow 
prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, large or 
minor decisions, emotional or mechanical ends, rich 
or poor persons, men or women, adults or children, 
brilliant or stupid persons, businessmen or 
politicians, teachers or students."
(Becker 1976, p.8)
Academic alcohol theory therefore, derives its conceptual and 
attitudinal framework from the contemporary perspectives of 
the society within which it develops. Furthermore, fundamental 
cultural beliefs and attitudes both shape the interpretation 
of the "facts", and determine the kinds of facts deemed to be 
relevant to an understanding of a phenomenon. Scott argues 
that
"what may appear to be statements of fact from our 
perspective are in reality expressions of core 
values that are woven into the basic assumptive 
world of our culture."
(Scott 1970, p.269)
For example, Moscovici and Hewstone argue that the human 
tendency to attribute the causes of events to people rather 
than to situational influences derives from "a dominant 
cultural representation tainted by individualism" (1983, 
p.120). Thus, Gusfield (1981) observes that research into 
driving accidents has been guided by the basic assumption that
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driving accidents are caused by incompetent drivers, rather 
than by unsafe cars or roads. He argues:
"such foci are not results of external, objective 
realities in any direct, compelling fashion but are 
deeply influenced by the social and cultural 
organization by which attention is directed down 
some avenues and away from others."
(Gusfield 1981, p.31)
Gusfield suggests the research emphasis is not simply due to 
an avaricious transport industry keen to evade responsibility 
for its costly failings, but reflects prevalent social beliefs 
about the causes of accidents. So guided, research collects 
data supportive to the underlying assumptions, whilst failing 
to perceive the relevance of alternative data to a different 
conceptual approach.
"Given a cognitive framework, certain data appear 
relevant while other material is implicitly ignored 
as irrelevant. Even the 'fact' of choice is not a 
matter of consciousness since the selectors are not 
aware of alternatives. The process is experienced as 
normal, natural, and self-evident. The factual world 
appears as unproblematic, certain, and devoid of 
ambiguity."
(Gusfield 1981, p.52)
Pernanen (1982) suggests that the finding of a rate of 
alcohol-involved homicides in Finland almost twice as high as 
that in Canada, could reflect more intensive documentation of 
alcohol involvement in Finland, springing from particular 
cultural beliefs and attitudes concerning alcohol.
Thus, developments in academic theory may both reflect and 
stimulate changes in broader belief systems, forging a 
reciprocal relationship between academic and lay thinking. In 
this sense, academic theory evolves in a dynamic relationship 
to shifts in cultural conceptualisations about the nature of 
social phenomena. Its assertions are not static statements of 
a fixed, objective "truth". Academic conceptualisations of
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criminal responsibility have evolved within the basic 
conceptual and attitudinal premises of the society in which 
they are formulated.
"Responsibility will never be perfectly 
conceptualised or understood. However, its 
significance in the analysis of crime lies in the 
very fact that it is a relative matter. It is an 
ever changing formula. Crime does not change, but 
responsibility does.”
(Schafer 1968, p.139)
Academic theories may themselves be founded on unquestioned 
common sense assumptions. Two examples may be given:-
a) The single cause assumption
This has been described as "the malevolence assumption", or 
the "tendency to see alcohol as blameworthy whenever it 
accompanies problematic behavior" (Hamilton and Collins 1982, 
p.254). The single cause assumption leads to neglect of the 
variable effects of alcohol itself, and of the multiplicity of 
situational factors influencing a single event. The discovery 
of alcohol involvement is assumed to provide a sufficient 
explanation of phenomena as diverse as traffic accidents 
(Gusfield 1981; Jacobs 1989) and domestic violence (Hamilton 
and Collins 1982). This assumption has encouraged theorists to 
postulate causative mechanisms directly linking alcohol to 
crime.
Such efforts derive ultimately from the intuitive 
"obviousness" of alcohol as an explanation for problematic 
behaviour. Other findings of strong associations between 
particular situational features and events have not inspired 
causal theoretical explanations because they do not appeal to 
common sense as plausible causal reasons for those outcomes. 
For example, the observation that the majority of homicides 
occur in the presence of onlookers (Luckenbill 1977) has not 
precipitated an extensive search in academic criminology for 
a causal link between audiences and homicide, despite evidence
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from psychological experiments that audience presence has a 
significant effect on individual behaviour (Nisbett and Wilson 
1977).
b) The assumption of social rejection
Academic theories have frequently sought to explain deviant 
lifestyles in terms of rejection from normal society, rather 
than of attraction to deviance, apparently on the assumption 
that no-one would willingly enter existences which to the 
outsider are characterised by filth, poverty, misery and 
danger. Thus, Wiseman observes that
"residence on Skid Row is seen as resulting from the 
'push' of adverse conditions, whether economic, 
social or psychological, rather than any great 
'puli' of attractiveness to the unattached man."
(Wiseman 1970, p.14)
Wallace similarly argues that the appropriate analysis of 
recruitment into skid row should concentrate on perception of 
the life-style as an option, participation in it, and 
consequent development of conformity to its ways. To the non­
participant, such unforced entry into an abhorrent life-style 
may appear simply inconceivable.
"To the non-skid rower, the process appears to 
involve ever-increasing isolation from the larger 
society accompanied by ever-increasing deviance from 
its norms. From the point of view of the skid rower, 
on the other hand, the process is one of increasing 
participation in the life of the skid row community, 
and is accompanied by increasing conformity to its 
norms."
(Wallace 1965, p.164)
3• Academic values
Academic theory and research may be directed by fundamental 
values of the academic discipline. For example, Jacobs (1989) 
attributes the dearth of scholarly interest in drunk driving 
to the lack of affinity between the subject matter and 
traditional criminological interests. Intoxicated drivers do
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not conform to psychological notions of criminals as motivated 
by special personality characteristics. Nor do they appeal to 
sociological emphasis on class divisions in the production and 
treatment of crime. Furthermore, politically,
Mdrunk driving does not make a critical case for 
liberal or conservative criminologists. It does not 
further either the liberal explanation of crime as 
a consequence of maldistribution of wealth, poverty, 
and unemployment or the neoconservative explanation 
of crime as rational economic behavior. Even 
traditional conservatives who believe that the root 
cause of crime is moral dissoluteness might find 
drunk driving troubling because of societal 
ambivalence toward alcohol and alcohol problems.”
(Jacobs 1989, p.xxi)
Lack of academic interest in drunk driving has led to failure 
to integrate research evidence of the extent of alcoholism 
among drunk drivers (Jacobs 1989? Stephan 1989) with the 
larger body of theory about the relationship between alcohol 
and crime. Theorists have neglected this evidence, partly 
through lack of interest in drunk driving and partly perhaps 
through recognition that alcoholic drivers evoke little public 
sympathy, or, therefore, support for the provision of 
treatment facilities for intoxicated offenders generally. 
Indeed, such evidence might stimulate demands for punishment, 
on the lines of Denney*s assertion that "[t]here is no doubt 
that the continual carnage on the roads that is directly 
attributable to the drinking driver well justifies tougher 
laws and stronger enforcement" (1986, p.125).
4. Academic conceptualisations
Academic conceptualisations themselves influence the direction 
which research takes. For example, Miller and Welte (1986) and 
Pernanen (1982) criticise the emphasis on violent offences in 
theoretical explanations of intoxicated crime. In the study of 
the effects of alcohol on behaviour, this emphasis has 
encouraged concentration on the measurement of aggression 
(Pernanen 1982), with relative neglect of nonpharmacological
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considerations such as the social context of alcohol use 
(Miller and Welte 1986) .
Academic conceptualisations also influence the interpretation 
of research. Four examples may be given, of which disease 
theory provides three:-
a) Disease theory's assertion that loss of control over 
drinking is a defining characteristic of alcoholism (Jellinek 
1960) has occasionally resulted in a search for "true" 
alcoholics which has excluded many chronic alcohol abusers 
despite blatant evidence of deterioration in their physical 
and psychological functioning. Thus, it has been suggested 
that the phenomenon of group drinking, characterised by the 
sharing of money and drink, signifies a crucial difference 
between skid row drinkers and "true" alcoholics, who would 
find it impossible to exert such self-control in the service 
of group norms (Rubington 1958? Wallace 1965). Despite 
Wallace's insight that "heavy drinking is a product of group 
behavior patterns rather than the result of individual 
cravings for alcohol" (1965, p.184), the opportunity to 
generate an alternative conceptualisation of alcoholism is 
missed. Belief in the loss of control criterion for alcoholism 
dictates that the majority of skid row drinkers are not "true" 
alcoholics.
b) The loss of control assumption also appears in Jackson's 
(1954) analysis of marital relationships involving alcoholic 
husbands. Observing that periods of sobriety recur over the 
course of the husband's alcoholic career, often in direct 
response to the wife's remonstrances, Jackson fails to 
perceive deliberate regulation of drinking, remarking instead: 
"The periods of sobriety also keep her family from facing the 
inability of the husband to control his drinking" (1954, 
p.61). Thus, loss of control is perceived in the face of 
evidence of control. The theoretical conceptualisation of 
alcoholism has diverted attention from the theoretically
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irrelevant fact of cessation of drinking towards the 
theoretically salient fact of resumption.
c) Fajardo (1976) diagnoses wives of alcoholics who tolerate 
their husband*s drinking as having contracted the "twin malady 
of co-alcoholism". Instead of the cumulative psychological 
effects of failure to change their husbands* behaviour, 
Fajardo perceives "a person who shares the attitudinal 
problems of an alcoholic", apparently influenced by the 
connotations of disease with infection and contagion.
d) Medical conceptualisations, whilst not necessarily 
asserting the presence of clinical disease as an explanation 
for phenomena such as alcoholism, nevertheless tend to focus 
either on weaknesses within individual sufferers or on the 
functioning of the health services themselves (Snow, Baker, 
Anderson and Martin 1986). Thus, the "medicalisation of 
homelessness" is alleged to have resulted in a neglect of 
structural socio-economic factors which bear on homelesness, 
and an exaggeration of the prevalence of mental illness among 
the homeless (Snow, Baker, Anderson and Martin 1986). Mental 
illness is perceived in behaviours which might more 
appropriately be viewed as adaptations to abnormal social 
circumstances or reactions to physiological deprivation (Snow, 
Baker and Anderson 1988).
Academic theories and decision making
Academic theories point to the principles for making 
judgements about abstract problems, such as how criminal 
responsibility should be determined. However, academic 
theory*s application to legal judgements of criminal 
responsibility is problematic for four reasons: its
complexity; conflict between alcohol theorists; legal 
resistance; and non-academic motivations for distortion.
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1. Complexity of alcohol theory
There are three basic approaches to academic theorising on 
intoxication and alcoholism: physiological theories concerning 
the pharmacological properties of alcohol and their effects on 
the brain and nervous system; psychological theories 
emphasising the personality structure and beliefs about 
alcohol of the individual drinker; and situational theories, 
emphasising the physical and social environment in which 
drinking occurs. However, the current academic consensus is 
that "the truth" lies in complex interrelationships between 
these different aspects of drinking behaviour (Adesso 1985; 
Barrett 1985; Blum 1982; Galizio and Maisto 1985; Lang 1981; 
McCarthy 1985; Sher 1987; Zinberg 1984).
"Alcohol consumption results in a complex 
physiologic state that interacts with a number of 
individual difference variables and the social 
context to create a relatively unique, situationally 
specific phenomenological experience"
(Sher 1987, p.231)
Such complex theorising about the nature of alcohol's effects 
makes an appeal to the authority of academic alcohol theory 
problematic. To suggest that individuals may react variably to 
the effects of alcohol in different situations, and 
differently from other individuals in the same situation, 
implies that general laws predicting alcohol's effects on the 
human mind and will may not be available to guide the 
attribution of individual criminal responsibility.
2. Conflict between alcohol theorists
Alcohol theorists dispute "the truth" about alcohol's effects. 
Two examples may be given
a) Disease theory
In a recent special issue of International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 
devoted to the intoxication excuse, Fingarette (1990a) 
declares that scientific research has established 
unequivocally that intoxication cannot excuse criminal
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behaviour. Fingarette regards continuing legal confusion, and 
defendants' persistent invocation of the intoxication excuse, 
as a product of the time lag between the scientific 
establishment of the "facts" and their absorption by the 
general public.
"[S]cience has now rendered invalid all the familiar 
lines of excusatory arguments based on alcoholism. 
Scientific specialists in the field are of course 
aware of this. Unfortunately, however, most people, 
including most law professionals, are still unaware 
of it."
(Fingarette 1990a , p.77)
Within the same journal, Lehman (1990) attacks this view, 
defending the particular variant of disease theory adopted by 
Alcoholics Anonymous. Lehman criticises academic theories 
which regard alcohol abuse as essentially rational behaviour, 
arguing that they support a damaging misconceptualisation of 
responsibility.
"[T]he misunderstandings about responsibility that 
Fingarette's work betrays, often cause those who 
share them to drink and take drugs. People drink and 
drug themselves because their lives are painful.
They are hurt because they try to live their lives 
according to ideas of self regulation that are 
derived from Western theory, but that do not fit our 
nature as human beings. For the resulting pain, 
alcohol is a sovereign remedy. So, the concepts that 
fail as a framework for understanding alcoholism are 
the same that guide so many to that life of psychic 
misery which fosters alcoholism, drug abuse, teenage 
suicide, compulsive overeating? all the destructive 
disorders of the modern self."
(Lehman 1990, p.106)
Fingarette (1990b) replies with equal ferocity, remarking on 
the vehemence of Lehman's attack:
"For scholars such as myself, who came to this study 
in the course of scholarly inquiry, and who have no 
background of alcoholism personally or in the 
family, the fierce emotions and reactions aroused 
were initially surprising and disturbing.
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Eventually, one becomes accustomed to the situation, 
but never with sang froid."
(Fingarette 1990b, p.125)
Disease theory continues to attract academic adherents. 
Alcoholism has recently been defined as "an exciting, 
fascinating disease" (Vaillant 1980, p.15), "an incurable 
illness and disease" (Denzin 1987, p.31), and "a disorder that 
can be defined in clinical terms and requires a proper regime 
of treatment" (Kessel and Walton 1989, p.2).
b) Disinhibition
The belief that alcohol causes disinhibition of behaviour from 
conventional moral standards has been challenged for several 
years by ethnographers (Macandrew and Edgerton 1969). More 
recently, Woods (1981) , reviewing pharmacological research and 
theory, could identify no contemporary pharmacologist who 
believes that alcohol elicits disinhibited behaviour. 
Nevertheless, Felker (1989), discussing the legal attribution 
of responsibility is prepared to conclude that alcohol 
contributes directly to crime through its disinhibiting 
effects. Kessel and Walton assert that
"groups of people have had their passions so 
inflamed by alcohol that they carried out cruel, 
senseless, irrevocable actions from which, if the 
highest mental processes were functioning intact, 
each individual would recoil with disgust."
(Kessel and Walton 1989, p.11)
3. Legal resistance
Disease theory is a notable example of an academic theory 
which has influenced legal discourse. Holding that alcoholic 
drinking is involuntary conduct because of the loss of control 
over drinking brought about by the condition of alcoholism, 
disease theory has profound implications for the attribution 
of criminal responsibility to alcoholics (Kittrie 1971; 
Mitchell 1990). Where the law has accepted this theory of 
alcoholism, it has nevertheless resisted the implication that
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evidence of alcoholism should procure a defendant's acquittal. 
Mitchell (1990) observes that one means of achieving this has 
been to argue that alcoholism is irrelevant to the legal 
determination of criminal responsibility. According to this 
argument, whether or not intoxication is involuntary is
immaterial, because the offending behaviour itself must be 
voluntary. For example, an individual may be compelled to 
drink, but he is not compelled to drive in his intoxicated 
condition.
Mackay (1990) notes a different strategy, employed by the 
Court of Appeal. The Court allowed that alcoholic inability to 
abstain would constitute a defence of diminished 
responsibility. However, by requiring proof that the first 
drink in the sequence leading to the intoxicated offence was 
itself taken involuntarily, it ensured that such a defence was 
virtually unachievable. Thus, the law is not a passive
recipient of the authority of academic alcohol theory, but
preserves its own purpose of sanctioning misconduct when
applying that theory to legal decisions.
4. Non-academic motivations for distortion
Mitchell (1988) argues that alcohol theorists themselves are 
responsible for the failure of lawyers to catch up with 
contemporary alcohol theory. In his view, experts offer 
distorted representations of research findings in order to 
fulfil aims beyond the pursuit of truth.
"Medical witnesses deny intent not from ignorance or 
misperception of legal definitions but in order to 
achieve certain results. Those results include 
diverting offenders to treatment, increasing 
psychiatric funding, publicizing therapeutic ideals, 
and opposing retributionist practices. The duplicity 
here is evidenced when rehabilitationists use the 
ordinary, criminal law standards of responsibility 
to hold their own clients accountable for behavior. 
Intent is only denied in a retributive context."
(Mitchell 1988, p.100)
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Reviewing legal cases involving the intoxication excuse, 
Mitchell "could find no genuine case where intoxication caused 
an automatic or involuntary act”, but several in which "odd, 
intoxicated behaviour was incorrectly alleged to be 
irrational, motiveless, and thus involuntary" (1988, p.94). 
That lawyers choose not to perceive this obvious fact about 
their own cases, must, he argues, be due to more than simple 
deference to the authority of another academic discipline. He 
offers three reasons for judicial tolerance of the 
intoxication excuse. A successful intoxication defence to a 
charge of murder, by reducing it to manslaughter, opens up the 
range of discretionary determinate sentences from the 
otherwise mandatory life sentence. Judges are attracted to 
this opportunity to maintain their sentencing discretion. 
Additionally, some judges adhere to a therapeutic ideology of 
legal practice. Furthermore, production of misleading 
testimony by defence lawyers is encouraged by the incentive to 
win their case.
Lawyers' preoccupation with the tension between the public 
interest and the rights of defendants to have their mental 
state taken into account, and alcohol theorists' preoccupation 
with disputed interpretations of research findings, have made 
both vulnerable to distortion in the pursuit of their separate 
objectives. When lawyers and alcohol theorists meet in the 
adjudication of criminal responsibility, these objectives are 
pursued through a dialogue which resorts, not to the academic 
wisdoms of either discipline, but to an appeal to common sense 
assumptions about the effects of alcohol, despite potent 
arguments from both camps that intoxication is not a valid 
excuse for criminal conduct.
"But by now it is no news that both of these 
approaches, the medical and the legal, however 
inspired, can in practice disregard human dignity 
when ignorance, social prejudice, well-intentioned 
dogma, lack of funding, or routinization take over."
(Fingarette and Hasse 1979, p.193)
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A return to common sense?
Medical conceptualisations of alcoholism have been 
significantly instrumental in humanising a traditionally 
punitive approach to drinking problems (Ajzenstadt and Burtch 
1990; Heather and Robinson 1985). Nevertheless, they have been 
the target of sustained criticism from academics themselves 
that they serve the interests of those who promulgate them by 
misleading the public. Fingarette alleges;
"The public currently has good reason to believe 
(though mistakenly) that alcoholics drink 
uncontrollably. Physicians and health professionals 
of all kinds, public service groups, treatment 
centers, government officials - in short many kinds 
of seeming authorities - have for years been 
barraging the public with pronouncements to the 
effect that alcoholism is a disease, and that 
alcoholics are helpless victims of a compulsion to 
drink."
(Fingarette 1990a, p.82)
The promulgation of such theories is alleged to mislead 
alcoholics themselves, diminishing their capacity for 
improvement. Roman and Trice, whilst accepting disease theory, 
nevertheless question its "double-bind" effect of consigning 
the alcoholic to a passive sick role which absolves him of 
responsibility for his condition, but simultaneously requires 
him actively to seek treatment and to stop drinking.
"The expectations surrounding these sick roles serve 
to further develop, legitimise, and in some cases 
even perpetuate the abnormal use of alcohol."
(Roman and Trice 1968, p.245)
Objections to medical conceptualisations of alcoholism 
continue (Faulkner, Sandage and Maguire 1988? Fingarette and 
Hasse 1979? Heather and Robinson 1985; Nusbaumer 1983). More 
generally, critics complain that theories of deviant behaviour 
which imply reduced responsibility on the part of the deviant, 
provide the public with ready-made excuses for their 
transgressions. Thus, Peele claims that "trying to assess the 
combination of motives that drives people to commit crimes
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serves primarily to invite the more resourceful criminals to 
present the most saleable excuses for their misbehavior" 
(1990, p.96). Similarly, Mitchell suggests that legal doctrine 
on intoxicated crime feeds the public with "a false picture 
of the intoxicated offender as wild, dangerous, unconscious, 
or out of control' (1988, p.87), promoting belief in the 
excusability of intoxicated misconduct.
Discontent with the results of applying academic theory to the 
intoxication excuse has led several academics to appeal for a 
return to common sense.
"The message in all this is that one of the best 
antidotes to addiction is to teach children 
responsibility and respect for others and to insist 
on ethical standards for everyone - children, 
adults, addicts."
(Peele 1990, p.100)
Shiner (1990) argues that lawyers have worked themselves into 
an impossible position over the intoxication excuse, by 
committing the basic philosophical error of regarding the 
human mind and body as distinct entities. They have 
consequently concluded that the state of a person1s mind 
cannot be inferred from his actions. Such philosophical 
naivete ignores common sense, which recognises that 
intentionality is directly demonstrated through visible 
action. Thus, of an attacker or someone brandishing a rifle, 
"(w)e know he is acting intentionally, because to act in that 
way ju s t is to assault or brandish, and to assault or brandish ju s t 
is to assault or brandish intentionally" (Shiner 1990, p.19). 
Therefore, in judging criminal responsibility, one has only to 
imagine oneself a witness at the scene of the crime and to 
consider how one would distinguish intentional from 
unintentional behaviour: "Easy" (Shiner 1990) .
Fingarette and Hasse eloquently defend common sense.
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"There is, unfortunately, no single, simple sign or 
label that identifies the condition at issue here.
Only a review of the defendants history, conduct, 
physical health, and general demeanour can provide 
an adequate picture. This is not a picture that can 
be read off with scientific precision, or even with 
science at all, though scientific data may be of 
help. It is a picture that can only be assembled and 
assessed from the perspective of practical lay 
judgement, the judgement of ordinary people who know 
how to get along in life taking practical account, 
as they go, of the bearing of law on their conduct.
The test they apply to the defendant is a test they 
themselves pass every day of their lives: Is the 
defendant, as portrayed up to the moment of the 
offending act, and in the circumstances of that act, 
on the whole able to take into account in a 
practical way, in acting as he does, the criminal 
significance of his act?"
(Fingarette and Hasse 1979, p.193)
LAY THEORIES OF DEVIANCE AND JUSTICE 
Characteristics of lay theories
Lay theories are the common sense notions of the non-expert 
about the nature of, and relations between, objects and events 
in the world. The academic study of lay theories, however, has 
itself suffered from misconceptions about what, and how, lay 
people think about social phenomena. Two such "common sense 
theories about common sense theories" have particularly 
underpinned much of the academic study of lay beliefs and 
attitudes:-
a) "Lay theories are simple theories."
Thus, for example, by offering restricted choices of answers, 
research into lay theories of crime causation, alcoholism and 
insanity can produce the impression that lay explanations of 
these phenomena are simplistic, compared to academic multi- 
causal theories (Finkel and Handel 1989? Furnham 1988; Semin 
and Manstead 1983). More sensitive research techniques reveal 
complexity and subtlety in lay conceptualisations. For 
example, using a case vignette methodology, lay subjects have 
demonstrated the capacity to discriminate finely between 
insanity and personality disorder. Lay diagnoses of insanity
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are parsimonious rather than grossly inclusive of unusual 
behaviours or mental processes (Finkel and Handel 1989; 
Roberts, Golding and Fincham 1987). Furthermore, lay 
conceptualisations of insanity are not rigid, but "flexible, 
shifting in relevance and determinativeness from case to case, 
rather than remaining constant" (Finkel and Handel 1989, 
p.55) .
b) "Lay beliefs are straightforwardly related to lay 
attitudes."
Thus, for example, lay attitudes towards alcoholics have been 
assumed to be either simply moralistic (alcoholics are bad) or 
medical (alcoholics are sick) (Furnham 1988). Studies, 
however, reveal that people frequently hold ambivalent 
attitudes, subscribing in part to both moralistic and medical 
views. Further, a particular conceptualisation of alcoholism 
does not clearly predict attitudes towards alcoholics (Furnham 
1988; Heather and Robertson 1985). Such ambivalence has 
sometimes been explained as a phenomenon of the transition 
between traditional moralistic beliefs and full absorption by 
the public of contemporary medical conceptualisations (Orcutt 
1976). This hypothesis apparently assumes that lay people 
strive to avoid the discomfort of conflicting ideas and 
attitudes and to achieve the comfortable certainty of 
simplicity. As will be seen, however, research suggests that 
lay people tolerate considerable conflict between their 
theories, and between their beliefs and attitudes with 
equanimity.
With these cautions about the shortcomings of some research 
into lay theories stated, it is nevertheless possible to draw 
from the available literature five characteristics of lay 
theories; their function; ignorance; contradiction; 
complexity; indeterminateness.
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1• Function
By enabling people to form judgements about cause and effect 
relationships, lay theories provide a conceptual framework for* 
attributing responsibility (Furnham 1988). Thus, lay theories 
provide basic premises for making moral judgements, by 
defining whether an outcome is to be attributed to forces in 
the environment or to the will of individual actors (Berglas
1987), and by distinguishing conditions for making intuitive 
judgements of fairness, blameworthiness and praiseworthiness 
(Furnham 1988; Meehl 1977). Thus, McHugh (1970) suggests that 
common sense attributions of responsibility are based on a 
behaviour*s occurrence in a situation where alternative 
actions are apparently available, and the actor*s knowledge of 
those alternatives.
Lay theories also serve specific individual interests. Furnham 
argues that:
"people do not hold beliefs for simple rational, 
logical and dispassionate reasons. Theories nearly 
always serve a function, such as to bolster or 
maintain self-esteem, to ensure group solidarity, to 
provide a social or moral framework through which to 
comprehend new facts. Lay theorists, then, appear to 
be much more psychological than logical in nature."
(Furnham 1988, p.208)
Suggested functions of responsibility attributions have 
included needs to experience control over the physical and 
social world (Hewstone 1983), to believe in a just world, and 
to defend oneself against blame (Fitzmaurice and Pease 1986; 
Furnham 1988; Shaver 1985). However, this concentration on 
individual motivations neglects an important social function 
of lay theory. The expression and exchange of common sense 
wisdom provides a vehicle for the transmission of cultural 
values and beliefs. Critics of the individual focus of 
attribution research point out that judgements of 
responsibility are essentially social, collective processes 
(Harre 1981; Hewstone 1983; Tajfel and Forgas 1981; Semin and 
Manstead 1983). Semin and Manstead remark that "the central
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medium through which the accountability of conduct takes place 
is ta lk" (1983, p.19).
2. Ignorance
Lay theories about social phenomena often appear ignorant 
despite considerable exposure to their manifestations. For 
example, Furnham comments:
"As the drinking of alcohol in nearly all societies 
is, and has been, a frequent occurrence, people are 
very familiar with the consequences of alcoholism. 
However, they remain surprisingly ignorant about the 
effects of alcohol and the causes of, or cures for, 
alcoholism."
(Furnham 1988, p.79)
The persistence of erroneous beliefs about distant phenomena 
is not altogether surprising, since the believer may simply 
lack an opportunity for disconfirmation (Crocker, Fiske and 
Taylor 1984? Tajfel and Forgas 1981). However, the persistence 
of erroneous beliefs about common experiences appears 
counterproductive. It seems reasonable to expect an erroneous 
belief to be corrected in the light of experience. Crocker, 
Fiske and Taylor (1984) suggest that lay theories are 
constructed in ways which make them difficult to challenge 
through experience. For example, beliefs about mental illness 
may be nonspecific about what a mentally ill person should or 
should not do in any particular situation. In this sense, 
theories may not be "logically disconfirmable", since they are 
ill-defined as to what constitutes, and what does not 
constitute, an example of the theory (Crocker, Fiske and 
Taylor 1984).
An example of a theory's protection from disconfirmation 
arises in Murphy's (1986) observation that store detectives 
select suspects on the basis of notions about how an honest 
shopper would look and behave. Given the prevalence of 
shoplifting, store detectives may have their theories 
repeatedly confirmed, since "targeting on one specific group,
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however selected, is likely to prove 'successful1, and a self- 
fulfilling prophecy is established" (Murphy 1986, p.147).
Most lay people appear to think that the sentences passed in 
the courts are too lenient, yet when asked about specific 
examples of crime, they favour sentences which are broadly in 
line with, or sometimes less harsh than current sentencing 
practice (Hough and Mayhew 1983; Hough, Moxon and Lewis 1987; 
Stalans and Diamond 1990). Plausible explanations for this 
discrepancy point to public ignorance about crime and criminal 
justice. Stalans and Diamond (1990) observe that most lay 
people assume that offences are usually much more serious than 
they actually are; for example, that burglars carry weapons 
and vandalise property. Thus, when asked general questions 
about crime and sentencing, people think of offences which are 
atypical of those usually passing through the courts. 
Similarly, Roberts, Golding and Fincham (1987) suggest that 
public belief that the insanity defence constitutes an 
unwarranted loophole in the criminal law, is linked to a 
significant overestimation of its use and success, and 
misunderstanding of the consequences for the defendant of an 
insanity acquittal. Stalans and Diamond (1990) suggest that it 
is necessary to understand not only what lay people think, but 
how they come to think it.
"The failure to come to grips with the way people 
think about the law can result in considerable 
distortions in the conclusions we reach about what 
they think."
(Sarat 1977, p.455)
Erroneous lay beliefs about the consequences of punishment may 
profoundly influence public policy, uncorrected by academic 
knowledge. For example, Ross (1975) remarks that the 
"Scandinavian myth" that harsh punishments for drinking and 
driving are an effective deterrent has led to the adoption of 
draconian laws in other countries despite lack of supportive
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evidence. Ross suggests that it is more appropriate to see 
deterrence as stemming from deep-rooted cultural attitudes.
3• Contradiction
Furnham observes:
”A logical analysis of lay theories often reveals 
them to be fairly inconsistent in the sense that 
antonymous presuppositions are simultaneously held 
by people who may be unaware of, or simply not 
concerned by, contradiction.1
(Furnham 1988, p.208)
For example, Marsh and Campbell (1979) studied pub licensees, 
who almost unanimously blamed alcohol as a major cause of 
disturbances on their premises. They also frequently claimed 
to be able to identify troublemakers "coming through the 
door". The belief that likelihood of troublemaking was based 
on visible attributes, such as race, contradicted the belief 
in alcohol itself as the real cause of violence. Furthermore, 
licensees were aware that their often considerable personal 
consumption of alcohol did not cause violence in themselves.
4• Complexity
The complexity of lay theories is seen in their relationships 
to culture, individual differences and specific situations.
a) Culture
Lay theories are derived from cultural beliefs, modified by 
individual experience. Thus, Swidler defines culture as
"a *tool kit* of symbols, stories, rituals and 
world-views, which people may use in varying 
configurations to solve different kinds of 
problems."
(Swidler 1986, p.273)
Culture thus provides basic premises for beliefs about cause, 
effect, responsibility and morality (Forgas 1981b? Harre 1981; 
Moscovici and Hewstone 1983? Semin and Manstead 1983? Tajfel
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and Forgas 1981). The pervasiveness of these cultural 
foundations has already been seen in their influence on 
academic theory.
Sanders and Hamilton (1987) found that cultural differences in 
the attribution of responsibility for wrongdoing reflected 
broad cultural differences in social structure and attitudes. 
Thus, American concern with attributes of the criminal and the 
criminal act, contrasts with Japanese interest in the role 
relationships between offender and victim. Sanders and 
Hamilton conclude that "the rules of retributive justice may 
have deep seated, widely shared cultural roots" (1981, p.291).
b) Individual differences
Furnham argues that culture alone cannot explain how different 
lay theories come to be held by different individuals within 
the same society. For this it is necessary "to establish which 
socialisation experiences and maturational processes 
contribute to the establishment of which specific, stable 
beliefs about human behaviour." (Furnham 1988, p.8) . Different 
lay theories may derive from differences in individuals' 
relationships to a phenomenon. Thus, for example, Furnham 
suggests possible distinctions between lay theories about 
addiction, based on the quality of direct or indirect 
experience with the phenomenon: theories held by non-addicted 
lay people, by addicts and by professionals without specific 
theoretical training.
Differences between the theories of individuals within a 
single culture are not fully understood. For example, Sanders 
and Hamilton (1987) found no support for the common sense 
belief in systematic demographic differences in the ways 
people attribute responsibility. However, Hough, Moxon and 
Lewis (1987) found differences in punitiveness according to 
age, education, and rural or inner city residence.
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Different political beliefs appear to be linked to different 
explanations of crime, with Conservatives favouring 
individualistic theories, while Labour voters prefer societal 
explanations (Furnham and Henderson 1983). However, although 
it seems intuitively reasonable to assume that beliefs about 
justice are derived from broader beliefs and attitudes such as 
political ideology (Furnham 1988; Stalans and Diamond 1990), 
such relationships between belief systems are not obvious 
beyond the level of broad divisions (Furnham 1988). For 
example, belief in free will does not necessarily result in 
greater punitiveness than belief in determinism, despite its 
implications for responsibility judgements (Viney, Waldman and 
Barchilon 1982).
Personality differences may influence beliefs about 
responsibility to a limited extent. Carroll and Payne (1976) 
found that individuals who tended to perceive the locus of 
control for behaviour as internal to the actor based 
inferences about responsibility for a crime primarily on 
information about the offence and offender. Individuals who 
tended to locate the locus of control for behaviour in 
external forces were more concerned with information about the 
offender's environment. However, these emphases did not amount 
to strong differences. Ryckman, Burns and Robbins (1986) found 
that authoritarianism was not consistently associated with 
support for harsher punishment.
c) Situational specificity
Lay theories may be flexible belief systems, influenced by the 
perception of specific situations. Roizen (1981) reports 
survey data suggesting that people may hold general, and 
apparently contradictory beliefs that alcohol causes feelings 
of aggression, romance, friendliness and sleepiness, but 
rarely claim that alcohol produces any one of those feelings 
on each drinking occasion.
"In this observation would seem a nice demonstration
that alcohol is not linked to its various effects in
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lockstep fashion in popular opinion but is instead 
regarded very much as a matter of the 
particularities of the drinking event. That most of 
us might agree that alcohol may help us to be 
friendly does not, then imply about common opinion 
that alcohol always or even usually will have this 
effect.”
(Roizen 1981, p.241)
Similarly, lay theories of crime appear to vary according to 
perceptions of individual offenders and offences (Furnham 
1988? Furnham and Henderson 1983).
5. Indeterminateness
Lay theories of crime and justice provide a framework for 
deciding upon responsibility and punishment. However, general 
beliefs about crime causation and the purposes of punishment 
do not straightforwardly prescribe action in specific 
instances. In order to achieve this connection, information 
about specific offences and offenders must be reconciled with 
the general belief system (Asquith 1977? Hogarth 1971). Their 
compatability, however, is not always obvious.
Firstly, lay beliefs about criminal responsibility do not 
necessarily equate with beliefs about guilt and 
blameworthiness, nor do they link to beliefs about punishment 
in obvious and direct ways. For example, although most lay 
people believe that mental illness reduces rationality and 
criminal responsibility, they are ambivalent as to whether 
guilt, blameworthiness and punishment are inconsistent with 
such reduced competencies (Roberts, Golding and Fincham 1987).
"Theoretically, Anglo-American jurisprudence grants 
mercy and affords at least minimal treatment to the 
insane defendant rather than assigning punishment. 
Society remains uncomfortable with the idea of mercy 
and genuine exculpation for insane defendants, 
however, and expresses explicitly a desire for 
retribution."
(Roberts, Golding and Fincham 1987, p.225)
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Similarly, Critchlow (1985) found that although intoxication 
softened judgements of cause, responsibility and blame for 
wrongdoing, suggested punishment was not affected. Critchlow 
suggests that people hold a “strict liability" view of 
punishment which prescribes equal punishment despite 
diminished responsibility.
However, such judgements may themselves be influenced by the 
conceptual forms available. Roberts, Golding and Fincham 
(1987) found that, despite evidence of the capacity of lay 
people to discriminate finely and appropriately between 
insanity and personality disorder, the provision of a broad 
diagnostic category of "guilty but mentally ill" led to shifts 
in judgements in favour of this category. The authors argue 
that the provision of an ambiguous category reduces the 
clarity of judgement. Further, whilst the ambiguous category 
of guilty but mentally ill "satisfies the retributive 
component it also assuages the conscience of the potential 
juror by appearing to promise some sort of special treatment" 
(Roberts, Golding and Fincham 1987, p.226).
Secondly, when people talk about the causes of crime, they 
stress social conditions and distal causes such as 
unemployment, poverty and addiction (Furnham 1988; Furnham and 
Henderson 1983). However, when people act on crime, they 
engage in self-protection from victimisation.
"People appear to operate with two disparate sets of 
theories - those about the causes of crime and those 
about the prevention of victimisation."
(Furnham 1988, p.169)
Belief about an issue is not necessarily an obvious indicator 
of the emotional feeling which it arouses. Public fear of 
crime often appears to be exaggerated in relation to the real 
chances of victimisation (Hough and Mayhew 1985). However, 
Furnham (1988) observes that fear of victimisation is not a 
necessary consequence of the belief that one's personal chance
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of becoming a victim is high. Other feelings such as fatalism 
or personal control may reduce anxiety. Equally, belief that 
one's personal chance of victimisation is remote is not a 
guarantee of low anxiety, since contemplation of the offence 
may evoke feelings of abhorrence or defencelessness.
Nevertheless, concurrent belief that one has a high chance of 
victimisation and anxiety about the prospect do not 
necessarily produce self-protective behaviour. For example, 
Lejeune and Alex (1973) suggest that fear and anticipation of 
being mugged are insufficient in themselves to overcome 
powerful cultural expectations of the "street-role" of 
citizens, which do not include alertness to the possibility of 
imminent attack by strangers.
Thirdly, as suggested in Chapter One, lay judgements of 
responsibility are influenced by anticipation of their 
consequences. Thus, harsh mandatory sentences for particular 
crimes, such as the death penalty for murder, deters juries 
from convicting defendants (Carroll and Payne 1977).
Complex interrelationships between different sets of beliefs 
and attitudes, compounded by situationally specific 
perceptions, render the behavioural outcome of judgement 
indeterminate. Thus, Palys and Divorski criticise the "black 
box" approach to sentencing research, in which the "empirical 
focus is solely on the relationship between 1 inputs' (i.e. 
offence, offender, and contextual variables) and 'outputs' 
(i.e. sentencing outcomes) , while attributes or perceptions of 
the judges themselves are ignored" (1984, p.333).
Some of the foregoing discussion may be illustrated with an 
example of lay theorising about crime. Judge Pickles deplores 
the lack of education of the judiciary in the disciplines of 
sociology, psychology, criminology and penology: "[t]he
English bench as a whole is too ignorant, isolated, and, of 
course, self-satisfied" (1987, p.67). However, he later
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castigates those same disciplines for their own ignorance, 
remarking that "criminologists know more about books and 
statistics than they do about criminals" (Pickles 1987, 
p.135). Despite his self-confessed ignorance, he confidently 
sets out his theories about crime causation, amongst which he 
includes the decline in religious belief, egalitarianism, 
"women's lib" and welfarism. He affirms himself, however, to 
be agnostic, egalitarian, "pro-women's lib" and welfarist. 
These statements illustrate the confidence of lay theories 
despite ignorance, contradiction and complexity in their 
relationships to broader social attitudes and self­
perception. It has been for the Court of Appeal to comment on 
the influences of Judge Pickles' theories on his sentencing 
practice.
Lay theories and decision making
The characteristics of lay theories do not merely demonstrate 
their unreliability for judging responsibility. A more 
appropriate analysis might suggest that lay theories provide 
flexible frameworks for making rapid judgements about complex 
issues, thereby enabling decisions to be taken without undue 
hesitation.
Theories which depict human judgement as an exercise in 
logical, scientific and mathematical reasoning based on the 
rigorous accumulation and assimilation of available 
information (e.g. Kelley 1967) have attracted increasing 
criticism (Abelson 1976? Carroll and Payne 1976; Eiser and Van 
Der Pligt 1988? Hewstone 1983? Ickes and Layden 1978? Jaspars 
1983? Langer 1978; Mandler 1984? Nisbett and Wilson 1977? 
Palmerino, Langer and McGillis 1984? Sillars 1982? Semin and 
Manstead 1983? Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Critics point to 
the fact that "the highly influential views of information- 
processing psychology argue that human rationality is 
seriously limited by biological constraints" (Carroll and 
Weaver 1986, p.20). Some suggest that the support of 
experimental research for a view of human judgement as a
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logical, statistical process is at least in part an artifact 
of research design (Abelson 1976; Carroll and Payne 1976), 
which fails to represent "messy, real-world decisions" 
(Abelson 1976, p.38). In so far as individuals may be capable 
of processing information in such highly rational ways, the 
likelihood of their doing so is inhibited by pressures of 
time, the difficulty of such reasoning processes, and the huge 
amounts of information in the environment which would need to 
be processed to achieve results (Abelson 1976; Hewstone 1983; 
Mandler 1984; Sillars 1982).
Alternative theories of information processing explicitly 
recognise that "people fail to behave consistently with 
normative rationality, but instead make simplifications and 
shortcuts that are reasonable but may produce inferior 
outcomes" (Carroll and Weaver 1986, p.20). Such perspectives 
have stimulated social psychologists to confront "the question 
of whether humans analyse social cues at a ll in their day-to-day 
social interactions" (Hewstone 1983, p.10). The answer has 
increasingly been couched in terms of the "mindlessness of 
ostensibly thoughtful action" (Langer 1978, p.38). The 
consequent theoretical perspective has centred on the learning 
of basic intellectual frameworks for selecting and 
interpreting information in the environment and the 
utilisation of these frameworks to make rapid judgements about 
the nature of specific situations and the appropriate action 
within them. Such frameworks have been called "cognitive 
scripts" (Abelson 1976; Hewstone 1983; Langer 1978) or 
"cognitive schemata" (Crocker, Fiske and Taylor 1984; Eiser 
and Van Der Pligt 1988; Holstein 1976; Mandler 1984; Sillars 
1982). Cognitive scripts or schemata enable individuals to 
ignore substantial quantities of information in the 
environment and yet to respond rapidly, by prescribing basic 
cues for the identification of, and appropriate response to 
specific situations.
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Abelson defines a cognitive script as
"a coherent sequence of events expected by the 
individual, involving him either as a participant or 
as an observer."
(Abelson 1976, p.33)
Abelson suggests that individuals are capable of generating 
"hypothetical scripts". A hypothetical script "abstracts 
critical features of alternative situations, and its 
employment involves reasoning about those features" (Abelson 
1976, p.35).
Similarly, Holstein defines a cognitive schema as
"knowledge about a domain that establishes relations 
between specific events or entities within that 
domain. A schema provides hypotheses about incoming 
stimuli which include plans for interpreting and 
gathering schema-related information."
(Holstein 1985, p.84)
Crocker, Fiske and Taylor explain the advantages of utilising 
cognitive schemata.
"Social schemas are very useful to perceivers: They 
help us to structure, organise, and interpret new 
information? they facilitate encoding, storage, and 
retrieval of relevant information; they can affect 
the time it takes to process information, and the 
speed with which problems can be solved. Schemas 
also serve interpretive and inferential functions."
(Crocker, Fiske and Taylor 1984, p.197)
Judgements based on such scripts may promote insensitivity to 
potentially useful information (Langer 1978). Furthermore, 
once learned, they may be resistant to change, despite 
inaccuracy, because of the stability and order which they 
impose on an otherwise uncertain and complex environment 
(Crocker, Fiske and Taylor 1984). Thus, the dangers of 
reliance on scripts are inefficiency, inaccuracy and the
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temptation to fit reality to the script rather than vice versa 
(Crocker, Fiske and Taylor 1984).
Two implications of this view of human information processing 
are particularly pertinent to this discussion. Firstly, Langer 
argues that such a theoretical perspective explains 
discrepancies between expressed attitudes and overt behaviour.
"To expect people who report beliefs and opinions on 
issues, when made to think about those issues, to
later behave in a manner consistent with those
beliefs and opinions is to assume that they are 
thinking while they are behaving."
(Langer 1978, p.46)
Secondly, the perspective challenges the assumption that 
social phenomena are defined and understood simply by 
acquiring the "facts". Individuals employing different scripts 
will perceive different "facts" as salient to their 
understanding and response to the same social situations
(Eiser and Van Der Pligt 1988). Furthermore, the
interpretation of, and emotional response to similar "facts" 
may differ. An example of the differing social judgements 
which may result is provided in Wiseman's discussion of skid 
row.
"Which view of Skid Row is the 'real one'? Is it a 
pathological area - a dirty, miserable, smelly 
firetrap, peopled by ill, discouraged, and even 
desperate men? Or is it a warm and friendly but 
ragged campus, abounding in opportunities for 
socializing, camaraderie, making deals, playing 
games, and getting by?"
(Wiseman 1970, p.43)
Wiseman suggests that there may, after all, be no single 
"truth", but that "the change in appearance and meaning is the 
result of the application of different frames of mental 
reference to the same phenomena" (1970, p.43). Even the same 
individual may utilise alternative "frames of mental 
reference" at different times, as when skid row men, after a
59
period in an institution, perceive it, for a time, through the 
eyes of the non-participant outsider (Wiseman 1970).
The relevance of this perspective to an analysis of lay 
theories lies in the similarities apparent between cognitive 
scripts and lay theories. Both may appear ignorant of "facts", 
be contradictory, and bear complex relationships to the 
perception of self and social situations. Both provide basic 
premises for the interpretation of and response to social 
phenomena. In these senses, lay theories and cognitive scripts 
are theoretically analogous. Cognitive scripts and schemata, 
however, are generally described as concrete representations 
of social situations (Abelson 1976). Lay theories are often 
assumed to be generalisations about social phenomena, although 
some commentators suggest this is an inaccurate portrayal 
(e.g. Jaspars 1983) and the situationally specific application 
of different lay beliefs has been noted.
The attempt to explain why people hold lay theories, despite 
their apparent unreliability for accurate judgement formation, 
may draw on this theoretical analogy. In their general forms, 
lay theories provide hypotheses about social phenomena which 
guide the selection and interpretation of information. They do 
not determine responses, because of the influences of 
immediate factors concerning the motivation of the perceiver, 
features of the specific situation and the time and effort 
required for the conversion of abstract hypotheses into 
specific responses. People thus often rely on concrete 
theories about specific situations and events.
Lay and academic theories: a comparison
Furnham (1988) defines the differences between lay and 
academic theories, although it is to be pointed out that the 
earlier discussion shows that academic theories do not always 
conform to their ideal types. Academic theories are general, 
explicit, coherent and internally consistent. They are subject 
to test by falsifiability, distinguish between cause and
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correlation, explain processes linking phenomena, and consider 
the relative importance of multiple causative factors. 
Academic theories are "strong”: they are based on numerous 
observations, integrate information from related areas of 
research and produce predictions of future events. By 
contrast, lay theories usually concern specific phenomena, and 
are implicit, incoherent and inconsistent. Lay theorists seek 
verification of their theories, confuse cause and correlation, 
describe types of phenomena rather than relationships between 
them, and overstate the causal significance of human action. 
Lay theories are "weak": they are not based on precise,
reliable information.
Furnham's distinctions confer obvious status on academic 
theories as sources of reliable explanations of social 
pheneomena. It has generally been assumed that crucial 
decisions in the formulation of social policy would be 
improved by appeal to academic theories rather than by 
reliance on common sense. Thus, Furnham and Henderson argue:
"It may be true that legislation and methods of 
preventing and treating delinquency have been based 
on lay theories, politically motivated decisions or 
the need for retribution. Ideally, however, 
legislation and methods of reducing delinquency 
should be based on empirically verified academic 
theories. This is not to say that lay theories are 
unimportant and are not worthy of research - rather 
it is to point out that they are no substitute for 
careful theorizing and research of academic 
criminologists, sociologists and psychologists."
(Furnham and Henderson 1983, p.118)
It has already been shown, however, that some academics doubt 
that academic theories of intoxication and criminality have 
assisted the just operation of the law. Meehl is cautious 
about the authority claimed for academic theories, observing 
that "the behavioral sciences are plagued with methodological 
problems that often render their generalized conclusions 
equally dubious" (1977, p.10). Lay theories, or "fireside 
inductions", as Meehl calls them, are not necessarily untrue
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because they are derived unscientifically from "the culture's 
authority plus introspection plus anecdotal evidence from 
ordinary life" (Meehl 1977, p.10). Meehl urges caution before 
discarding lay theories as unhelpful or untrue on account of 
their scientific weakness.
"In thinking about law as a mode of social control, 
adopt a healthy skepticism toward the fireside 
inductions, subjecting them to test by statistical 
methods applied to data collected in the field 
situation? but when a fireside induction is held 
nearly semper, ubique, et ab omnibus a similar skepticism 
should be maintained toward experimental research 
purporting, as generalized, to overthrow it."
(Meehl 1977, p.28)
In the academic quest for truth, however, there has been 
little reference to the academic study of lay theory itself. 
Furnham, Jaspars and Fincham (1983) note that even in the 
discipline of social psychology, which has studied both 
academic and lay explanations of behaviour, there has been 
little interaction between the two fields of inquiry. The 
academic study of lay theories has been justified less in 
terms of establishing the true explanations of phenomena than 
by the anticipation of manipulating lay theories to achieve 
some social advantage. Thus, the study of lay theories has 
been concerned with the development, persistence and change of 
lay beliefs, and with their structure, function and 
interrelationships (Furnham 1988), rather than with the 
attempt to uncover truths about the world in lay wisdom. The 
justifications for such study have generally centred on 
expectations of influencing lay theories, or the decisions and 
behaviours which are prompted by them. For example
a) "The study of lay theories may illuminate the notions of 
responsibility embodied in the formal institutional structures 
of society such as the law."
For example, Jacobs argues that the emergence of special 
treatment in law for drunk driving offences as distinct from 
other forms of traffic violation is derived from the "offense
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against morality, decorum, and good citizenship" (1989, p.64) 
which drunk driving represents. Furthermore, Jacobs argues 
that the erroneous common belief in the universality of drunk 
driving, fostered by a loose equation of drinking and 
drunkenness, has impeded the law's attempts to grapple with 
the real problem of dangerous intoxicated driving. Disabusing 
the public of its erroneous beliefs about the effects of 
alcohol would, it is suggested, bring about consequential 
changes in public tolerance of intoxicated misconduct and, 
thereby, in drinking behaviour itself (Lang 1981).
b) "Problematic behaviour may be changed by matching treatment 
to the lay beliefs of the subject."
For example, Furnham (1988) suggests that the effectiveness of 
alcoholism treatment programmes may be enhanced by matching 
patients to the regime in which the theoretical explanation of 
the cause of alcoholism most closely resembles the beliefs of 
individual patients. Furnham and Henderson (1983) advance a 
similar argument for the effective treatment of delinquency.
c) "Lay beliefs may be more effectively altered if their 
psychological function is understood."
If the need for a particular belief is identified it may be 
obviated, or satisfied in different ways, so that inaccurate 
or damaging lay theories may be altered (Furnham 1988). For 
example, Lang (1981) advocates the development of alternative 
ways to achieve pleasurable changes in consciousness, without 
the troublesome connotations of lay beliefs about alcohol's 
effects on responsible conduct.
The boundaries and directions of influence between academic 
and lay theories have been shown to be dynamic, interactive, 
rather than unidirectional, processes. Peele exemplifies the 
ambiguity in the demarcation between academic and lay theories 
in what is intended as a denunciation of the damaging 
influence of false academic theorising.
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11 In the area of addiction, what is purveyed as fact 
is usually wrong and simply repackages popular myths 
as if they were the latest scientific deductions. To 
be ignorant of the received opinion about addiction 
is to have the best chance to say something sensible 
and to have an impact on the problem."
(Peele 1990, p.101)
Closely examined, this outraged assertion makes little logical 
sense, despite its intuitive appeal to distrust of academic 
theorising and faith in common sense. If academic theories are 
truly versions of "popular myths", or lay beliefs, and are 
also usually wrong, then by implication common sense is also 
usually wrong. How, then, can reliance on simple common sense 
itself be expected to produce any statement more sensible than 
the false wisdom of academic theory?
The disparaging comments of Peele and Judge Pickles illustrate 
the common sense "ivory tower" assumption that academics are 
too remote from the realities of the social phenomena they 
ponder to contribute sensibly to their comprehension. However, 
common sense itself is not an entirely reliable source of 
wisdom. A possible solution might be found in the 
"professional theories" of practitioners intervening directly 
in the social phenomena in question. Such professionals are 
not academic theorists, conducting research and building 
formal theory based on abstracted principles. Nor are they 
truly lay theorists, since they may draw directly on academic 
theory to illuminate their professional perspectives and 
practice.
PROFESSIONAL THEORIES
Characteristics of professional theories
Five features of professional theories are significant: their 
function? individualisation? organisational structure? 
conferral of professional identity? and accountability.
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1• Function
Professional theories, whilst couched in general terms, enable 
the practitioner to interpret and respond to specific 
instances of the social phenomenon with which they are 
concerned. This does not mean that professional theories 
determine behaviour. However, the abstract principles of 
professional theories must be capable of rapid application to 
concrete examples of their subject matter and conversion from 
interpretation into response.
Professional theories are therefore geared to the 
interpretation of and response to "real" examples of phenomena 
such as alcoholism and crime, and are informed by 
professionals* exposure to this reality. However, this concern 
with "real” instances does not in itself demonstrate the 
objective "truth" of professional theories. For example, Scott 
(1970) observes that professional theories may conceptualise 
blindness as a technical handicap to be compensated by aids 
and learned adaptational techniques, a psychological trauma 
involving shock and grief, requiring rehabilitation through 
learning adaptive skills and attitudes, or a condition 
producing special vulnerability to depression, necessitating 
recreational diversion. Similarly, professional theories of 
mental illness may take be somatotherapeutic (concentrating on 
organic disfunction), psychotherapeutic (concentrating on the 
self-concept and personality of the patient), or 
sociotherapeutic (emphasising the patient's social milieu) 
(Scott 1970). Thus, Scott argues:
"One of the connotations associated with the notion 
of a professional ideology is that the conceptions 
of stigma embodied in them are empirically true, or 
at least truer than the conceptions which laymen 
hold. The claim of expertise implies that the 
claimant has a comprehensive understanding of the 
nature of stigma and its impact on human behaviour - 
an understanding firmly rooted in scientific 
knowledge... [T]his connotation is partly inaccurate
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if only because the meaning of a stigma to different 
experts is often quite different and in some cases 
even contradictory.”
(Scott 1970, p.269)
2. Individualisation.
Professional practice requires the application, in "real" 
instances, of general theories about the nature of a social 
phenomenon and the appropriate response to it (Curnock and 
Hardiker 1979). Studies of professional practice suggest that 
this is achieved through typification: the construction of 
general case typologies, or diagnostic categories, and their 
application to individual cases, cued by information from 
personal contact, case records and discussion with third 
parties (Hawkins 1983? McCleary 1978? Pfuhl 1980? Sudnow 
1965). Typologies provide both explanations of individual 
character and behaviour, and prescriptions for the appropriate 
professional response. While case typologies are informed by 
the abstract conceptualisations and ideologies of the 
profession (Curnock and Hardiker 1979), they are also derived 
inductively from repeated experiences of real instances. Thus, 
Sudnow describes the development of typologies of crime and 
criminals by public defenders, based on the accumulated 
experience of specific cases.
"In the course of routinely encountering persons 
charged with 1petty theft', 'burglary', 'assault 
with a deadly weapon', 'rape', 'possession of 
marijuana', etc., the P.D. gains knowledge of the 
typical manner in which offenses of given classes 
are committed, the social characteristics of the 
persons who regularly commit them, the features of 
the settings in which they occur, the types of 
victims often involved, and the like. He learns to 
speak knowledgeably of 'burglars', 'petty thieves', 
'drunks', 'rapists', 'narcos', etc., and to 
attribute to them personal biographies, modes of 
usual criminal activity, criminal histories, 
psychological characteristics, and social 
backgrounds."
(Sudnow 1965, p.259)
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The use of case typologies has also been observed in studies 
of professional practice in the fields of parole (Hawkins 
1983? McCleary 1978; Maguire, Pinter and Collis 1984), 
probation (Curnock and Hardiker 1979; Drass and Spencer 1978), 
juvenile delinquency (Asquith 1977; Morris and Giller 1981), 
disability, (Scheff 1966), alcoholism (Shamblin 1990) and 
psychiatry (Daniels 1970)•
3. Organisation
Professional practice is shaped by the goals and resources of 
the organisation in which it is located. Thus, professional 
typologies are not simply generalisations about an 
organisation's clientele, but concern the services which it 
provides.
"Since the typologies which agents use are provided 
by the organizations within which they work, the 
typologies are heavily influenced by the 
organization. In particular, typologies and their 
use reflect and are sensitive to organizational 
goals and functions, particularly in reference to 
the organization's place in some larger social 
structure. They also reflect the goals and 
viewpoints of the agents themselves within these 
organizational arrangements."
(Drass and Spencer 1987, p.279)
These remarks highlight three aspects of organisational 
influence on professional theories: the professional agency; 
the larger system of which the agency is a part; and the 
discretion exercised by individual professionals within the 
constraints imposed by the first two conditions.
a) Agency
The professional agency defines the available range of case 
typologies and responses. This agency influence has been 
ascribed titles such as "theory of office" (Drass and Spencer 
1987), or "bureaucratisation of deviance" (Pfuhl 1980). Drass 
and Spencer define the professional theory of office as a 
"working ideology", which "consists of typologies of deviant 
actors and appropriate processing outcomes, as well as rules
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which link the two" (1987, p.278) . For example, Daniels 
observes that:
"psychiatrists are like representatives of any 
bureaucratic agency. They order their expectations 
of the clients to be serviced according to their 
understanding of the goals and powers of the 
bureaucracy. And so they attempt to fit their 
clients into the well-established categories."
(Daniels 1970,p.164)
b) System
Professional agencies do not necessarily enjoy complete 
autonomy in constructing their theory of office, since they 
may be located within, and accountable to, wider 
organisational systems which influence their sphere and mode 
of practice. For example, Daniels (1970) comments on the 
shaping of army psychiatric practice to the needs of the 
military services for soldiers to be generally fit for combat. 
Similarly, the professional practice of the probation service 
is framed by its location within the criminal justice system 
(Ashworth, Genders, Mansfield, Peay, Player 1984? Curran and 
Chambers 1982? Curnock and Hardiker 1979? Parker, Casburn and 
Turnbull 1981? Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989).
c) Discretion
The process of typification is held to involve the application 
of professional skill and judgement. Individual discretion is 
a highly valued feature of professional status. Differences 
between professionals in their reasoning about typologies in 
relation to particular cases, however, has also attracted 
allegations of arbitrariness and personal prejudice from 
unsympathetic observers (Pfuhl 1980? Shamblin 1990).
4. Identity
An ideology, coupled with special knowledge and resources, 
provides a cohesive professional identity. Learning the 
principles underpinning practice constitutes the process of 
induction into a profession and acquisition of professional
68
identity (Asquith 1977? Scheff 1966? Shover 1974). Thus, new 
entrants are powerfully motivated to learn the professional 
typologies which provide the basic tools for functioning. 
Progression from crude basic typification to proficiency in 
the full range and sublety of theories represents significant 
professional accomplishment.
"A fairly accurate index of socialization into an 
agency might be the degree to which a staff member 
uses the diagnostic packages that are prevalent in 
that agency."
(Scheff 1966, p.143)
Recognition of deficiencies in the typologies may lead to 
disillusionment and departure (Shover 1974), maintenance of 
basic competence through suppression of doubts (Scheff 1966? 
Shover 1974) or professional advance through creative 
refinements to the existing conceptualisations (Scheff 1966). 
The mastery of professional theories therefore carries 
considerable prestige.
5. Accountability
Professional theories provide the essential justifications of 
individual practice. Whilst discretion is a prized feature of 
professional activity, complete autonomy is rare. Within a 
professional organisation, practitioners' decisions are
subject to evaluation, and therefore must be capable of
justification. Professionals are held accountable for their 
conduct, judged against the organisation's ideology, knowledge 
and practices, including the recognised typification processes 
(Asquith 1977? Drass and Spencer 1987).
"[U]nder a model of professional decision-making, 
the ultimate justification of a decision is that the 
decision was made through the correct exercise of 
professional judgement. The criteria on which a
decision is made are drawn from a stock of
professional knowledge and though the professional 
may exercise discretion, some check can be made on
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his decision by reference to that stock of 
professional knowledge which creates for him a frame 
of relevance. "
(Asquith 1977, p.65) 
Professional theories and decision making
Professional theories facilitate economical information 
processing. In this sense, they provide cognitive scripts 
which directly relate clientele to services. The analogy with 
cognitive scripts suggests that professional theorising 
involves concrete reasoning about situations, providing rapid 
applicability to specific instances.
"A frame of relevance provides the professional with 
a set of generalisations or typifications about 
delinquency which allows him to identify particular 
cases as coming under a more general category. 
Definitions of need and assumptions about causation 
then relate to a variety of factors such as broken 
homes, deprived areas and so on depending on the 
particular professional stance. Thus, the process of 
interpretation of information and the identification 
of need against a particular frame of relevance 
allows the professional to make sense of a wealth of 
potentially ambiguous information."
(Asquith 1977, p.65)
Professional rules for information processing may be learned 
by exposure to professional practice (Scheff 1966). Thus, non­
professional observers of practice, particularly if familiar 
with the system within which the profession is operating, may 
learn basic rules of professional decision making. The lawyer, 
Sir David Napley remarks:
"I have discovered over the years that, even in 
those cases where I ultimately refer the client for 
some form of psychiatric investigation, I can now 
usually, more or less, ask the same sort of 
questions and frequently arrive at roughly the same 
sort of conclusions as psychiatrists do. Indeed, I 
have come to the view, although I hold psychiatrists 
(or some of them) in the greatest of respect, that
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many of the matters with which they are concerned 
can often be reduced to the application of simple 
psychology and common experience.”
(Napley 1983, p.166)
Would "simple psychology and common experience” enable Napley 
to perform psychiatric diagnosis in all spheres of psychiatric 
practice? His own professional familiarity with the criminal 
justice system, its customary modes of dealing with like 
cases, and the influence of psychiatric evaluations within it 
may facilitate his performance of diagnostic tasks in that 
specific setting. This example shows that basic rules of 
professional decision making may be learned independently of 
the more abstract principles which inform professional 
activity.
Critics (e.g. Pfuhl 1980) deplore the rule-bound professional 
transformation of individuals into "typical cases", attracting 
"routine remedies” (Morris and Giller 1981). Thus, Harris and 
Webb reproach welfare agencies for their practices of "routine 
individualisation", rendering treatment impersonal, inflexible 
and insensitive to individual differences.
"[S]imultaneously everybody and nobody is 
individualised. Routine individualisation exists as 
the very child of the social, between, at the one 
extreme, the non-discretionary application of 
specified rules, and at the other, the tru ly  
individualised response to every problem, the 
flexible, creative practice which, though part of 
welfare work's professional persona, is altogether 
unrealistic among bureau-professionals whose lives 
are measured out in files and cases, and who have 
little option, at least after the first flush of 
enthusiasm has worn off, other than to approach each 
new client with the question: 'what type of case is 
this?1"
(Harris and Webb 1987, p.110)
Thus, professionals are accused of employing typologies in the 
service of their bureaucratic routines, rather than using
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"real" knowledge to understand and respond flexibly to 
individual circumstances.
" [T]hough the assumed causes of delinquency may have 
little empirical validity, they do at least have 
heuristic value. That is, whether they truly are the 
causes of delinquency or not has less significance 
than the value they have for the individual by 
allowing him to make sense of and impose 
explanations and order on information in his role as 
professional.”
(Asquith 1977, p.65)
Defences against these charges are frequently ambivalent. 
Scheff argues that professional organisations are capable of 
developing rich, flexible and accurate case typologies, while 
equally commenting on the tendency to rely on "minimal working 
concepts" (1966, p.142). Meehl (1973), while vigorously 
defending the proper application of diagnostic knowledge 
derived from empirical research in clinical psychology, 
equally fiercely condemns the failure of many professionals to 
utilise available knowledge adequately. Far from inflexible 
routinisation, however, Meehl sees the results of poor 
practice in inappropriate, irrelevant use of individualised 
information.
Professional and academic theories: a comparison
Five features contrast professional and academic theories: 
their relationships to cultural beliefs and attitudes, to 
organisational interests, to multiple disciplines, to 
outcomes, and to their subject population.
1. Cultural beliefs and attitudes
Professional theories assume the existence of a body of 
knowledge about their subject matter (Asquith 1977? Scott 
1970). Nevertheless, only a fraction of the knowledge derived 
from academic research filters through to the professional 
practitioners "whose constructed meanings have the greatest 
impact on people with stigmatizing conditions" (Scott 1970, 
p.269). However, professional theories are not comprised only
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of fragmented academic theories, fleshed out by practical 
experience.
"[T]he conceptions of stigma contained in 
professional ideologies are only partly determined 
by empirical knowledge derived from direct 
experiences with and scientific studies of 
stigmatized people. Their content is also determined 
by, and reflects, certain social, cultural, and 
political forces in the environments in which 
experts are immersed and on which they depend for 
economic support."
(Scott 1970, p.269)
Thus, whilst academic theories may promote changes in lay 
conceptualisations and the language in which lay beliefs are 
expressed, the social legitimation of a particular profession 
depends on effective communication of the profession's 
ideology in existing lay terms.
"Expert conceptions of stigma reflect prevailing 
cultural values, attitudes, and beliefs. In a sense, 
this is inevitable. Experts must use the 'native 
tongue' in order to communicate their constructed 
meanings to laymen, and the modes of expression that 
a language affords are grounded in the core values 
of a culture. Moreover, it is laymen who usually 
grant legitimacy to experts' claims to special 
knowledge about stigma? any constructed meanings 
that are dissonant with lay values, beliefs, and 
attitudes will probably be rejected as nonsensical."
(Scott 1970, p.270)
Furthermore, societal disapproval of its deviant members, 
often dictates that expensive professional services must be 
justified in terms of rehabilitation, or reduction of the 
level of non-conformity among the clientele (Scott 1970). 
Thus, core cultural values may determine the structure and 
expression of professional theories and the goals of 
professional activity.
2. Organisational interests
Shover, pointing to the diversity of professional theories of 
crime among different agencies, which "appear to develop their
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own ad hoc correctional 'theories' and categories of offenders" 
(1974, p.357), remarks:
"The success of alleged behavioral 'experts' in 
winning the legally established prerogative to 
tinker with offenders can, in the light of these 
facts, only be considered remarkable."
(Shover 1974, p.357)
In this sense, Shover argues, our academic knowledge of 
criminality is less seriously deficient than is our 
comprehension of the functioning of the professional 
organisations which translate theoretical principles into 
interventive strategies.
In the quest for social legitimacy, the claims of professional 
theories may owe less to academic knowledge than to the 
interests of the profession itself in survival and 
advancement. As has been seen, similar allegations have been 
made of the proponents of academic theories. However, despite 
the fragmentation of academic theories in their translation 
into professional theories, this process is often a major 
vehicle for the transmission of academic theories into lay 
life. Schneider's criticism of the blaming of "medical 
imperialism" (Heather and Robertson 1985) for the advancement 
of the disease theory of alcoholism may be understood in this 
light.
"The disease concept of alcoholism has a long 
history in America and has been supported both by 
medical and non-medical people and organizations for 
a wide variety of reasons. That certain forms of 
deviant drinking are now or have been for more than 
one hundred and fifty years medicalized is not due 
to a medical 'hegemony', but reflects the interests 
of the several groups and organizations assuming, or 
being given, responsibility for behaviors associated 
with chronic drunkenness in the United States. The 
disease concept owes its life to these variously 
interested parties, rather than to substantive
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scientific findings. As such, the disease concept of 
alcoholism is primarily a social rather than a 
scientific or medical accomplishment.”
(Schneider 1978, p.370)
Professional expansionism is often assumed to imply the 
profligate application of professional diagnostic typologies 
to bring as wide a subject population as possible under the 
authority of professional intervention. For example, Pfuhl 
alleges:
" (I)f investigative bodies consist of psychiatrists, 
the probability increases that a decision of 
incompetence will result, likely as an expression of 
the psychiatric construction of reality. Being 
trained to 'find mental illness' psychiatrists do 
precisely that!”
(Pfuhl 1980, p.196)
The reality of professional practice, however, is less simple. 
For example, the dependence of professional agencies on wider 
organisational systems may encourage the exclusion of 
potential subjects from the profession's diagnostic 
categories. Thus, Daniels found that psychiatric practice in 
the armed forces is concerned less with clinical diagnostic 
criteria than with social judgements about 'reasonable' or 
'honorable' breakdown which can occur to anyone under 
sufficient pressure" (1970, p.168). Abstract academic 
principles for the construction of a profession's typologies 
are therefore modified to accommodate organisational pressures 
and expectations.
3. Multiple disciplines
Diverse perspectives contribute to professional intervention 
in social problems, including, for example, nursing, 
psychology, social work and psychiatry. From the interaction 
of several professions, rooted in different academic 
disciplines, professional theories may emerge which are 
"hybrids" (Scott 1970) of these seperate perspectives (Asquith 
1977? Scott 1970).
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Different academic disciplines also interact. Contemporary 
theories of intoxication, as has been seen, attempt to 
integrate pharmacological, psychological and sociological 
knowledge. Such integration, in academic theorising, reflects 
the pursuit of new abstractions at greater levels of 
sophistication and coherence. In professional theorising, 
however, it is more likely that integration represents the 
piecemeal accumulation of wisdoms which appear pragmatically 
to advance professional practice and survival. Such piecemeal 
theory building can produce internal contradictions through 
failure to discard discredited theory (Sheldon 1978).
4• Outcomes
The exigencies of practice may result in disparities between 
professional conceptualisations and the academic meanings of 
the same concepts in abstract theory. For example, Asquith 
remarks:
"There is an essential difference between a notion 
of justice in theory and the notion of justice as an 
operational concept. Though there may be some 
dispute at the theoretical level as to whether a 
system of delinquency control based on the meeting 
of need can be a system of justice, such a clear cut 
distinction may well be lost completely at the 
practical level. In considering the significance of 
the status of key individuals in the administration 
of justice conceptual niceties give way to practical 
difficulties."
(Asquith 1977, p.62)
Davis (1983), comparing academic criminology to the 
professional practice of probation officers, relates their 
differences to their distinct goals. Academic goals concern 
the discovery of new facts and the construction of abstracted 
theory. To the academic, therefore, "logic" is related to 
empirical evidence and principles of relationships between 
objects and events, without the interference of value 
judgements. Professional goals concern immediate, practical 
requirements to respond to concrete situations in conformity 
to organisational expectations. Thus, "logic", to the
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professional practitioner is equated with common sense and 
linked to the evaluation of performance outcomes (Davis 1983) .
Murphy (1986) identifies discrepant professional and academic 
conceptualisatons of the "professional criminal". Academic 
criminologists use the term to refer to those comparatively 
few offenders whose criminality is highly organised, who 
offend as a full-time occupation, are linked to criminal 
networks and make profit. Store detectives, who rarely 
encounter such professional criminals, nevertheless regularly 
perceive professionalism among their suspects, attributed on 
the basis of skill and confidence in stealing and dealing with 
arrest.
5. Subject population
Academic and professional theories are concerned with similar 
subject populations. Academic theories, however, do not 
require the legitimation of their subject populations. 
Although professional organisations attract criticism for 
imposing their conceptualisatons on to a powerless clientele 
(Pfuhl 1980; Scott 1970), nevertheless, professionals cannot 
function without the collaboration, at some level, of those 
who use their services. Professional judgements therefore have 
to be negotiated in interaction with the clientele, who may 
influence the outcome to varying degrees, for example, by 
paying for services (Scheff 1966).
Studies of professional decision making reveal a negotiated 
process in which clients are explicitly or implicitly taught 
the diagnostic categories and rewarded for conformity to those 
typologies by the provision of service (Scheff 1990; Shamblin 
1990; Spencer 1983; Scott 1970).
Professional and lay theories: a comparison
Three aspects of professional and lay theories of criminal 
responsibility bear comparison: their relationship to cultural
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beliefs and attitudes? differences in emphasis and subtlety; 
and the seductiveness of lay styles of reasoning.
1. Cultural beliefs and attitudes
The academic knowledge of professionals is infused with the 
perspectives of their social and cultural backgrounds. Wiseman 
(1970) , for example, observes that professional theories about 
skid row life are derived from the combination of professional 
training in psychological and sociological concepts, and the 
middle class values of most professionals' backgrounds. Such 
values may be exposed at the surface of professional 
judgements if the professional is inhibited from explicitly 
expressing special knowledge, as when communicating with a lay 
audience (Curran and Chambers 1982).
Professional theories are also susceptible to individual 
differences in perspective which may guide the acquisition and 
interpretation of information within the parameters of theory. 
For example:
"Individual beliefs about the causes of events, 
crimes in particular, therefore lead to 
consideration of different information about a 
parole applicant, different inferences about the 
responsibility of the person for the crime, and 
different conclusions about the appropriate handling 
of the case."
(Carroll and Payne 1976, p.21)
2. Emphasis and subtlety
Crocker, Fiske and Taylor (1984) suggest that professional 
expertise derives from the possession of well developed 
cognitive schemata for reasoning about specific instances of 
the profession's concerns. Thus, professionals, through the 
practiced use of their theories, are able to process 
information more effectively, paying more attention to 
conflicting information and moderating judgements in the light 
of the additional information perceived.
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Carroll and Payne (1977) compared decisions about parole cases 
made by criminal justice experts and college students. They 
found basic similarities in the reasoning processes and 
judgements made, but experts used more information and 
combined different information more flexibly than students. 
Similarly, Lawrence and Homel found differences in the 
reasoning processes of experienced and novice magistrates.
"Major experience/inexperience differences occurred 
at the levels of what magistrates brought to the 
cases and their reasoning. Experts had more 
patterned approaches, and were directed by their 
treatment objectives to assess cause of the 
defendant's behaviors, and their prospects of 
responding to treatment and individualized 
approaches. Although the novice knew and responded 
to ritualized evidence-gathering procedures, he 
seemed to work with single details."
(Lawrence and Homel 1986, p.180)
Crocker, Fiske and Taylor (1984) suggest that, in consequence 
of such practiced subtlety, professional theories may be more 
resistant to change than lay theories, because they integrate 
more information into a stable, coherent pattern, are based on 
more experience and have stronger links between component 
parts. Change, therefore, may have a higher cost to the 
professional than the novice, since alteration in one aspect 
affects other areas of knowledge and experience.
Scott (1970) argues that the refinement of professional 
theories may result in discrepancies in the conceptualisations 
of lay and professional people. The finer, explicitly defined 
distinctions between normality and deviance of professional 
theories may reduce their correspondence with looser lay 
conceptualisations, despite broad similarities. As a result, 
the more marginal judgements of professional and lay people 
may differ. Thus, for example, judges and juries may be 
prepared to overrule a professional affirmation of criminal 
responsibility in favour of an insanity verdict (Howard and 
Clark 1985).
79
3. The seductiveness of lay theorising
Meehl attacks professionals in clinical mental health practice 
for "ignorance, errors, scientific fallacies, clinical 
carelessness, and slovenly mental habits" (1973, p.298) 
despite available and reliable diagnostic procedures. Carroll 
and Payne (1976) note the accumulation of research evidence 
that professionals tend to rely on case-specific information 
for making judgements rather than the available academic 
information about, for example, base-rates of a particular 
attribute or behaviour. They suggest that rather than base 
judgements on statistical information about the frequency of 
a particular crime, decision makers prefer to compare the 
immediate situation or person under scrutiny with others in 
their personal experience, as do lay people.
Abelson (1976) suggests that professional judgements based on 
concrete, "scripted" reasoning rather than hypothetical, 
abstracted principles are far more common than is 
acknowledged. It is professionally undesirable to justify 
judgements about a person on the basis of perceived 
similarities between that person and oneself, for example. Not 
only is it harder to utilise abstracted reasoning, but, 
Abelson suggests wryly, it is intrinsically less satisfying.
"Introspectively, it is not much fun operating at 
this level, either - and the consequent decisions 
are conflictful and unconfident."
(Abelson 1976, p.37)
Conflict and lack of confidence stems from the disconcerting 
effect of parsimonious information processing, despite 
statistical assurance of its relevance and accuracy. Studies 
of human information processing demonstrate a paradoxical 
relationship between quantity of information, quality of 
decisions and the confidence of decision makers. In general,
"studies indicate that the effects of increasing the 
amount of information are to increase the 
variability of the responses and to decrease the
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quality of the choices, while also increasing the 
confidence of the decision maker in his judgements".
(Carroll and Payne 1976, p.24)
Dawes (1976) refers to this phenomenon as our "cognitive 
conceit", or unjustified faith in our human mental capacities 
for processing plentiful information efficiently, a failing to 
which professionals are no less prey than lay people. Thus, 
while professionals prefer to base their judgements about 
individuals on personal contact, rather than documentary 
evidence interpreted in the light of statistical knowledge, 
the decisions which consequently emerge are not more, but 
possibly less accurate (Meehl 1973; Ruback and Hopper 1986).
Criticisms of the comparatively narrow advantages of 
professional information processing over lay, professional 
neglect of academic knowledge relevant to decision making, and 
professional susceptibility to lay attitudes and styles of 
reasoning, have led to accusations that professionals make 
quite unwarranted claims to expertise.
"We must, in short, seriously begin to question 
whether these occupational claims rest upon anything 
more than common-sense assumptions and images".
(Shover 1974, p.358)
CONCLUSIONS
Academic theories construct general principles, abstracted 
from the concrete evidence of research, to describe the nature 
of social phenomena and to derive from these descriptive 
principles logical conclusions as to the manner in which 
change may be effected. Such prescriptions are often directed 
at policy rather than practice and thus are not easily 
converted into prescriptions for dealing with individual 
situations. Lay theories represent the common sense wisdom of 
the non-expert, derived from direct and vicarious learning. 
Their general forms do not determine the responses of the lay 
theorist in specific situations, in which immediate factors 
strongly influence judgement and behaviour, possibly by
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invoking "cognitive scripts". Professional theories convert 
abstract conceptualisations of a phenomenon into rapid 
interpretations and responses to specific situations, by 
providing well developed scripts derived from special 
knowledge and experience and modified by the expectations of 
the professional agency.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESPONSIBILITY, CHOICE 
AND
ACADEMIC THEORIES OF ALCOHOL-RELATED CRIME
This chapter considers whether academic research and theory 
has undermined the confident ascription of criminal 
responsibility to intoxicated offenders. It is suggested that 
the legal concern that academic knowledge erodes the principle 
of free will is bolstered more by the deterministic expression 
of alcohol theory than by the substance of its research? and 
that academic theory about the alcohol-crime relationship 
often rests on common sense assumptions. The chapter examines 
firstly the alcohol-crime association? secondly, academic 
interpretations of offenders' theories of intoxicated crime? 
and thirdly, the major emphases of academic theories of the 
alcohol-crime relationship. Dispositional, situational and 
substance focused approaches are each illustrated with a 
particular theoretical conceptualisation of the alcohol-crime 
relationship.
THE ALCOHOL-CRIME ASSOCIATION
Research has repeatedly demonstrated the frequency with which 
alcohol consumption precedes crime commission. This 
statistical alcohol-crime association has been found in 
surveys of offenders (Washbrook 1977), studies of criminal 
careers (Pittman and Gordon 1958? Collins 1982) and studies of 
particular offences, including murder (Gillies 1965, 1976), 
rape (Rada 1975? Wright and West 1981), robbery (Walsh 1986), 
assault (Berkowitz 1986? Mayfield 1976) and burglary (Bennett 
and Wright 1984a). Researchers have become so accustomed to 
the association that failure to find it is sometimes 
attributed to methodological defects such as ineffective 
inquiry or inefficient recording (Pittman and Handy 1964), 
rather than to its actual absence. Collins, reviewing the 
accumulated literature, concludes:
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” [C] considerable evidence suggests that alcohol is 
often present in or before criminal events, and that 
a disproportionate number of criminal offenders have 
alcohol problems.1
(Collins 1982, p.188)
The association is particularly strong for violent crime 
(Collins 1982), a factor which has contributed to a 
concentration of research and theory on this relationship 
(Miller and Welte 1986; Pernanen 1982).
The repeated establishment of the alcohol-crime association 
reflects the preoccupation of much alcohol research with 
indexing the social harm attributable to alcohol misuse. 
Alcohol has been implicated in almost all forms of social ill, 
of which crime is only one. Others include domestic violence 
(Gayford 1975; Kantor and Straus 1987; Wilson 1982) , accidents 
(Denney 1986; Royal College of Physicians 1987), employee 
absenteeism (Plant 1981; Polich 1979; Rix 1981), divorce 
(Blane 1979; Jacob and Seilhamer 1982), prostitution (Blane 
1979), suicide (Beck, Wissman and Kovacs 1976; Blane 1979) and 
acute and chronic sickness (Royal College of Physicians 1987). 
In 1985, McDonnell and Maynard estimated the total annual cost 
of alcohol-related harm at an alarming £1614million.
The repeated finding of an association between alcohol 
consumption and a problematic event explains very little about 
the relationship between the two phenomena. Nevertheless, the 
tendency to assume cause from association, noted in Chapter 
Two, pervades much of this literature. The single cause 
assumption is linked to a variety of deficiencies in the 
collection and interpretation of the research data 
demonstrating the association:-
a) The influence of cultural beliefs and attitudes on the 
exercise of academic research was noted in Chapter Two. 
Pernanen (1982) suggests that proper examination of cultural 
variations in alcohol use and crime rates might challenge the
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assumed stability of the alcohol-crime relationship. For 
example, Pernanen notes that France has a very high national 
consumption of alcohol, but a low homicide rate, while the 
reverse pertains in Central and South America.
b) The association has not been adequately contextualised 
within the drinking patterns of the general population. It 
tends to be assumed that the statistical association 
demonstrates an abnormal drinking pattern peculiar to 
offenders. However, "impact figures” (Pernanen 1982) created 
by statistical assertions about the extent of alcohol 
consumption by offenders would signify little if they resemble 
the customary drinking patterns of comparable groups in the 
general population (Evans 1986? Pernanen 1982) . For example, 
Kantor and Straus (1987) found that although male heavy 
drinkers were more likely to abuse their wives than light or 
non-drinkers, nevertheless the majority of heavy drinkers did 
not abuse their wives. Washbrook (1977), however, attributed 
his finding, that a group of male prisoners appeared no more 
alcoholic than a group of male employees, to defects in the 
research methodology.
c) Research has concentrated on convicted, and particularly 
imprisoned, offenders. However, Collins (1982) suggests that 
alcohol-involved offenders may be over-represented in the 
criminal justice system. Reasons for this are unclear, and 
probably multiple. Contributory factors may not involve a 
causal relationship between alcohol and crime. For example, 
the perception of alcohol as an indicator of culpability, 
noted in Chapter Two, may increase the likelihood of 
prosecution and harsh punishment.
d) Research has neglected to contextualise pre-offence 
drinking within offenders' customary drinking patterns (Miller 
and Welte 1986). Bennett and Wright (1984a, 1984b) found that 
the frequency of burglars' pre-offence drinking closely 
reflected the frequency of their drinking in itself. Kantor
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and Straus (1987) found that although wife assaults frequently 
followed drinking, most occurred when neither partner had been 
drinking.
e) The "malevolence assumption" (Hamilton and Collins 1982) 
has also infected aspects of victim research, through findings 
of an association between drinking and victimisation (Goodman, 
Mercy, Loya et al. 1986; Hough and Mayhew 1983, 1985; Wright 
and West 1981). By strengthening theories of victim 
precipitation, this assumption imputes blame to victims, 
although the criminal justice system relies heavily on the 
assumption of "innocent" victims (Shapland, Willmore and Duff 
1985). A less emotive analysis might suggest that the 
association reflects situational aspects of crime, such as the 
likelihood of victim and offender meeting in a public drinking 
place.
f) Covariation between levels of alcohol consumption and crime 
rates does not necessarily reflect a causal relationship. 
Pernanen (1982), reviewing "natural experiments" in which the 
availability of alcohol was reduced through events such as 
price increases or strikes in the liquor industry, found an 
association with a reduced rate of violent crime. However, 
Pernanen cautions that consequences of reduced alcohol 
availability such as reduced levels of social interaction in 
public places, may explain this covariation. Smith and Burvill 
(1987) found that a lowered legal drinking age in Australian 
states was followed by a rise in juvenile crime. Violent 
crime, however, was much less affected than property crime, 
such as opportunistic car thefts, suggesting that juvenile 
criminal activity was influenced by the changes in 
opportunities for typical juvenile crime brought about by 
heightened interaction in public drinking places.
g) Situational factors associated with alcohol-related 
offences suggest a complex causal relationship. For example, 
violent crime commonly occurs in or around licensed premises
86
(Felson, Baccaglini, and Gmelch 1986? Luckenbill 1977; 
Goodman, Mercy, Loya et al 1986) . Such crime, however, is not 
only associated with drinking, but also with concentrations of 
young adult males (Felson, Baccaglini and Gmelch 1986? Hope
1985), city centre locations (Hope 1985) and the physical 
design of pubs (Marsh and Campbell 1979).
h) The alcohol-crime association, and covariation between 
alcohol availability and crime, feed an assumption that 
increased drinking will inevitably be accompanied by increased 
crime. At the individual level, however, this does not appear 
to be true. Indeed, very heavy or chronic drinking may 
suppress serious offending (Collins 1982? Hamilton and Collins 
1982? Pernanen 1982; Pittman and Gordon 1958? Washbrook 1977).
Thus, cultural, situational and individual variables may all
have a strong bearing on the alcohol-crime relationship, but 
have often been neglected in data collection and
interpretation, due to the intuitive obviousness of alcohol 
itself as a plausible cause of crime.
OFFENDERS' THEORIES 
Overview
It was noted in Chapter Two that academic research does not 
generally regard lay theories as a source of objective truth. 
Nevertheless, researchers have on occasions asked offenders 
about their beliefs about the influences of alcohol on their 
criminal behaviour (e.g. Bennett and Wright 1984a, 1984b).
Such information also emerges during the course of
interviewing about other aspects of offending (e.g. Athens 
1980? Walsh 1986), participant observation research (e.g 
Parker 1974), and the collection of biographical data (e.g 
Athens 1982? Maguire 1982). Such sources suggest four 
distinctions made by offenders between intoxicated and sober 
crime, suggesting qualitative differences in the exercise of 
rationality and intentionality: motivelessness; impulsivity? 
indiscriminateness? and incompetence. These distinctions,
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however, imply degrees of motivation, deliberation and skill 
which are not generally associated with sober crime. They 
appeal to intuitive common sense notions, which are accepted 
or discredited by researchers according to their own 
perspectives.
1. Hotivelessness
Although the obvious purpose of robbery is to obtain money, 
Cordilia (1986) found that men convicted of group robbery 
after drinking quite often said that money was not important. 
Parker, during drinking sessions with a gang, observed that 
"one can get into a fight for almost no apparent reason" 
(1974, p.145). Burglars (Bennett and Wright 1984a, 1984b) and 
opportunistic robbers (Walsh 1986), sometimes assume that 
intoxication has caused their offence, since they do not 
recollect forming any prior intention. Offenders also appear 
to regard impulsivity and indiscriminateness as evidence of 
the motiveless of their intoxicated crimes.
Such statements imply that motives for sober crime are well 
articulated. However, when asked generally about their 
criminal motives, offenders offer mundane, unambitious and 
often vague reasons. For example, burglars usually cite 
wanting money as their motive (Bennett and Wright 1984a? Walsh
1986), but, as Walsh remarks,
"few seemed to have any clear idea of what they were 
looking for beyond 1 money*, and of those who did 
have a definite notion of their wage and return for 
skill, most set their sights very low and were 
content with quite trivial amounts, usually £100 or 
less."
(Walsh 1986, p.33)
Ill-gotten gains are often small (Maguire 1982; Walsh 1986). 
Further, the uses to which offenders put them display little 
ambition or deliberation, revolving around basic subsistence 
(Bennett and Wright 1984a) and, particularly, pleasures such
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as drinking and gambling (Bennett and Wright 1984a; Maguire 
1982? Walsh 1986).
Criminal motivations have complex sources, including both
historical factors in the offender's prior experience, and
situational factors providing the immediate opportunity for 
the offence (Bennett and Wright 1984a; Clarke and Cornish 
1985? Cordilia 1986). Moreover, motivation to offend is 
generally intermittent, limited, and highly dependent on the 
confluence of the motivation itself and an opportunity to 
satisfy it (Bennett and Wright 1984a? Best and Luckenbill 
1982? Briar and Piliavin 1965; Cornish and Clarke 1987? Pfuhl 
1980; Walsh 1986).
"Realistically, then, commitment to legitimate 
values is a modality, a condition characteristic of 
most people most of the time. Second, for most 
people, release from moral constraint is situation 
specific, short-lived, and must be renewed from time
to time. This episodic release, as the term implies,
is an event that stands out or apart from other 
customary conditions. Thus, there is no contention 
here that willingness with respect to one form of 
deviance is generalized to other forms. Rather, 
people are released from moral constraint in a 
specific, episodic, and recurrent manner."
(Pfuhl 1980, p.70)
Such episodic, situationally specific motivation is not easily 
distinguishable from motivation intermittently "caused" by 
alcohol. Given the customary frequency of offenders' drinking 
(Bennett and Wright 1984a, 1984b? Miller and Welte 1986), it 
may be more appropriate to regard alcohol as a prevalent 
feature of situations in which criminal opportunities arise, 
or are generated by already motivated offenders.
Criminal motivations include emotional rewards? for example, 
excitement, relief of boredom, unhappiness and anger (Bennett 
and Wright 1984a; Maguire 1982; Feeney 1986)? beating the 
system (Bennett and Wright 1984a? Pfuhl 1980)? peer group 
solidarity (Best and Luckenbill 1982? Cordilia 1986? Scully
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and Marolla 1985? Wade 1967) ? triumph over fear (Munro 1972) ? 
and demonstration or preservation of self-image (Pfuhl 1980; 
Scully and Marolla 1985? Wade 1967). Further, single offences 
may serve multiple purposes (Pervin 1986), which may be more 
or less fully articulated by the offender. For example, 
wanting money is compatible with also wanting excitement, 
although the former, being concrete, may be more easily 
articulated.
Intoxication itself achieves such goals, providing camaraderie 
(Cavan 1966? Marsh, Dobbs and White 1986), excitement (Dorn 
1983? Parker 1974? Maguire 1982) and opportunities to 
demonstrate one's status to peers and others (Cavan 1966? Dorn 
1983? Maguire 1982? Parker 1974). Thus, a cluster of 
activities, including intoxication, offending and gambling 
(Cornish 1978) satisfy similar motivations.
Attributing motivelessness to intoxicated crime, therefore, 
wrongly implies that motivation for sober crime is well 
articulated, ambitious, and independent of situational 
contingencies. Intoxication and offending have some common 
motivations. Motivelessness in fact appears to be a more 
accurate description of the sober, non-offending activities in 
the lives of ordinary offenders (Parker 1974? Patrick 1973).
"Life with the gang was not all violence, sex and 
petty delinquency. Far from it. One of the foremost 
sensations that remains with me is the feeling of 
unending boredom, of crushing tedium, of listening 
hour after hour at street corners to desultory 
conversation, and indiscriminate grumbling."
(Patrick 1973, p.80)
2. Impulsivity
Offenders suggest that they commit intoxicated crime "on the 
spur of the moment", without prior deliberation or intent to 
offend. This theme emerges in accounts of intoxicated robbery 
(Cordilia 1986? Walsh 1986), burglary (Bennett and Wright 
1984a, 1984b) and rape (Wright and West 1981).
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However, impulsivity is not peculiar to intoxicated crime. 
Bennett and Wright (1984a) found that the idea of offending 
sometimes seemed to "pop into" burglars' heads, with no 
identifiable precipitating factor. They suggest that with 
experience offending becomes mere routine, obviating the need 
for contemplation. Furthermore, planning has a cost in 
flexibility, causing difficulty in adapting to setbacks by 
switching targets, compared with a more opportunistic approach 
(Bennett and Wright 1984a). Walsh (1986) sees impulsive 
burglary as a popular protective strategy against the anxiety 
provoked by pondering the hazards of the enterprise.
Despite the apparent impulsivity of intoxicated violence, 
ethnographers in group drinking situations record keen 
awareness of the behavioural cues associated with aggression, 
careful avoidance of producing them, and defusing of volatile 
situations (Archard 1979? Mungham 1976? Parker 1974).
Moreover, spontaneity is an integral feature of some types of 
crime. For example, Zimring (1981) suggests that spontaneity 
characterises robbery by young offenders because they 
typically offend in groups, engage in little preparation and 
rely on numerical strength. Street robbery, in any case, 
depends heavily on speed and surprise for success, allowing 
little time for deliberation (Feeney 1986? Lejeune 1977? Walsh 
1986). Similarly, vandalism is rarely planned, but develops in 
playful group interaction, seizing opportunities immediately 
to hand (Best and Luckenbill 1982? Wade 1967). Furthermore,
"[b]ecause most delinquent activities require few 
resources, such as special skills or equipment, many 
occasions can be transformed into situations for 
delinquency."
(Best and Luckenbill 1982, p. 52)
Parker (1974) suggests that the apparently spontaneous 
fighting between young men in city centre pubs must be 
understood in the context of situations which lack rules 
regulating confrontations, necessitating pre-emptive action.
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Historical factors promote readiness to seize sudden 
opportunities. Cordilia (1986) suggests that socially isolated 
men are highly motivated to preserve tenuous relationships 
with drinking companions. Wade argues:
"Little exploration of feelings of fellow members of 
a delinquent group need be made when past natural 
histories of their careers indicate predispositions 
to any behaviour hinting of excitement, danger, and 
even malice."
(Wade 1967, p.101)
Experience enables robbers (Feeney 1986? Walsh 1986) and 
thieves (Carroll 1982? Carroll and Weaver 1986) to identify 
opportunities more rapidly, and to be readier to seize them. 
Experience thus provides a "pattern" (Feeney 1986) or "script" 
(Forgas 1986? see also Chapter Two) for an offence.
Suddenness masks the generally orderly execution of impulsive 
offences. The "ethogenic approach to social psychology" (Marsh 
and Paton 1986) assumes that all behaviour is understandable 
given sufficient knowledge of the actor1s perceptions and 
motivations. This perspective has fostered a series of studies 
showing logical sequences of events and behaviour leading to 
the completion of impulsive robbery (Lejeune 1977? Luckenbill 
1980), assault and homicide (Athens 1980? Felson and Steadman 
1983? Luckenbill 1977), rape (Athens 1980) and vandalism (Wade 
1967) .
Impulsivity, therefore, reflects prior experience, a defensive 
psychological strategy and factors integral to certain types 
of crime.
3. Indiscriminateness
Indiscriminateness implies that intoxicated offenders commit 
random offences, rather than selecting offences or targets on 
a rational basis. Burglars may attack premises, not on the 
basis of prior selection, but merely because they are 
encountered after leaving the pub (Bennett and Wright 1984a?
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Maguire 1982). Cordilia (1986) suggests that intoxication 
distorts normal priorities to the extent that sober 
individuals find their intoxicated violence incomprehensible. 
Parker's (1974) accounts of group drinking sessions are 
replete with apparently indiscriminate attacks on people and 
property.
Intoxicated indiscriminateness has been called illusory by 
anthropologists, who find that even the most outrageous 
drunken violent and sexual orgies are constrained by rules: 
for example, prohibiting violent victimisation of women and 
children, sexual partnership with children and kin, or the use 
of certain weapons (Macandrew and Edgerton 1969). 
Discrimination is also affirmed on occasion by offenders. For 
example, in Maguire's biography of a professional burglar 
violence is resolutely eschewed, despite considerable heavy 
drinking, because "there's no profit in this game" (1982,
p.100).
Sober criminals, however, do not always practice fine 
discrimination. Patrick found that juvenile gang members were
"capable of both utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
delinquent acts. The same boys could steal objects 
for profit, for their own consumption, and for 'the 
hell of it' all in the one day. They committed 
thefts as the need and the mood of the moment took 
them without regard for the neat classifications of 
sociologists."
(Patrick 1973, p.200)
Bennett and Wright (1984a) found that burglars' willingness to 
attack different types of dwelling increased with experience. 
This probably reflects, not increasing indiscriminateness, but 
learning, for example of the much lower risk of apprehension 
than that anticipated by novices. This, again, given the 
frequency of pre-offence drinking, may explain the willingness 
to seize opportunities casually encountered after drinking.
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Fine discrimination between types of offence and target is 
constrained by the limitations of available opportunities 
(Collins 1982? Letkemann 1973; Walsh 1986). For example, 
robbers profess to principles about victimising groups such as 
the elderly or women (Lejeune 1977? Walsh 1986), but these 
scruples are "easily eroded in the attempt to select the most 
accessible or vulnerable target" (Lejeune 1977, p.135).
Indiscriminateness, therefore, is not a necessary consequence 
of intoxication, nor is subtle discrimination practised by the 
majority of sober offenders.
4. Incompetence
Inadequate preparation, clumsiness, and unnecessary risk 
taking are regarded as qualities of intoxicated crime (Bennett 
and Wright 1984a, 1984b? Cordilia 1986? Walsh 1986). Offenders 
believe that intoxication inhibits successful performance of 
dishonest crime and that it promotes aggressive offences 
(Cordilia 1986? Walsh 1986? Wright and West 1981).Walsh 
remarks that drinking sessions in which burglars exchange 
useful information
"can easily degenerate, due to boasting based on 
alcohol intake, into a 'dare', where nobody really 
wants to, but feel now that they have to, as a result 
of group pressure, carry out a task which is fraught 
with needless risk."
(Walsh 1986, p.44)
Nevertheless, intoxicated people often competently perform 
complex behaviours which are particularly valued. 
Anthropological studies reveal the competent performance of 
social functions such as ceremonial duties despite intoxicated 
interference with basic motor functions (Marshall 1981) . Blane 
suggests that the apparent decrease in alcohol-related 
problems over the life span
"may reflect not a reduction in alcohol-related 
problems but a more sophisticated capacity to 
modulate the behaviors in question so that they
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don't come to the attention of those whose function 
it is to identify such behaviors."
(Blane 1979, p.27)
Observers of offenders remark on the high value placed on 
personal control (Walsh 1986) and skills such as verbal quick 
wittedness (Campbell 1986; Parker 1974), displayed during 
drinking sessions.
Professional crime is a comparative rarity. For example, 
dwelling-house burglaries are frequently committed by 
juveniles (Maguire 1982), in offenders' own, often 
disadvantaged, neighbourhoods (Bennett and Wright 1984a; 
Maguire 1982; Hough and Mayhew 1983), achieving little gain 
(Maguire 1982; Walsh 1986) and involving needless risks 
(Bennett and Wright 1984a; Maguire 1982; Walsh 1986). 
Experienced burglars know how to execute careful crime, but 
frequently fail to implement their knowledge (Bennett and 
Wright 1984a; Maguire 1982; Walsh 1986). Roebuck and Johnson 
(1962), comparing specialist and "jack-of-all-trades" 
offenders, found that the latter displayed gross incompetence 
throughout their criminal careers, despite their comparative 
sobriety.
The technical sophistication of much crime is low. Common, 
rather than specialised, knowledge and skills are very 
frequently applied to criminal activity (Letkemann 1973), and 
learning involves the mastery of psychological defences 
against anxiety at least as much as technical ability (Carroll 
1986; Lejeune 1977; Walsh 1986). Preparation is often minimal 
(Bennett and Wright 1984a; Lejeune 1977? Maguire 1982; Walsh 
1986), equipment basic (Walsh 1986), and success reliant on 
victims' or observers' naivete rather than on subterfuge 
(Bennett and Wright 1984a; Buckle and Farrington 1984; Lejeune 
1977? Lejeune and Alex 1973? Murphy 1986? Steffensmeier and 
Terry 1973? Walsh 1986).
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Maguire (1982) suggests that burglars' customary lifestyle, 
favouring hedonism, profligacy and dare-devilry, militates 
against the consistent use of knowledge and skill. Bennett and 
Wright (1984a) found that unnecessary risk taking was itself 
prompted by rewards such as the certainty of gain, excitement 
and convenience.
Incompetence, therefore, is not a necessary consequence of 
intoxication, nor is it a distinctive quality of intoxicated 
crime.
The Appeal to Common Sense
These observations suggest that levels of motivation, 
preparation, discrimination and skill in sober crime are over­
estimated in subjective comparisons with intoxicated crime. 
Offenders generally seem to weigh opportunities and risks in 
a rough and ready way, rather than with objective precision, 
opting for "what seems reasonable at the time" (Bennett and 
Wright 1984a? also Clarke and Cornish 1985; Cornish and Clarke
1986). In crime, as in other activities, as noted in Chapter 
Two,
"[c]omplex situations are typically dealt with 
through simplified strategies or heuristics 
involving limited comparisons and judgements".
(Carroll 1982, p.64)
Thus, Coid (1986a), reviewing sober and intoxicated rape, 
concludes that the most significant finding is probably their 
essential similarity.
In making their distinctions between intoxicated and sober 
crime, offenders appeal to common sense beliefs about 
alcohol's effects, rather than to special insights derived 
from experience. Indeed, the intuitive reasonableness of their 
claims is reflected in the difficulty, in much of the 
literature, of distinguishing fully between offenders' 
theories and the assumptions of the researchers.
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Taylor (1972) criticises the frequent tendency of academics to 
discredit offenders* accounts in favour of their own theories, 
or to accept them only under special conditions such as 
guaranteed privacy. Such responses smack of academic 
arrogance. Nevertheless, the dilemma is real. Firstly, 
offenders may be motivated, under any conditions, to offer 
self-justificatory or self-excusatory accounts, rather than to 
acknowledge fault or failure to themselves or to others 
(Maguire 1982). Secondly, offenders' accounts reflect the 
ignorance of lay people generally about alcohol. Fitzmaurice 
and Pease (1986) also note that offenders' theories of crime 
usually reflect popular beliefs, rather than special insight. 
Thirdly, people appear often to have little or no knowledge of 
the "real” reasons for their actions, invoking instead reasons 
which, although incorrect, strike them as plausible (Nisbett 
and Wilson 1977). Thus, offenders may offer intoxication as 
a primary explanation when it appears to be either the most 
desirable or the most likely reason for their behaviour, on 
the basis of common sense beliefs about alcohol's effects on 
rationality. Furthermore, when directly asked to compare their 
intoxicated and sober crimes, offenders may bring to mind 
occasions with distinctive features, such as arrest, which may 
be attributed to intoxication.
Researchers appear to respond to offenders' accounts with 
acceptance or qualification, according to their particular 
personal beliefs, theoretical perspectives and research focus. 
This can lead to notable contradictions.
a) Personal beliefs
Researchers' willingness to believe in the irrationality and 
incompetence of intoxicated offenders' behaviour contrasts 
strikingly with their confidence in the reliability of their 
own intoxicated reasoning. Participant observers produce 
confident commentary after heavy drinking sessions with their 
subjects (Archard 1979? Parker 1974; Hobbs 1988). Hobbs, 
investigating the police, recalls;
97
"For the most part I spoke, acted, drank, and 
generally behaved as though I was not doing 
research. Indeed, I often had to remind myself that 
I was not in a pub to enjoy myself, but to conduct 
an academic inquiry and repeatedly woke up the 
following morning with an incredible hangover facing 
the dilemma of whether to bring it up or write it 
up."
(Hobbs 1988, p.6)
Maguire's (1982) repeated endorsement of burglars' 
denunciation of intoxicated crime as irrational contrasts 
oddly with the respectful biography of a successful 
professional thief, whose accounts are replete with references 
to heavy drinking which go unremarked by the author. Maguire's 
concept of "professionalism" appears to disqualify the 
possible relevance of intoxication to this analysis.
b) Theoretical perspective
Berkowitz (1986) disputes Luckenbill's (1977) assertion of the 
significance of onlookers in violent interactions. No 
assaulter in Berkowitz' study believed that the presence or 
absence of an audience influenced his offence. This, however, 
ignores the evidence from experimental research that people 
fail to recognise the effects of an audience on their 
behaviour (Latane and Darley 1970), which suggests that the 
responses of Berkowitz's assaulters were predictable but 
unreliable. By contrast, Berkowitz argues that assaulters 
increased their violence in response to signs of their 
victims' pain, although themselves unaware of this stimulus. 
Berkowitz' selectivity as to which "unconscious" responses he 
recognises complements his theoretical preference for the 
explanation of wilful harm inflicted by "explosive" men with 
weak ego defences.
Similarly, Cordilia (1986), favouring a symbolic 
interactionist perspective, explains intoxicated group robbery 
as the attempt to prolong intense, but tenuous relationships, 
although interviewed offenders did not articulate their 
motives in this way.
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c) Research focus
Researchers sometimes appear "blind" to their subjects' 
obvious intoxication when offending. Maguire's (1982) 
disregard of intoxication when examining "professionalism" has 
been mentioned. Athens' (1980) investigation of violent crime, 
derived entirely from offenders' accounts, achieved detailed 
explanations of the motives for and execution of offences 
without invoking alcohol as a cause, although the majority 
mentioned being heavily intoxicated. Athens himself does not 
comment on the prevalence of intoxication in these accounts. 
For both offenders and researchers, focusing on the sequence 
of events and decisions leading to an offence appears to 
render alcohol superfluous to causal explanations of crime.
Summary
Offenders' theories of intoxicated crime are derived from lay 
beliefs about alcohol, and are likely to be invoked as 
explanations of offences when other reasons are unacceptable 
or unavailable. They are capable of detailed accounts of 
intoxicated crime without invoking alcohol as a cause. 
Researchers tend to accept or reject the appeal to intuitive 
common sense according to their personal beliefs, theoretical 
perspectives and research focus.
DISPOSITIONAL THEORIES 
Overview
Dispositional theories of deviance attempt to link the 
development of deviant behaviour to distinctive experiences or 
personality characteristics. They therefore primarily concern 
the processes of initiation, development and change during 
drinking and criminal "careers". Research emphasises methods 
such as longitudinal studies, cross-sectional surveys, studies 
of special populations such as prisoners or alcoholics in 
treatment, and personality measurement.
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a) Life experiences
The development of individual drinking problems has been 
studied by longitudinal comparisons of drinking patterns 
between early and later adolescence (e.g. Marsh, Dobbs and 
White 1986), adolescence and young adulthood (e.g. Ghodsian 
and Power 1987) and youth and later adulthood (e.g. McCord and 
McCord 1962). The manifestation of drinking problems has been 
studied through cross-sectional population surveys (e.g. Hauge 
and Irgens-Jensen 1987). Collectively, such studies suggest 
that although early and later drinking problems are linked, 
individual drinking patterns fluctuate so considerably over 
the life span that "no reliable predictive statement can be 
made about a given individual even in the presence of 
extensive information about the person's drinking behavior, 
personality and life history" (Blane 1979, p.28? also Collins 
1982; Zucker 1979). Despite the instability of individual 
drinking patterns through the life cycle, there is in general 
a marked shift from comparatively common problematic drinking 
in young adulthood towards unproblematic drinking in maturity 
(Blane 1979? Collins 1982? Sadava 1987). Drinking problems are 
experienced differently in youth and middle age (Hauge and 
Irgens-Jensen 1987? Zucker 1979). Similar fluctuations, and 
the tendency towards desistance after young adulthood are 
found in criminal careers (Briar and Piliavin 1965? Collins 
1982? Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983).
Multiple life history factors are implicated in the 
development of drinking problems. These include, for example, 
ethnicity, religion and culture (Blane 1979? Goldman, Brown 
and Christiansen 1987? Greeley, McCready and Theisen 1980? 
Zucker 1979), parental relationships and models (Goldman, 
Brown and Christiansen 1987? Greeley, McCready and Theisen 
1980? Zucker 1979), family size (Zucker 1979) and socio­
economic status (Blane 1979? Collins 1982? Zucker 1979). Such 
factors, however, interact with each other to exert their 
relative influences in complex combinations (Collins 1982? Cox 
1987? Sadava 1987? Zucker 1979). Furthermore, the salience of
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different factors to an individuals drinking pattern changes 
over the life span, for example in the relative influence of 
parental and peer group models (Zucker 1979). Finally, the 
influence of historical factors is heavily modified by the 
individual's contemporary social position and drinking 
environment (Blane 1979; Collins 1982? Harford, Wechsler and 
Rohman 1983? Hauge and Irgens-Jensen 1987? Hope 1985; 
Nusbaumer, Mauss and Pearson 1982; Sadava 1987? Zucker 1979). 
Again, similar factors have been found to predict persistent 
delinquency (Farrington 1987? Loeber and Dishion 1983; West 
and Farrington 1973).
b) Personality characteristics
The "alcoholic personality" concept has been discredited by 
the failure of research to link alcoholism convincingly to 
distinctive personality characteristics (Cox 1987; Fingarette 
1988). Nevertheless, the concept retains its attractiveness. 
Some theorists, while recognising the lack of supportive 
evidence, continue to argue the importance of personality 
factors in alcoholism. For example, Ludwig suggests that
"the lack of a typical alcoholic personality does 
not mean that there is not a constellation of 
inchoate attributes common to alcoholics, or most 
individuals for that matter, which can become 
exaggerated and hypertrophied in response to a 
growing dependence upon alcohol and all of the 
deception, interpersonal difficulties, and 
expenditure of energy it entails to maintain so 
destructive a habit."
(Ludwig 1988, p.78)
It is unclear how far some measures of personality which 
characterise alcoholics, such as low self-esteem, depression, 
anxiety, high field dependence and external locus of control, 
are a cause, and how far a consequence of alcoholism (Cox 
1985, 1987; Heather and Robertson 1985). Cox argues that
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"the intense negative affect observed among 
alcoholics is largely a consequence of long-term 
alcohol abuse."
(Cox 1985, p.215)
The suggestion in some research that individuals prone to 
develop drinking problems are more sensitive to alcohol's 
effects than others (Cappell and Greeley 1987; Cox 1987? Sher
1987), nevertheless begs the question how such individuals 
come to value those effects. For example, Sher (1987) notes 
that individual susceptibility to alcohol's tension reducing 
effects appears to be unrelated to personality measures of 
anxiety proneness.
Personality characteristics which do appear to predict 
problematic drinking, such as impulsivity, non-conformity and 
low self-control, do not self-evidently explain its onset. 
Despite the consistent finding of these personality 
characteristics,
"there is no uniform evidence that substance users 
and abusers were maladjusted or psychologically 
distressed prior to their substance use."
(Cox 1985, p.215)
These personality characteristics also resemble 
characteristics such as troublesomeness, aggression and anti­
social behaviour, which have been found to predict delinquency 
(Farrington 1987; Loeber and Dishion 1983).
Thus, adolescent problem drinking and delinquency appear to be 
part of a cluster of non-conforming behaviours which may have 
common psychosocial foundations (Collins 1982; Sadava 1987? 
Zucker 1979). Although the intensity of offending during later 
criminal careers appears to covary with periods of heavy 
drinking, this is not in itself evidence of a causal effect of 
frequent intoxication on criminality (Collins 1982, 1986).
Collins (1982) suggests that in fact adolescent delinquency 
may precede drinking, and adult criminality may exacerbate
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drinking problems. This perspective has received scant 
attention, perhaps because it runs counter to the common sense 
cause and effect relationship between drinking and crime.
Dispositional explanations of the relationship between acute 
intoxication and specific criminal events are largely of two 
types: that intoxication exacerbates the factors which
predispose individuals to commit crime; or that there is an 
underlying common cause of both drinking and offending 
(Pernanen 1982).
Approaches of the former type usually rely on assumed 
pharmacological effects of alcohol, such as disinhibition 
(Pernanen 1982). More detailed attempts have difficulty 
encompassing the varied strands of relevant research. For 
example, Blum (1982) suggests that the probability of violence 
among alcoholics is enhanced by the stressfulness of social 
situations caused by their external locus of control, field 
dependency and impaired abstract reasoning. This argument, 
however, overlooks evidence that violence is suppressed among 
very heavy drinkers (Kantor and Straus 1987) and that the 
offences of chronic alcoholics are typically non-violent, 
drunkenness offences (Washbrook 1977; Pittman and Gordon 
1958) .
Blum's account suggests predictability of offending from the 
combination of personal attributes and the effects of alcohol. 
However, both intoxicated and sober individuals vary 
considerably in their responses to different situations 
(Pervin 1986; Toch 1986). For example, males may confine their 
violence to domestic situations (Fagan, Stewart and Hansen 
1983), but even there not all provocative situations will 
result in violence (Dobash and Dobash 1984).
Approaches of the latter type usually identify personal 
attributes which are thought to underlie both excessive 
drinking and criminality. The concept of "undersocialisation”,
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examined below, falls into this category. Such common cause 
conceptualisations may offer explanations of the apparent 
covariation of drinking and offending careers, or the transfer 
of deviance from offending to drinking in later life, since 
both behaviours are thought to stem from the same psychosocial 
sources. Once again, however, explanations of the relationship 
between acute intoxication and specific criminal events tend 
to appeal to alcohol's assumed effects.
Undersocialisation
The concept of "undersocialisation” (Bahr and Caplow 1974) is 
not a unified theory, but is invoked to a greater or lesser 
extent by several alcohol and crime theorists. It is also a 
popular lay and professional concept, expressed in terms such 
as "inadequacy", "inability to cope", "dependency" and "poor 
self-control". Underpinning the various academic, lay and 
professional manifestations of the undersocialisation concept 
is the theme that drinking and offending are maladaptive 
solutions to the failure to develop sufficient psychological 
resources to respond competently to the demands of
conventional social life.
The popularity of the undersocialisation concept is
accompanied by a tendency to regard its explanatory power as 
self-evident. Thus, it receives only passing mention in some 
of the literature on alcoholism (e.g. Jellinek 1960) and crime 
(e.g. Washbrook 1977). Pittman and Gordon explain the shift 
from property crime to chronic drunkenness offences in terms 
of undersocialisation.
"[T]he criminal career is generally divided into two 
distinct phases. The first covers the earlier years 
of life, generally when the man is under 40 years of 
age, and is marked by arrests and incarcerations for 
offenses that are seemingly unrelated to excessive 
use of alcohol. However, these arrests and 
incarcerations mean that their attempted criminal 
careers have been unsuccessful. They then drop out 
of active crime, not only because of ineptness and 
age, but also through the emergence of the new 
pattern of adaptation to societal norms and
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requirements which is reflected in increased 
drinking and life on Skid Row. In terms of their 
perception of the life situation, drinking forms a 
part of a new pattern of gratifying psychological 
needs, replacing the unsuccessful attempt to achieve 
that gratification in a career of crimes against 
property."
(Pittman and Gordon 1958, p.542)
They continue:
"The penal institution is thus functional for those 
inebriates who show long and continuous histories of 
incarceration, in that it meets, although in a 
socially disapproved way, the basic psychological 
needs of their personality structure. Incarceration, 
on the other hand, is dysfunctional in the sense 
that it provides the situation in which the 
developing dependency can be fixed in the 
personality pattern where it is already evident as 
an inability to develop autonomy in adulthood."
(Pittman and Gordon 1958, p.546)
The undersocialisation concept lies at the heart of some 
theoretical accounts of intoxicated crime. For example, 
Cordilia's (1986) symbolic interactionist analysis of robbery 
arising in a group drinking context appeals to the generation 
of intense, tenuous relationships between socially isolated 
individuals in a drinking situation.
Control theory (Briar and Piliavin 1965; Gottfredson and 
Hirschi 1990? Hirschi 1969? Hindelang 1973? Wiatrowski, 
Griswold and Roberts 1981) provides an example of a rigorous 
theoretical account, complemented by considerable research, of 
the release of criminality through the failure of 
socialisation experiences to develop strong internal controls, 
or "commitments to conformity" (Briar and Piliavin 1965). 
Nevertheless, since crime is not continuous even among poorly 
controlled individuals, it is necessary to examine specific 
criminal events (Clarke and Cornish 1985), to determine the 
factors which motivate the individual to act on the 
coincidence of his weak self-control and the opportunity to 
offend (Briar and Piliavin 1965? Hirschi 1986? Shover 1985).
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The undersocialisation concept implies that the deviant 
lifestyle is less demanding than the conventional one. 
Individuals who have failed to achieve adequate levels of 
socialisation for competent performance in conventional life, 
turn to deviance as an easier route to survival. However, both 
alcoholic and criminal lifestyles make heavy demands on 
individual resources (Archard 1979; Cook 1975; Healy 1988; 
Phillimore 1979; Shover 1986; Walsh 1986; Wiseman 1970). Cook, 
observing the frequent use of the word "inadequate" in social 
workers' reports on skid row men, remarks;
"These 'judgements at a distance' do not reflect in 
any way the qualities the men need to survive on 
skid row. The resourcefulness and energy required on 
skid row can at times be considerable, and hordes of 
the passively inadequate men described could not 
survive at all."
(Cook 1975, p.164)
Significant skill deficits are deficits for criminal 
competence as much as for conventional activities. Roebuck and 
Johnson (1962) attribute the failure of "jack-of-all-trades" 
offenders to progress in professional crime to their 
clumsiness, poor self-discipline, frequent apprehension, 
indiscriminate choice of crime and isolation from more 
sophisticated criminals. The single area of relative social 
competence displayed by these offenders was their comparative 
sobriety!
Bahr and Caplow (1974) found that skid row drinkers were more 
sociable, had more friends and more family and community ties 
than abstainers, whose histories were marked by non­
attachment .
"A condition such as 'undersocialization', cannot be 
the major factor in the development of a certain 
behavior if it appears most consistently in the 
lives of those who do not exhibit the behavior. The 
heavy drinkers in our sample may indeed be 
undersocialized in comparison with the general 
population, but this deficiency cannot be the
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explanation for their excessive drinking if it is 
even more characteristic of abstainers and moderate 
drinkers on the Bowery."
(Bahr and Caplow 1974, p.256)
Facilitated by the assumption of social rejection, noted in 
Chapter Two, the point that skid row life is more tolerable if 
the individual participates in its major social activity is 
often taken to imply "escape" through intoxication. There are, 
however, distinct benefits to be derived from participation in 
skid row drinking, including a degree of sociability and 
support unavailable to the abstainer (Bahr and Caplow 1974? 
Peterson and Maxwell 1958? Rubington 1958). This incentive 
encourages the adaptation of individual drinking behaviour to 
the predominant pattern of the drinking group (Rubington 1958? 
Wallace 1965). The filtering of information on the basis of a 
particular conceptualisation, suggested in Chapter Two, may 
lead to the perception of undersocialisation in behaviour 
which is a product of this "social organisation of deviance" 
(Best and Luckenbill 1982) . Four examples of this may be 
given:-
a) Skid row drinking patterns are shaped by the tension 
between chronic poverty and the desire to maintain drinking 
(Archard 1979). Loose drinking groups are formed for the 
procurement and consumption of alcohol, avoiding police 
interference (Archard 1979? Cook 1975? Peterson and Maxwell 
1958? Rubington 1978) . Such transient relationships, driven by 
economic and situational necessity, may appear to reflect 
inability to sustain social ties.
b) Skid row men have neither the financial resources nor the 
opportunities to make long term plans or provisions. Feeding, 
clothing, drinking and shelter are day-to-day activities, 
funded by the small financial and material resources available 
from casual work, state and charitable welfare, small scale 
theft and begging (Archard 1979? Cook 1975? Healy 1988? 
Peterson and Maxwell 1958? Phillimore 1979? Wiseman 1970).
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Analyses of these activities, however, show each to require a 
degree of enterprise, persistence and skill which is masked by 
the superficial appearance of passive receipt of hand-outs.
c) The suppression of serious offending among chronic heavy 
drinkers may appear as the result of incompetence exacerbated 
by physical and mental deterioration (e.g. Pittman and Gordon 
1958). However, opportunities for large scale or organised 
crime are simply absent in the environments and social 
groupings within which skid row men move (Archard 1979? 
Pernanen 1982; Wiseman 1970).
d) Failure to remain in treatment facilities may appear to the 
providers as evidence of inadequacy and lack of commitment to 
rehabilitation (Archard 1979). However, skid row men appear to 
employ a different definition of treatment resources as, for 
the most part, a means of maintaining their lifestyle, rather 
than changing it. Such facilities provide short term 
detoxification, shelter, food and escape from police 
surveillance to restore the physical and psychological stamina 
required by the rigours of skid row life (Archard 1979? Healy 
1988? Wiseman 1970).
Summary
Research prompted by dispositional perspectives has 
demonstrated that some groups of individuals have an increased 
risk of drinking problems (Sadava 1987; Zucker 1979). However, 
closer prediction of individual drinking careers has not been 
possible. Nor has it been possible to identify a causal 
relationship between problem drinking and criminality. The 
two appear to have common psychosocial foundations. 
Dispositional explanations of specific intoxicated criminal 
events are weak, encouraging the attribution to personal 
characteristics of responsibility for behaviour which is in 
fact heavily influenced by the environments in which 
individuals move. Psychosocial factors must be considered in 
relation to the specific situations in which individuals
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become motivated to act upon such predispositions as they 
have, either to drink or to commit crime (Adesso 1985; Bennett 
and Wright 1984a? Best and Luckenbill 1982; Berkowitz 1986? 
Fingarette 1988; Ludwig 1988; Pervin 1986? Toch 1986).
SITUATIONAL THEORIES 
Overview
Situational perspectives recognise that criminal activity 
requires ”the confluence in time and space of the target and 
offender in the absence of effective deterrents” (Gottfredson 
1984, p.3). Thus, they are primarily concerned with the 
analysis of specific drinking and criminal events, examining 
the contributions of situational factors to the production of 
crime: the human (Garofalo 1987? Gottfredson 1984? Hough and 
Mayhew 1983, 1985? Lejeune and Alex 1973) and physical 
(Bennett and Wright 1984a? Maguire 1982; Mayhew, Clarke, 
Sturman and Hough 1976) targets of crime? and the development 
of criminal opportunities (Bennett and Wright 1984a? Clarke 
1980? Clarke and Cornish 1985? Hope 1985).
Drinking behaviour is heavily influenced by situational 
factors. For example, it varies according to the public or 
private nature of the drinking context (Harford 1979, 1983; 
Marsh, Dobbs and White 1986), presence and number of drinking 
companions (Harford 1983? McCarty 1985), models for drinking 
behaviour (McCarty 1985? Nusbaumer, Mauss and Pearson 1982? 
Zucker 1979), and gender of drinking companions (Harford 1983? 
Wilsnack and Wilsnack 1979). Harford (1983) suggests that 
different factors such as drinking context and type of 
drinking companion interact in complex ways to modify drinking 
behaviour. Nusbaumer, Mauss and Pearson (1982), however, argue 
that the detailed attention to social situational factors 
neglects the special reinforcements for heavy drinking 
provided in the design and management of public licensed 
premises.
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Bennett and Wright (1984a), by contrast, argue that 
situational research in criminology has concentrated narrowly 
on immediate factors in the physical environment, to the 
neglect of relevant social situational factors such as the 
presence and behaviour of peers. Similarly, Hope (1985) argues 
that an analysis of city centre disorder should include a 
broad examination of situational and socio-cultural factors 
concerning the leisure preferences of those who congregate in 
city centres, physical factors concerning the design of city 
centres and drinking places, and issues in the management of 
licensed premises.
Such arguments encourage a theoretical perspective in which 
alcohol itself may be defined as a situational factor, 
defining the context of social interaction (e.g. pub), its 
nature (e.g. leisure) and the range of anticipated behaviour 
(e.g. disinhibited) (Cavan 1966? Gusfield 1987). Both alcohol 
(Barrett 1985? Harford 1979? McCarty 1985? Sadava 1987) and 
crime (Campbell 1986? Clarke and Cornish 1985? Cornish and 
Clarke 1986? Forgas 1986? Pervin 1986? Toch 1986) theorists 
argue that individual perception and cognition are crucial to 
the explanation of the influence of situational factors on 
behaviour. Thus, situational analyses of crime must be highly 
crime specific in order to identify important aspects of 
decision making (Cornish and Clarke 1986).
The pursuit of research into broad categories of crime such as 
assault obscures fine differences between sub-categories of 
offences under that heading. Situational analyses of violent 
interactions (e.g. Luckenbill 1977? Felson and Steadman 1983) 
are primarily accounts of escalating mutual aggression between 
males, often arising in a public drinking setting. Examining 
domestic violence, Dobash and Dobash (1984) , found that during 
an attack female victims repeatedly attempted to appease, 
rather than to incite a male aggressor. They suggest that this 
signifies a crucial distinction between domestic assaults and 
public violence between males: that the intention to attack is
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formed by the aggressor prior to the interaction itself, 
rather than emerging within it. Any role played by alcohol in 
a premeditated assault must differ, at least in the initial 
stages, from that implied when violence is an unplanned 
outcome of a situationally inspired aggressive interchange.
Situational perspectives thus usefully present alcohol as a 
contributor in conventional decision making processes, rather 
than attributing qualitative alterations in rationality to its 
effects. They aid an understanding of the variability of 
individual behaviour in different situations. Paradoxically, 
however, analyses of intoxicated crime tend to imply the 
inevitability of criminal, in particular violent, outcomes of 
drinking episodes in provocative situations.
Symbolic Interactionism
Symbolic interactionism has provided a major contribution to 
the analysis of criminal events, particularly violence, on 
which much recent interactionist theory has focused (Felson 
and Steadman 1983), and which has particular attractions for 
theories of intoxicated crime. The theory stresses the 
importance of the establishment, management and preservation 
of self-image in social interaction (Felson and Steadman 
1983). Thus, it has an affinity with lay explanations of 
violence as the result of "macho posturing”, "refusal to climb 
down", and "face saving".
Luckenbill's (1977) study of "situated transactions" resulting 
in homicide illustrates this genre of research and theoretical 
analysis. Creating detailed reconstructions of incidents of 
criminal homicide from content analysis of the official 
documentation in each case, Luckenbill concluded:
"Transactions resulting in murder involved the joint 
contribution of the offender and victim to the 
escalation of a ‘character contest', a confrontation
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in which at least one, but usually both, attempt to 
establish or save face at the other*s expense by 
standing steady in the face of adversity."
(Luckenbill 1977, p.177)
Luckenbill's study illustrates an earlier point: that a
research focus on the sequence of events and decisions prior 
to an offence obviates the necessity of invoking alcohol as a 
contributory causal factor. Indeed, Luckenbill asserts that 
the analysis is generally applicable to homicidal assaults 
irrespective of alcohol involvement. Other research, however, 
has established alcohol involvement as one of only two factors 
which reliably distinguish fatal from non-fatal assaults; the 
other being the presence of a weapon (Pittman and Handy 1964). 
Indeed, this is the only qualitative difference between 
alcohol-related and sober crime to emerge during the 
literature search. The discrepancy therefore seems important.
One possible explanation is methodological. Despite the 
advantages of crime specificity, exclusive concentration on 
homicide might itself obscure vital differences between fatal 
and non-fatal assaults (Bankston 1988). Had Luckenbill's study 
included non-fatal assaults, alcohol involvement might have 
emerged as a distinctive factor in homicide. Certainly, 
alcohol is a prevalent situational feature in Luckenbill's 
account. Thus, Luckenbill's analysis may in fact embrace the 
significance of alcohol without explicitly identifying it.
For example, a fatal outcome might be attributed to alcohol's 
disinhibiting, or aggression arousing effects, resulting in 
greater attacking force by an intoxicated aggressor, or 
greater resistance in an intoxicated victim. Such an 
explanation would also usefully account for Luckenbill's 
failure to identify a decision to use lethal force, but only 
a "working agreement" between participants to use violence 
itself.
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However, an appeal at this stage to alcohol's assumed effects 
is premature. Felson and Steadman (1983) found that although 
both victim aggression and victim intoxication were related to 
the severity of a violent assault, these two factors were 
themselves unrelated. This finding contradicts the prediction 
that resistance will be greater among intoxicated victims 
through disinhibition or aggression arousal. Further, if 
alcohol fails to intensify victim aggression, by implication 
it may equally fail to intensify assailants' attacks.
Alternative explanations may be suggested for Luckenbill's 
failure to identify a decision to use lethal force. One 
possibility is again methodological. Possibly Luckenbill's 
data was drawn predominantly from homicides in which fatality 
was indeed an unpremeditated, even unforeseen outcome of a 
violent incident. Alternatively, a clue might lie in 
Luckenbill's observation that the homicides were characterised 
by prior "rehearsals", in which aggressive interactions 
involving the participants had occurred. The failure of 
previous strategies to prevent a recurrence of aggression 
might prompt assailants to use greater, if not explicitly 
lethal, force on the fatal occasion. The availability of such 
alternative explanations demonstrates that the stage has not 
yet been reached when only an appeal to alcohol's effects can 
explain a fatal outcome.
Symbolic interactionist accounts which attempt to include 
detailed analysis of alcohol's effects encounter difficulties 
deriving, paradoxically, from the complementary attractiveness 
of some of these effects to the theoretical perspective 
itself. Such attraction may encourage theorists to stress 
these effects disproportionately to their demonstrated impact 
on behaviour. Thus, symbolic interactionists have stressed 
particular pharmacological effects of alcohol on perception 
and cognition, such as field dependency and subjective 
feelings of power and control (Cambell 1986; Cordilia 1986; 
Gibbs 1986). Gibbs (1986) has developed a sophisticated model
113
of the contribution of these effects to the development of 
bar-room violence, drawing on earlier work by Pernanen (1976, 
1982) . The theoretical attractiveness of such effects stems 
from their conceptual affinity with key symbolic 
interactionist concepts of role-taking, situational identity, 
and defence of self-image. These perceptual and cognitive 
changes are seen to enhance the subjective importance of 
immediate self-presentational roles, assumptions of mastery 
over people and events, and situational cues to aggression, 
whilst simultaneously impoverishing the sophistication and 
range of the behavioural repertoire.
However, Pernanen (1982) cautions that these effects have been 
found in experimental studies of the effects of comparatively 
low doses of alcohol on behaviour such as competitiveness in 
card games. Theoretical extrapolation to violence under 
conditions of heavy intoxication relies on the assumptions 
that perceptual and cognitive changes occur incrementally with 
dosage and that competitiveness and violence are part of the 
same behavioural repertoire. Empirical support for these 
assumptions is unavailable (Pernanen 1982) . Pernanen1s 
description of the connotative attractiveness of the limited 
available empirical evidence to broad theoretical analyses 
also reflects the fundamental influence of common sense 
notions on academic theory noted in Chapter Two.
"The seeming relevance may stem largely from 
semantical connections between the concept of 
‘power1, with the concept of (potential) force, and 
‘risk*, with disregard for (potential) adversity 
such as physical punishment or sanctions in general.
The latter concept is thus rather closely 
coextensive with the concept of deviance, and 
relevant alcohol effects are perhaps implicit in the 
notion of 'drinking for courage'."
(Pernanen 1982, p.25)
The distortion of empirical evidence, encouraged by its 
affinity with a theoretical perspective, results in analyses
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which imply that aggression, escalating into violence, is a 
virtually inevitable outcome of increasing intoxication.
"[Vjiolence is the product of certain kinds of
interpersonal interactions, and alcohol affects 
perception and cognition in ways that make the
occurrence of these kinds of interactions more 
likely. The bar is the context within which these 
interactions occur, and it features environmental 
qualities that can , shape both drinking and the
expression of aggression."
(Gibbs 1986, p.137)
But "[a]lcohol-related violence is rare in relation to the 
number of man-hours devoted to drinking" (Evans 1986, p.146; 
also Blum 1982? Smith and Burvill 1987). Bankston (1988), 
criticising this weakness in interactional analysis, 
recommends control theory as a more useful theoretical 
framework. Control theory, by focusing on the erosion of 
constraints on violence in aggressive situations, would alert 
the analyst to features of alcohol use situations affecting 
the release of conventionally inhibited behaviour, such as 
heightened interaction, crowding, physical design, drinking 
companions, drinking styles, bystanders and pub management 
(Cavan 1966; Harford 1979, 1983? Harford, Wechsler and Rohman 
1983? Hope 1985? McCarty 1985? Marsh and Campbell 1979; 
Pernanen 1982; Zinberg 1984). Once again, there is a beguiling 
affinity between this theoretical frame and concepts of 
disinhibition and aggression arousal, so that alcohol might be 
seen to contribute directly to the weakening of behavioural 
controls.
At this point, however, the conceptual distinction between 
"escalatory" and "erosive" situational factors becomes 
difficult to sustain in practice, since both the pertinent 
situational variables and the behavioural outcome are the same 
in either case. Furthermore, this approach offers no clearer 
identification of the (literally) "decisive" element in the 
use of force, again implying inevitability through the 
progressive erosion of controls. Thus, other situational
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approaches have problems in explaining intoxicated crime in 
common with symbolic interactionism.
Theoretical approaches such as these risk invoking alcohol as 
an all-purpose explanatory tool. For example, Gibbs (1986) 
claims that alcohol may explain both variation and consistency 
in individual responses to different situations. Cordilia 
(1986) suggests that alcohol "magnifies" the significance of 
situational cues, enhancing individual responses. Such appeals 
to alcohol's effects explain everything and nothing. In 
attempting to retain sufficient flexibility to acknowledge the 
indeterminateness of behaviour in alcohol use situations, 
theoretical statements about alcohol's effects may become so 
general that they explain little or no more about behaviour 
than theories of sober crime.
"In general the causes of alcohol-related violence 
and deviance may not be so different from the event- 
based etiology of sober deviance and violence. The 
excessive situational determination, impulsivity, 
inability to delay gratification, etc., which have 
been put forth in explanations of general deviance 
and crime, can be created artificially (as an 
analogue of sorts) by the use of alcohol."
(Pernanen 1982, p.30)
Summary
Situational perspectives on intoxicated crime are primarily 
concerned with drinking and criminal events. Their advantages 
derive from the recognition of alcohol as a situational 
factor, and a contributor to normal decision making processes. 
Theoretical attempts to specify alcohol1s contribution to the 
formation of criminal intention, however, either become overly 
deterministic or remain uninformatively general.
SUBSTANCE FOCUSED THEORIES 
Overview
Substance focused theory and research primarily concerns the 
identification of changes in mood and behaviour directly 
attributable to the pharmacological effects of alcohol. It has
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already been seen that dispositional and situational theories 
of alcohol-related crime often appeal to these assumed effects 
(Hamilton and Collins 1982? Pernanen 1982).
Substance focused research emphasises methods such as clinical 
observation and testing, measurement of physiological 
responses of light, heavy and non-drinkers to varied alcohol 
doses, and behavioural observation and subjective self-reports 
under the same conditions. A major tool in such experimental 
research has been the balanced placebo design methodology, in 
which subjects' beliefs about whether or not they have 
consumed alcohol are manipulated independently of the actual 
administration of alcohol or placebo doses. Substance focused 
theories relate experimental findings to "real world" 
conditions, by drawing on the contributions of ethnographic 
observations of drinking behaviour in natural environments.
Substance focused research has pursued the precise 
specification of conditions in which particular mood and 
behavioural changes will result from alcohol ingestion. 
However, it has been impossible to identify specific effects 
of alcohol on the brain and central nervous system which 
induce responses with potentially straightforward links to 
criminal behaviour, such as aggression (Brain 1986? Evans 
1986). Others, such as sexual responsiveness appear in fact to 
be suppressed (Coid 1986a). Alcohol's physiological effects 
appear to be generalised and indeterminate as to behavioural 
consequences (Pernanen 1982). Ironically, this genre of 
research has convincingly demonstrated the significance of 
non-pharmacological factors in intoxicated behaviour, and in 
particular the role of expectancies, or subjective beliefs 
about the effects of alcohol.
The central concept underpinning substance focused 
explanations of the alcohol-crime relationship is "loss of 
control". Unlike dispositional theories, which postulate low 
self-control as an individual characteristic, substance
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focused theories suggest that episodic loss of control is 
itself induced by alcohol's pharmacological effects. Lay 
theory encapsulates this notion in the observation that some 
intoxicated individuals "can't hold their drink". This key 
concept underpins the relevance of substance focused theories 
both to drinking and criminal careers, through a concern with 
chronic inebriation, and to drinking and criminal events, 
through a concern with acute intoxication. Thus, the loss of 
control assumption pervades substance focused 
conceptualisations of alcoholism and disinhibition.
1. Chronic inebriation: alcoholism
The loss of control concept in theories of alcoholism implies 
that chronic inebriation destroys the ability to regulate 
drinking itself voluntarily. Its significance in theories of 
alcohol-related crime is largely connotative: by implication, 
control over other behaviour is also lost (e.g. Kessel and 
Walton 1989); or "desperate" crime results from the need to 
continue drinking (e.g. Cameron 1964).
Disease theory (Jellinek 1960) hypothesised that chronic 
inebriation damages cell tissues so that alcohol' s presence in 
the bloodstream triggers involuntary drinking; that alcoholics 
perpetuate drinking in order to avoid the discomfort of 
withdrawal? and that this loss of control over drinking is 
permanent. These hypotheses have been disconfirmed by clinical 
research. Initial alcohol consumption does not trigger 
involuntary drinking in alcoholics (Mendelson and Mello 1987? 
Wilson 1987)? alcoholics may tolerate self-imposed withdrawal 
(Archard 1979? Healy 1988? Fingarette 1988? Mendelson and 
Mello 1979)? and alcoholics may resume non-problem drinking 
(Armor 1980? Polich 1980). The extent of drinking by 
alcoholics following detoxification is influenced by their 
social circumstances, such as marital status (Armor 1980), and 
the degree of tolerance of drinking in their environment, as 
in "dry" or "wet" hostels (Cook 1975? Rubington 1958) .
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Ethnographic studies reveal alcoholic drinking to be a 
controlled activity. In skid row drinking groups, the "runner" 
does not consume the bottle instead of returning to the group. 
Consumption itself is moderated by sipping, passing on, pauses 
and conversation (Archard 1979? Peterson and Maxwell 1958; 
Rubington 1978). Crude spirit consumption is an intermittent 
response to economic necessity and does not cause continuous 
reliance on the practice (Archard 1979; Cook 1975? Peterson 
and Maxwell 1958). The novice must practice consuming it 
slowly, in small sips, made palatable with orange juice 
(Archard 1979; Cook 1975).
Such evidence of voluntary self-regulation has presented 
academic theory with the problem of explaining why alcoholics 
continue, or resume heavy drinking in the face of the 
obviously disastrous consequences. Sober alcoholics frequently 
describe drinking as pleasurable (Mendelson and Mello 1979). 
However, simple enjoyment is an inadequate explanation, since 
despite their affirmations, direct observation of intoxicated 
alcoholics reveals progressive dysphoria, anxiety, agitation 
and irritability (Barrett 1985? Mendelson and Mello 1979). 
This discrepancy cannot be explained by the deleterious 
effects of alcoholism on memory, rendering alcoholics 
incapable of recalling their aversive experiences (Mendelson 
and Mello 1979; Wilson 1987). Notwithstanding the self-serving 
selectivity of such memory impairment, sober alcoholics do 
nevertheless recognise the long-term damaging consequences of 
their drinking (Wilson 1987).
Cox (1987) suggests that changes in the affective consequences 
of intoxication during alcoholic drinking careers produce 
concomitant changes in the motivation for drinking: alcoholics 
drink to offset negative affect. But drinking is a manifestly 
unsuccessful strategy for accomplishing this. Such reasoning 
begins to suggest that alcoholic drinking is irrational 
behaviour caused by alcohol's ruinous effects on the 
alcoholic's ability to assess his own internal emotional
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states. Mendelson and Mello (1979), concluding that the 
explanation for persistent alcoholic drinking is as yet 
unknown, suggest that common sense assumptions about what 
constitutes a "positive" or "aversive" experience may require 
radical reappraisal.
These problems lead to a temptation to resort to the loss of 
control assumption, which pervades some academic expositions, 
despite attempts to retain notions of rationality and self- 
direction. For example, Ludwig (1988) argues that alcoholics 
simply refuse to believe that they will never be able to 
resume drinking without suffering aversive consequences. 
Notwithstanding the measure of clinical evidence, already 
noted, to support this alcoholic obstinacy, Ludwig's 
explanation is itself infused with the loss of control 
assumption. Thus, Ludwig suggests:
"[T]he attractive but controversial hypothesis of 
state dependent learning is probably overly 
simplistic, ignoring such alternative explanations 
as the disinhibiting effects of alcohol on the 
frontal cortex of the brain (which could explain why 
conscience has wryly been defined as 'a substance 
readily dissolvable in alcohol'), the influence of 
different discriminative stimuli as determinants of 
specific behaviors, and the ability of alcohol to 
unleash a whole array of conditioned responses. 
Whatever the true explanation, the problem remains 
clear. Virtually all psychotherapeutic approaches 
eventually falter once alcohol begins circulating in 
the brain, unlocking a highly predictable repertoire 
of the attitudes and behaviors associated with 
drinking."
(Ludwig 1988, p.61)
Much of the controversy about alcoholic loss of control has 
centred on the concept of "craving". Jellinek (1960) 
postulated irresistible craving as a defining characteristic 
of alcoholism. Ludwig (1988), acknowledging the evidence of 
self-regulation, suggests that craving is a "strong desire" 
which may or may not be resisted. Other theorists object that 
the concept of craving is meaningless: if craving is
irresistible, then it is defined simply by drinking; if it is
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not, it merely states the known fact that alcoholic drinking 
behaviour is variable (Fingarette 1988? Mendelson and Mello
1979) .
This sterile academic dispute revolves around the question 
whether internal states can be said to exist if there is no 
behavioural evidence for them. Common sense, however, 
suggests, by introspection, that people frequently experience 
desires which they refrain from indulging. Indeed, this may be 
one of those "fireside inductions", held "semper, ubique et ab 
omnibus'* which Meehl (1977) cautions academics against 
ignoring. Ludwig*s (1988) graphic biographical accounts of 
craving experiences describe situations with which drinking is 
commonly associated, and in which the desire to drink 
therefore is generally regarded as unremarkable: whilst
pondering an acute dilemma, watching sport on television, 
staying in a hotel, finishing a game of golf and flying. 
Arguably, the difference for the alcoholic derives from a 
conflict of interests: he simultaneously wants to drink,
anticipating immediate pleasure, and also to abstain, 
anticipating longer-term misery. Cornish offers a similar 
explanation of compulsive feelings associated with gambling.
"If there is little evidence that the gambler is 
forced into ever more intense involvement by the 
compelling nature of the reinforcement itself, the 
subjective feelings of pressure or compulsion 
undoubtedly experienced by some heavy gamblers can 
still be given an alternative explanation. Where 
people have begun to gamble at an early age, for 
example, such feelings are particularly likely to 
arise as rival sources of reinforcement (wife, or 
family) begin to make their appearance in the 
gambler*s life. At this stage, and not before, the 
gambler would become aware of conflicts of interest 
such as those between the earlier and smaller 
reinforcements provided by gambling and those larger 
and later ones provided by people and events outside 
the gambling situation. These conflicts might be 
responsible for belated attempts at 'impulse-
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control' ... and the subjective feelings of 'loss of 
control' frequently reported as symptomatic of the 
'compulsive' gambler..."
(Cornish 1978, p.208)
Despite experiences of aversive consequences, motivations for 
drinking persist, partly, at least, due to their very 
mundanity. They may become conditioned by association with 
particular situations (Barrett 1985; Fingarette 1988? Ludwig 
1988? also Kaplan 1983 on drug use). Once motivated to drink, 
the alcoholic must choose which action - drinking or 
abstinence - will achieve greater satisfaction. This choice is 
not so starkly obvious as the evidence of aversive 
intoxication experiences and long-term damage suggests. For 
example, confidence in successful abstinence and the 
perception of relative gain from abstinence over drinking may 
be crucial factors in the decision (Orford 1980? also Sutton 
1978 on smoking) . Barrett also points out that evidence of the 
ultimately aversive consequences of alcoholic intoxication 
obscures the simple fact that
"people continue to use psychoactive drugs not 
because they necessarily 'feel good' or 'euphoric' 
but only that they ' feel' better soon after taking the 
drug than they did immediately before."
(Barrett 1985, p.133)
It is unnecessary to "feel better" on every drinking occasion. 
Intermittent success is sufficient to maintain an established 
habit (Cox 1985? Ludwig 1988? also Cornish 1978 on gambling). 
Further, alcoholics do not generally experience strong rewards 
for abstinence. The comparative sociability of the alcoholic 
over the abstinent skid row lifestyle (Bahr and Caplow 1974) 
has already been noted. Polich (1980) found that, four years 
after treatment, abstainers and non-problem drinkers fell 
substantially below general population norms on measures of 
social adjustment such as employment, personal satisfaction 
and psychiatric symptoms, even though they fared better than 
continuing heavy drinkers.
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"Social rehabilitation, then, was not a common 
outcome even for those who were in remission at the 
four year follow-up."
(Polich 1980, p.105)
For the alcoholic, then, sobriety may be, if not an aversive 
state, then not a particularly positive one either. Once this 
is recognised, the alcoholic's decision to drink appears 
similar to any other mundane choice: a subjective balance of 
the perceived costs, risks and benefits of the different 
options within the actor's environment (Fingarette 1988; 
Ludwig 1988? Sutton 1978; Wilson 1987). Fingarette makes a 
point similar to one raised by the earlier review of 
offenders' theories of intoxicated crime: that it is a mistake 
to compare alcoholics' decisions to a standard of rationality 
to which sober decision makers do not generally conform.
"The general truth is this: Human beings do not 
always respond wisely and with foresight; we often 
drift, unwitting, into a tangled web of decisions, 
expectations, habits, tastes, fears, and dreams. The 
chronic heavy drinker is no exception - no more 
mysterious, no less vulnerable. For the person 
challenged by personal problems, heavy drinking is 
one of the culturally available responses, however 
imprudent and self-destructive."
(Fingarette 1988, p.103)
2. Acute intoxication: disinhibition
Like undersocialisation, "disinhibition" is not a unitary 
concept, but has been applied to a range of suppositions about 
alcohol's destabilising effects on moral self-control (Lang 
1981). These include disruption of higher order mental 
processes, triggering of aggression, arousal of sexual 
responsiveness and reduction of anxiety (Adesso 1985; Lang 
1981). Academic theories of disinhibition, therefore, have 
obvious connotative links with lay notions such as "Dutch 
courage". Indeed, the fact that it is not easy to trace 
authoritative academic origins for such hypotheses, despite 
the considerable effort that has gone into testing them, 
suggests that they may be derived directly from lay notions.
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The results of research into alcohol's disinhibiting effects 
have been comprehensively reviewed (e.g. Adesso 1985; Brain 
1986; Cappell and Greeley 1987; Coid 1986a, 1986b; Evans 1986; 
Macandrew and Edgerton 1969; Lang 1981; Woods and Mansfield 
1981). They repeatedly show that intoxication does not 
inevitably lead to disinhibited behaviour, is not culturally 
uniform in its behavioural consequences, does not trigger 
aggression, does not enhance sexual responsiveness and does 
not uniformly reduce anxiety. Furthermore, subjects' self- 
reports of mood changes after alcohol consumption frequently 
conflict with the evidence of physiological measurements.
Thus, in relation to alcohol's tension reducing capacity, for 
example, Cappell and Greeley observe "a huge gap between the 
apparent faith in the [tension reduction theory] and the 
quality of the evidence to support it" (1987, p.44). Instead, 
"there have been numerous observations of how complex are the 
relationships determining alcohol's credentials as an 
anxiolytic agent" (Cappell and Greeley 1987, p.44). Cappell 
and Greeley identify two points of key relevance to alcohol- 
crime theory. Firstly, subjects vary considerably in their 
experience of tension reduction, according to factors such as 
gender, dose, the nature of the anxiety provoking stimulus and 
customary drinking patterns. Secondly, mood enhancement is 
demonstrated only at low alcohol doses, with increases in 
anxiety and tension at higher doses. Alcohol-crime theory, 
however, has generally assumed that alcohol's effects are 
uniform and incremental.
A third issue appears more immediately compatible with 
alcohol-crime theory. Conflict situations appear particularly 
successful in eliciting tension reduction after alcohol 
consumption (Cappell and Greeley 1987). Contemplation of an 
offence appears to arouse conflictual feelings, as offenders 
weigh the anticipated gain against uncontrollable hazards 
(Carroll 1986; Walsh 1986). Intoxication is one strategy 
employed by offenders for coping with such conflict (Walsh
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1986). Nevertheless, it is unclear what in the nature of 
conflict makes it amenable to alcohol's tension reducing 
effects, or in what circumstances intoxication will be 
preferred to other anxiety-reducing strategies (Cappell and 
Greeley 1987? Sher 1987), Volpicelli (1987), however, argues 
that tension reduction theory is fundamentally misguided in 
assuming that alcohol consumption precedes anxiety reduction, 
claiming that the evidence suggests that tension reduction 
itself elicits alcohol consumption. This interpretation would 
complement the frequent observation that offenders rapidly 
spend the proceeds of crime on alcohol (Bennett and Wright 
1984a? Maguire 1982? Walsh 1986). Here, however, alcohol-crime 
theory based on disinhibition through tension reduction 
encounters the problems of continuing disagreement among 
alcohol theorists about the correct interpretation of the 
research evidence, and selection between attractive but 
opposing alternatives.
Pernanen expresses the implications for the alcohol-crime 
relationship in the following way:
"A central assumption in direct-cause thinking and 
a prevalent one in disinhibition theorizing is that 
alcohol ingestion has unvarying qualitative effects 
on psychological states and consequent behavior. 
Aggression and other relevant behavior in connection 
with alcohol use would thus result largely 
independently of situational or individual 
predisposing factors. A more realistic assumption in 
the light of systematic research findings, everyday 
observations, and both successes and failures of 
controlled and associational studies is that any 
relevant direct effects of alcohol are qualitatively 
indeterminate in their emergent psychological and 
behavioral consequences. Instead, these are 
determined by the effects of alcohol in conjunction 
with other factors which vary largely independently 
of the values of the alcohol use variables.”
(Pernanen 1982, p.27)
Pernanen sees two alternatives for theory building. Theory may 
assume that "given a detailed enough specification of 
'external' predisposing and situational determinants, a
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satisfactory explanation can be given by a listing of these 
and a specification of their internal relationships" (Pernanen 
1982, p.27). Alternatively, explanations may be developed 
which are explicitly premised "on the perceiving/cognizing 
individual and his/her structuring of the situation" (Pernanen 
1982, p.27). The research reviewed above appears to have been 
primarily guided by the former principle, although the direct 
applicability of such precisely specified relationships to 
"messy, real-world decisions" (Abelson 1976) in which 
individual and situational factors are themselves highly 
variable, complex and fluid, seems questionable. Its results 
might more usefully be regarded as helping to define the 
crucial variables, and their inter-relationships, whilst 
constructing explanations of the latter type.
Paradoxically, the intensive efforts to specify precise 
relationships between alcohol's pharmacological effects and 
mood and behavioural changes have provided clear evidence of 
the crucial importance of cognition in the production of these 
changes. The balanced placebo design methodology, in which 
subjects' beliefs that they have consumed alcohol are 
manipulated independently of the administration of alcohol or 
placebo doses, has demonstrated that responses depend heavily 
on the belief in, rather than the fact of alcohol ingestion. 
These "expectancy" effects, or the influence of subjective 
beliefs about alcohol's effects, have emerged in studies of 
tension reduction (Cappell and Greeley 1987), aggression 
(Evans 1986? Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987), sexual 
responsiveness (Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987? Coid 
1986a), mild forms of disinhibition such as laughter and 
sociability (Lang 1981) and alcoholic craving (Goldman, Brown 
and Christiansen 1987? Marlatt, Demming and Reid 1973? 
Fingarette 1988).
Expectancy effects have considerable implications for alcohol- 
crime theory. For example, as seen earlier, intoxicated
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aggressiveness has been attributed to perceptual and cognitive 
impoverishment. However, since expectancy effects occur 
independently of alcohol*s presence, individuals who do not 
believe that they have consumed alcohol may remain apparently 
immune to the implied psychological consequences of their 
deteriorating information processing capacity (Lang 1981).
Expectancy theory has particular advantages for the different 
theoretical approaches reviewed in this chapter. Firstly, the 
variability of intoxicated behaviour may be explained by 
postulating expectancies, themselves modified by dose, setting 
and individual differences, as a mediating factor between 
consumption and response (Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 
1987) . Secondly, learned expectancies may explain the links 
between prior life experiences and later alcohol-related 
behaviour (Adesso 1985? Douglas 1987? Heath 1981? Goldman, 
Brown and Christiansen 1987? Greeley, McCready and Theisen
1980). Thirdly, the significance of situational factors for 
alcohol-related behaviour may derive from learned 
associations, or expectancies (Adesso 1985? Goldman, Brown and 
Christiansen 1987? Ludwig 1988).
Summary
The key concept underpinning substance focused theories of 
alcohol-related crime has been "loss of control". However, 
clinical and ethnographic research challenges the assumption 
that chronic or acute intoxication induces loss of control 
over either drinking behaviour itself or any other activity.
Substance focused research has not identified straightforward 
relationships between the pharmacological effects of alcohol 
and changes in mood and behaviour which might underlie 
criminality. It has exposed the over-reliance of alcohol-crime 
theory on assumptions about the uniformity of alcohol*s 
pharmacological effects.
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The major contribution of substance focused theory and 
research to alcohol-crime theory has been its demonstration of 
the importance of cognition in mediating mood and behavioural 
changes consequent on alcohol consumption. Theory and research 
concerning alcohol expectancies may have considerable 
implications for the development of theories of intoxicated 
crime. The inclusion of expectancy theory would shift the 
theoretical focus to the effects which the individual is 
motivated to achieve in the situation in which drinking takes place, 
his be lie f in alcohol fs ability to achieve these effects, and 
how he learns to interpret alcohol*s generalised pharmacological 
effects as specific changes in mood facilitating desired, but 
prohibited behaviour. Such a shift in theoretical emphasis 
would support the confident attribution of criminal 
responsibility, by implying the motivated use of alcohol in 
the commission of crime.
CONCLUSIONS
The single cause, or "malevolence" assumption has inhibited 
full theoretical consideration of cultural, situational and 
individual factors involved in the alcohol-crime association. 
Although offenders are capable of providing detailed accounts 
of intoxicated offences, which do not differ substantially 
from sober crime, they nevertheless attribute significant 
changes in the intentional and rational execution of crime to 
intoxication. These attributions appeal to common sense 
notions about alcohol*s effects, and are likely to be invoked 
when other reasons for an offence are either unacceptable or 
unavailable. Researchers* acceptance of offenders' theories of 
intoxicated crime depends on their own personal beliefs about 
alcohol, theoretical perspectives and research foci. Academic 
theories of intoxicated crime reflect lay beliefs about 
alcohol's effects. Dispositional, situational and substance 
focused theories undermine the attribution of intoxicated 
responsibility, although the research evidence related to 
these theories does not itself support such a conclusion. 
Alcohol expectancy theory may provide a means of developing
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academic theories of intoxicated crime in directions which 
allow for the possibility of motivated use of alcohol in 
facilitating criminality.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LAY THEORIES AND JUDGEMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY: 
NEUTRALISATION AND RATIONALISATION
This chapter explores the use of lay theories about alcohol in 
the construction of judgements of responsibility. It is 
suggested that alcohol expectancies are a specific variety of 
lay theory, constituting a body of common sense beliefs about 
alcohol's effects on mood and behaviour. As lay theories, 
alcohol expectancies provide an assumptive framework for the 
attribution of responsibility for intoxicated behaviour. The 
processes by which this may be achieved are explored in the 
context of offenders' pre-offence neutralisations and post­
offence rationalisations.
ALCOHOL EXPECTANCIES AND LAY THEORIES: A COMPARISON
Alcohol expectancies may be compared with lay theories on
three key dimensions: their definitions; their
characteristics; and their relationship to decision making.
Definitions
In Chapter Two, lay theories were seen to be common sense 
notions about the nature of, and relationships between,
objects and events in the world. Similarly, in their 
exposition of alcohol expectancy theory, Goldman, Brown and 
Christiansen explain the term "expectancy" in the following 
way:
"The term expectancy typically refers to an 
intervening variable of a cognitive nature. Whether 
explicit or implied, this cognitive variable is 
understood to be knowledge (information, encodings, 
schema, scripts, and so on) about relationships 
between events or objects in the real world. The 
term expectancy, rather than attitude or belief, is 
usually invoked when the author refers to the 
anticipation of a systematic relationship between 
events or objects in some upcoming situation. The 
relationship is understood to be of an if-then 
variety; i f  a certain event or object is registered 
then a certain event is expected to follow (although
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the i f condition may be correlated with, rather than 
causal of, the then event)."
(Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987, p.183)
Goldman, Brown and Christiansen (1987) define alcohol 
expectancies as a specific variety of such cognitions about 
causative relationships. Therefore, the definitions of lay 
theories and alcohol expectancies are essentially equivalent.
Characteristics
In Chapter Two, it was seen that lay theories are 
characterised by their function of providing a conceptual 
framework for the attribution of cause, effect and personal 
responsibility, their ignorance, their contradiction, their 
complexity in relation to culture, individual differences and 
situational specificity, and their indeterminateness.
1. Function
Alcohol expectancies define a range of moods and behaviours 
which are susceptible to change through intoxication. Thus, 
they enable individuals to anticipate and interpret the 
effects of alcohol on their own and others' behaviour. Alcohol 
expectancies are common, rather than idiosyncratic beliefs 
(Brown, Goldman, Inn and Anderson 1980? Goldman, Brown and 
Christiansen 1987). As such, they provide a set of premises 
for social judgements about intoxicated behaviour and personal 
responsibility under intoxication.
2• Ignorance
Brown, Goldman, Inn and Anderson (1980) identified six 
independent alcohol expectancies common to adults with 
drinking histories ranging from abstinence to alcoholism: that 
alcohol positively transforms experiences, enhances social and 
physical pleasure, enhances sexual performance and experience, 
increases power and aggression, increases social assertiveness 
and reduces tension. Reviewing research, Goldman, Brown and 
Christiansen (1987) found considerable agreement about the
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nature of alcohol expectancies, which also reflect Roizen's 
(1981) broader survey data mentioned in Chapter Two. However, 
the review of substance focused research in Chapter Three has 
already exposed the inaccuracy of these alcohol expectancies.
It was suggested that the ignorance of lay theories may be 
linked to difficulties in discontinuing them. In this context, 
it is to be noted that the alcohol expectancies identified 
above are entirely permissive. They do not insist that mood 
and behaviour on each drinking occasion will necessarily 
change in the ways which they postulate as possible effects of 
alcohol. Nor do they disqualify any sober moods and behaviours 
from manifesting themselves under intoxication. The alcohol 
expectancies, therefore, permit a considerable and variable 
range of moods and behaviours to be interpreted as the results 
of intoxication.
3. Contradiction
The alcohol expectancies identified by Brown, Goldman, Inn and 
Anderson (1980) are mutually contradictory. For example, 
alcohol is believed to enhance sociability, to arouse 
aggression and to reduce tension. Similarly, Christiansen and 
Goldman (1983) identified seven alcohol expectancies among 
adolescents, which embrace blatant contradictions: for
example, the beliefs that alcohol both enhances and impedes 
social behaviour; both improves and disrupts cognitive and 
motor functioning? and both arouses and relaxes. Furthermore, 
individuals may hold different expectancies for themselves and 
for others (Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987).
4• Complexity
a) Culture
In Chapter Two, lay theories were seen to be derived from 
cultural beliefs and attitudes, modified by individual 
experiences of, and relationships to particular phenomena. 
This perspective is reflected in accounts of the origins and
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development of alcohol expectancies. Macandrew and Edgerton 
argue:
" [ I ] f we are ever to understand drunken comportment, 
we must focus on the shared understandings of the 
nature of drunkenness that obtain among men living 
together in societies.H
(Macandrew and Edgerton 1969, p.171)
Recent academic alcohol theory has again stressed the
significance of culture in the transmission of beliefs about 
and attitudes to alcohol (Adesso 1985? Douglas 1987? Galizio 
and Maisto 1985? Greeley, McCready and Theisen 1980? Goldman, 
Brown and Christiansen 1987? Gusfield 1987? Lang 1981? Wilson 
1987). Such theorists argue that a significant amount of 
learning about alcoholfs apparent effects on behaviour occurs 
prior to direct experience of drinking. Alcohol-crime 
theorists have similarly seized on the theoretical importance 
of the "cultural phenomenology" (Collins 1989) of alcohol
(also Gusfield 1981? Pernanen 1982). Pernanen argues:
"In addition to definite, although conceptually not 
easily delimited, and categorized effects on 
behavior, mood-modifying drugs (including alcohol) 
have been surrounded with informal and formal social 
arrangements, and societal reactive systems, which 
have partly determined social definitions and
beliefs about the nature of the drugs and their 
users as well as the effects of the drugs. These 
social and cultural factors cannot be neglected in 
any attempts at explaining the psychological, 
behavioral, societal and cultural phenomena
associated with alcohol use."
(Pernanen 1982, p.10)
b) Individual differences
Whilst culture may provide a basic conceptual framework for 
anticipating and interpreting alcohol's effects on mood and 
behaviour, individual experience modifies these notions in 
particular ways. Individual experience includes both vicarious 
learning from the examples of others and direct experience of 
alcohol consumption. Of the former, Wilson asserts:
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"Vicarious learning or modeling is a robust form of 
cognitive learning that is seminal in the 
development of social behavior, including drinking. 
Complex behavior patterns and attitudes are acquired 
through observation of social models without any 
reinforcement of overt behavior..."
(Wilson 1987, p.343)
This specific learning is distinct from the transmission of 
broader cultural beliefs and attitudes, although the sources 
are to some extent the same, as in parental models. For 
example, Greeley, McCready and Theisen (1980) observe that 
within the same ethnic group, there are gender differences in 
the socialisation processes which lead to individual drinking 
practices.
Direct experience of alcohol consumption further increases the 
specificity of expectancies, leading, for example, to 
distinctions between expectancies for different dosages 
(Goldman Brown and Christiansen 1987; Wilson 1987), and 
drinking situations (Wilson 1987). Individual physiological 
differences (Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987; Wilson
1987) and differences in the personal values placed on the 
anticipated effects (Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987) may 
also contribute to this process of specific expectancy 
development.
"It does seem, then, that the two processes of 
social learning and experience with a drug 
contribute to the development of expectancies about 
the effects of a drug. This is precisely what social 
learning theory would predict; with increased 
experience one develops more specific expectancies 
from the generalized expectancies acquired through 
social learning processes."
(Adesso 1985, p.183)
Relationships between specific alcohol expectancies and 
broader social attitudes have not been explored. However, 
Greeley, McCready and Theisen1s (1980) study of ethnicity and 
drinking behaviour suggests that factors such as religious 
beliefs will interact with beliefs about alcohol.
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Goldman, Brown and Christiansen (1987) suggest that heavy, 
light and non-drinkers are not distinguished by qualitatively 
different alcohol expectancies, but by the differing strengths 
with which they hold common expectancies. They further suggest 
that different groups of heavy drinkers, such as college 
students, medical patients and alcoholics in treatment, hold 
common expectancies in varying degrees. Alcohol expectancies 
may interact with individual personality variables such as 
internality or externality of perceived locus of control. Such 
evidence, although tentative, indicates that individual self- 
perception is linked to alcohol expectancies (Adesso 1985).
c) Situational specificity
The apparent contradictions between different alcohol 
expectancies may arise, at least partly, from a tendency to 
think of alcohol*s effects in terms of specific situations, as 
was suggested of lay theories in Chapter Two. Brown, Goldman, 
Inn and Anderson (1980) identified expectancies by measuring 
subjects* responses to statements such as "Having a few drinks 
is a nice way to celebrate special occasions", "After a few 
drinks it is easier to pick a fight" and "Alcohol helps me 
sleep better". In order to decide on their agreement or 
disagreement with such statements, individuals may bring to 
mind occasions when alcohol has been associated with such 
outcomes. Picking a fight tends to occur on different 
occasions and in different situations to falling asleep, 
although drinking may precede both events. As was suggested in 
the discussion of lay theories, such situational specificity 
may enable people to disregard the inconsistency of their 
alcohol expectancies. These points also illustrate the 
theoretical utility of regarding alcohol as a situational 
variable, identified in Chapter Three.
5. Indeterminateness
Goldman, Brown and Christiansen claim that
"expectancy patterns can successfully predict
drinking behavior at all levels of the drinking
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continuum, from beginning drinking in adolescents 
through alcoholism."
(Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987, p.207)
This claim, which is supported by other reviewers of the 
research evidence (e.g. Adesso 1985? Wilson 1987), suggests a 
discrepancy between lay theories and alcohol expectancies. The 
alcohol expectancies identified by Brown, Goldman, Inn and 
Anderson (1980) and Christiansen and Goldman (1983) do appear 
to be general beliefs about alcohol's effects on rationality, 
mood and behaviour. However, it is important to identify 
precisely what behaviour they predict, and how they may be 
successful.
Alcohol expectancies appear to be successful in the prediction 
of aspects of drinking careers. Goldman, Brown and 
Christiansen (1987) claim them to be more powerful predictors 
than the types of life history variable identified as 
significant in Chapter Three. This is perhaps to be expected. 
The importance of social learning about and experience with 
alcohol in the development of expectancies was argued earlier. 
The relevance of the research inspired by dispositional 
theoretical perspectives, reviewed in Chapter Three, to the 
fuller understanding of expectancy development becomes 
apparent when considered in this light. Individual life 
history and personality characteristics will themselves have 
a bearing on the exposure to, experience of, and development 
of beliefs and attitudes concerning alcohol. In this context, 
the greater predictive strength of the alcohol expectancies 
may reflect their status as a distillation of the influence of 
such factors on specific expectancy development.
Alcohol expectancies do not determine drinking or drunken 
behaviour in any specific drinking situation. However, since 
they are derived from batteries of statements which encourage 
situationally specific responses, they are quite closely tied 
to individuals' beliefs about the effects of alcohol in
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particular situations. Goldman, Brown and Christiansen note 
that in the development of attitude theory and research,
"the more closely the measures of an attitude 
correspond to specific features of the situation in 
which a behavior will be performed, the better the 
predictability of the behavior."
(Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987, p.186)
It has been seen that alcohol expectancies are entirely 
permissive, and are not disconfirmed by the non-production of 
certain behaviours on specific drinking occasions. However, 
when applied to particular drinking situations, alcohol 
expectancies do specify certain forms of intoxicated behaviour 
as inappropriate. For example, sleeping is an inappropriate 
response to intoxication at a dinner party.
Alcohol expectancy theory thus far appears to have neglected 
to contextualise the role of alcohol expectancies in decision 
making within the drinker’s social circumstances. Thus, the 
apparent irrationality of alcoholics' persistent strong 
expectancies for mood enhancement has not yet been explained 
within expectancy theory. Indeed, Goldman, Brown and 
Christiansen (1987) fail to remark upon the general inaccuracy 
and contradictoriness of alcohol expectancies, despite their 
confidence in the influence of those beliefs on behaviour. 
Rather, it appears that alcohol expectancy theory has, like 
other academic theories reviewed in Chapter Three, moved from 
prediction towards a deterministic position, in which 
individual behaviour is seen to be as much governed by 
cognitive expectancies as it was earlier thought to be by 
alcohol's pharmacological effects. This deterministic position 
produces the apparent irrationality of fixed beliefs about 
alcohol's effects, because it fails to contextualise those 
beliefs in the cultural, situational and individual 
circumstances within which they develop and are maintained.
An illustration of this may be found in Adesso's (1985) review 
of research evidence that frequent and problem drinking are
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associated with strong expectancies for enhanced power, 
sexuality, tension reduction and cognitive and motor 
functioning. These are inaccurate beliefs about alcohol's 
effects. Adesso's argument, that experience with alcohol 
increases the specificity of expectancies, thus implies that 
frequent and problem drinkers fail to learn, or to draw the 
appropriate conclusions from their experiences.
The predictive power of alcohol expectancies might more 
usefully be considered in the light of Pernanen's 
"perceiving/cognizing individual and his/her structuring of 
the situation" (1982, p.27). In particular, theoretical 
development might follow Barrett's advice that
"drug-taking behaviour is not reflexive. Rather, it
is a goal-directed, purposeful, operant response."
(Barrett 1985, p.127)
Such a position would suggest that individuals are not 
passively driven by their alcohol expectancies, but acquire a 
sophisticated degree of control over alcohol's generalised 
effects, to produce desired changes in mood and behaviour in 
particular situations. In this light, the predictive power of 
alcohol expectancies reflects the identification of situations 
in which particular beliefs about alcohol's effects become 
salient, and may be invoked to anticipate, interpret and 
legitimate changes in mood and behaviour associated with 
alcohol in those situations.
Alcohol expectancies and decision making
It was suggested in Chapter Two that lay theories provide 
flexible conceptual frameworks for making judgements about 
complex issues. Applied in specific situations, concrete 
cognitive schemata facilitate rapid information processing and 
decision making.
In the foregoing discussion, it was shown that alcohol 
expectancies, when applied to specific drinking situations,
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enable certain intoxicated behaviour changes to be defined as 
appropriate or inappropriate. A particular significance of 
this function derives from the generalised, non-specific 
effects of alcohol on mood and behaviour, discussed in Chapter 
Three. A few general "rules of thumb”, selectively applied to 
specific situations, creates confidence, comprehensibility and 
predictability in drinking situations of considerable 
complexity, variability and ambiguity. Here, a theoretical 
analogy with cognitive scripts also begins to emerge. The 
situationally specific application of a set of general, 
flexible assumptions about the range and quality of alcohol's 
effects provides scripts for effective participation in social 
drinking occasions.
The analogy with cognitive scripts may also point to an 
explanation for the apparent irrationality of alcoholics' 
strong beliefs in alcohol's mood enhancing effects. The 
resistance to change of established scripts was noted in 
Chapter Two. This resistance is acquired precisely because the 
scripts have been found to "work" to the individual' s 
satisfaction on most of the occasions on which they are 
invoked. Alcoholics' expectancies for mood enhancement will 
have been reinforced by repeated prior experiences of success 
in achieving mood enhancement, and sobriety itself may not 
offer rewards which strongly challenge alcoholics' perception 
that they generally "feel better” (Barrett 1985) after 
drinking than they do when sober. Factors involved in the 
persistence of this perception were explored in Chapter Three.
Summary
Alcohol expectancies, as general assumptions about alcohol's 
effects, constitute a specific variety of lay theory. Applied 
to specific drinking situations, alcohol expectancies may 
supply basic cognitive scripts for the anticipation, 
interpretation and legitimation of intoxicated behaviour and 
associated mood changes. It has been suggested that a 
deterministic approach to interpreting the relationship
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between alcohol expectancies and behaviour implies fundamental 
irrationalities in the development and persistence of these 
expectancies, since they are inaccurate, contradictory and 
strongest for problem drinkers. Theory might more fruitfully 
be developed from the hypothesis that alcohol expectancies are 
linked to rational, purposeful behaviour.
The remainder of this chapter considers the potentially 
purposeful exploitation by offenders of lay theories about 
alcohol in the legitimation and explanation of intoxicated 
crime. This will be examined from two perspectives: pre­
offence neutralisation and post-offence rationalisation. It is 
argued that the significance of lay theories about alcohol in 
the legitimation of criminal activity lies in the implications 
of these beliefs for judgements of personal responsibility.
It should be noted that the criminological literature is not 
entirely clear or consistent in distinguishing between 
"neutralisation" and "rationalisation". However, since the 
following discussion examines different stages in the
offending sequence, it is useful to distinguish clearly 
between lay theories applied at these different stages. The 
distinction indicated by Minor (1981) has been adopted. 
"Neutralisation" refers to a personal rationale for 
legitimating a proposed course of criminal conduct. 
"Rationalisation" refers to a personal rationale constructed 
by an offender for excusing himself for crime after its 
commission. Rationalisation is thus to be distinguished from 
"mitigation", which here refers to a formal "account" (Scott 
and Lyman 1968) of a criminal offence offered publicly, in 
order to reduce judgements by others of culpability and
consequent punishment.
NEUTRALISATION
The role of alcohol in offence neutralisation will be 
considered from four perspectives: its pharmacological
effects? its cultural significance in moral judgements? its
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situational significance in moral decisions; and its 
invocation as a techniques of neutralisation.
Pharmacological effects
Goldman, Brown and Christiansen (1987) observe that the 
mechanisms which have often been postulated to explain the 
development of alcohol expectancies, such as classical 
conditioning, vicarious learning or causal attribution, do not 
themselves require any pharmacological effects. Expectancies 
are held to develop through the repeated association between 
alcohol consumption and particular behavioural consequences, 
whether or not alcohol directly produces that effect. 
Nevertheless, they sound a note of caution.
"It is possible using expectancy concepts to come 
very close to the point at which all alcohol-related 
behavior can be explained without reference to any 
pharmacological effects of alcohol as a drug. While 
this line of thinking serves as an interesting and 
challenging counterpoint to the more typical 
approach in the drug field of explaining everything 
with biological variables, one should never be so 
naive as to disregard pharmacology. Instead, an 
adequate balance between behavioral and 
pharmacologic mechanisms is the ultimate goal."
(Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987, p.182)
Thus, a discussion of the potential role of lay theories about 
alcohol in the neutralisation of moral inhibitions should be 
contextualised within a discussion of alcohol's 
pharmacological effects.
The failure of research to identify precise pharmacological 
mechanisms for the causation of intoxicated disinhibition was 
noted in Chapter Three. However, people commonly believe that 
alcohol produces alterations in mood consistent with 
disinhibited behaviour (Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987; 
Roizen 1981), and use alcohol to facilitate these changes 
(Cavan 1966; Macandrew and Edgerton 1969; Lang 1981). But 
whatever mood change an individual seeks or anticipates 
through intoxication, it seems unlikely that alcohol's
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pharmacological effects alone can be relied upon to achieve 
it. Alcohol's pharmacological effects are highly susceptible 
to individual variables (Bardo and Risner 1985; Barrett 1985; 
Blum 1982).
"[T]he effects of a drug depend not only on 
biochemical factors such as its chemical structure, 
route of administration, and rate of metabolism, but 
also on individual biochemical differences among the 
organisms receiving the drug. The species of the 
organism, its age, gender, and health status are all 
known to alter the effect of a drug, some more 
markedly than others."
(Bardo and Risner 1985, p.91)
Although the common belief that alcohol disrupts intellectual 
functioning is justified (Berglas 1987), the manner in which 
it does so is complex. The extent of interference with 
different cognitive and motor functions depends on their 
complexity, specific sensitivity to disruption by alcohol, and 
the motivation and personality of the drinker (Blum 1982; Lang 
1981; Woods and Mansfield 1981).
Evidence further suggests that mood changes consequent upon 
alcohol consumption are susceptible to situational influences. 
For example, solitary and group drinking lead to different 
affective changes (Blum 1982; Hartocollis 1962; McCarty 1985), 
alcoholic withdrawal experiences are related to the number of 
situational cues for drinking (McCarty 1985), and behaviour 
changes are more predictable in institutionalised settings 
involving unambiguous roles and authority (Blum 1982).
Such complexity and variability in the direct effects of 
alcohol on any one individual's mood, intellectual functioning 
and behaviour lead Barrett to argue that an adequate theory of 
drug-taking behaviour
"requires no assumptions about exactly how the 
person 'feels' either before or after drug use. It 
maintains only that the latter is preferred."
(Barrett 1985, p.128)
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Theorists thus suggest that alcohol has a generalised effect 
on internal physiological arousal, but the specific emotional 
definition attributed to this experience by the drinker is 
guided by external cues (Blum 1982? Lang 1981? Marshall 1981? 
Zillman 1978). However, it is not suggested here that 
individuals merely respond passively to the combined 
experience of internal arousal and external cues. Individual 
motivation must also be considered in the interpretation of 
intoxicated mood changes. It is to be remembered that balanced 
placebo design experiments demonstrate the failure of subjects 
to respond to environmental cues for disinhibition when they 
do not believe that they have consumed alcohol, despite 
alcohol*s effects on internal arousal. Pharmacologically 
induced arousal without awareness of alcohol consumption, 
therefore, does not cause a mood alteration despite the 
presence of salient situational cues (Lang 1981).
The experience of an emotion requires both arousal and an 
available explanation for it (Lang 1981? McCarty 1985). In 
drinking situations, individual arousal is potentially 
influenced by the multiple situational factors identified in 
Chapter Three, such as alcohol, peer group behaviour, crowding 
and physical design features. However, individuals may not 
identify all of these disparate sources of arousal, but 
"collapse" them into a single emotional attribution, the 
experience of which may be enhanced as a result (McCarty 1985? 
Zillman 1978).
"Individuals tend to combine undifferentiated 
physiological sensations. Consequently, all 
sensations are attributed to one specific salient 
stimulus rather than partialed out among the actual 
sources. The perceived strength of the salient 
stimulus is enhanced, and emotional behavioral 
reactions may be amplified as a result of the 
transfer of excitation."
(McCarty 1985, p.271)
Reviewing experimental evidence that intoxicated individuals 
may attribute arousal either to drug ingestion or to
143
situational stimuli, McCarty (1985) implies that the 
"misattribution" of arousal to external stimuli is a mistake. 
However, the attribution of arousal to a drug may itself be 
purposeful, in permitting individuals to ignore other, less 
convenient, sources of discomfiture.
Attitudinal research has revealed a remarkable human talent 
for altering the perception of internal states of arousal so 
that they complement the emotional condition implied by 
behaviour (Brickman 1978? Dienstbier 1978; Eiser and Van Der 
Pligt 1988? Zanna and Cooper 1974). Such research suggests 
that individuals prefer to experience consistency between 
their internal emotional states and external behaviour, to the 
extent that they will redefine their internal states in order 
to produce such consistency. This perspective has been 
fundamental to theories of attitude formation and change (e.g. 
Festinger 1957). It was noted in Chapter Three that alcohol 
appears to reduce tension in conflict situations. Possibly, 
therefore, alcohol consumption may facilitate the achievement 
of consistency between internal arousal and external behaviour 
in situations involving moral conflict.
For example, Dienstbier (1978) found that subjects, confronted 
with a moral dilemma over whether to cheat in a test, were 
more likely to cheat when they were able to attribute 
sensations such as heart acceleration and flushing to the 
side-effects of a pill. In Dienstbier's experiments, the pill 
was a placebo, but the ability to attribute the physiological 
signs of conflict to its effects reduced the inhibitory 
influence of such arousal on moral infractions. Zanna and 
Cooper (1974) found that subjects required to write an essay 
expressing opinions contrary to their personal beliefs did not 
demonstrate the reduction of inconsistency through attitude 
change usually observed in such exercises, when they were able 
to attribute signs of tension to the effects of a pill. Again, 
the experience of conflict appeared to be reduced or negated 
when arousal could be attributed to drug ingestion.
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It is unnecessary for individuals to be fully aware of this 
process of redefining emotional arousal? indeed they 
frequently appear to be unaware of it (Eiser and Van Der Pligt 
1988; Fitzmaurice and Pease 1986? Brickman 1978? Zanna and 
Cooper 1974). Nevertheless, the "appropriate" emotional 
definition of internal arousal may have to be learned by 
individuals engaging in a new behaviour (Brickman 1978) , as in 
the case of novice drug users learning to experience 
disorientation as pleasurable (Best and Luckenbill 1982? 
Zinberg 1984).
Physiological arousal is often diffuse and non-specific 
(McCarty 1985). Dienstbier (1978) argues that certain emotions 
may be alike in their underlying physiological arousal, so 
that different emotional attributions may be made for similar 
arousal experiences. Again, this process may be purposeful. 
For example, fear may be eliminated if the arousal it 
engenders may be re-attributed to excitement (Dienstbier 
1978). Thus, facilitated by features of drinking situations, 
intoxication may enable the drinker to define the experience 
of arousal as a specific mood change.
Applying such an analysis to the experience of arousal in 
drinking situations, it may be hypothesised that such 
situations facilitate an emotional attribution consistent with 
rule-breaking behaviour. It was noted in Chapter Three that 
drinking and offending offer common emotional rewards, such as 
excitement, camaraderie and status enhancement. Drinking 
situations thus facilitate the translation of arousal into 
definitions of mood which are also consistent with offending 
behaviour.
It is to be noted that this analysis of the achievement of 
consistency between mood and offending behaviour does not 
require the prior intention to commit crime. It is a product 
of a coincidence of emotional rewards offered by two different 
activities. This may account in part for the apparent
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impulsivity of some intoxicated offending, such as that of 
youthful peer groups. Following intoxication, mood is already 
consistent with subsequent behaviour, as individuals seize 
opportunities for further excitement. Nevertheless, it is also 
possible that individuals intending to offend might exploit 
this coincidence of intoxicated and criminal moods, and drink 
purposefully to achieve "Dutch courage" (Bennett and Wright 
1984a, 1984b? Walsh 1986). For example, a husband dwelling on 
his wife's faults while drinking, may experience sufficient 
"aggression" to enable him subsequently to assault her. Such 
an analysis complements the finding of Dobash and Dobash 
(1984), mentioned in Chapter Three, that the intention to 
attack is formed prior to the aggressive encounter between 
husband and wife.
Repeated experiences of an anxiety provoking event reduces the 
degree of anxiety which it elicits (Volpicelli 1987). Thus, 
the importance of alcohol as a facilitator of mood and 
behaviour consistency may diminish as the offender acquires 
criminal experience. The two activities of drinking and 
subsequent offending may then, over time, simply become part 
of an established "routine" (Bennett and Wright 1984a, 1984b), 
or scripted activity. Nevertheless, once mastered, the 
usefulness of alcohol for achieving mood and behaviour 
consistency may be invoked when required. The alcohol 
expectancy for the desired mood change having been learned and 
strengthened through experience, it is available for 
exploitation on subsequent occasions according to need.
Thus, intoxication provides a means of achieving consistency 
between emotional states and behaviour, which may facilitate 
moral infractions: firstly by enabling arousal to be
attributed directly to alcohol rather than to moral conflict? 
and secondly by facilitating the re-attribution of arousal to 
emotions consistent with proscribed behaviour. The thrust of 
these arguments avoids the pitfalls of deterministic 
reasoning. For example, it would not be suggested here that an
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intoxicated individual would show greater sexual curiosity 
(Coid 1986a, 1986b; Goldman, Brown and Christiansen 1987;
Lang, Searles, Lauerman and Adesso 1980) because his 
expectancy for sexual disinhibition him causes him to lose his 
customary guilt. Rather, it would be suggested that the 
convenient re-attribution to intoxication of the arousal 
caused by conflict between sexual guilt and temptation permits 
him to show that curiosity which he is motivated to indulge.
Culture and moral judgements
Alcohol plays a significant role in the cultural definitions 
of different activities, for example, by symbolising religious 
ceremony or the transition from work to leisure (Douglas 1987; 
Gusfield 1987). Further, drinking
"has a moral connotation associated with a style of 
life - a patterned system of behavior regulating a 
wide range of actions and distinguishing one group 
from another. Alcohol, we are arguing, has had a 
special function as a symbol of a general style of 
life associated with levels of social status. It has 
been a symbol of group membership because it has 
communicated to observers the set of commitments of 
the drinker or abstainer to ways of moral conduct in 
realms of work, play, and familial association.1
(Gusfield 1963, p.29)
Drinking is frequently and spontaneously invoked in 
explanations of the social significance of non-drinking 
behaviour. For example, Stone's (1962) study of attitudes 
towards fashion gave rise to a secondary analysis of drinking 
attitudes, because of the frequency with which respondents 
illustrated their remarks with references to drinking. 
Assertions about the drinking styles of different social 
groups were invoked by Stone's respondents to support 
inferences about social status and moral rectitude. 
Information about, for example, the amount and kind of 
beverage consumed, frequency of drinking and drunkenness, or 
favoured drinking locales, was advanced to convey a broader 
picture of the social group to which individuals belonged,
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together with inferences about its respectability or 
undesirability. The social context of drinking is an important 
source of individuals' perceptions of their own and others' 
status, both as drinkers and as social and moral actors, in 
drinking careers from adolescence to alcoholism (Archard 1979; 
Bahr and Caplow 1974? Cook 1975; Harford 1983? Harford, 
Wechsler and Rohman 1983? Hauge and Irgens-Jensen 1987? Mars 
1987? Marsh, Dobbs and White 1986? Phillimore 1979? Rubington 
1958? Wilsnack and Wilsnack 1979).
However, social and moral judgements based on inferences from 
drinking styles are neither unambiguous nor unanimous. 
Inferences from perceptions of drinking styles to judgements 
of social status can foster simplistic theories about the 
causes of drinking problems. For example, Douglas argues:
"Just because alcohol in this setting is the gate of 
access to all that is most desired, a person 
suffering social rejection would understandably turn 
to compensatory drinking, to possess at least the 
symbol of what he does not have. This suggests a 
vein for research among the social uses of alcohol: 
the more that alcohol is used for signifying 
selection and exclusion the more might we expect its 
abuse to appear among the ranks of the excluded."
(Douglas 1987, p.9)
Douglas' hypothesis is based on the assumption of social 
rejection noted in Chapter Two. However, the research noted 
above shows clearly that people are as acutely, if not more, 
conscious of drinking styles signifying low status as they are 
of drinking as a high status activity. For example, even among 
vagrant alcoholics much significance is attached to 
consumption of, or abstention from surgical spirits, but the 
nature of that significance also varies according to an 
individuals' own participation in or rejection of the practice 
(Archard 1979? Cook 1975). Douglas' analysis further fails to 
accommodate easily the occurrence of alcoholism among high 
status people.
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There is considerable cultural diversity in the definitions of 
problems associated with alcohol (Heath 1981? Greeley, 
McCready and Theisen 1980? Jellinek 1960). Furthermore, even 
within a culture, such definitions may be ambiguous. For 
example, Raymond (1975) complains that the processing of drunk 
driving offences as traffic violations prevents drivers from 
recognising their own drinking problems. However, a society 
may perhaps justifiably perceive the problem as a driving 
problem with implications for public safety, rather than as a 
drinking problem, which is a private affair.
"Intoxication” is to some extent a subjectively defined 
experience, derived not only from drinking but from the 
specific drinking culture to which an individual belongs 
(Macandrew and Edgerton 1969). Thus, although young males 
frequently associate their drinking with unpleasant 
consequences such as hang-overs, nausea, recklessness, 
aggressiveness and police intervention (Collins 1982? Hauge 
and Irgens-Jensen 1987? Marsh, Dobbs and White 1986? Polich 
1979? Wechsler 1979? Zucker 1979), the same occasions may also 
be associated with fun and excitement (Dorn 1983? Marsh, Dobbs 
and White 1986) . Youthful male drinkers do not tend to 
criticise excessive drinking (Wilsnack and Wilsnack 1979). 
Indeed, in so far as youthful drinking is an important public 
affirmation of social roles and status (Marsh, Dobbs and White 
1986? Wilsnack and Wilsnack 1979), the simplest way for a 
young person to demonstrate publicly that he has been drinking 
is to manifest drunkenness.
This social aspect of drinking behaviour could be an important 
contributor to reports of greater intoxication by younger 
drinkers when consuming similar amounts to older drinkers 
(Hauge and Irgens-Jensen 1987). Age-related changes in the 
experience of problems associated with drinking, from hang­
overs and police intervention among the young to anxieties 
about health and control in later life (Hauge and Irgens- 
Jensen 1987), may reflect shifts in the social context of
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drinking (Harford 1979) and in perceptions of appropriate 
alcohol-related behaviour.
Drinking, therefore, is a key reference point for social and 
moral judgements of people and behaviour. Its significance, 
however, is diverse and ambiguous. Subgroups within a culture 
both experience intoxication, and perceive its moral 
significance differently, according to such factors as age and 
the social context of drinking.
Drinking situations and moral decisions
The influence of situational factors on behaviour has already 
been identified. Situational features also guide moral 
interpretations of behaviour (Dienstbier 1978). People 
discriminate between situations in terms of the moral rules to 
be applied to them (Campbell, Bibel and Muncer 1985) . The mere 
presence of alcohol in a situation endows it with a particular 
moral meaning in setting it apart from serious, non-leisure 
occasions (Gusfield 1987). Thus, events and behaviour acquire 
different moral significance in drinking or sober situations.
Definitions of drinking situations, however, themselves vary 
widely (Roman 1982), including, for example, recreation, 
religious ceremony and business transactions. There is no 
singular moral definition which can encompass the range of 
situations in which alcohol is present, or the moral 
expectations and judgements of behaviour within them. For 
example:
"American ambivalence toward the subject is 
undeniable. Perhaps 30 per cent of the nation's 
citizens do not drink at all, yet others tolerate 
considerable latitude in drinking behavior. 'Geting 
[sic] loaded' at a college fraternity party, for 
example, more often than not is simply shrugged off 
as an instance of adolescent conduct. Hard-drinking, 
even to the point of drunkenness, is still accepted 
as the sign of 'being a real man' in some social 
circles. In other cases, drinkers who see nothing 
wrong with their own imbibing have doubts about it 
in others. Adults who routinely attend cocktail
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parties express deep concern over drinking among 
their teenage (or younger) children."
(Lender and Martin 1982, p.191)
In many drinking situations, particularly recreational ones in 
public places, there is considerable ambiguity as to the moral 
meaning of behaviour. Cavan remarks on the central 
contradiction inherent in interactions between strangers in 
public drinking places:
"As strangers, they should be treated with the 
reserve and restraint that drinking is at the same 
time expected to diminish."
(Cavan 1966, p.43)
Cavan observes that such interactions are guided by a series 
of implicit norms and conventions which permit the 
simultaneous loosening of behavioural reserve and maintenance 
of social distance. Nevertheless, the constant ambiguity in 
these social relationships increases the unpredictability of 
interactions.
"Thus, while sociability is available to all in the 
public drinking place, there is little to guarantee 
that encounters between the unacquainted, once 
begun, will proceed in a neat and orderly fashion. 
Rather, from the onset their career is problematic, 
subject to a variety of contingencies that make them 
always tentative and often superficial."
(Cavan 1966, p.63)
Unpredictability is enhanced by the dislocation of public 
drinking situations from social roles which generally inform 
behaviour, such as parent, spouse, or employee (Campbell 1986? 
Cavan 1966). Public drinking situations commonly acquire the 
status of "time out" (Macandrew and Edgerton 1969) from these 
customary roles and their constraints on behaviour. This 
situational dislocation from social roles protects the 
integrity of individuals' "sober" identity (Campbell 1986; 
Cavan 1966? Gusfield 1987; Macandrew and Edgerton 1969). 
Furthermore, loose structures for conveying authority, and
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prescribing social behaviour within the drinking situation 
itself (Blum 1982? Gusfield 1987? Hope 1985? Luckenbill 1977) 
create a precariousness in the establishment and maintenance 
of orderly conduct, particularly where actors are unfamiliar 
with each other (Felson, Baccaglini and Gmelch 1986).
The unpredictability of public recreational drinking 
situations has encouraged the development of strategies for 
bringing behaviour under control at numerous social levels: 
law and public policy (Gusfield 1987)? social rituals and 
sanctions applied on drinking occasions (Zinberg 1984)? 
integration between drinking places and community social life 
(Plant 1981)? authority and rules invoked within drinking 
establishments for dispute settlement (Cavan 1966? Gibbs
1986)? and the careful, rulebound conduct of interactions 
(Cavan 1966). However, this should not obscure the point that 
moral ambiguity, and its associated unpredictability and 
risks, are precisely those features of public drinking 
situations which are valued, sought and created within them. 
A view of problematic behaviour in drinking situations, as 
merely a product of poor controls, requiring improvements in 
management and design, erroneously assumes that people 
unequivocally wish for the elimination of this moral 
ambiguity. However, the fun, excitement and enjoyable risks to 
be derived from the moral ambiguity of public recreational 
drinking situations are undoubtedly part of their attraction. 
"Time out" behaviour is thus motivated behaviour, licensed by 
the presence of alcohol in the drinking situation (Cavan 1966? 
Macandrew and Edgerton 1969).
Indeed, overt attempts to control actual or threatened rule 
infractions appear to be the primary immediate cause of the 
eruption of disorderly behaviour in public recreational 
drinking settings (Felson, Baccaglini and Gmelch 1986? Marsh 
and Campbell 1979? Pernanen 1982). Attempts at control, even 
in volatile situations, may therefore be made in a non-
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confrontational manner, avoiding explicit condemnation of the 
offending behaviour.
"Thus activities handled in unequivocal terms in 
most settings may, in the public drinking place, be 
treated with a tact and finesse that seem 
unwarranted by their nature."
(Cavan 1966, p.69)
In ambiguous situations such as these, alternative definitions 
for rulebreaking behaviour may be invoked which remove the 
potential moral opprobrium. In particular, behaviour may be 
defined as "play", "having fun", and perpetrators may define 
themselves as "pranksters" (Coid 1986b? Wade 1967). Thus, for 
example, behaviour which in a bus queue would be considered 
sexual assault, at a party is "a bit of fun" (Coid 1986b) . 
Such occasions also require responses from others to the 
behaviour which are appropriate to its situational moral 
definition. Thus, a "victim" of unsolicited sexual approaches 
at a party who calls the police may be regarded as a 
"spoilsport" (Coid 1986b). These situational moral definitions 
and expectations of behaviour are closely connected to the 
kinds of intent attributed to it. The attribution of, for 
example, intent to offend sexual privacy is itself dependent 
on the situational cues informing participants of the nature 
of the occasion and the kinds of behaviour, or "scripts" 
appropriate to it.
Drinking situations thus become situations of "non­
responsibility". Within such situations, the dynamics of group 
behaviour may play a vital role in the transformation of "time 
out", which merely implies permissiveness, into criminal 
activity. In situations of collective non-responsibility, the 
abdication of individual responsibility is a notable feature 
of group crimes such as rape (Wright and West 1981? Coid 
1986a), vandalism (Wade 1967) and robbery (Cordilia 1986) .
Thus, the presence of alcohol signifies a change in a 
situation's moral meaning, with implications for the kinds of
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behaviour which will be deemed appropriate and the kinds of 
intent which will be attributed to actors. The moral 
definition of drinking situations may be ambiguous, 
particularly in public recreational drinking settings. This 
moral ambiguity facilitates unpredictability, "non- 
responsibility" , the redefinition of offensive behaviour in 
non-pejorative terms, and the development of group dynamics in 
which individual moral responsibility is abdicated.
Techniques of neutralisation
The discussion so far has identified various sources of 
diversity and ambiguity in moral judgements of intoxicated 
behaviour. Neutralisations of the moral offensiveness of 
behaviour are available through these sources of diversity and 
ambiguity. Under what circumstances might an individual invoke 
alcohol itself as a neutralising technique?
The selective invocation of alcohol as a technique of 
neutralisation may be linked to factors such as alcohol*s 
power to overcome moral objections to the offence; the 
individual*s readiness to offend? his preference for the 
available offending opportunities? and his prior experience. 
These factors are mediated by alcohol expectancies, or lay 
theories about alcohol.
1. Overcoming moral objections
Neutralisation is only necessary in circumstances in which the 
individual has some moral objection to the deviant behaviour 
under consideration. The individual who experiences no guilt 
or moral ambivalence about engaging in a certain behaviour has 
no need of self-excusatory devices to overcome it (Minor
1980). Theories which suggest that offenders are committed to 
deviant norms (e.g. Moran 1971) are repeatedly confronted by 
research evidence that offenders appear to subscribe to 
conventional moral standards (e.g. Ball-Rokeach 1973? Shover 
1983). This implies that the majority of individuals 
contemplating an offence will experience a degree of conflict
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between their internal emotional state and the behaviour under 
consideration, and will be motivated to achieve consistency 
between them, either by avoiding the behaviour or by altering 
their emotional state to achieve compatibility with it.
In drinking situations, it may be unnecessary to invoke 
alcohol itself to achieve neutralisation. Other techniques may 
be available and preferable (e.g. Minor 1981? Sykes and Matza 
1957). Three conditions have been suggested on which a 
neutralisation technique may depend for its success: it must 
be acceptable to its user (Agnew and Peter 1986) ; the user 
must perceive the situation to be one in which it is 
applicable (Agnew and Peter 1986); and there must be time to 
generate it (Minor 1981).
Alcohol has particular attractions for meeting such 
conditions. Firstly, common cultural beliefs about its effects 
on rationality, mood and behaviour legitimate its invocation 
by individuals (Lang 1981). Secondly, the multiplicity and 
inconsistency of these beliefs facilitate the use of 
neutralisations invoking alcohol in a wide variety of 
situations and for diverse behaviours. Thirdly, the fact of 
prior consumption, and the universality of the alcohol 
expectancies, facilitate the immediate invocation of alcohol 
as an opportunity for deviance arises. The generation of 
successful neutralisations by the uninitiated in deviance can 
require considerable psychological effort, ingenuity and 
practice (Best and Luckenbill 1982; Carroll and Weaver 1986; 
Cornish and Clarke 1986).
"The deciding individual is obviously embedded in 
social, cultural, interpersonal, and historical 
contexts, all of which are affected, however 
slightly, by the final choice. Simultaneously, the 
train of thought engaged in by a person trying to 
make up his or her mind is dominated by the 
constraints and opportunities, values and norms, 
that characterize those interwoven contexts."
(Sloan 1986, p.l)
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The availability of "common knowledge" about alcohol's effects 
provides a ready stock of neutralisations for immediate use. 
Thus, the alcohol expectancies, or lay theories, provide 
potentially powerful neutralisations for behaviour about which 
the individual experiences moral conflict. Evidence of their 
effectiveness has been found in the release of sexual 
responsiveness among high sex-guilt individuals (Lang, 
Searles, Lauerman and Adesso 1980) , violence among individuals 
with rigid religious backgrounds (Roebuck and Johnson 1962), 
and wife assault among men who morally repudiate it (Kantor 
and Straus 1987).
2. Readiness to offend
Cordilia (1986) draws attention to the complex and variable 
relationship between historical and situational factors and 
the generation of motivation to offend. Historical factors in 
the individual's experience may themselves lead to motivation, 
or to the individual encountering situations within which 
motivation is generated. These differences reflect differences 
in the quality of the motivation, or readiness to offend.
In the first case, in which motivation arises through prior 
experiences, this may represent only a provisional readiness 
to engage in certain behaviour given the occurrence of a 
particular kind of situation. Pfuhl describes this as a state 
of willingness, which "means no more or less than that one is 
available for participation in a deviant act" (1980, p.70). 
Clarke and Cornish argue:
"Readiness involves rather more than receptiveness: 
it implies that the individual has actually 
contemplated this form of crime as a solution to his 
needs and has decided that under the right 
circumstances he would commit the offence."
(Clarke and Cornish 1985, p.167)
Alcohol may be related to this type of provisional readiness 
in two ways. Firstly, life experiences and personality 
characteristics, identified in Chapter Three as creating
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"risk" or "vulnerability" to heavy drinking and crime, may be 
restated here as background influences in the generation of 
provisional readiness to offend. Such factors enable the 
individual to contemplate moral infractions more easily. 
Individual biographies influence exposure to and perception of 
deviant behaviour and the evaluation of the non-deviant 
alternatives (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Pfuhl 1980). For 
example, Athens (1989) argues that brutalising experiences 
contribute to readiness to respond to threat with violence. 
Repeated exposure to intoxicated violence may also strengthen 
the expectancy for this consequence of drinking, rendering it 
unsurprising and comparatively easy to apply to one's own 
behaviour.
Secondly, readiness is linked to self-concept in that it 
requires the ability to perceive oneself as one who would 
engage in the deviant behaviour under consideration (Clarke 
and Cornish 1985? Briar and Piliavin 1965; Pfuhl 1980). 
Alcohol, via the alcohol expectancies, has the capacity to 
facilitate episodic changes in self-concept, by licensing 
proscribed behaviour as the product of intoxication rather 
than personal moral failing. In this sense, the alcohol 
expectancies may provide the individual with provisional 
"permission" to offend, in the form of statements such as "If 
I were drunk I wouldn't care", or "If I were drunk I would 
react to that sort of provocation with violence".
Provisional readiness to offend may persist over time without 
being acted upon (Carroll 1982? Pfuhl 1980). However, once a 
provisional neutralisation has been formulated, motivation to 
commit the contemplated offence may itself be enhanced (Minor 
1981). Furthermore, provisional readiness interacts with 
situational factors, and may be perpetuated by repeated 
exposure to the temptation to offend. For example;
"[V]iolent episodes between intimates have no exact 
point at which they begin or end? instead, they form 
an integral part of a continuing relationship. The 
factors associated with a man's use of violence
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against his wife are present most of the time, and 
the specific factors leading to any particular event 
may occur days, months or even years before the 
event itself.”
(Dobash and Dobash 1984, p.272)
Within certain relationships such as marriage, alcohol may 
already feature as a symbol of power and control (Blum 1982; 
Kantor and Straus 1987). The link between intoxication and 
marital violence may thus develop, and acquire increasing 
salience, over a series of hostile interchanges.
In the second case, Cordilia's (1986) analysis suggests that 
the motivation to offend may be generated within situations 
affording the opportunity for the offence. Motivation here is 
more closely related to the formulation of intention to commit 
a specific offence, as, for example, in Luckenbill's (1977) 
situationally inspired "working agreement" between aggressors 
to use violence.
Individuals may go to greater or lesser efforts to create 
opportunities to offend in the situations in which they find 
themselves. Drinking situations provide opportunities to 
"display" readiness to offend, for example, by discussing 
targets for burglary (Bennett and Wright 1984a, 1984b? Walsh
1986), or by projecting hostility (Parker 1974). Furthermore, 
such interactions facilitate the learning of perspectives 
which permit offending behaviour, by exposure to examples, 
neutralisations, opportunities and encouragement (Best and 
Luckenbill 1982; Pfuhl 1980).
Intoxication is one of a range of techniques employed by 
offenders "to manipulate their beliefs to make them compatible 
with intended courses of action" (Bennett and Wright 1984a, 
p.142). Others include contemplation of gain (Walsh 1986); 
concentration on the urgency of need (Walsh 1986)? 
anticipation of heightened self-esteem and respect of others 
(Walsh 1986); exaggeration of skill (Lejeune 1977? Walsh
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1986)? minimisation of risks (Lejeune 1977); refusal to plan 
or to contemplate failure (Bennett and Wright 1984a; Walsh
1986) ? and redefinition of fear as enjoyment (Lejeune 1977? 
Wade 1967) . A particular attraction of alcohol in this process 
may be its legitimation of potential failure as the result of 
intoxicated incompetence, without reflection on the 
individual's public image as a competent operator (Berglas
1987). Equally, intoxication may enhance success through the 
experience of overcoming an intellectual handicap (Berglas
1987) .
3. Preference
Garofalo (1987) suggests that "target attractiveness", or the 
instrumental or symbolic value of the target to the offender 
is an important aspect of offence decisions. Offenders' 
preferences may reflect moral scruples about certain offences 
or offence targets (Maguire 1982; Munro 1972), or pragmatic 
considerations, for example, to do with anticipated victim 
behaviour (Walsh 1986) or the disposability of property 
(Garofalo 1987). Nevertheless, the frequent abdication from 
such moral or pragmatic stances, arising from factors such as 
the vagaries of opportunity and the urgency of need was noted 
in Chapter Three. Lay theories about alcohol's effects on 
rationality and morality provide non-pejorative explanations 
for behaviour which contradicts preferences, for example by 
invoking indiscriminateness or impulsivity.
4. Prior experience
Repeated experience of an offence alters the perception of its 
moral significance, reducing the need to neutralise guilt or 
fear (Carroll and Weaver 1986? Feeney 1986; Jacobs 1989; Minor 
1980; Pfuhl 1980). Such shifts in perception will reduce the 
importance of neutralisations based on beliefs about alcohol.
A further consequence of experience, however, may be that the 
offence becomes part of the series of scripted activities 
connected with drinking situations and established in the
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offender's repertoire. Thus, offending "routines" (Bennett and 
Wright 1984a), "patterns" (Feeney 1986) or "scripts" (Forgas
1986) arising in drinking situations may acquire the 
concreteness and "mindlessness" of other, non-deviant 
behaviours commonly associated with drinking.
Experience of intoxication may also influence the perception 
of alcohol itself (Blum 1982? Zucker 1979). It has been seen 
that heavy drinkers hold conventional alcohol expectancies, 
but with particular emphases. The experience of success in 
acting out a particular expectancy, for example, for increased 
assertiveness under intoxication, is likely to reinforce that 
expectancy, perpetuating the association between intoxication 
and the offence.
Summary
The presence of alcohol neutralises moral conflict in a 
variety of ways, involving its pharmacological effects, its 
cultural and situational significance for moral judgements, 
and the direct invocation of lay theories or expectancies. 
Intoxication facilitates mood changes consistent with moral 
infractions. Cultural and situational definitions of 
intoxicated behaviour are diverse and often ambiguous in their 
implications for the moral significance of behaviour. Lay 
theories about alcohol's effects may mediate offenders' 
decisions by providing rationales for overcoming moral 
objections, enhancing readiness to offend, attenuating 
preferences for particular offences or offence targets, and 
strengthening the association between intoxication and 
offending on the basis of experience.
RATIONALISATION
It may not be possible to draw a rigid distinction between 
pre-offence neutralisation and rationalisation after the 
event. An offender may have more time after an offence to 
construct a rationalisation (Minor 1981), but once achieved, 
this may serve as a neutralisation for subsequent offences.
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Walsh (1986) observes that burglars concentrate on their last 
offence and the intensity of their need in order to perpetuate 
their feelings of self-justification for future offending.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that techniques for 
neutralisation and for rationalisation are the same in all 
cases. For example, a rationalisation is likely to take into 
account the outcome of the offence. Thus, rationalisations may 
differ for successful and unsuccessful offences, with the 
latter type being constructed to compensate injured pride. The 
relationship between a rationalisation constructed following 
an unsuccessful offence and the neutralisation of subsequent 
offences may then depend on the prediction of future success. 
Thus, for example, intoxication may be invoked as a 
rationalisation for failure which does not reflect on the 
offender's general, sober competence (Berglas 1987) .
Although rationalisations must be plausible, at least to the 
offender, they may be constructed in ways which do not reflect 
the real reasons for an offence (Semin and Manstead 1983), 
since their primary purpose is self-excusatory. In this 
respect, rationalisations may fall broadly into two types. 
Firstly, they may justify or excuse the offender's act. For
example, a murderer "may select as an event leading to his 
violence one which places the brunt of responsibility for the 
murder on the victim" (Luckenbill 1977, p. 197) . Alternatively, 
rationalisations may justify or excuse the offender's condition. 
For example, Cook (1975) observes that alcoholics describe 
their problems in terms of the incurability of alcoholism, the 
inevitable failure of attempts at sobriety, and the inexorable 
escalation of the appetite for alcohol.
Taylor (1972) suggests that a full understanding of offenders' 
rationalisations for their behaviour requires an examination 
of four issues: the range of justifications available for 
particular offences? the role of others in defining the 
acceptability or unacceptability of the available
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justifications; the variables affecting the acceptance and 
development of alternative rationalisations; and the 
significance of alternative rationalisations for the 
offender*s self-image and behaviour. The following discussion 
will examine offence rationalisations from these aspects, 
under the briefer headings of availability; acceptability; 
alternatives; and behaviour and self-image.
Availability
It was seen in Chapter Three that offenders do not appear to 
possess special insights into the causes of crime. Although 
rationalisations may not reflect real reasons for actions*, 
offenders* explanations conform to cultural beliefs about the 
causes and justifications for behaviour (Semin and Manstead 
1983) , or "vocabularies of motives*' (Taylor 1972) . Cultural 
beliefs about alcohol circumscribe the motivational statements 
which may invoke alcohol (Pernanen 1982). Thus, for example, 
in Jewish culture, in which alcohol use is integrated with 
religious ritual and symbolism, motivations for drinking do 
not invoke the intoxicating effects of alcohol p e rse; whilst in 
Irish culture drinking motivations concern emotional release 
through the direct effects of alcohol (Greeley, McCready and 
Theisen 1980). Sykes and Matza's (1957) observation that 
delinquents' self-justificatory accounts are based on legal 
defences to crimes, probably reflects less the legal expertise 
of offenders than the fact that legal defences are themselves 
rooted in cultural beliefs about the causes and moral 
justifications of behaviour.
As reflections of cultural beliefs about reasons for actions, 
offenders' rationalisations are socially learned. Thus, for 
example, Scully and Marolla argue:
"We view rape as behavior learned socially, through 
interaction with others; convicted rapists have 
learned the attitudes and actions consistent with 
sexual aggression against women. Learning also 
includes the acquisition of culturally derived 
vocabularies of motive, which can be used to
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diminish responsibility and to negotiate a non­
deviant identity.”
(Scully and Marolla 1984, p.530)
Whilst it is difficult to develop personal rationalisations 
for deviance independently of such deep-rooted cultural 
beliefs, it may also be advantageous to adopt the available 
vocabularies of motive. For example, observing the common 
tendency for sex offenders to explain their behaviour in terms 
of sudden loss of self-control, Taylor remarks:
”It is others who have led him to cite such motives, 
but most importantly it means that he can now 
represent his motives to himself in such 
deterministic terms before engaging in the action or 
before deciding upon whether to continue it."
(Taylor 1972, p.27)
It was noted earlier that cultural beliefs circumscribe social 
definitions of what constitutes a problem associated with 
drinking. Such beliefs may further influence offenders* 
perceptions of their behaviour. For example, Stephan (1989) 
argues that the lack of "problem consciousness" in cultural 
beliefs about drunk driving is linked to the failure of such 
offenders to perceive any reason to change their drinking 
habits. Jacobs takes this argument further, implying that 
rationalisation skills may be highly developed at the cultural 
level, in order to sustain justifications for activities which 
have unpleasant social consequences:
"Given the complexity, magnitude, potential dangers, 
and relentless occurrence of crashes and casualties, 
it is a tribute to our capacity for repressing 
unpleasant truths that we continue to think of 
automobile injuries as aberrational and perceive 
driving to be safe compared with other (actually 
safer) modes of transportation, such as airplanes."
(Jacobs 1989, p.16)
This tenacity in maintaining cultural beliefs and attitudes 
may be linked to the apparent absence from common vocabularies
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of motives of one particular academic theory: drunk driving as 
suicide. Jacobs (1989) argues that such a proposition is 
consistent with evidence that most alcohol-related traffic 
fatalities are single-vehicle crashes? that many occur on 
clear roads during clear nights? and that suicide is 
statistically associated with intoxication and alcoholism. 
Nevertheless, attempted suicide is not a common explanation 
for drunk driving, and despite the potential advantages in 
challenging the retributive thrust of social attitudes to 
drunk driving, it does not appear to be commonly advanced by 
offenders.
Rationalisations which link intoxication and offending are 
facilitated by their common vocabularies of motive. The 
similarity of many incentives and rewards for both drinking 
and offending reduces the necessity to construct special 
rationalisations for offending. Explanations for drinking may 
be adopted or adapted in the development of offence 
rationalisations. In this context, it may be noted that 
academic theories of both drinking and crime themselves draw 
upon similar explanatory concepts. Thus, academic accounts of 
delinquency and drinking often appear interchangeable. For 
example:
"Because delinquent behavior is typically episodic, 
purposive, and confined to certain situations, we 
assume that the motives for such behavior are 
frequently episodic, oriented to short-term ends, 
and confined to certain situations."
(Briar and Piliavin 1965, p.36)
"[M]ost adolescent drinking is episodic and 
opportunist in character. Those who drink tend to 
drink when and where they can and few will have the 
routine drinking habits associated with regular 
adult drinkers."
(Marsh, Dobbs and White 1986, p. 13)
Similarly, although it has been strongly argued that there are 
no theoretical concepts which satisfactorily explain the age-
9
164
crime relationship (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; Rowe and 
Tittle 1977), academic theorists have usually attempted to 
construct explanations invoking factors such as marriage, 
employment, or loss of confidence, which are held to alter the 
personal motivations of offenders (e.g. Collins 1982; Shover
1985). Such factors are similarly invoked by alcohol theorists 
to explain the age variation in drinking patterns (e.g. Blane 
1979; Sadava 1987; Zucker 1979).
Thus, drinking and crime are semantically linked, facilitating 
the adoption and adaptation of common vocabularies of motive 
for the purpose of explaining one behaviour in terms of the 
other.
Acceptability
The foregoing discussion suggests that offenders' 
rationalisations are derived from culturally available 
explanations of the causes and justifications of behaviour. 
Indeed, the most useful rationalisations will be constructed 
for their social, rather than purely personal, acceptability. 
Cameron (1964) found that although non-professional 
shoplifters might in fact employ sophisticated techniques for 
stealing, they differed markedly from professionals in the 
inadequacy of their excuses upon arrest. It appeared that non­
professional shoplifters, through their failure to perceive 
themselves as criminals liable to be held to account in 
public, had devised rationalisations with a severely limited 
currency, plausible only to themselves.
Interaction with other offenders facilitates the learning of 
a repertoire of rationalisations (Best and Luckenbill 1982). 
These rationalisations may be adapted to complement the 
circumstances of the preceding crime. For example, Parker 
(1974) observed that following apparently impulsive fights, 
the gang would spend some time developing the appropriate 
rationalisations, such as "teaching a lesson" to a rival gang, 
or "self-defence" against an aggressive stranger. Notably,
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Parker*s gang do not appear to have found it necessary to 
invoke intoxication in the rationalisation of violence, 
although drinking had almost invariably taken place 
beforehand. They drew instead on perceptions of the social 
relationships between themselves and their victims. In only 
one instance, in which an argument developed within the gang 
itself, does Parker record that intoxication was invoked as a 
cause of the aggression. Here, however, rationalisation 
provided grounds, not for justification, but for tolerance and 
forgiveness.
The rehearsal of rationalisations among drinking or offending 
companions promotes not only the individual * s personal 
repertoire, but also peer group solidarity (Parker 1974). To 
this extent, the acceptability of rationalisations shared 
between peers will be related to the needs of the group. For 
example, despite the public commitment of Alcoholics Anonymous 
to continual sobriety, "slipping” appears to be quite common 
amongst its members (Fingarette 1988). Confession and re­
affirmation of commitment in the style of Alcoholics Anonymous 
meetings appears to reinforce group identification (Antze
1987).
Peer group rehearsals may also reflect the translation of 
unpleasant emotional concomitants of an offence into a non- 
pejorative, and even attractive experience. Fear may be 
redefined as thrill, and unnecessary risk-taking or 
incompetence as part of the hilarity of the occasion (Lejeune 
1977). In this sense, rationalisations may assist the learning 
of re-attribution of arousal, discussed earlier: the
individual who has learned to say with hindsight, "I was 
excited, not scared”, may learn to say "I am excited, not 
scared” in later, similar situations. Thus, rationalisations 
may assist neutralisation of subsequent offending.
Alcohol, therefore, will not be invoked indiscriminately, 
simply because of its conveniently wide applicability. Rather,
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the intoxication excuse will be applied selectively and 
purposefully as a rationalisation for offences for which 
other, perhaps morally more persuasive, explanations are 
unavailable or unnecessary. Ladouceur and Temple (1985) found 
that although convicted offenders reported consumption levels 
prior to their offence similar to their typical drinking 
pattern, they differed markedly in their perceptions of their 
intoxication. Rapists and burglars were more likely to report 
feeling very drunk at the time of their offence than were non­
violent sex offenders and assaulters. A possible explanation 
for these differences in the subjective experience of 
intoxication might derive from the necessity, perceived by 
offenders, for special rationalisations for abhorrent or 
incompetent crimes which deflect responsibility on to an 
external agent.
Alternatives
The discussion so far has pointed to the essentially social 
nature of rationalisation. Even though they may be invoked for 
personal self-justification, rationalisations draw on cultural 
vocabularies of motive, are learned and rehearsed among social 
groups, and are most usefully developed with consideration of 
potential audiences. Cultural vocabularies of motives develop 
in accordance with the social need for them. For example, 
Morgan argues:
"Historically, when physical chastisement against 
wives was seen as a common prerogative of husbands, 
an alcohol-related or any other type of 
disinhibitory Excuse' was not needed...However, in 
the last half of the 20th century, with relations 
within the family in flux, husbands attempting to 
retain dominance can no longer justify acts of 
violence and aggression as an automatic right. The 
mediating influence of disinhibitory alcohol 
behavior then is seen as a much easier association 
to make."
(Morgan 1981, p.414)
Alternative rationalisations are invoked according to the 
perceived expectations of different potential audiences (Scott
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and Lyman 1968). For example, the exaggeration of violence in 
accounts of aggressive incidents among young male peers "may 
be acceptable within a social group which tacitly recognises 
the legitimacy of adding a sense of 'excitement' to routine 
events" (Marsh and Campbell 1979, p.7).
Social subgroups may develop alternative rationalisations for 
the different purposes of justifying behaviour to their own 
satisfaction or of explaining that behaviour to outsiders. For 
example, in the first case, Peterson and Maxwell (1958) 
observe that "winos", as one of the most vilified groups on 
skid row, share a range of justifications for drinking wine, 
including assertions that its effects are more deadening and 
longer lasting, that it is more easily digested and that it 
suppresses appetite more successfully than other beverages. In 
the second case, Wallace (1965) reports that skid row men 
offer explanations of their lifestyle to outsiders which serve 
to counter social opprobrium by condemning conventional 
standards, glorifying skid row, and producing biographies 
adapted to appeal to the preconceptions of the investigator.
Personal rationalisations require some social reference group 
within which they may be developed and sustained. Best and 
Luckenbill (1982) remark on the stress and disorientation 
experienced by solitary offenders, resulting in increasing 
difficulty in effectively utilising their limited, inflexible 
stock of rationalisations to sustain their lifestyle. Cameron 
(1964) suggests that the childishness of the excuses offered 
by non-professional adult shoplifters is linked to the 
development of rationalisations for stealing among juveniles, 
upon which mature offenders fall back in the absence of a 
contemporary peer group within which to generate more 
appropriate alternatives. Taylor (1972) notes that the 
isolation of sex offenders prevents them from developing 
alternative vocabularies of motive, resulting in the 
persistence of claims to intoxicated loss of control or 
overwhelming biological drives.
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Behaviour and self-image
The evidence, reviewed in Chapter Three, of the crucial 
significance of cognition in the production of alcohol-related 
behaviour, suggests that behaviour itself may be influenced by 
the available explanations and rationalisations for it. 
Anthropologists argue that in societies in which a limited 
number of clearly defined beliefs about alcohol's effects 
pertain, intoxicated behaviour is itself predictable; but in 
Western societies, the diversity and inconsistency of beliefs 
result in great variability in alcohol-related behaviour (Lang 
1981? Macandrew and Edgerton 1969). Macandrew and Edgerton 
conclude caustically:
"The moral, then, is this. Since societies, like 
individuals, get the sorts of drunken comportment 
that they allow, they deserve what they get."
(Macandrew and Edgerton 1969, p.173)
Jacobs (1989) suggests that the ambiguity of cultural 
directives concerning drinking and driving encourages 
rationalisation and, thereby, lax compliance.
"Smokers are told that smoking causes emphysema and 
lung cancer and are exhorted not to smoke. Drivers 
are told that seat belts are an important safety 
device and are urged to wear them. People who drink 
and drive are told that drinking and driving are 
both alright and that even drinking/driving is 
alright if it is not excessive. People are not 
really meant to follow the injunction 'If you drink, 
don't drive.' What is meant is, 'If you drink 
excessively, don't drive.' This is a vague 
exhortation that starkly contrasts with such simple 
messages as 'Don't smoke' and 'Wear seat belts.'"
(Jacobs 1989, p.163)
However, the foregoing discussion should not encourage the 
conclusion that rationalisations are solely social in their 
construction. It has been argued that cultural and social 
beliefs and attitudes circumscribe the available range of 
rationalisations, their acceptability, and the generation of 
alternatives. Individual motivations, however, are likely to
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influence the selection, utilisation and adaptation of 
rationalisations from among this cultural stock. Thus, for 
example, Snyder, Stephan and Rosenfield (1978) suggest that a 
variety of personal motives, such as desire for accuracy, to 
present oneself in a particular light, or to avoid disbelief, 
may compete against the general tendency for individuals to 
take credit for good outcomes of their actions, but to blame 
external causes for bad ones. In the case of rationalisations 
for deviance, the significance of the behaviour for the 
individual1s estimation of his own moral character may 
crucially influence the selection and invocation of self- 
excusatory devices.
Cameron (1964) illustrates the crucial impact of a deviant 
attribution on self-image and behaviour in the finding that 
non-professional shoplifters almost universally desist 
abruptly upon initial arrest. These "snitches”, having 
sustained hitherto a belief in their respectability, despite 
the regularity, deliberation and skill of their stealing, had 
no rationalisations capable of deflecting the sudden 
acquisition of the identity of "thief".
In developing a typology of criminal identities, Irwin (1970) 
acknowledges that in reality these characterisations overlap, 
are ambiguous, and frequently contradicted in the behaviour of 
offenders. Nevertheless, Irwin argues that such identities are 
meaningful to offenders, and subtly influence individual self- 
images .
"In spite of this overlap in the life routines of 
actual felons, the task of describing the systems in 
their ideal-typical form is being undertaken because 
they do exist as relatively distinct entities in the 
minds of some of the participants, and they operate, 
therefore, distinctly and differentially on an 
overall and long-term basis."
(Irwin 1970, p.7)
The major themes identified by Irwin in the identity of 
"thief" - the quest for the "big score", the moral code of
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responsibility and loyalty to peers, and the importance of 
"coolness” and skill - are echoed by Walsh (1986) in his study 
of burglars. Such self-characterisations, albeit that they 
appear romantic and removed from realities of offenders' 
behaviour, nevertheless offset the severely pejorative terms 
in which they also frequently describe themselves (Walsh
1986). In this context, it is notable that rationalisations 
invoking alcohol may be either self-laudatory (e.g. a "hard 
drinker") or self-deprecatory (e.g. an "alcy").
Taylor argues that sex offenders are highly motivated to 
sustain rationalisations which appeal to loss of control, 
given the alternative necessity of coming to terms with 
socially abhorrent sexual preferences as an integral aspect of 
their own characters. Similarly, Shover remarks that 
persistent, yet incompetent ageing criminals resorted 
"alternately with resignation or desperation to the belief
that it was 'too late' for them to accomplish anything in
life" (1985, p.215).
The investment of offenders in the maintenance of a self-image 
which is, at least to some degree, non-deviant, accounts for 
the attractiveness of the intoxication excuse as a personal 
rationalisation for abhorrent behaviour.
"[I]f people have been brought up to believe that
one is 'not really oneself' when drunk, then it
becomes possible for them to construe their drunken 
changes-for-the-worse as purely episodic happenings 
rather than as intended acts issuing from their 
moral character."
(Macandrew and Edgerton 1969, p.169)
McCaghy suggests that the personal significance of such 
rationalisations has been ignored in the interpretation of sex 
offenders' invocations of the intoxication excuse as purely 
public denials of responsibility.
"We do not wish to naively imply that persons may 
not use their explanations of deviance as
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manipulatory devices while fully intending to resume 
their deviant behaviour. Nor do we claim that 
denials or excuses involving drinking represent, 
either totally or exclusively, the intent or ability 
of individuals to avoid further deviance. We do wish 
to suggest, however, that the confrontation between 
society and the deviant may produce corrective 
efforts by the deviant which are misinterpreted 
because of society's emphasis on his accepting full 
responsibility for his deviance."
(McCaghy 1968, p.49)
Taylor (1972) further points out that a degree of tolerance is 
extended by prisoners only to those sex offenders for whom the 
offence could plausibly be attributed to temporary loss of 
control. Such stringent criteria for minimal social acceptance 
"suggests that it might be foolish to persuade the sexual 
deviant that he acted with consciousness and awareness" 
(Taylor 1972, p.36).
It was noted earlier that drinking styles are frequently 
invoked to illustrate or to impute social and moral 
characterisations. Equally, reference to one's personal 
drinking pattern is often a core aspect of self-concept. 
Athens' (1980) enquiry into the self-perception of violent 
offenders at the time of their offences, shows that offenders 
repeatedly explained their self-images, whether positive or 
negative, by reference to their drinking patterns. The 
selective utilisation of rationalisations invoking alcohol may 
therefore derive from individual motivations either to sustain 
a valued self-image or to acknowledge self-criticism.
Summary
Offence rationalisations are based on cultural "vocabularies 
of motives". Drinking and offending share common vocabularies 
of motive, reducing the need to construct special 
rationalisations for offending, by facilitating the adoption 
and adaptation of drinking explanations. The most useful 
rationalisations are constructed for their social, rather than 
purely personal acceptability. Indeed, offender peer groups
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develop and rehearse alternative rationalisations, suitable 
for different audiences. Rationalisations invoking alcohol are 
likely to be applied to offences for which morally more 
persuasive explanations are absent or unnecessary. However, 
rationalisations are also likely to be invoked according to 
individual motivations, particularly to sustain personal self- 
images .
CONCLUSIONS
Alcohol expectancies constitute a particular variety of lay 
theory about the effects of alcohol on rationality, mood and 
behaviour. Alcohol expectancies thus mediate judgements of 
personal responsibility for intoxicated crime. They facilitate 
the neutralisation of moral conflict about offending behaviour 
by overcoming moral objections, enhancing readiness to offend, 
attenuating moral or pragmatic preferences for specific 
offences or offence targets, and enabling offending to develop 
into a scripted activity in drinking situations. They also 
provide the basis for offence rationalisations, based on 
cultural vocabularies of motives, which appeal to different 
audiences and sustain personal self-images.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LAY THEORIES AND JUDGEMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY:
MITIGATION
This chapter examines the intoxication excuse in mitigation. 
It considers, firstly, the relationship between lay judgements 
of responsibility and formal courtroom mitigation? secondly, 
some special aspects of mitigation, and in particular, the 
process by which mitigation achieves its purpose of reducing 
judgements of culpability and consequent punishment.
MITIGATION: THE APPEAL TO LAY THEORIES
In Chapter Four, in drawing a distinction between 
rationalisation and mitigation, it was suggested that 
mitigation is "a formal ’account* (Scott and Lyman 1968) of a 
criminal offence offered publicly in order to reduce 
judgements by others of culpability and consequent 
punishment”. This definition now requires deeper inspection, 
in order to determine the similarities and differences between 
accounts offered in everyday life and mitigation in the 
courtroom.
Scott and Lyman explain their concept of accounts in the 
following exposition:
”An account is a linguistic device employed whenever 
an action is subjected to valuative inquiry. Such 
devices are a crucial element in the social order 
since they prevent conflicts from arising by 
verbally bridging the gap between action and 
expectation. Moreover, accounts are 'situated' 
according to the statuses of the interactants, and 
are standardised within cultures so that certain 
accounts are terminologically stabilized and 
routinely expected when activity falls outside the 
domain of expectations.”
(Scott and Lyman 1968, p.46)
These elements of everyday accounts can be perceived in 
courtroom mitigation. Scott and Lyman's definition points out 
the likelihood that certain cultural conventions for the
174
construction of accounts will be followed in courtroom 
mitigation, while special features will derive from the
specific situation in which they are presented. A weakness of 
their definition when applied to courtroom mitigation may lie 
in their specification of conflict prevention as the function 
of account rendering. In the courtroom, following conviction 
for an offence, mitigation is less concerned with prevention 
of conflict than with reduction of punishment. Shapland's 
explanation of everyday accounts lessens this discrepancy.
"[0]ffence has been given to someone and the person 
giving the offence accounts for giving that offence 
and attempts to forestall punishment, i.e. he 
performs remedial work on the situation."
(Shapland 1981, p.43)
"Remedial work", according to Shapland, involves the
restoration of equity to the harmed victim: by compensation? 
by some equivalent harm to be suffered by the offender; or by 
justification of the harm suffered by the victim. However, 
Shapland continues:
"Although restoring equity to the victim is 
important, the offender must also portray his 
current relationship to the rules which his conduct 
appears to have broken and do penance, whether 
directly to the victim, or separately, for breaking 
the rules as well as harming the victim."
(Shapland 1981, p.44)
Mitigation recognises the inevitability of punishment. Within 
this constraint, however, the similarities between accounts 
and mitigations are sufficient to warrant the observation that 
"the content of the mitigation speech is a special case of 
what would be said in everyday life" (Shapland 1981, p.43). 
Therefore, much may be learned about courtroom mitigations by 
a consideration of everyday accounts, or accounts in lay life. 
Two aspects of accounts require consideration for this 
purpose: their basic types and their specific features.
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Types of accounts
Accounts fall into two basic types: justifications and excuses 
(Scott and Lyman 1968? Shapland 1981? Shaver 1985). In the 
courtroom sentencing exercise, the primary judgement is that 
of moral culpability or blameworthiness, rather than absolute 
responsibility. Full denial of responsibility, therefore, is 
not an optional strategy in the attempt to mitigate 
punishment. It may be this presumption of personal 
accountability in the sentencing situation which contributes 
to some discrepancy between Scott and Lyman*s (1968) typology 
of everyday accounts and Shapland*s (1981) typology of 
mitigations. Scott and Lyman (1968) class ’'scapegoating*' as a 
type of excuse, to reduce culpability? Shapland (1981) 
apparently assumes that scapegoating would be a justificatory 
technique of victim denial. Scott and Lyman (1968), however, 
class "the sad tale", in which the offender explains his act 
in terms of his own adversity, as a justification? Shapland 
(1981) perceives this as an excuse to reduce, rather than to 
deny, culpability. Nevertheless, these comparatively minor 
definitional differences do not discredit the essential point: 
courtroom mitigations observe the rules of construction and 
presentation established in everyday accounts and rooted in 
common sense assumptions about cause, responsibility and moral 
blameworthiness.
1. Justifications
"Justifications are accounts in which one accepts 
responsibility for the act in question, but denies 
the pejorative quality associated with it."
(Scott and Lyman 1968, p.47)
This type of account asserts that "contrary to the perceiver's 
opinion, the action taken was a positive one" (Shaver 1985,
p.162). Shaver (1985) suggests that such an assertion may be 
achieved by arguing either that the act did not in fact 
possess the morally reprehensible nature originally perceived
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in it, or that its reprehensibility was outweighed by some 
larger social purpose which it served.
In the context of courtroom mitigations, such arguments would 
be heavily constrained by the fact of conviction and the 
inevitability of punishment. The presumption of personal 
accountability in this context, in which the judgement to be 
made concerns the extent, and not the fact, of culpability 
suggests that mitigation by justification is a high risk 
strategy, liable to be perceived as evasion of personal 
responsibility or assertion of commitment to a reprehensible 
morality. Some justificatory techniques, such as "condemnation 
of the condemners" or "self-fulfilment" (Scott and Lyman 1968) 
may be altogether impermissible in these circumstances. 
Others, such as denial of either the injury or the victim 
(Scott and Lyman 1968), may require strategic presentation to 
achieve acceptability. For example, Shapland, Willmore and 
Duff (1985) point out the heavy reliance of sentencing 
proceedings on the assumption of the "blameless" victim. In 
Schafer*s words:
"The norm-delineated functional role of the victim 
is to do nothing to provoke others from attempting 
to injure his ability to play his role. At the same 
time, it expects him actively to prevent such 
attempts. This is the victim's functional 
responsibility."
(Schafer 1968, p.152)
In these circumstances, scapegoating of the victim would 
require measured argument if it were not to amount to outright 
denial of responsibility, a stance which might antagonise 
sentencers considering punishment. Nevertheless, the 
scapegoating of rape victims is an example of the frequently 
successful appeal to lay theories about the causes of sexual 
violence which implicate victims as provocateurs (Scully and 
Marolla 1984).
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2• Excuses
"Excuses are accounts in which one admits that the 
act in question is bad, wrong, or inappropriate but 
denies full responsibility."
(Scott and Lyman 1968, p.47)
Excuses appeal to circumstances such as accident or mistake, 
or to forces such as temporary incapacity or duress (Shapland
1981). Except in some extreme cases, such appeals do not 
challenge the presumption of personal accountability, but seek 
to reduce moral censure. Thus, they address themselves to the 
judgement of moral blameworthiness or culpability with which 
the sentencing court is concerned. They further allow for 
expressions of remorse, gestures of atonement and the 
acceptance of punishment: the specific "remedial work" with 
which the sentencing court is concerned. Excuses, therefore, 
are a less risky strategy in mitigation.
Characteristics of accounts
Certain characteristics of accounts are subject to particular 
constraints in the context of courtroom mitigations: 
impression management; negotiation? intelligibility? and 
credibility.
1. Impression management
Scott and Lyman remark:
"Since individuals are aware that appearances may 
serve to credit or discredit accounts, efforts are 
understandably made to control these appearances 
through a vast repertoire of 1 impression management' 
activities."
(Scott and Lyman 1968, p.54)
Above all, the offender must demonstrate the sincerity of his 
account, showing proper regard for the correctional process 
(Shapland 1981). For example, in apologising, the offender 
must show genuine distress caused by the victim's suffering 
(Shapland 1981). In the courtroom, the expectation of
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sincerity extends to the defence solicitor proffering 
mitigation on the offender's behalf.
"That involves, above all, trying consistently with 
fair and proper means to reduce the level of 
punishment which may come to your client but, 
secondly, and this is important, assisting the court 
to arrive at what seems to be the least punishment 
consistent with justice. No-one will doubt that in 
seeking to persuade to the mitigation of punishment, 
the major requirement is to convince the court that 
you are there to assist, as indeed you are."
(Napley 1983, p.164)
Impression management is a complex task for defendants in the 
courtroom. Firstly, unfamiliarity with courtroom procedure and 
etiquette (McBarnett 1983? Carlen 1976? Parker, Casburn and 
Turnbull 1981), physical design features of the courtroom 
(Carlen 1976), and the offering of mitigation through a third 
party are disruptive situational influences on the display of 
behaviour which usually accompanies an account. Secondly, 
defendants experience multiple motivations connected with the 
court appearance itself: for example, to speed the processing 
of their case, to avoid publicity and to protect their 
employment (Bottoms and McClean 1976). Thus, motivation to 
atone for the offence itself, however sincere, is necessarily 
in competition with these situational motivations.
Furthermore, the offender's perspective on his offence may 
itself be influenced by features of the criminal justice 
process. For example, Schafer (1968) found that offenders' 
remorsefulness and wish to make reparation varied in relation, 
not only to features of their offences, but also to their 
anticipated sentence. Expectation of capital punishment was 
associated with intensified remorse and wish to make 
reparation. In respect of offenders facing imprisonment, 
however, Schafer observes:
"Their orientation was such that they could not 
understand their wrongdoing in terms of social 
relationships, not even in terms of the victim.
Their understanding of incarceration seemed limited
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to what they viewed as merely a normative wrong that 
has to be paid to the agencies of criminal justice, 
but to no one else. Their reluctance to go beyond 
this isolated and narrow attitude was not due to 
some deviant logic, but to a lack of understanding 
of the referent factors of their crime."
(Schafer 1968, p.83)
Bottoms and McClean (1976) suggest that much of the behaviour 
of defendants at court should be interpreted as impression 
management techniques for dealing with these situational 
aspects of the court appearance, rather than for accounting 
for the offence. They identify certain self-presentational 
styles, such as "the respectable first-timer", "the 
strategist", "the rights assertive" defendant, and the 
"passive respondent". The notable point about these self- 
presentational styles is that they are derived from 
recognisable roles in everyday life. Furthermore, they are 
selected to complement the type of person which the defendant 
perceives himself, or may be perceived by others, to be in 
everyday life. For example, the "respectable first-timer" may 
be either "a remorseful one-time loser", or a "mistakenly 
indicted citizen". But in either case, qualification for this 
self-presentational style requires an established identity in 
everyday life, thus excluding teenagers from attempting it 
(Bottoms and McClean 1976). The attitudinal research reviewed 
in Chapter Four might suggest that the offender*s perspective 
on his offence may be influenced in the attempt to integrate 
his account with the self-presentational styles available to 
him in the courtroom.
2. Negotiation
In everyday accounts, the offender is attempting to negotiate 
for himself absolution from, or reduction of censure. 
Negotiation in everyday accounts is generally implicit. It 
does not require assertion, since it is inherent in the 
rendering of the account itself.
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Whilst negotiation is an intrinsic feature of the everyday 
account, a large part of negotiation in the courtroom is 
separated from the mitigation speech. Courtroom negotiations 
are frequently explicit, whether at a low key, consultative 
level between participants, as when solicitors confer with 
court clerks (Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981), or in the 
form of overt pressure to alter the course of the proceedings, 
as in plea bargaining (Baldwin and McConville 1977). This 
severance of negotiation from mitigation creates a paradoxical 
relationship between the necessary sincerity of the mitigation 
itself and communications outside it which reveal a distinctly 
pragmatic approach to the "true facts" of the case. For 
example,
"the decision to prosecute on a particular charge is 
much affected by the ability of the defendant to 
create organizational problems for the prosecution 
by taking the case to trial."
(Gusfield 1981, p.161)
It is to the offender*s advantage to grasp this severance of 
negotiation from mitigation. For example, Baldwin and 
McConville, studying plea bargaining in the Crown Court, 
remark:
"Many of the defendants we interviewed, and 
particularly the recidivists among them, regard this 
kind of dealing as a standard, if somewhat 
underhand, method of administering justice and it is 
to some of them a much more realistic and acceptable 
way of proceeding than, say, taking their chance 
with a jury."
(Baldwin and McConville 1977, p.25)
However, negotiations to reduce judgements of responsibility 
and culpability may require a shift in the offender's 
perspective on the nature of his offending behaviour. For 
example, an offender offering mitigation based on an appeal to 
intoxicated impulsivity, however sincerely he may believe in 
that "cause" of his offence, may nevertheless discover that
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success depends not merely on contrition, but on demonstrable 
reform. Mosher observes of American justice:
"Treatment strategies have begun to incorporate the 
criminal justice system into the treatment methods 
themselves. Providers view the coercive arm of the 
law as helpful to their work. The threat of criminal 
prosecution serves to encourage a breakdown of the 
'denial* of the problem, generally considered the 
first step toward successful treatment. The criminal 
law actually encourages clients to admit to an 
alcohol problem which needs to be cured, for 
otherwise they may be found morally responsible for 
criminal behaviour."
(Mosher 1981, p.453)
3. Intelligibility
Scott and Lyman (1968) argue that successful accounts are 
adapted to the social circle within which they are offered. 
Acceptable "vocabularies of accounts" become routinised within 
cultures, subcultures and social groups, according to their 
established "background expectancies", or "those sets of 
taken-for-granted ideas that permit the interactants to 
interpret remarks as accounts in the first place" (Scott and 
Lyman 1968, p.53).
This argument suggests that successful accounts must be 
intelligible in the social context within which they are 
offered, rather than that in which the offence itself was 
committed. It further suggests that intelligibility is 
constrained by the availability and acceptability of 
alternative "vocabularies of accounts" within that social 
context. A clear relationship emerges here between everyday 
accounts and certain qualities of personal rationalisations 
for offences, as considered in Chapter Four.
In the courtroom, the immediate intelligibility of mitigation 
is vital. There is rarely time available to express novel or 
unusual explanations for behaviour. As was seen in Chapters 
Three and Four, offenders do not in any case possess special 
insights into crime causation and they develop personal
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rationalisations which reflect cultural conceptual traditions 
and "vocabularies of motives". Furthermore, the stock of lay 
theories of intoxication provides conveniently rapid 
explanations of deviant behaviour. Thus, Critchlow (1985) 
found that whilst information about intoxication did not 
generally negate attributions of responsibility for offensive 
behaviour, it did have a significant impact on judgements of 
severely antisocial acts. Critchlow attributes this effect to 
the unavailability of conventional explanations for highly 
unusual behaviour.
"When judging an act that violates expectancies, an 
observer searching for reasons may seize upon 
alcohol intoxication as a cause of the behaviour, 
thereby reducing attributions of responsibility, 
blame, and causal role."
(Critchlow 1985, p.271)
Howard and Clark (1985) found similarly that courts were 
likely to favour an insanity verdict when crimes involved 
impetuous passion or lacked an obvious motive, thus defying 
conventional explanations of behaviour. Sommer, Burstein and 
Holman (1988) found that censure of the behaviour of mentally 
ill people was reduced when it appeared bizarre or self­
destructive, as in cases of public obscenity or suicide. Thus, 
Best and Luckenbill remark that it is easier to attribute 
responsibility to an actor if he "announces or can be presumed 
to have motives consistent with conventional explanations for 
intentional action" (1982, p.216). Intoxication, like mental 
illness, offers a ready explanation for a range of 
extraordinary behaviours.
Mitigation requires causal thinking (Fitzmaurice and Pease 
1986). Shaver's (1985) "working definition" of responsibility 
usefully makes this point. According to Shaver, responsibility 
is
"a judgement made about the moral accountability of 
a person of normal capacities, which judgement 
usually but not always involves a causal connection
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between the person being judged and some morally 
disapproved action or event.”
(Shaver 1985, p.66)
Information about an offender*s history, personal 
circumstances, or state of mind, advanced in mitigation must 
appeal to readily intelligible plausible causes of crime. As 
Scott and Lyman (1968) point out, certain general explanations 
usefully provide plausible causes of a variety of specific 
behaviours and outcomes. For example, "having family problems" 
may explain criminality, heavy drinking, or depression.
"The person offering such an account may not himself 
regard it as a true one, but invoking it has certain 
interactional payoffs: since people cannot say they 
don*t understand it - they are accounts that are 
part of our socially distributed knowledge of what 
'everyone knows' - the inquiry can be cut short."
(Scott and Lyman 1968, p.53)
Thus, Napley suggests a useful appeal to lay versions of the 
undersocialisation theory of criminality.
"Many people, despite their age in years, have not, 
in fact, grown up? they have not faced up to the 
responsibilities of life and, if this is so and you 
can demonstrate it, you can make a plea in 
mitigation in a highly effective way; it is 
something which judges and experienced magistrates 
know and to which they will be receptive. Properly 
presented and cogently argued, they may accept it as 
an explanation."
(Napley 1983, p.166)
A further example of a general lay explanation invoked for 
specific behaviours derives from the ubiquitous metaphor of 
"sickness" noted in Chapter Two. Cook offers an excellent 
illustration of an account which appeals to this metaphor:
"For the hard core of skid row drinkers the 
Camberwell * spike* can still represent the final 
downfall. As one hard-liner put it: 'I felt sick,
really sick, sick from drink, sick from 
'skippering*, and sick of life. In fact I felt so
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bad that I walked from the East End to the 'spike'.
That was really admitting defeat.'"
(Cook 1975, p.131)
In this context, the flexibility of lay theories about 
alcohol's effects provides a range of plausible explanations 
for different behaviours. As Lang points out, in excuses for 
intoxicated conduct, "social acceptance of such drinking 
attributions is critical to the maintenance of their use" 
(1981, p.91). A special advantage of lay theories of 
intoxication derives from the readiness of individuals to 
attribute various "well known" effects of alcohol to others, 
despite having no personal experience of such results from 
drinking (Roizen 1981? Sharp and Lowe 1989a).
4. Credibility
Scott and Lyman (1968) suggest two reasons for the rejection 
of an account: illegitimacy, due to its inadequacy for a grave 
offence or its unacceptability in the group to which it is 
offered? and unreasonableness, due to its appeal to an unusual 
explanation beyond common theories of plausible causes. As has 
been seen, the intoxication excuse, by appeal to lay theories, 
provides a plausible explanation for a variety of behaviours. 
Its legitimacy, however, is linked to the gravity of the 
offence, the type of account being offered, and the frequency 
with which it is invoked by an individual. Examples of its 
circumscription by each of these factors may be given:
a) Offence gravity
McCaghy (1968) observes that some deviant behaviours are 
perceived to be so bizarre or despicable that no explanation 
which attempts to portray them as reasonable will be accepted. 
Intoxication, for example, is unlikely to succeed in 
mitigating sexual molestation of children if the appeal merely 
suggests that such behaviour falls into the "normal" range of 
pardonable disinhibited lapses from social decorum. Successful 
invocation of the intoxication excuse in these circumstances 
involves "deviance disavowal" (McCaghy 1968): repudiation of
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the behaviour, and of other perpetrators of that behaviour, 
whilst asserting exceptional loss of control induced by 
intoxication in the offender*s own case.
b) Type of account
Scully and Marolla (1984) found that convicted rapists offered 
one of two types of account: admission, in which the use of 
unacceptable force to obtain sex was acknowledged? or denial, 
in which either sexual contact with the victim was denied, or 
was acknowledged but not defined as rape. Appeals to 
intoxication varied according to the type of account. 
Admitters cited alcohol as a cause of their loss of sexual 
control. Deniers, however, used intoxication as a source of 
victim discreditation and scapegoating. They did not regard 
intoxication as having affected their own judgement or 
behaviour, since their denial required the assertion of self- 
control and ability to recall events accurately. These 
differences in the appeal to alcohol*s effects occurred 
without noticeable evidence of differences between admitters 
and deniers in the actual use of alcohol prior to the offence.
c) Frequency of invocation
Repeated recourse to the intoxication excuse progressively 
weakens its credibility (Berglas 1987? Nusbaumer 1983). Turner 
remarks that
"because a deviant role is negatively valued and 
deviants are subjected to discriminatory treatment, 
disavowal of deviance is the usual response. But 
like all roles, a deviant role can sometimes be the 
lesser evil in a situation of limited choice."
(Turner 1972, p.313)
The appeal to alcohol's effects in these circumstances may 
shift from deviance disavowal, through invocation of episodic 
intoxicated loss of control, to deviance avowal, through 
embracement of an alcoholic identity. Thus, Nusbaumer 
explains:
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"Ultimately, the illness model allows for greater 
reality negotiation on the part of deviant drinkers.
They may choose to negotiate reality by openly 
avowing their deviance through self-labeling and 
adopting a repentant-deviant role that allows for 
the conditional acceptance of continued deviant 
behavior."
(Nusbaumer 1983, p.229)
Macandrew and Edgerton describe the extreme form of this as a 
shift from invocation of the "time out" excuse to the 
"ineligibility" excuse.
"Every society has come up with some version of 
Ineligibility in order to account for and to deal 
with certain of those classes of troublesome or 
potentially troublesome persons (the profoundly 
mentally retarded, for instance) who are considered 
chronically or permanently incapable of living up to 
their society's minimal standards of competence.
Since it is presumed of these people that 'they know 
not what they do' or that they are incapable of 
doing otherwise than they do, the approach that we 
have termed Ineligibility consists in setting them 
off as a class apart and granting them one or 
another form of long-term or permanent immunity from the 
demands of their society's accountability system."
(Macandrew and Edgerton 1969, p.167)
At this point, however, it is pertinent to note a particular 
implication of these identified qualities of accounts in the 
special context of courtroom mitigation. The discussion of 
intelligibility identified a relationship to the conditions 
for rationalisation construction in terms of acceptability, 
availability and alternatives. Thus, mitigations based on the 
intoxication excuse resemble personal rationalisations which 
appeal to alcohol's effects. Personal rationalisations, 
however, were also observed to be intimately linked to self- 
concept .
In the courtroom, the contrivance of the intoxication excuse 
is revealed through the situational constraints on the general 
qualities of account rendering. Defendants' situational 
motivations, the constraints on impression management, the
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severance of negotiation from mitigation, the need for rapid 
intelligibility, and the shifting criteria for credibility all 
convey a deep ambiguity to defendants' appeals to 
intoxication, despite the advantages. It does not necessarily 
follow that offenders do not at some level believe their 
appeals to alcohol*s effects. They subscribe to the same stock 
of common sense wisdom about alcohol's effects as does their 
audience. More deeply, however, self-exculpatory 
rationalisations based on intoxication may have formed a 
crucial aspect of their defence of personal self-concept. In 
this respect, belief, however wilfully induced in the first 
instance, has played an important role in the success of 
personal rationalisations.
Thus, Cook (1975) draws attention to the genuine ambivalence 
of skid row drunks about their condition. The strategic appeal 
to a "full-blown medical model" (Cook 1975, p.117) in court is 
underpinned by a series of real personal rationalisations 
which derive from that model, as seen in Chapter Four. 
Similarly, Scully and Marolla, whilst observing that "rapists 
have learned the advantage to be gained from using alcohol and 
drugs as an account" (1984, p.539), also allude to their 
ambivalence. A successful appeal to some form of "sickness" 
absolves from public blame. Nevertheless, to believe in some 
temporary "sickness" at the time of the offence protects a 
non-deviant identity and predicts recovery of a normal 
condition. Thus,
"Admitters asserted a non-deviant identity despite 
their self-proclaimed disgust with what they had 
done. Although admitters were willing to assume the 
sick role, they did not view their problem as a 
chronic condition, not did they believe themselves 
to be insane or permanently impaired."
(Scully and Marolla 1984, p.540)
Summary
Courtroom mitigation follows the conventions of everyday 
accounts of deviant behaviour, rooted in common sense
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assumptions about cause, responsibility and moral culpability. 
In the courtroom context, justifications are higher risk 
strategies for mitigation than excuses, since they challenge 
the presumption of personal accountability. Certain 
characteristics of everyday accounts are constrained in the 
courtroom situation: impression management? negotiation?
intelligibility? and credibility. Whilst courtroom mitigations 
resemble personal rationalisations in respect of their 
availability, acceptability, and alternatives, their 
contrivance in the courtroom situation may conflict with the 
protection of a non-deviant identity.
MITIGATION: SPECIAL ASPECTS
Shapland (1981) points out some basic differences between 
everyday accounts and courtroom mitigations. Everyday accounts 
usually involve some direct conversational exchange between 
two or more people, while mitigation is a speech delivered 
with little verbal interchange or response. Neither the victim 
nor the offender may be involved in the presentation or 
response to mitigation. The person who receives and responds 
to the mitigation is a third party, the sentencer, who 
represents, not the victim personally, but society. The 
offender*s mitigation may be offered by a third party, whose 
own ideas about an appropriate account for the offence will 
influence the representation of the offender's original 
account. The offender's established legal responsibility for 
the offence precludes certain forms of complete justification. 
Punishment is inevitable? mitigation must therefore aim to 
achieve leniency rather than deliverance from punishment.
This last point generates the essential thrust of mitigation. 
Although the construction of accounts in mitigation follow the 
established rules governing those in everyday life, the 
essential aim of reducing punishment constrains their 
selection and presentation.
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Mitigation seeks to achieve its purpose by changing the 
audience*s perception either of the offence, or of the 
offender. It may be suggested, however, that a change in the 
perception of an offence in itself consequentially alters the 
perception of the offender, by modifying the judgement of his 
responsibility. Fitzmaurice and Pease argue:
"Mitigation or aggravation entail by necessity a re­
estimation of the liability to be punished through 
a consideration of factors which are concerned with 
a more global assessment of the 'morality' of the 
accused..."
(Fitzmaurice and Pease 1986, p.125)
In the absence of interaction and exchange between the 
sentencer and the person offering mitigation, the latter may 
assume a need to challenge the most severe potential judgement 
of the offence and offender (Shapland 1981). Mitigation, 
therefore, attempts to shift the audience's perception from a 
hypothetical "worst case scenario", or cognitive schema of an 
offence type, towards a more moderate one by appealing to 
"special" information about the particular offender. 
Successful mitigation, then, attracts attention to special 
information about a case, thus reducing the audience's 
reliance on rigid cognitive schemata for types of offences, 
and "provoking mindfulness" (Palmerino, Langer and McGillis 
1984; also Fiske and Neuberg) in respect of individual 
offenders.
There is some evidence to suggest that this may be an 
effective strategy. For example, Stalans and Diamond (1990) 
note that when asked general questions about crime and 
punishment, lay people suggest that the courts are too 
lenient, but when exposed to information about specific cases, 
they moderate their criticism of judicial sentencing. 
Ellsworth (1978) observes a similar incongruity between lay 
judgements about abstract issues and specific cases. When 
presented with a detailed case, substantially fewer subjects 
favoured capital punishment than when responding to an
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abstract question about their support for that measure. 
Similarly, Austin, Walster and Utne (1976) cite evidence to 
suggest that jurors take a defendant's own suffering into 
account when considering punishment. The perception that an 
offender has himself suffered, either through the commission 
of the offence itself, or through other misfortunes appears to 
reduce severity. The latter authors suggest that such 
information increases feelings of liking for the offender.
There is, then, some evidence that increasing attention to the 
individuality of a case can reduce the harshness of general 
lay judgements of criminal responsibility. Sentencers appear 
to reach their decisions by constructing explanations of crime 
from which to infer the "moral quality" (Hogarth 1971) of a 
case. Successful mitigation manipulates this process by 
pointing out information which increases sentencers1 attention 
to, and reasoning about the circumstances in which a 
particular offence has been committed.
However, this general principle for successful mitigation is 
not entirely straightforward in practice. Firstly, there may 
be instances when it is not to the intoxicated offender's 
advantage to increase attention to his case. For example, in 
a minor American court, Mileski found that the majority of 
offenders incarcerated for intoxication and breach of the 
peace were processed in batches, with very brief consideration 
of their case: "a trip to jail, then, very often is a result 
of one impersonal contact with the judge" (Mileski 1969, 
p.78). Nevertheless, Mileski also found that defendants 
charged with intoxication rarely focused attention upon 
themselves by proffering excuses. Those who did so in fact 
attracted more severe punishment. Mileski relates this finding 
to the pressure of time in a busy court, suggesting that "the 
court disproportionately uses the sanction of jail as a 
defense against the injection of extra information during the 
courtroom encounter" (1969, p.62).
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Secondly, there are no clear rules governing the type of 
information to be advanced in mitigation (Shapland 1979). 
Shapland (1979) found considerable diversity in the mitigating 
factors advanced by different barristers in similar cases. 
This did not appear to be due to discrepant information, but 
to different techniques for its presentation. Shapland argues 
that mitigation speeches do not attempt to invoke the entire 
range of mitigating factors available in specific cases, but 
to select those which are considered to be most persuasive. 
Thus, selectivity may be the
"result of a particular structuring of the 
mitigation speech, whereby only a few important 
factors are given in some detail, rather than all 
possible mitigating factors being mentioned at least 
briefly, with more emphasis given or time spent on 
the more important ones."
(Shapland 1979, p.161)
Nevertheless,
"there is no general agreement on what is mitigating 
or what kind of character is mitigating, so that 
what may be mitigating in one case may be 
aggravating in another.”
(Shapland 1981, p.82)
Some types of information, such as stupidity, unemployment or 
intoxication, are essentially ambiguous as to their mitigating 
or aggravating potential (Carroll and Payne 1977; Corbett 
1987; Critchlow 1985; Ewart and Pennington 1987; Hawkins 1983; 
Shapland 1979, 1981), and therefore require strategic
presentation in the context of other information to portray 
the offender's moral character in a certain light. Some 
evidence suggests that the particular interpretation of such 
ambiguous information is related to the type of offence 
(Carroll and Payne 1977) and to the range of sentences between 
which sentencers are choosing (Softley 1980). Here, the 
potential ambiguity of the intoxication excuse is aptly 
illustrated by Felker (1989), who suggests that information 
about a defendant's intoxication might influence all potential
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purposes of sentencing. Felker suggests that by treating it as 
an aggravating factor, courts might seek to deter potential 
intoxicated offenders. Where an offender shows no sign of 
reducing his alcohol consumption and, thereby, his threat to 
public safety, incapacitation might appear appropriate. 
Punishment might be mitigated through evidence of intoxicated 
impulsivity, or aggravated through evidence of deliberate 
intoxication for Dutch courage. Rehabilitation might be 
invoked for the provision of treatment, or, alternatively, 
sentence length might be increased in cases of severe 
alcoholism in order to facilitate that treatment. The absence 
of conscious irony in Felker's analysis is remarkable. Felker 
apparently perceives no oddity in such manipulation of a 
single item of information to infer quite different judgements 
of moral culpability justifying alternative sentencing goals.
Summary
Mitigation generally seeks to achieve leniency by moderating 
the judgement of culpability through attracting attention to 
the individuality of cases. However, there are no clear rules 
governing the selection and presentation of information in 
mitigation. Some types of information, including intoxication, 
are ambiguous as to their mitigating or aggravating potential 
and may be interpreted in the context of other information 
about the offence or offender, and in relation to specific 
sentencing goals.
CONCLUSIONS
Courtroom mitigation follows the conventions for the 
construction of everyday accounts for deviance. Mitigation 
seeks to reduce sentencers' reliance on cognitive schemata of 
particular types of offence and to increase their attention to 
the individuality of particular cases. The intoxication excuse 
in mitigation has particular advantages in providing easily 
understood explanations for deviant conduct, and in being 
adaptable to a range of strategies, including, for example, 
victim discreditation, deviance disavowal and deviance avowal.
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However, it is also an ambiguous excuse: firstly, because its 
apparent contrivance in the courtroom setting conflicts with 
its importance as a personal rationalisation protecting a non­
deviant identity; and secondly, because it has both mitigating 
and aggravating potential.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY:
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter identifies some issues arising from the 
theoretical framework established in previous chapters and 
considers the opportunities for their empirical exploration 
through a study of sentencing practice in a magistrates1 
court. It explains the methods selected for this empirical 
enquiry.
STUDYING THEORY IN PRACTICE
One of the purposes of reviewing a body of theory and research 
relating to a particular phenomenon is to identify a
conceptual framework within which to comprehend "real world" 
instances of it (Selltiz, Wrightsman and Cook 1976). Empirical 
studies undertaken to explore that conceptual framework may 
themselves then lead to new insights into the nature of the 
phenomenon in question (Selltiz, Wrightsman and Cook 1976). 
Burgess argues that in the empirical study of social
phenomena,
"the theoretical framework is of paramount 
importance, as this will influence the questions 
that are posed and the data that are collected. For 
the data that is gathered by the field researcher is 
shaped by the themes that emerge during the 
investigation."
(Burgess 1982a, p.16)
Theoretical review and conceptualisation thus anchor and guide 
the process of empirical research. Several theoretical issues 
emerged in the foregoing chapters which might illuminate the 
"real world" judgements of responsibility and blameworthiness 
underpinning the decisions of a sentencing court.
In Chapter Two, judgements of responsibility were seen to be
social processes, invoking lay theories which set out the 
general terms of reference for attributions of cause, effect
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and personal responsibility. It was noted that attribution 
theory has been criticised for its concentration on individual 
judgements, neglecting the broader cultural and social
framework within which the forms of those judgements are
created. The methodologies employed in attribution research 
have similarly attracted criticism for reflecting this narrow 
focus (Fincham and Jaspars 1980; LLoyd-Bostock 1983). Dallos 
and Sapsford (1981) remark upon
"the pressure in recent psychological thought
towards an emphasis on social perception, symbolized 
meaning and deliberate action rather than on the 
kind of research that stems from a deterministic 
model of man and looks for causes external to the 
person.1
(Dallos and Sapsford 1981, p.434)
Thus, the "black box" approach to sentencing research, in
which sentencers are regarded as repositories for information, 
independent of the social context in which they receive and 
act upon that information, has also been considered flawed.
The implications for research methodology of this recognition 
of judgements of responsibility and blameworthiness as social 
processes is explained by Douglas.
"The only valid and reliable (or hard, scientific) evidence concerning 
socially meaningful phenomena we can possibly have is that based 
ultimately on systematic observations and analyses o f everyday life. 
Anything else, certainly anything more abstract, can 
be valid and reliable only to the extent that it 
builds on the evidence provided by such studies of 
everyday life."
(Douglas 1971, p.12)
This perspective suggests a rich vein for the study of 
sentencing decision making. Sentencing by lay magistrates in 
the English courts necessarily involves a collective decision 
making process, since the magistrates themselves do not sit 
alone but in groups, usually of three. Sentencing research has 
paid rather scant attention to this aspect of sentencing
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decision making as a collective, and thereby necessarily 
social enterprise involving multiple decision makers, although 
more broadly based studies of magistrates1 courts have
recognised this issue and have explored its potential dynamics 
in general terms (e.g. Burney 1979).
More broadly, the theoretical perspective implies the
importance of the total contribution of participants in the 
courtroom process to the "construction" (Dallos and Sapsford 
1981) of judgements of responsibility and consequent decisions 
about punishment. Dallos and Sapsford explain:
"The individual is seen not as a passive recipient 
of experiences and as passively reacting to internal 
or external "forces", but as actively making sense 
of the world and taking action in order to discover 
it or to change it. Moreover, this "construction" of 
the world, which replaces the more passive concept
of perception, is seen as an essentially social
process - the social world is the most important 
part of our reality, and other people are our main 
source of information - so that this kind of 
psychology stresses very heavily the importance of 
communication."
(Dallos and Sapsford 1981, p.434)
Studies which contribute to this broader theoretical 
perspective on the social processes of courtroom decision 
making include, for example, examinations of different styles 
of interaction between courtroom personnel (e.g. Anderson 
1978? Darbyshire 1984? Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981), of 
the influence of specific roles such as the clerk (e.g. 
Darbyshire 1984) , and of the treatment of particular groups 
such as women offenders (e.g. Allen 1987? Eaton 1984? Edwards 
1984) .
However, the theoretical framework also suggests complex and 
indeterminate relationships between this situational decision 
making process and the more general beliefs and attitudes of 
the decision makers concerning social phenomena. Magistrates* 
general "frames of relevance" (Asquith 1977), guiding their
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approach to information processing might include theories of 
crime, criminal justice and, in respect of alcohol-related 
offenders, intoxication and alcoholism. The holistic approach 
to sentencing research implied by the theoretical framework, 
therefore, points to the exploration both of these general 
theories and of specific sentencing decisions, with an attempt 
to comprehend the relationships between these general notions 
and the situational decision making process in specific cases.
The empirical study of the social process of decision making 
in a magistrates' court also affords an opportunity to explore 
the relationships between lay and professional theories, 
considered theoretically in Chapter Two. Of particular 
interest are the interactions between magistrates, as lay 
theorists of deviance, and probation officers, as professional 
theorists trained to intervene directly in real manifestations 
of deviance, in a setting within which the two are required to 
establish a modus vivendi which serves the purposes of the 
criminal justice system.
Shapland (1979, 1981) has studied the construction of
mitigation speeches. However, the theoretical examination in 
Chapter Five suggested a view of mitigation as a social 
process which achieves its effect through engaging the 
audience's attention to and reasoning about the individuality 
of a specific case, thus moderating the perception of the 
blameworthiness of a particular offender. This process of 
mitigation involves more than the mitigation speech itself. 
For example, styles of impression management available to 
defendants might enhance or discredit the accounts offered in 
mitigation? negotiations between court personnel may establish 
the broad parameters within which the mitigation speech itself 
must achieve its impact.
The ambiguity of the intoxication excuse in mitigation has 
been noted. The theoretical discussions of lay theories in 
Chapter Two, and of alcohol expectancies in Chapter Four,
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point to a hypothetical explanation for this ambiguity. It was 
suggested that lay theories about alcoholfs effects are 
selectively applied to specific drinking situations. The 
selective invocation of such theories in the interpretation of 
specific crimes may have connotative implications for 
judgements of responsibility and blameworthiness.
These perspectives for the conceptual analysis of "real world" 
judgements of responsibility in the courtroom are derived from 
the theoretical discussion of the previous chapters. However, 
they are broad perspectives which do not confine empirical 
study within rigid conceptual constraints. To do so would risk 
repeating the kinds of errors of which the genre of narrow, 
individually focused attribution theory and research have been 
accused. Furthermore, the distortion of empirical reality by 
the imposition of an inflexible theoretical analysis was noted 
in Chapter Two, notably in relation to the study of alcohol 
itself, and in particular to the disease model of alcoholism 
(Faulkner, Sandage and Maguire 1988). The collection and 
assimilation of empirical data in an exploratory study may 
itself influence and refine theoretical study and abstraction 
(Becker and Geer 1960).
The theoretical perspective for empirical study described here 
in itself suggests one good reason for retaining analytical 
flexibility. As active and purposeful decision makers, the 
human subjects of study may themselves construct parts of the 
empirical reality to which the researcher will be exposed, on 
the basis of their perceptions and definitions of the nature 
and field of his or her enquiry (Geer 1964; McCall 1969; 
Vidich 1969). Recognition of this interrelationship between 
the researcher and the researched leads Burgess to qualify the 
earlier strong pronouncement on the paramountcy of theory.
"[I]t is important for researchers to define their
projects and their roles as this will influence the
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whole of the research process. However, these 
projects and field roles will often be redefined by 
those who are researched.1
(Burgess 1982a, p.16)
Exploratory study, therefore, does not merely collect the data 
to which a pre-determined theoretical analysis will be 
applied, but tests and develops the formulation of the theory 
itself (Becker and Geer 1960; Selltiz, Wrightsman and Cook 
1976). Research methodology should be planned in order to 
accommodate this interaction between theoretical development 
and empirical study.
"Whatever method is chosen, it must be used 
flexibly. As the initially vaguely defined problem 
is transformed into one with more precise meaning, 
frequent changes in the research procedure are 
necessary in order to provide for the gathering of 
data relevant to the emerging hypotheses.1
(Selltiz, Wrightsman and Cook 1976, p.92)
THE STUDY
The empirical study began with the approval and agreement in 
principle to assist the project of the clerk to the justices 
at a magistrates' court and the chief probation officer of the 
area covered by the court. The provincial city in which the 
court was located has been given the title, simply, of "City", 
in order to preserve confidentiality. Data collection spanned 
the 2 years from July 1988 to August 1990. It should be noted 
here, however, that the research for this thesis was conducted 
on a part-time basis, and therefore these dates do not reflect 
the intensity of empirical study throughout the period. In 
fact, the most intensive period of data collection took place 
during the final 6 months, when I was granted sabbatical leave 
from my teaching duties.
There were 4 components to the research methodology: 
observation in the court itself? a survey of court files? 
extended interviews with magistrates and probation officers;
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and brief focused post-sentence interviews with magistrates 
concerning specific cases.
Courtroom observation
The study began with observation in the court. It commenced 
with a block period of 3 months involving daily attendance at 
City magistrates* court, during which observation extended 
over a wide field, facilitating a broad comprehension of the 
courtroom processes and of the interactions of court 
personnel. During this phase, observation covered proceedings 
in 2 types of court: the daily "plea" courts, in which
decisions were taken across the range of the court's criminal 
business, including adjournments, bail, committals to the 
Crown Court, and sentencing? and a weekly sentencing court, 
which dealt with sentencing in the more complex cases in which 
Social Enquiry Reports (henceforth SERs) had been required. 
This initial phase was terminated by the start of the new 
academic teaching year, which curtailed the time available 
each week for study. Courtroom observation was then conducted 
on a weekly basis, covering the morning plea court and the 
afternoon sentencing court, until June 1989. At this stage, 
the court file survey was conducted. A break was then taken 
from empirical study in order to review the information 
yielded thus far and to plan the focus of future data 
collection.
Courtroom observation resumed in March 1990 with a 3 week 
block period in order to refresh my acquaintance with the 
court. It continued thereafter with attendance at the now 
(fortuitously) twice weekly sentencing courts until August 
1990. This latter period of courtroom observation was 
undertaken following the agreement by the clerk to the 
justices and the magistrates to allow me to conduct post­
sentence interviews concerning the cases heard during each 
sentencing court.
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Notes were taken on a total of 252 cases during the combined 
periods of courtroom observation. The majority of these were 
cases in which sentence was passed by the magistrates. A small 
number, mostly recorded during the early, tentative phase of 
study, did not proceed as far as sentence, but were 
transferred to another court, discontinued, taken to trial and 
acquittal, or committed to Crown Court. The cases also 
included a number of sober cases. "Sober", here, should not be 
taken as an assertion of fact about an offence. A sober case 
was one in which there was no mention at any point in the 
proceedings of a defendant's alcoholism or intoxication at the 
time of his offence; it does not follow that he was in fact 
sober. The inclusion of unsentenced and sober cases in data 
collection, despite the study's focus on sentencing decision 
making in alcohol-related cases, stemmed from certain 
reasoning which informed note taking from the outset.
The decision to record proceedings verbatim was influenced by 
Shapland's (1981) study of the construction of mitigation 
speeches. In order to understand most fully the structured use 
of specific information about alcohol, I took the view that I 
needed to know not only the precise manner in which that 
information itself was offered, but also the context in which 
it arose. However, since I was interested, more broadly than 
Shapland, in the process of mitigation and decision making, this 
reasoning extended to the verbatim recording of all 
participants' contributions to the proceedings. I could not, 
therefore, wait until the end of a case to determine whether 
to record it, but had to commence immediately. Similarly, I 
could not wait until reference to alcohol was made in a case 
before starting to record.
This reasoning and its consequences resulted in particular 
advantages to the eventual analysis. By virtue of recording 
the majority of hearings observed, I gathered a range of 
information about the general conduct of court business which 
contextualised and facilitated the specific interpretation of
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the sentencing process. I also gathered examples of decision 
making in sober cases with which to compare the treatment of 
alcohol-related cases. Furthermore, the methodology meant that 
I documented the accumulation of decisions prior to final 
sentence in several cases which proceeded through a series of 
adjournments for different reasons: for example, for legal
consultation, preparation of SERs or psychiatric reports, or 
deferment of sentence. This ability subsequently to trace the 
progress of cases over what could turn out to be a substantial 
period of time was in fact an unanticipated, but valuable 
spin-off from the necessarily protracted period covered by the 
empirical study.
The arrangement of the field notes, when transcribed from the 
rapid verbatim note taking in court, followed the advice of 
Bickman (1976) and Burgess (1982b) in separating the factual 
account from interpretations, hypotheses or comments. This 
division of the page enabled me to make detailed notations 
concerning individual cases during the later analysis as I 
compared and grouped cases and refined the conceptual 
framework within which I was working (Becker and Geer 1960; 
Bickman 1976; McCall 1969; Vidich 1969).
My role as observer within the courtroom setting deserves 
comment, since it proved considerably more complex than is 
implied by verbatim recording of proceedings, or, indeed, than 
I had been led to anticipate from my readings of 
methodological texts (Becker and Geer 1960; Bickman 1976; 
Burgess 1982; Geer 1964; McCall 1969; Vidich 1969) and 
accounts of court based studies employing similar techniques 
(Eaton 1984; Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981; Parker, Sumner 
and Jarvis 1989; Shapland 1979, 1981). Although verbatim
recording of formal proceedings, as the primary observational 
technique, implies passive spectatorship, I experienced a 
degree of difficulty in determining the boundary between 
passive and participant observation for which the neat 
classifications of the text books failed to prepare me. For
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example, Bickman*s reassuring advice proved too general for 
guidance in the specific situations in which I had to 
formulate responses.
”[P]assivity is not inherent in observational 
methodology. The observer should be able to modify 
the research setting without destroying its 
naturalness.”
(Bickman 1976, p.253)
I was invited to sit at the desk occupied by the probation 
officers. In the intervals between formal proceedings, these 
officers willingly explained issues to me, showed me SERs and 
up-dated me about defendants I had seen in court with whom 
they were still in contact. By virtue of my position, I also 
witnessed many of the informal negotiations between the 
probation officers, solicitors and court clerks. In quiet 
intervals, I was also able to approach court clerks, 
solicitors, the court police officer and ushers for 
information and clarification. My increasing familiarity, 
obvious interest and the generally open style of courtroom 
interactions led to invitations to include myself in exchanges 
which, despite their cheerful informality, were bound up with 
the decision making process. To refuse all direct invitations 
to contribute to these discussions would have appeared quite 
hostile in these circumstances. It should also be acknowledged 
that this willingness to include me was naturally a pleasant 
experience, and appeals for my opinion were positively 
flattering. The seductiveness of this situation was, I 
suspect, exacerbated by the necessary speed and fragmentation 
of these interactions between court personnel during temporary 
absences from the courtroom of the magistrates, when all 
personnel were attempting to deal with a multiplicity of 
problems relating to different cases in which they involved.
Verbal techniques for responding adequately in these 
situations had to be devised and practiced on an ad hoc basis. 
Over time, I tried to discipline myself against volunteering
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speech in exchanges in which I was included by implication 
only, and to cultivate the art of responding to direct 
invitations with another question, which would clarify an 
issue for me, but not influence the decisions others needed to 
take.
This, however, raised a further problem, which appeared to me 
to stem from a conundrum about the role of "naive" observer. 
How can a truly naive observer know that a question will be 
neutral in its effects on those to whom it is addressed? That 
is only ascertainable from the outcome of asking it.
Example 6.1
Given the aforementioned speed and fragmentation of 
interactions, I became accustomed to acquiring information 
opportunistically, seizing brief interludes when a court 
clerk, solicitor, probation or police officer, or usher was 
not actively engaged in the business of the day. On one 
occasion, I became increasingly perplexed during a case which 
the probation officer had told me involved a breach of a 
suspended sentence imposed at the Crown Court for serious 
violent offences. The defendant had already breached this 
suspended sentence twice. These offences were recorded on the 
prosecution solicitor's list of previous convictions, and were 
also described in detail in the SER. However, during the 
hearing, no mention was made of the suspended sentence by the 
prosecution solicitor, clerk or defence solicitor. Nor did the 
magistrates enquire about it after receiving the list of 
convictions and reading the reports. Baffled by this, but 
thinking there must be a technical explanation in view of the 
apparently blatant disregard by all participants, I appealed 
to the clerk after the magistrates had retired to discuss 
their decision.
JRs "I was expecting to hear about the suspended
sentence."
Clerk: (startled) "What suspended sentence?"
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The clerk consulted the defendant's previous convictions and 
looked at the prosecution solicitor.
Clerk: "Did you realise he was on a suspended sentence?" 
CPS: "Yes. I've checked it. It's finished with. When he 
was up for the breach of the peace, the magistrates made 
no order and so it's finished."
Clerk: "It's dead, is it?"
CPS: "Yes. I made enquiries."
Clerk: "Well, did they make no order or take no action? 
It makes a difference."
The clerk consulted the legal manual, which appeared to 
support the view that the wording of the previous decision did 
make a difference to the current status of the suspended 
sentence. The clerk then went to take advice from other 
clerks. The prosecution solicitor explained to me:
"I haven't got the files because it wasn't supposed to be 
relevant. But the court police officer told me he 
attacked 3 police officers. One was a woman, and he 
ruptured the spleen of another."
The clerk returned with the news that the legal manual was 
misleading, and therefore the suspended sentence was "still 
alive". My mounting alarm now turned to horror, as the 
suggestion before the magistrates was to adjourn for enquiries 
into the availability of treatment for alcoholism. In the 
event, it appeared that the magistrates had moved so far in 
their determination to follow this course, that the revelation 
seemed to make little impression on them, particularly in the 
absence of prosecution details. The case was duly adjourned.
Afterwards, I apologised profusely to the clerk for my 
unwitting interference. The clerk, however, seemed quite 
pleased.
"It's cleared up an ambiguity in the law that I've been 
misreading for years. It saved me a lot of embarrassment 
because it was bound to be picked up by the next clerk 
when it comes back in 4 weeks time. And so whatever 
happens to the defendant then would have happened 
anyway."
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There were other times when it seemed to me that to refuse to 
volunteer my involvement in some aspect of a case would have 
been uncivil and poor recompense indeed for the generous 
assistance of court personnel in solving my own problems. At 
a minor level, this led, for example, to my recording case 
results during probation officers' absences from the 
courtroom, and advising them if they were sought by a clerk, 
solicitor or defendant. On occasions when I witnessed the 
hearing of a case which was subsequently adjourned for SERs 
during the probation officer's absence, it would have been 
churlish not to offer an account of the proceedings, 
particularly when I obviously had verbatim notes to hand. This 
fact of having a lot of information at my disposal, obtained 
by virtue of my very role of observer, could lead to a 
potentially powerful ability to influence court proceedings. 
On a small number of occasions I chose to exercise this 
ability in a fairly modest way.
Example 6.2
The probation officer, called to a busy plea court, left the 
probation assistant to monitor events in the sentencing court. 
Reading through the reports prepared for the afternoon's 
business, I was struck by a contradiction between the
assertion in one SER that a defendant was suitable for
community service and the equally strong assertion in a 
separate report from the community service officer that he was 
unacceptable because he had failed more than one appointment 
for assessment. Realising that in the officer's absence the 
unwitting assistant would be challenged about this 
contradiction in open court once the case began, I passed the 
reports across, pointing to the conclusions. Alarmed, the
probation assistant took the reports to show the officer, who 
subsequently returned to the courtroom and requested an
adjournment, apologising for an apparent discrepancy between 
the conclusions of the report writer and community service 
officer and explaining that immediate clarification was 
impossible due to unavailability of both parties. The
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magistrates responded quite mildly to this candid 
acknowledgement of inefficiency, which was perhaps more 
persuasive due its pre-emptive nature and because it therefore 
also saved time that afternoon.
My own view of this, and other less intrusive interventions, 
was that it would have been simply bad manners to allow my 
theoretically uninvolved role to reduce to a spectator sport 
in practice third party embarrassment or confusion, on the 
relatively few occasions when I could assist to prevent or 
displace it. Had the probation staff in the above example 
recognised a decision to withhold information which enabled 
them to deal with a practical difficulty rather than to be 
taken by surprise in the midst of a hearing, they might have 
been justifiably offended. As will become apparent in the 
following analysis, although these occasional interventions 
may have affected the decision making process, it was unlikely 
that this was to defendants* detriment, since disruptions to 
the smooth running of court business sometimes appeared to 
rebound upon them. Finally, occasions of my more active 
participation often concerned issues of little relevance to 
the study's central focus. Thus, in making these decisions 
about participation, I attempted to follow the advice of 
Vidich.
"The decision to assume standards and values or the 
degree to which participation is required is best 
made on the basis of the data to be collected and 
not on the basis of standard field practice."
(Vidich 1969, p.84)
Court file survey
The court file survey involved examination of the files on all 
cases which I had recorded. This enabled me to check the 
accuracy of my recording of factual detail, collect full 
criminal histories, and read correspondence, notes and 
reports, including the brief police statement concerning the 
offence. It also enabled me to establish what had happened in
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a case during periods in which I "lost sight" of its progress 
through the court, a particular problem during the months of 
only weekly attendance.
This exercise convinced me of the importance of understanding 
the sentencing decision in the context of the situational 
decision making process. The collection of factual information
about each case was incapable alone of explaining the 
decisions which were taken, particularly when comparing cases 
which appeared factually similar but in which very different 
sentences were passed. Nor did I find perusal of detailed 
SERs, in isolation from the situational decision making 
context, particularly illuminating in this respect. Sentencing 
disparities between offences of apparently similar gravity 
have been repeatedly observed in the sentencing research 
(Ashworth, Genders, Mansfield, Peay and Player 1984? Hogarth 
1971; Hood 1962; Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981? Parker, 
Sumner and Jarvis 1989? Tarling 1979). The experience of 
conducting the court file survey reinforced my subsequent 
efforts to comprehend situationally inspired variations within 
the overall sentencing traditions of City court (Bond and 
Lemon 1981? Pennington and Lloyd-Bostock 1987).
Interviews with magistrates and probation officers
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 magistrates 
and 15 probation officers. All interviews were conducted 
between May and July 1990.
1. Magistrates
The 20 magistrates (11 male and 9 female) comprised a sixth of 
the 120 strong bench. They were recruited for this part of the 
research, for the most part by the simple expedient of asking 
all magistrates who participated in post-sentence interviews 
whether they would be willing to undertake this extended, and 
more general interview. This tactic also helped to reduce the 
possibility of selective bias on my part. Towards the end of 
interviewing, when it was becoming difficult to find willing
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magistrates who had not already been interviewed, I was 
assisted by one of the court's administrative staff, who 
introduced me to some I had not met. The gender balance was 
intended, but fortunately no special effort was actually
required to achieve it.
The interview schedule (see Appendix A) was planned to take 
about an hour to administer, and on average this was achieved. 
Magistrates, however, quite often willingly extended this by 
taking more time than was strictly required of them to explain 
matters relating to court business or to explore their ideas 
about issues raised by the questions. Most interviews took
place at the courthouse, in one of the retiring rooms,
although some magistrates invited me to their homes and 2 to 
their place of work. The interviews were tape-recorded, 
although I also took brief notes, partly as back up in case of 
poor recording quality and partly to assist my own
concentration. Subsequently, complete transcripts were made of 
all interviews. Magistrates were assured of complete 
confidentiality. They were fully aware of tape recording, as 
the machine was placed openly on the desk between us. However, 
when, as occasionally happened, magistrates revealed personal 
information which might result in recognition, I have tried to 
ensure that such material is not made explicit in the 
following chapters.
The broad aim of the interviews was to gain the "flavour" of 
City bench: the traditions and perspectives which appeared to 
bind a disparate group of people together and to guide their 
collective decision making. There were, however, 3 specific 
aims:-
a) I sought to draw out magistrates' views on the purposes and 
administration of justice. Although the examination of lay 
theories in Chapter Two warns against expectation of a fully 
coherent body of beliefs and attitudes, it does not follow 
that themes would not emerge which importantly guided
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magistrates' approaches to the sentencing exercise. Moreover, 
themes which were expressed by numbers of magistrates might be 
thought to shape the overall pattern of sentencing in City 
court.
b) Given the recurrent perspective in criminal justice of 
alcohol-related offending as symptomatic of a problem 
requiring treatment, I was interested in the openness of City 
magistrates to this approach. This involved examining their 
attitudes towards the probation service, which provides access 
to treatment based sentencing options.
c) Through a sequence of questions asking magistrates for 
their explanations of hypothetical instances of alcohol- 
related deviance, I sought to identify some of the lay 
theories of intoxication, alcoholism and crime which 
underpinned their judgements of responsibility. This exercise 
does not purport to be an intensive or exhaustive study of a 
body of lay theories, or, indeed, of the theories entertained 
by this particular group of people. However, it does not 
necessarily need to be such, for the purposes of this 
investigation. As a series of rapid explanations of 
potentially very complex issues, these questions may have 
successfully elicited some of the simple "rule of thumb" 
explanations which magistrates invoked in situations requiring 
them to make swift judgements. In such pressured decision 
making situations, theories which draw on intuitively obvious, 
immediately accessible, "off the top of the head" explanations 
are potentially the most likely to be utilised to make sense 
of complex and ambiguous information.
Early in the interviewing process, I was uncomfortably aware 
that some subjects appeared discomfited by these questions on 
intoxicated deviance and responsibility. This was perhaps to 
be expected, given the nature of the questions. I was aware 
that successful interview schedules in qualitative research 
such as this are generally held to be those which enable
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subjects to respond in terms of personal experience (Jupp 
1989; McCall 1969). Broad abstract questions are difficult for 
subjects in an interview asking for rapid responses. In fact, 
as will be noted later, probation officers seemed more often 
disconcerted by these questions than magistrates. However, I 
decided that the exercise merited persistence, since 
differences between magistrates' and probation officers' 
responses began to emerge almost immediately. I then began to 
preface the sequence with a caution that interviewees might be 
a little surprised by the questions, and an assurance that I 
was genuinely interested in their "top of the head" responses. 
Magistrates seemed to accept this reassurance at face value, 
and quite often seemed to enjoy the invitation to express 
their theories on topics which they encountered frequently in 
the context of decision making, but rarely pondered in the 
abstract. Some remarked afterwards that it had been an 
interesting exercise.
2» Probation officers
The 15 interviews with probation officers (8 males and 7 
females) included the 3 senior and 12 main grade officers who 
were involved in the criminal work of the City probation team 
at the time of interviewing. Due to staff changes, more main 
grade officers were in fact involved in the study as a whole 
during the courtroom observation exercise. These interviews 
(see Appendix B) sought to clarify the professional theories 
which informed probation officers' decision making in the 
areas relevant to the study. All interviews were conducted at 
the probation office, except 2 which were performed at 
probation officers' homes. Interviews were recorded and 
transcribed, and confidentiality approached in the same way as 
for magistrates. Three areas of enquiry were pursued
a) Probation officers were exposed to the same sequence of 
questions on intoxicated deviance and responsibility as were 
magistrates. Although probation officers engaged in this 
exercise with good will, more seemed uncomfortable, and also
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seemed actually more uncomfortable than was the case for 
magistrates. This was true despite the reassurances that 
appeared to be successful in enabling magistrates to relax and 
positively to enjoy themselves. This seems to me probably to 
arise from a combination of factors stemming from probation 
officers' professional status.
Firstly, some probation officers may have felt that this was 
a test of their professional expertise, and that I was 
matching their responses against the "correct" answers. 
Certainly, some officers did not appear to be convinced by my 
explanation that I was interested in comparing different kinds 
of responses and not in assessing individual knowledge. By 
contrast, the invitation to magistrates to express their "top 
of the head" ideas was consonant with their status as lay 
theorists in the field of crime? thus it posed no challenge to 
a professional identity.
Secondly, these questions may genuinely have been more 
difficult for probation officers, precisely because of their 
professional expertise. Even at this "off the cuff" level, 
probation officers produced more varied and more complex 
theories of intoxicated deviance than did magistrates. Had 
interviewees been able to reflect more deeply on their 
responses, I suspect that this difference would have become 
more, rather than less obvious. Furthermore, explanations of 
crime and responsibility were intimately connected with 
probation officers' "theories of office" (Drass and Spencer 
1987): their perspectives on their own professional role and 
tasks, discussed in Chapter Two. Put simply: probation
officers had more to think about than magistrates when 
responding to these questions.
b) Most of the remaining questions focused directly upon 
probation officers' "theories of office" (Drass and Spencer 
1987), in relation to 2 spheres of their professional 
activity. Given the importance of SERs in the sentencing
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exercise, particularly in relation to treatment based options 
for alcohol-related offenders, I sought to clarify probation 
officers' views on this task. Similarly, given the probation 
order as the primary tool for delivering treatment based 
services, I sought to understand how officers perceived 
probation supervision, which assumes especial importance in 
their theories of office since it is, quite literally, the 
activity by which they are defined as professionals in the 
criminal justice system.
c) I was interested to discover how the work entailed 
specifically by involvement with alcohol-related offenders 
related to these general perspectives on the professional role 
and tasks of probation officers. There was a danger here in 
becoming tedious by repeating questions which had already been 
asked in general terms with specific reference to alcohol- 
related offenders. Moreover, supplementary questions in this 
form rarely produced responses which were more informative 
than the initial, general observations. In the end, my purpose 
was best served simply by inviting officers to comment on what 
they liked and what they did not like about any aspect of 
their work with alcohol-related offenders.
Post-sentence interviews
In the light of the developing theoretical perspective, the 
necessity of considering magistrates' responses in the 
extended interviews in relation to their decisions in specific 
cases became clear during the review between the periods of 
observation. Furthermore, although magistrates often followed 
the recommendations in SERs, it was impossible to understand 
whether this was because they accepted probation officers' 
assessments, or because they reached the same conclusions as 
to sentence via different reasoning about the information 
presented. Parker, Sumner and Jarvis (1989) argue that 
magistrates regard SERs with suspicion as biased documents 
requiring re-analysis. If sentencers do indeed perform 
independent reasoning operations upon the data with which they
214
are presented, then we must wonder why concordance rates 
between SER recommendations and sentencing are generally found 
to be high (Bottoms and McWilliams 1986? Hine, McWilliams and 
Pease 1978? Konecni and Ebbeson 1982? Stanley and Murphy 
1984) . From magistrates' announcements of sentence in open 
court, I could learn nothing about the processes by which they 
reached their conclusions. Thus, it became increasingly 
important to the research to find some means of learning about 
magistrates' perceptions of the information which they 
received in individual cases (Ashworth 1987? Ewart and 
Pennington 1987? Konecni and Ebbeson 1982). Indeed, I would 
probably not have found it useful to undertake such an 
extended second phase of observation had the opportunity to 
study specific decisions in greater detail not become 
available.
Unsurprisingly, I had been advised by the clerk to the 
justices at the outset, and several magistrates commented when 
approached, that questions about specific cases in the 
extended interviews were unlikely to be productive. 
Recollection of specific cases was lost in the passage of 
time. Before embarking on the second observational period, I 
was emboldened to broach the possibility of post-sentence 
interviews by the evidence forthcoming in Parker, Sumner and 
Jarvis' (1989) study of magistrates' sentencing decisions that 
such an exercise was not necessarily prohibited. I was helped 
by the clerk to the justices, in consultation with the 
magistrate who chaired the bench as a whole at that time, to 
obtain the permission of magistrates by invitation to speak 
about my research at a bench meeting. This attracted 
magistrates' interest in the project, and enabled them to 
agree in principle to my request, given assurances that I had 
no intention of extracting sensitive disclosures about the 
tripartite discussions in the retiring room, or about 
individual magistrates, and that magistrates who did not wish 
to become involved in this aspect of the research were free 
simply to decline.
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The interviews were conducted with any magistrates who were 
interested and willing. This meant that sometimes all 3 
magistrates included themselves in the interview, while at 
other times one of their number took on the task of 
representing their combined views. Sometimes, I wondered 
whether this "composite" perspective offered by a single 
magistrate was an attempt to preserve the apparent unity of 
the ultimate decision in the face of real differences of 
opinion. This hypothesis arose on a very few occasions when I 
had difficulty in following the logic with which I was 
presented. However, mindful of my undertaking, I took care to 
do no more than ask for clarification in general terms, and to 
accept what I was then offered. In any case, given my explicit 
focus on theories of intoxicated crime and their relationship 
to sentencing decisions, it would have been impertinent to 
attempt to exploit an opportunity to indulge my curiosity 
about the detail of magisterial relationships.
Twenty-eight post-sentence interviews (see Appendix C) were 
conducted. Magistrates1 responses were recorded in writing as 
they spoke. Questions were devised to prompt magistrates to 
talk about the case as fully as possible, covering, for 
example, their opinions on the seriousness of the offence, the 
offender, the information provided and their satisfaction with 
the outcome. I swiftly discovered that magistrates were keen 
to deliver their own account and usually pre-empted my 
questions. It seemed rather rude, but also unwise (McCall 
1969) to block this spontaneity, and indeed, many of the most 
vivid and telling comments arose in these divulgences. I 
therefore adopted the practice of inviting magistrates to tell 
me about the case in their own words before proceeding with my 
questions, which helped to clarify and expand these accounts.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IN THE COURTROOM:
SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES ON SENTENCING
This chapter examines the sentencing pattern of City 
magistrates' court in the years since 1985 (the first year in 
which the Home Office published statistics showing the 
sentencing of individual petty sessional divisions). These 
statistics are considered in the light of situational factors 
influencing the perception of all personnel that City court 
had a stable tradition of non-custodial sentencing. Further 
situational influences on sentencing itself are then 
identified through consideration of the physical environment 
of the courthouse, the relationships between participants in 
the courtroom process, and the imposition of custodial 
sentences.
SENTENCING IN CITY COURT
It became apparent, during both informal conversations with 
people at court and structured interviews with magistrates and 
probation officers, that sentencing at City court was 
perceived to be generally non-punitive, and in particular to 
show a stable tradition of low use of custody. This tradition 
was largely attributed to the attitudes of the magistrates. I 
was often told that City had a "liberal", or "soft" bench, 
that the magistrates were reluctant to use custody, did not 
"like" custody, were a "push over" and "just didn't do it". 
Indeed, it will be shown later that the strong belief in a 
stable tradition of non-custodial sentencing could 
significantly influence the behaviour of court personnel 
towards the magistrates in sentencing hearings.
Home Office statistics for the years 1985 to 1990 reveal a 
more complex picture. Table 1 shows the level of custodial 
sentencing in respect of indictable offences for each of those 
years.
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Table is Sentences to immediate custody* for indictable 
offences as a proportion of total for sentence in City 
magistrates* court, compared with all magistrates* courts in 
England and Wales# (Home Office Criminal Statistics 1985- 
1990a, 1985-1990b).
YEAR
City Magistrates' Court England and Wales
Total for 
sentence
Immediate
custody
(%)
% Variation
(%)
1985 1346 107 (8) 8 Not
available
1986 1163 92 (8) 8 5-10
1987 1096 49 (4) 8 4-9
1988 985 63 (6) 7 4-9
1989 917 35 (4) 5 2-8
1990 1028 38 (4) 5 3-7
*Partially suspended sentences are not included in the 
calculations, since numbers are negligible in magistrates' 
courts, both in City and in England and Wales as a whole.
#Figures include juveniles.
218
It can be seen that there was a decline in the absolute 
numbers of defendants receiving custody in City court between 
1985 and 1989. This, however, reflects a decline in the total 
numbers of defendants being sentenced for indictable offences, 
in line with the trend for England and Wales as a whole (Home 
Office 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989). The slight increase in numbers 
of defendants receiving custody in 1990 reflects an increase 
in numbers being sentenced.
Table 1 also shows a decline in the proportionate use of 
custody for indictable offences in City court. Thus, the 
figures do not reflect a stable tradition of low custodial 
sentencing, but rather an evolving one. This declining 
proportionate use of custody also corresponds with a similar 
decline in magistrates* courts in England and Wales as a 
whole. Indeed, City court's proportionate use of custody is 
close to the figure for England and Wales for all years except 
1987, which was in this respect, therefore, an unusual year. 
Furthermore, City court's proportionate use of custody 
generally reflects the middle of the range for magistrates' 
courts, suggesting an average, rather than considerably lower 
use of custody.
The absolute numbers of defendants receiving immediate custody 
in City court might be somewhat higher than these figures 
indicate, since they would include those so sentenced for 
imprisonable summary offences such as excess alcohol, or given 
immediate custody as an alternative to fine payment for non- 
imprisonable offences such as drunkenness. There was, however, 
no reliable means of establishing more detailed information 
about custodial sentencing from the court records.
The prevailing belief that City court had a well-established, 
stable tradition of low use of custody, therefore appears to 
overstate the case. City court was not excessive in its use of 
custody, but neither was it unusually sparing, when compared 
with the general picture for England and Wales. Furthermore,
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its proportionate use of custody had not been stable over 
recent years, but had declined to its current level.
The strength of current belief in City court's tradition of 
"liberal" sentencing was encouraged by some complex factors 
which will emerge in later chapters. However, it may also have 
derived from some situational factors which may be identified 
at this point.
Firstly, the decline in absolute numbers receiving custody had 
reached a point at which custody was imposed at less than the 
rate of once per week. Among a bench of 120 strong, therefore, 
the experience of participation in a custodial sentence would 
indeed be rare for individual magistrates. Several magistrates 
in interview commented on the rarity of their personal 
experience of imposing custody. They attributed this, however, 
to a prevailing reluctance among their ranks to invoke this 
sanction. Similarly, other court personnel attributed the 
comparative rarity of imprisonment to the attitudes of the 
magistrates towards that sanction. Such an attitude, clearly, 
was for people at City court an intuitively obvious 
explanation for the absence of frequent imprisonment. The 
likelihood that it reflected in part a decline in numbers of 
defendants for sentence for indictable offences was less 
readily apparent to participants in the courtroom process. 
Indeed, people appeared to be unaware of this trend. Certainly 
it was never mentioned by any individual.
Secondly, to some extent, the sentencing figures belie a 
genuinely sparing approach to the use of custody by City 
magistrates, which is indicated in the observational data. 
Twenty-two defendants were observed who were sentenced to 
immediate custody. In these cases, magistrate did not 
routinely invoke the full extent of their powers. One 
defendant was sentenced to 7 months, one to 6 months, 4 to 3 
months and 2 to 2 months. Fourteen defendants were sentenced 
to periods of 28 days or less. These custodial sentences
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included a period of 21 days for each of 2 drug suppliers, and 
one of three months for a defendant convicted of 15 dishonesty 
offences and also of GBH. Six defendants were in breach of 
suspended sentences. In 2 of these, magistrates explored 
alternatives prior to sentence, and were unsuccessful due to 
the defendant's failure to co-operate. In one case the period 
of suspension was due to expire on the day following the court 
appearance and the sentence was not activated. In 2 further 
cases, the magistrates, in activating the sentence, reduced 
the period to be served. The observational data, therefore, 
suggest that City magistrates were parsimonious in their 
utilisation of custodial sanctions, even in cases reflecting 
the top of the range of seriousness in a magistrates' court.
Moreover, a number of sentences to immediate custody might be 
discounted as "not really custody" by participating 
magistrates and court staff. In 5 cases the imposition of 
custody made little or no difference to the defendants' 
circumstances. A sentence of 28 days, for theft and 
destruction of a motorcycle was imposed on a defendant who was 
already serving a longer sentence imposed at Crown Court. One 
defendant, who had been remanded in custody for psychiatric 
examination, was sentenced to a term ensuring his immediate 
release. A defendant who had stolen a bottle of alcohol from 
a hotel, although in breach of a suspended sentence, was 
sentenced to a nominal one day imprisonment, and was released 
at the close of court business. Three other defendants were 
also treated in this way for offences of theft, begging and 
drunkenness.
Thus, whilst in absolute terms the imposition of custody was 
a rare event in the experience of individuals compared to the 
time spent in court, participants in such cases not 
infrequently observed that its use was parsimonious. This 
direct experience of the manner in which custody was used 
probably contributed significantly to the belief in a 
tradition of non-custodial sentencing.
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Table 2: Sentences other than immediate custody* for
indictable offences in respect of offenders aged 17 and over 
in City magistrates1 court. Percentage of total for sentence 
in brackets#. (Home Office Statistics 1985-1990).
Year S. Impt CSO PO Fine Disch T.F.S
1985 27 (2) 77 (7) 96 (9) 684 (62) 104 (9) 1103
1986 21 (2) 68 (7) 92 (9) 614 (60) 128 (13) 1017
1987 19 (2) 73 (7) 85 (9) 624 (64) 114 (12) 974
1988 22 (2) 57 (6) 67 (8) 586 (66) 77 (9) 883
1989 10 (1) 41 (5) 59 (7) 576 (68) 107 (13) 846
1990 20 (2) 50 (5) 85 (9) 599 (62) 155 (16) 970
♦Abbreviations for some sentence names are used in the table, 
viz:-
S. Impt. - fully suspended sentence of imprisonment 
CSO - community service order 
PO - probation order
Disch - discharge, (includes both absolute and conditional) 
T.F.S -Total for sentence
#Figures do not match totals for sentence because of omission 
of cases receiving immediate custody and otherwise dealt with.
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A final observation about the perceived use of custody in fact 
relates to the non-custodial sentencing pattern of City court. 
Table 2 shows the use of sentences other than immediate 
custody over the same 6 year period. It can be seen that the 
options generally regarded as "higher tariff” - suspended 
sentences, community service and probation - remained 
relatively stable. The decline in the proportionate use of 
custody was complemented, not by a rise in these higher tariff 
options, but by increasing proportionate use of fines and 
discharges. Yet the frequency of appeals to magistrates, in 
mitigation addresses and SERs, to utilise "alternatives to 
custody" tended to give an impression that many defendants 
were at serious risk of incarceration. Were this the case, the 
displacement of custody might be expected to be perceived in 
the use of the high tariff "alternatives to custody". Instead, 
however, the perception of "liberal" sentencing appears to be 
encouraged by an exaggerated estimation of the extent to which 
custody would be used were it not for the availability of 
these direct alternatives.
It may not be unusual for court staff to consider their 
magistrates to be lenient, whatever their actual sentencing 
pattern (Burney 1979? Bankowski, Hutton and McManus 1987). 
However, in City court, this belief had some grounding in 
situational factors affecting the experience and thereby the 
perception of sentencing. The decline in absolute numbers of 
defendants sentenced to custody for indictable offences had 
reached a point where the imposition of custody was a 
comparatively rare experience for individual magistrates. 
Magistrates were parsimonious in their utilisation of custody, 
not routinely invoking the full extent of their powers. A 
proportion of custodial sentences may have been discounted by 
participants as "not really custody" since they made little or 
no difference to defendants' circumstances. Finally, it seemed 
that there was an overestimation of the extent to which high 
tariff alternatives were necessary to divert defendants from 
immediate custody.
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THE COURTHOUSE
The physical design of court houses and courtrooms receives 
attention in all observational studies of magistrates1 courts 
(Anderson 1978? Burney 1979; Carlen 1976? Darbyshire 1984? 
Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981? Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 
1989). To a large extent, these descriptions detail the 
specific situational features which are common to all courts, 
but also unique to their status as courts: for example, the 
spatial separation between key participants, and physical 
features such as desks, docks and witness boxes.
In other respects, however, there appears to emerge a subtle 
interrelationship between particular features of a court house 
or courtroom and the behaviour and role relationships enacted 
within it. This phenomenon possibly deserves more rigorous 
analysis than it has so far been accorded in the literature. 
On the one hand, the significant influence of physical 
situational features on behaviour, noted in Chapter Three, is 
as likely to apply in courts as in pubs. On the other hand, 
however, ideological or attitudinal positions, such as 
rehabilitation or punitiveness, might be expected to develop 
independently of physical constraints and even to rise above 
them. For example, a juvenile court in Parker, Casburn and 
Turnbull's (1981) study, conducted its business in a 
democratic style in two quite different buildings: one modern, 
comfortable and understating formality in its interior 
furnishings? the other older, austere and poorly resourced. 
Nevertheless, it does appear from descriptive accounts that 
the presence or absence of quite basic design features such as 
communal refreshment areas for defendants (Parker, Casburn and 
Turnbull 1981) or for magistrates (Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 
1989) frequently complement the ideological orientation of the 
court itself. One possible factor in these impressionistic 
accounts, of course, could involve a tendency of observers to 
endow the physical environment with attributes complementary 
to the behaviours by which they are impressed, thus guiding 
the selection of descriptive terms. Nevertheless, this
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complementary relationship between the physical environment, 
behaviour and the conduct of court business emerged in the 
study of City magistrates' court.
The courthouse itself was built, somewhat curiously, on the 
top of a multi-storey car park in the city centre. This 
inauspicious location, however, had been turned to 
considerable advantage by the degree of space and light which 
had been incorporated into the design. On entry, a large, 
tiled area contained the glass-fronted receptionist's and fine 
payment offices. Behind these, concealed from public view was 
the administration area. Also on this level, reached by 
separate access, were the police cells, stationed directly 
under the courtrooms, with flights of steps leading through 
wooden doors at the top directly into the docks which lined 
one side of each main courtroom.
From the entrance area a wide, carpeted staircase gave access 
to the second level, on which the courtrooms were situated. On 
this top level, a balustrade overlooked the reception area. 
There were large windows around the building's perimeter, 
providing full light throughout the day in the waiting area 
outside the courtrooms. This broad area was also thickly 
carpeted, had potted trees at intervals along its length, and 
fixed rows of seats constructed in light wood. At one end, 
part of this area was screened in light wood, to provide a 
cafeteria offering light refreshments which was serviced in 
the mornings by the WRVS. At the other end of the waiting area 
there were separate rooms for police, probation officers and 
solicitors. The court ushers also had a small partitioned room 
for their own use.
The public waiting area between these two ends of the building 
stretched across the entrances to the three main courtrooms. 
At either side of the entrance to each court was a small room, 
providing a total of five interviewing rooms for use by 
solicitors and probation officers and a sixth, containing a
225
low bunk, presumably for any person taken ill, although I 
never saw it in use.
Each of the three main courtrooms was a large, airy room, in 
which the light wood of the desks, docks, witness stands and 
magistrates' benches provided an unobtrusive formality. At 
either side of the entrance there were two fixed rows of 
upholstered seats for the public. Similar rows of seating 
behind the dock, which lined one side wall, the probation 
officers' desk, which lined the other, and the solicitors' 
benches in the central well of the court, provided a degree of 
comfort for all participants in the courtroom process, 
including the defendants. Clerks and magistrates were 
particularly fortunate in having large, well-upholstered 
armchairs from which to conduct the court's business.
Two more courtrooms were located in a different part of the 
building, towards the rear. These had been designed to serve 
as juvenile courts, and were smaller, with free-standing 
tables for solicitors, probation officers and clerks, and 
small benches for magistrates which were not elevated above 
the rest of the court. There were seats, but no docks, for 
defendants in the centres of these courtrooms, from which 
there was no direct access to the police cells. When no 
juvenile courts were running, these rooms could be brought 
into use for the overspill of business from the main courts, 
given a sufficiency of magistrates and court personnel to 
staff them.
At the rear of each of these five courtrooms, behind the 
magistrates bench was a door by which magistrates and clerks 
could enter and leave. These exits gave onto a central, square 
area, around the perimeter of which were ranged a series of 
retiring rooms for magistrates, and a larger, communal room 
with facilities for making tea. The centre of this area was 
bounded by glass, which partitioned a small "garden", with
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potted trees and other plants, creating a rather curious 
effect somewhat like a modern day cloister.
The light, space, unoppressive formality and reasonable 
comfort of the physical environment not only complemented, but 
facilitated the low key, non-confrontational approach which 
generally characterised the conduct of court personnel towards 
defendants and those accompanying them. On quiet days, usually 
in the late afternoons after the main business had been dealt 
with, the atmosphere could be quite restful. Even on the 
busiest days, the degree of ‘'press" and discomfort through 
crowding was unlikely to reach the stressful levels 
experienced in some other courts (e.g. Carlen 1976), and 
privacy between defendants and solicitors or probation 
officers was possible. The openness afforded by the balustrade 
overlooking the reception area reduced the claustrophobic 
potential of people massing together in the busiest part of 
the public waiting area.
Two incidents exemplify the facilitative relationship between 
the physical environment and the customary conduct of 
interactions between court personnel and the public.
Example 7.1
Outside the refreshment bar, and out of the line of sight of 
police officers in their office, an angry interchange 
developed between co-defendants who blamed each other for 
their predicament. Watched by a small group of supporters, 
huddled about them and a few uninvolved observers at a greater 
distance, the dispute escalated into pushing and appeared on 
the verge of real violence. One defendant then broke away and 
walked rapidly over to the main waiting area. The small group 
dispersed, to the cafeteria, toilets and other parts of the 
waiting area. Thus, a police officer attracted to the scene 
found, on arrival, nothing of concern.
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This small incident illustrates the advantages of the 
spaciousness of the public waiting area in containing 
potential aggression simply by permitting disputants to put 
physical distance between themselves, reducing the need for 
overt surveillance and control by court personnel. Space also 
permitted observers to ignore or pass by the huddle of 
disputants, rather than drawing them into overt displays of 
attention, interest or participation.
Example 7.2
Occasionally, the noise of disturbances in the public waiting 
area penetrated the courtroom, disrupting proceedings. On one 
such day, I left the court to see what was happening. It was 
a busy morning, with the seats fully occupied and other people 
standing or moving around. Among them, a young man was 
attempting to distance himself from the unwelcome attentions 
of a second man of about forty. The young man walked across to 
the notice board on which were posted the details of the day's 
business, and studied it, with a display of concentration 
which discouraged the other from further advances.
The older man wandered among the rows of seated waiting 
people. He approached three men who were joking together in 
overloud voices which, predictably, attracted his attention. 
He was unsteady on his feet as he stood over them, and his 
voice was indistinct. One of the three began to tell him to go 
away. He declined. This man then raised his voice to a near 
shout, and instructed the unwelcome visitor: "You go away over 
there", waving across the waiting area. The intruder 
protested: "I don't want to go over there". To this the man 
responded, still loudly, "You go away over there - now - or
I'll call the police". Still failing to achieve the desired 
response, he announced: "I'll break your jaw". As the man 
began to move unsteadily away, the court police officer 
appeared: "Everything all right?" The seated man, lowering his 
voice, replied cheerfully: "Yes, it's all right now".
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The police officer approached the drunken man, who was now 
standing by the notice board, greeted him with a cordial 
smile, and asked him if he was on the list to appear in court. 
He said he had merely come to the court in the hope of finding 
his solicitor. The police officer engaged him in conversation 
for several minutes, remarking how long it was since they had 
last met and asking after his family. Although swaying and 
speaking unclearly, the man responded warmly to this interest 
and eventually made his way unsteadily but peaceably out of 
the building.
The containment of aggression during this incident, which was 
protracted over some time, further illustrates the continuing 
advantages of space, given the numbers of people present and 
moving around in the waiting area. The low key intervention of 
the police officer appeared quite coincidental to the prior 
threatening interchanges, and to be a genuine expression of 
interest in a well known personality.
Although these two examples illustrate the advantages of a 
relatively unstressful physical environment in containing 
problematic incidents, and in facilitating a non- 
confrontational approach to their control, they also suggest 
that these situational factors provided a latitude to 
behaviour in which some transgressions might be unobserved or 
tolerated. Defendants and other people attending court seemed 
not only aware of this, but sometimes to exploit it for their 
own purposes.
Example 7.3
One morning, before the start of proceedings, while I was the 
only customer in the cafeteria, two men entered and sat, 
unnecessarily, at the table next to mine. One produced a 
tobacco tin which, when opened on the table, turned out to 
contain, not tobacco, but drugs. The two men began, rather 
ostentatiously, to examine and count their supply. This 
behaviour, and the occasional glance in my direction, made me
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feel acutely that they were enjoying the prospect of my 
potential curiosity, discomfiture, or even outrage. Although 
I decided against putting the hypothesis to the test, I 
surmised that any challenge would lead to a rapid 
demonstration of the legality of their possession of 
prescribed drugs, and that possibly the two men were inviting 
confrontation in order to enjoy this minor triumph.
The latitude to behaviour afforded by the unobtrusive approach 
to surveillance and control, enhanced by some of the 
attributes of physical design, had implications for the styles 
of impression management available to defendants which will be 
examined later. One specific feature of the physical 
environment is worth noting in this connection, however. At 
the top of the stairs to the waiting area, a notice at eye- 
level advertised the prohibition of alcohol on the court 
premises. Throughout the study period, I never once observed 
that rule enforced, although it seemed to be breached upon a 
number of occasions. The manner in which court personnel 
surveilled and controlled drinking and drunkenness, and the 
implications of their approach for defendants' behaviour and 
styles of impression management will be examined later.
ROLE RELATIONSHIPS
Gusfield observes:
"Sociologists of law have long made the point that 
the study of law as embodied in legislative acts and 
common law decisions yields a highly inaccurate 
description of what takes place in the behavior of 
police, the actions of attorneys, or the day-to-day 
events of courtrooms and primary-level judges. The 
law becomes a point in the negotiation between the 
different parties in the legal process, to be 
ignored or reinterpreted according to the 
organizational needs and specific interests of those 
involved in its implementation."
(Gusfield 1981, p.160)
Thus, the application of law is manipulated in a problem 
solving process which seeks to achieve the particular purposes
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of the courtroom situation, whether these be conviction 
(McBarnet 1983), compensation (Lloyd-Bostock 1983), 
retribution (Burney 1985; Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989), 
reformation (Hogarth 1971), or simply the administration of 
the court's business (Mileski 1969). Furthermore, despite 
formal definitions and expectations of the roles of court 
personnel, courts vary markedly in their interpretation and 
enactment of these roles. Comparative studies of courtroom 
behaviour suggest that courts vary along the dimension of 
their relative democracy or autocracy (Anderson 1978? 
Darbyshire 1984? Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981).
Parker, Casburn and Turnbull's (1981) study of two juvenile 
courts illustrates how these approaches differentially guide 
the pursuit of common interests. In a democratic court, the 
routes to efficiency and time saving were perceived to include 
due process, legal representation, informal negotiation, 
civility to defendants and tariff sentencing. In an autocratic 
court, however, these aims were sought by "herding" 
defendants, rapid and impenetrable incantation of procedural 
requirements, refusal of legal aid and failure to explain 
sentencing decisions.
Some participants have a particularly powerful influence over 
the orientation of role relationships between personnel. For 
example, Darbyshire's (1984) study of magistrates' court 
clerks illustrates how the manner in which assistant clerks 
conducted courts reflected the attitudes and behaviour of the 
individual justice's clerk.
The broad orientation of courtroom ideologies and 
relationships constrains individual freedom in the enactment 
of professional roles. Thus, for example, Anderson (1978) 
found that a democratic, welfare-oriented juvenile court 
attributed greater importance to the role of social workers 
than to legal representation, whilst the reverse was true of 
an autocratic court with a more punitive sentencing tradition.
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Anderson*s observation, however, does not describe a necessary 
relationship between ideology and role relationships. Parker, 
Casburn and Turnbull (1981) found a high regard for legal 
representation in a democratic court with a non-punitive 
sentencing tradition. The question of how far sentencing 
ideologies establish the pattern of role relationships, and 
how far the established role relationships themselves create 
a sentencing tradition cannot be clearly answered from a 
review of the literature.
Observational studies reveal that the behaviour of 
participants in the courtroom process adapts to the prevailing 
ethos of the individual court, even when it contradicts 
professional ethics and values. Thus, for example, defence 
solicitors may be tentative and uncontroversial in their 
representation of defendants in courts which pursue a 
tradition antagonistic to their role. This has been observed 
in studies of both welfare-oriented (Anderson 1978) and 
punitive (Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981) juvenile courts, 
in which devaluation of defence solicitors' role stems from 
quite different perspectives. Similarly, probation officers 
may attach considerable importance to their "credibility" 
(McWilliams 1986? Rosecrance 1985), adapting their behaviour 
to the ethos of an antagonistic court, rather than risk 
controversy resulting in further devaluation (Ashworth, 
Genders, Mansfield, Peay and Player 1984; Carlen 1976; 
Darbyshire 1984? McWilliams 1986? Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 
1981? Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989).
Professionals do articulate this tension between their 
professional values and their practice in antagonistic courts 
(Ashworth, Genders, Mansfield, Peay and Player 1984? Carlen 
1976? Darbyshire 1984? McWilliams 1986? Parker, Casburn and 
Turnbull 1981) . Nevertheless, these studies also suggest that, 
to some extent at least, professionals reconcile such conflict 
by adopting attitudes prevailing in the courtroom situation. 
Such a response would, indeed, be unsurprising in the light of
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attitudinal research reviewed in Chapter Four. 
Rationalisations for behaviour conflicting with professional 
values also develop. For example, defence solicitors may 
perceive assertiveness to be prejudicial to the interests of 
their clients (Anderson 1978; Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 
1981)? probation officers may value the "realism" of their 
sentencing recommendations to courts (McWilliams 1986).
Role relationships in City court may be examined from two 
perspectives; the relationships between court personnel; and 
those between court personnel and the public, particularly 
defendants.
Relationships between court personnel
City court conducted its business in a predominantly 
democratic style, requiring mutually respectful public 
interactions in the courtroom. In general, the formal business 
of the court was conducted in a co-operative style favouring 
a problem solving approach achieved through negotiation and 
compromise, rather than on an openly adversarial basis (see 
e.g. Darbyshire 1984; Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981 for 
observational comparisons of these styles). This observation 
of the established pattern of relationships, however, is most 
sharply illustrated by an examination of incidents which ran 
counter to the general code. Such an examination, while 
concentrating on the comparatively unusual, nevertheless 
reveals how role relationships were regulated in order to 
maintain the established code of conduct; for "[m]embers of a 
workgroup reward and punish one another for cooperation or 
conflict" (Lipetz 1980, p.48; also Mileski 1969).
Example 7.4
Magistrates' challenges to the representations of other court 
personnel were customarily conveyed in a reasonable, non- 
antagonistic manner. On one notable occasion, however, this 
mutually respectful style of interaction was profoundly 
disrupted.
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One morning, the clerk asked the magistrates to retire, after 
dealing with only one case, as there were no other cases ready 
to proceed. Two magistrates took the clerk angrily to task, 
declaring their dissatisfaction with the conduct of business, 
and an altercation developed.
H: "It's not good enough. Cases should be ready to go on
at 10a.m.”
Clerk: "I'm sorry, but I can't pluck cases out of the
air."
The magistrates retired, still protesting. Later, when 
proceedings recommenced, the first two defence solicitors to 
appear with their cases were asked by the magistrate to 
explain why they had not been in court at 10a.m.. Neither were 
prepared for this interrogation, being unaware of the earlier 
complaint. The first solicitor stared at the bench in 
amazement for an appreciable moment before replying politely: 
"Of course. I was in another court at 10a.m.". The defendant 
in this case, a disqualified driver, was very heavily fined, 
despite strong mitigation concerning his financial problems. 
The second solicitor, nonplussed, concluded that a summons to 
court had not been passed on: "I was in the cells,
interviewing my client. I didn't know another case of mine had 
been called". Seeing the meaningful expression on the clerk's 
face, the solicitor gave up the attempt at comprehension and 
sat down. The remainder of the morning's business was 
accomplished in a strained atmosphere.
The afternoon court, to which the same magistrates were 
returning, had been set aside for a complex sentencing 
hearing. The defendant, aged 23, had admitted several offences 
of burglary, ABH, public order, and criminal damage. He was in 
breach of a conditional discharge and a suspended sentence, 
and had now committed further offences during a period of 
deferment. He was represented by the second defence solicitor 
to have been publicly challenged by the magistrates.
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Before court, the solicitor and clerk discussed the events of 
the morning, protesting about their treatment, and that of the 
disqualified driver. Then the solicitor complained to the 
prosecution solicitor about a new charge of criminal damage 
brought against the defendant. It seemed that a struggle with 
the police had resulted in the defendant bleeding, from cuts 
acquired prior to his arrest, onto an officerfs shirt. The 
solicitors and clerk then considered their course of action. 
As proceedings started, the new charge was put to the 
defendant, a plea of not guilty was entered and a trial date 
fixed. This concluded the court's business. The magistrates 
retired. As they cleared up, the clerk told the solicitors: 
"I'm just listing it for the sentencing court".
On the due date, the prosecution withdrew its case in respect 
of the police officer's shirt, the sentencing hearing 
proceeded, and the defendant was sentenced to seven months' 
imprisonment. This outcome could hardly have been different, 
considering the superfluity of the contested charge and the 
defendant's history of breaching court orders. However, court 
personnel, not prepared to allow sentence to be decided 
against a background of acrimony, found the means to avoid it.
Alliances of diverse court personnel to correct behaviour 
which defied the expectation of mutually respectful, co­
operative conduct was not confined to the control of errant 
magistrates. Once when an unfamiliar legal representative from 
another locality became hotly aggressive over delays in 
reaching a trial date, demanding that magistrates require the 
case to be reviewed by "someone in the Crown Prosecution 
Service competent in these matters", the closing of ranks was 
almost physical. At this implied insult to a familiar 
prosecution solicitor, startled glances were exchanged around 
the court, so noticeably that the offending solicitor hastily 
intercepted the magistrates' remonstrance: "Of course, I'm not 
suggesting that my friend here is incompetent". The damage, 
however, was irremediable. Magistrates granted the prosecution
235
applications in full. On a more muted occasion, to a solicitor 
who ventured a query about the conduct of a case, the 
magistrate responded mildly: "(This) is one of our senior
clerks, you know". The reproof was not lost on the solicitor, 
who rapidly denied any imputation of incompetence.
In City court, there was no entrenched antagonism between 
particular groups. The principle at stake in these 
interchanges was not the perpetuation of any specific 
antagonistic relationship, but of the democratic, mutually 
respectful code of conduct.
Example 7.5
Three young men were to be sentenced for a ludicrously 
incompetent burglary. On the due date, only one defendant 
appeared, answering his bail. The others were not produced 
from custody, where they were serving sentences for other 
offences. The magistrates agreed to hear the single 
defendant's case in order that he should not be penalised by 
a delay not of his making.
The defendants, very drunk, had broken into a shop. This 
defendant, climbing through the window, passed out to his 
friends what he took to be a television and some jars. They 
left the jars and "television", which proved to be a video 
monitoring screen, in a garden. The group made off home, 
eating the contents of the jars which turned out to be monkey 
nuts, discarding along the way the shells, and most of the 
nuts as they were rotten. Police searching for the culprits 
had only to follow the trail.
Blaming alcohol and bad company for the offence, the defence 
solicitor pointed to a subsequent improvement in the 
defendant's circumstances, but endorsed the probation 
officer's recommendation for a probation order on the grounds 
of his continuing vulnerability. During the magistrates' 
retirement, the defence solicitor commented with amusement on
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the SER, which had been prepared in a different locality and 
suggested probation as an alternative to custody: "I can just 
see (his local) bench potting him for this. With these, not a 
chance”. A probation order was made.
On the following week, the same solicitor represented one of 
the co-defendants. The mitigation address, later reiterated by 
the second solicitor, stressed the triviality of the offence 
and urged magistrates to impose a concurrent custodial 
sentence which would not interfere with the defendant's 
existing release date. Remembering that the defendant was 
still a young offender, the defence solicitor then jocularly 
referred magistrates to the "Ways and Means Act", meaning the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988, specifying the justifications for 
custody:
"Perhaps I could suggest the criterion that the offence 
is so serious that no alternative is possible as one 
which you might like to hang your hat on."
The magistrates retired without comment. During their absence 
there was some hilarity in the courtroom about the defence 
solicitor's wry tactics.
JR: "Why didn't you suggest a conditional discharge, if 
the offence was trivial?"
DS: "He doesn't want anything hanging over his head when 
he comes out. They could give him two months and he would 
still keep his current release date."
Of particular interest here was the fact that the bench was 
chaired by the same magistrate who had officiated in the 
sentencing of the first defendant. This magistrate was 
effectively being asked to preside over a blatant 
contradiction of a previous decision.
Both defendants received a conditional discharge. Here, the 
magistrates apparently displayed greater regard for the proper 
application of law than the legal representatives. However, 
their decision may also have reflected a more immediate 
concern about role relationships: that they, as magistrates,
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should not be invited to conspire to manipulate the law in 
blatant contradiction to a prior decision, for the convenience 
of defendants. This decision was an assertion of magisterial 
independence, directed at court personnel.
This incident is also of interest for the light which it sheds 
on underlying assumptions of court personnel about "their" 
magistrates. Sentencing research has found magistrates willing 
and able to find their own justifications for passing harsh 
sentences, and to manipulate the law in the process (Burney 
1985? Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989). Even without 
familiarity with such research, overtly to invite magistrates 
to pass inflated sentences might strike defence solicitors as 
a dangerous precedent to set, unless there was a degree of 
complacency about the customary leniency of the bench to which 
such an invitation was proffered. This suggests that these 
defence solicitors did not expect City magistrates' 
traditional tolerance to be disturbed by the manufacture of a 
harsh sentence in special circumstances.
The democratic, mutually respectful code of conduct extended 
to the probation service, which enjoyed a recognition as a 
professional participant in courtroom proceedings which is 
denied to it in some courts (Darbyshire 1984). This 
recognition was explicitly conveyed in a curious small 
ceremony, called "presenting the reports", which was an 
idiosyncratic feature of City court's operation. In sentencing 
hearings for which SERs had been prepared, the clerk would ask 
for the reports to be "formally presented" by the probation 
officer at the appropriate point in proceedings, between 
prosecution and mitigation. The task minimally required the 
officer to address the bench with the words: "I am presenting 
Social Enquiry Reports prepared on the defendant by (my 
colleague)".
Probation officers new to City court were unfailingly caught 
at a loss when first asked to present reports, finding the
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request incomprehensible, and would complain that the ritual 
was unnecessary and embarrassing in its superfluity. However, 
the routine soon became a "scripted" activity to which they 
gave no thought? so much so, that it did not seem to occur to 
established officers to give new colleagues prior warning of 
the practice. Furthermore, established officers learned that 
this superficial task enabled them to proffer additional 
comments or advice, simply by providing them with a formal 
opportunity to speak. This ceremony could become a powerful 
tool for a probation officer wishing to influence proceedings, 
particularly given the sensitivity of its timing between 
prosecution and mitigation addresses, and the willingness of 
the court to receive their professional interventions.
Example 7.6
A defendant, aged 28, had committed several offences of theft 
and deception and was in breach of both a community service 
order and a probation order requiring his attendance at a 
groupwork programme. The probation officer was now 
recommending a probation order with a requirement of 
attendance at a day centre (known locally, after the reference 
in the Criminal Justice Act 1982, as a "4B order"). The 
probation officer, presenting the reports, requested the 
opportunity to clarify some points.
POs "Regarding the intake of alcohol - that information 
was taken in error from a previous report. The defendant 
tells me his intake is now considerably less. I would 
also like to say on his behalf that he was co-operating 
extremely well on his probation order up to the time of 
the breaches and it was a great surprise to me that he 
dropped out of contact."
M: "How much of the community service order has been
completed?"
POs "38 hours."
Ms "What is the nature of the 4B programme?"
The probation officer explained the intensive and demanding 
nature of the day centre programme. After the mitigation 
address, the magistrates retired, then returned to query the
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defendant’s failure to comply with the community service order 
and to ask for further information about the 4B programme.
POs "The community service order, if I may say, started 
adequately, but the defendant hasn’t worked at all since 
he left for London. Otherwise, no doubt he would have 
completed it satisfactorily. It was not entirely the 
defendant's fault that the order was not completed 
satisfactorily as he had produced sick notes on some 
occasions. The 4B order is a rigorous order. It is in 
some ways similar to the order he is already on, which 
requires group attendance, but much more intensive. The 
factors confronted would be for example his drinking and 
offending behaviour. It is all designed to give him more 
insight and enable him to make better decisions in the 
future. For example, the defendant doesn't know why he 
breached the probation order. This would confront that."
When following the probation officer's recommendation, the 
magistrate remarked to the defendant:
"There was a time during our retirement when we had 
decided to send you to prison. But after we came back we 
decided to do this instead. But I want the probation 
service to know that we expect any breach of this order
to be dealt with immediately and we do not expect a
recommendation that he stay out of prison. There is no 
question that if he comes back there will be a custodial 
sentence. Let's be quite clear about that."
This illustrates the latitude granted to probation officers to 
intervene in proceedings. In allowing themselves to^persuadedX. 
to pass a further non-custodial sentence on a defendant 
already in breach of two, these magistrates - albeit within 
the required terms of respectful courtroom interaction -
nevertheless let it be known that this probation officer's
protestations were overzealous. Their remarks in sentencing 
were a message, less to the defendant than to the probation 
officer, and an assertion of the independence of their 
decision.
Relationships between court personnel and the public
Reference has already been made to the low key, non- 
confrontational approach to interactions between court staff 
and the public in the waiting area. Some examination should
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also be made here of interactions with the public inside the 
courtroom, since the nature of these had implications for the 
styles of impression management available to defendants.
Example 7.7
One afternoon, the sentencing court was continuing after all 
others had finished their business. The first defendant, a 
female, to be called was absent. Her solicitor explained to 
the court that, following the car accident which had resulted 
in the present charges, the defendant had been unwell. But she 
then missed several court appearances without notification to 
her solicitor, who had now lost track of her. On the date of 
the last scheduled appearance a man, apparently her partner, 
had come to court and told the solicitor that the defendant 
was too ill and depressed to come to court and had gone away 
to recuperate. The solicitor complained: "He was very rude to 
me. I've known this defendant many years and I'm sure if I 
could see her we could get this sorted out, but she's under 
the influence of this man." The magistrates decided that they 
had no option but to issue a warrant not backed for bail.
As another case began, it became apparent that the afore­
mentioned man had arrived at court, bearing a sheaf of sick 
notes. During a retirement, the clerk went out, explained to 
him what had happened, and subsequently reported to the 
magistrates that he had asked to address the court. The clerk 
informed them also that the sick notes were for Social 
Security purposes and did not state that the defendant was too 
unwell to attend court. It had been explained to the man that 
he had no standing in court and the magistrates did not have 
to grant his request for an audience. The magistrates agreed 
to hear him after the conclusion of the present case. The 
clerk explained this to the man, commenting afterwards: "He's 
working himself up into a rage. I think we might have some 
shouting".
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The man was invited to sit near the front of the court. The 
clerk rehearsed the history of the proceedings, and further 
gave details of the sick notes just received, commenting, "I'm 
bound to say they do not adequately cover the dates of the 
court appearances or state that she is unable to attend 
court".
M: "What would you like to say?"
Man: "I want to tell you what it's like for (the
defendant) at the moment. She's very depressed 
M: "It's very important that she attend court. A warrant 
has been issued."
Man: (raising voice) "I've come here to explain. Have you got 
any idea what it's like living with someone who's eyes 
are dead, who says nothing all day? Her jaw's been 
strapped up
M: "The best help you could give (the defendant) is to 
ensure she comes to court and gets this matter over 
with."
Man: (shouting) "How can I ensure she attends court? She's 
not at home, she's gone to Wales! You people, you're all 
the same! There's bills coming through the door and no 
money from the Social, and the poll tax. And I go down to 
try to talk them all and they just shout regulations at 
me and you're all the same! You've no heart!"
The magistrate, who maintained a quiet voice and moderate tone 
throughout, remonstrated again. The man cried: "Oh, you're
hopeless!". He turned to go. As he reached the rear of court, 
he turned and declaimed furiously on his plight, with waving 
arms. Then, pointing at the magistrate, he cried: "I'll sort 
you out then! If you come round to my house with a warrant, 
then I'll come round and sort you out!" After some further 
unfocused abuse, he stormed from the court.
Clerk: (mildly) "Well, that was contempt of court, your
worships, and you would be within your rights to order 
his arrest, but I suggest it would serve no purpose."
People in court, which was empty at this late stage in the 
afternoon apart from the magistrates, clerk, probation 
officer, usher and myself, began to relax. The clerk 
telephoned to the police cells to warn of possible trouble, 
but there was no reply. Suddenly the man burst back into 
court, hurling incoherent abuse at the bench. The clerk
242
pressed the panic button, to sound an alarm in the cells. The 
usher scuttled to the dock, trying unsuccessfully to open the 
door to give the police access. This was the only response to 
the renewed outburst, so startled was everyone. The man 
departed again, ire apparently spent. The usher ran to lock 
the courtroom door to prevent any further dramatic entrances. 
The clerk explained to the magistrates that the police had 
apparently left court already. (Later it transpired that a 
police officer unfamiliar with the court had been in the cell 
area, looked at the flashing light and wondered what it was 
for.)
Later, the magistrate spoke to me in a post-sentence interview 
concerning another case:
"I was against imprisonment long before the Home Office 
decided they shouldn't send anyone to prison. People who 
come before the court have appalling problems and lead 
miserable lives. The whole paraphernalia of the courtroom 
hearing is simply intimidating and confusing to such 
people. They don't understand what's happening and rarely 
get the opportunity to participate. I try to think of 
questions to ask them directly so that they can join in, 
even if they've got a solicitor."
This magistrate's undeniable sincerity cast a deep irony on 
the remark of the probation officer, observing this courtroom 
interaction: "I don't like that magistrate - so officious". At 
the time, this diagnosis merely appeared overstated. Following 
the post-sentence interview, however, it appeared to reflect 
a real constraint deriving from the magisterial role. What 
else, after all, could the magistrate have said, within the 
terms appropriate to that role?
This magistrate was not, in fact, behaving officiously, but 
offic ia lly, while attempting to induce some constructive change in 
the dismal process of this case within the real constraints 
imposed by the magisterial role (Atkinson and Drew 1979) . The 
only real option would have been to deny the man an audience.
243
As the clerk subsequently remarked:
"It serves me right for encouraging them to let him 
speak. I was trying to be generous, but we didn't have to 
let him speak at all."
Unfortunately, to the perceiver, particularly one already 
distressed, the distinction between officious and official 
behaviour may not be obvious.
Example 7.8
The frequency of court appearances by drunks had diminished in 
recent years following the introduction of a police cautioning 
system. Court personnel, however, were familiar with the 
"regulars": the core of deteriorated, destitute alcoholics who 
inhabited the city centre by day. The behaviour of these 
people at court, as indeed in public, varied quite widely 
according to their degree of intoxication, impatience to 
resume drinking, sense of grievance and general irritability 
or tranquillity. Court personnel, and particularly the ushers 
and police who generally had the most contact with them during 
their attendances at court, seemed to deal with this 
unpredictability on a "treat as you find" basis, responding to 
the mood and behaviour with which they were immediately 
presented, rather than by storing up anticipation of and 
defensiveness against possible trouble. On one occasion I saw 
jocular exchanges between the court police officer and a man 
who only one week previously had brought proceedings to a 
standstill with an alarming display of aggression in the 
courtroom, necessitating his ejection. Indeed, the police 
officer defused the man's periodic irritation on at least two 
occasions during that morning by some cordial intervention.
When such defendants, alone or with supportive company, 
entered the courtroom to sit at the rear awaiting their turn 
in the dock, their restiveness could become distracting. At 
these times, the police officer would walk over and stand 
beside them, occasionally leaning to whisper advice to remain
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calm. Thus, the low key, non-confrontational approach to 
surveillance and control was continued in the courtroom.
Not always successfully. Once, when this routine signally 
failed to maintain disturbance at a tolerably muted level, the 
clerk, losing patience, asked the police officer to take the 
man downstairs to the cells. The police officer led the 
protesting man to the dock and through the door, assisted by 
the usher, who instructed him, like a bothersome child: "Off 
you go now". The man slept off the worst of his intoxication 
and was produced in the afternoon, when, for theft of a bottle 
of wine, he was sentenced to spend one day in police custody, 
thus to be released at the close of court business.
The prosecution solicitor, exchanging some humour about the 
manner of this defendant's removal, nevertheless observed: 
"But what was the basis really for taking him into custody? 
Contempt of court? I know he was a problem, but as a matter of 
civil liberties, it's not too good, is it?"
One answer to this question may derive from the assumption 
that swift removal was the easiest way, in the long run, to 
preserve the non-confrontational approach to social control in 
the courthouse, given the inflamed responses of the defendant 
to mild attempts at reason. A further element in the rationale 
for such behaviour, which will emerge fully in later 
discussion, derived from the fundamental belief that such 
people were incapable of regulating their own behaviour, 
coupled with the paternalistic notion that responsible 
decisions should therefore be taken on their behalf.
Example 7.9
Towards the end of the observation period, I attempted to 
clarify the lack of overt enforcement of the "No Alcohol" 
rule, by remarking to the usher that a defendant was nipping 
from a bottle concealed in his coat whilst sat in the dock 
waiting for his case to begin. (I was, by this time, confident
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that no real detriment would accrue to the defendant through 
such an intervention, for reasons which will become 
increasingly clear.) The usher looked across, watched until 
the defendant took another nip, then moved slightly closer to 
him. The defendant returned the bottle to his coat. The usher 
continued to watch, evidently hesitant to intervene directly. 
Within a few minutes the decision was rendered unnecessary by 
the arrival of the magistrates. In this incident it became 
clear that the usher* s decision involved more than the 
necessity of witnessing rule transgression directly in order 
to enforce it. The real dilemma concerned the potential 
sacrifice of the defendant's relative tranquillity through 
confrontation over a rule.
Example 7.10
I found myself included in an exchange of pleasantries between 
an usher and a boisterous young defendant. Afterwards, the 
usher remarked: "I can't see a reason to be too formal with 
the defendants. There but for the grace of God, I say". The 
topic moved to one of the regular drunks, who knew the court 
so well that during his attendances he would "settle in" and 
participate in its routines.
Usher: "Well, I don't put up with nonsense. I heard him 
the other day asking the WRVS ladies for two cups of 
water. I went up and I told him: 'Oh, no. You get tea or 
coffee here and you pay for it'."
JR: "He drinks water?"
Usher: "Oh, no. He would have thrown the water away and 
put his alcohol in the cups, so we can't tell. He's got 
a poacher's pocket inside his coat. I've reached into it 
once or twice and whipped out the bottle, and I keep it 
till he's ready to leave."
Thus it became clear that court personnel had unobtrusive 
methods of controlling drinking and drunkenness which they 
preferred to a reliance on confrontation. Some latitude was 
available to members of the public in their behaviour even in 
the courtroom. As will be seen, this latitude could be 
exploited by defendants pursuing particular styles of 
impression management.
246
CUSTODIAL SENTENCING
The decision to impose an immediate custodial sentence, being 
the gravest penalty available, might be expected to depend on 
a clear judgement, derived from the objective facts of a case, 
that the defendant was fully culpable. Research, however, has 
repeatedly revealed inconsistency between sentencing decisions 
concerning objectively similar cases between different courts 
(Burney 1979? Hood 1962? Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981? 
Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989? Tarling 1979), within the same 
court (Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989), and by individual 
sentencers (Ashworth, Genders, Mansfield, Peay and Player 
1984). In postulating reasons for this phenomenon, 
commentators have concentrated on sentencers* attitudes 
towards and interpretations of the objective facts of cases, 
tending to overlook the potential role of immediate 
situational factors within the courtroom process itself, 
beyond, perhaps, the appearance and demeanour of the defendant 
(Mileski 1969). Such factors are unrelated, in any objective 
sense, to the gravity of the offence under consideration, yet 
may powerfully influence the judgement formed of it.
In City court, as in the research noted above, it became 
apparent that there were no obvious "hard facts" regarding 
offence gravity which consistently resulted in a sentence to 
custody. For example: although 6 defendants who were in breach 
of a suspended sentence received immediate custody, a further 
8 did not? although 2 defendants were sentenced to custody for 
supplying cannabis, another, whose involvement had been 
sustained over a longer period, was not. The bases of such 
inconsistent judgements of offence gravity will be considered 
further in the following chapter. However, an examination of 
the 22 cases in which immediate custody was imposed suggested 
that some situational factors could be influential in the 
production of this outcome. Four factors which recurred in 
these cases concerned the composition of the bench of the day, 
mitigation, SERs and "outsider" status of the defendant or 
defence solicitor.
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Composition of the bench of the day
Some individual magistrates who participated in decisions to 
impose custody which were justified on the grounds of the 
absolute seriousness of a particular type of offence, were 
involved on other occasions in non-custodial sentencing for 
the same offence. It appeared that the coincidence of three 
"like-minded" magistrates, or a strong opinion pressed by an 
individual, could influence the degree to which a "serious" 
offence might be regarded as "sufficiently serious to warrant 
custody on this occasion".
Mitigation
Magistrates* courts are criticised in some research for their 
hostility to legal representation (Darbyshire 1984; Parker, 
Casburn and Turnbull 1981). In City court, clerks and 
magistrates were careful to satisfy themselves that a 
defendant's decision to proceed without legal representation 
was not taken out of ignorance or as a response to the stress 
of appearing in court. Unrepresented defendants who appeared 
uncertain or ignorant of their position, or who offered a 
legal defence in mitigation were "stood down" for consultation 
with the duty solicitor. In such cases, the case might further 
be adjourned to give the defendant an opportunity to instruct 
the solicitor of his choice. Only 2 defendants in the study 
who did not have legal representation were sentenced to 
custody. These were chronic alcoholics who were sentenced to 
a nominal one day, and released at the close of business. Lack 
of legal representation therefore, did not appear to be a 
factor in the imposition of custody in these cases.
The manner in which legal representation was conducted, 
however, did appear significant on occasion. In 3 cases, the 
defence solicitor explicitly prompted the magistrates to 
impose custody: in 2 of these custody was said to be
"inevitable", and mitigation sought the "shortest sentence 
possible"; in the third, it was suggested that the defendant 
had already "paid the penalty" by being remanded in custody
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for psychiatric assessment. In a further 3 cases, the defence 
solicitor appeared to antagonise the magistrates by the 
inadequacy of the mitigation address.
Social Enquiry Reports
In 9 cases, there was no SER prepared on the defendant. Four 
of these defendants were sentenced to a nominal one day. One 
defendant was already serving a longer sentence imposed at the 
Crown court. One defendant was sentenced to a term ensuring 
his immediate release following a remand in custody for 
psychiatric assessment. One defendant, sentenced to 7 days, 
was a chronic alcoholic and vagrant. It is difficult to see 
that the production of a SER in any of these cases could have 
served any useful purpose. In the remaining 2 cases the 
decision to proceed without SERs appeared more questionable, 
since one defendant had not previously been to prison and the 
other was said to have complex family problems. Both of these 
defendants, however, were in breach of suspended sentences.
The 13 cases in which SERs were present in fact appear of 
greater interest. In 2 cases the report was unfavourable to 
the defendant, and in one of these the writer offered no 
alternative to custody. In 4 cases the defendant had exhausted 
all the available alternatives, and with them, apparently, the 
tolerance of the probation officer. In the remaining cases, it 
appeared that the report writer, whilst attempting to be 
supportive of the defendant, made an error of judgement, by 
failing to acknowledge the seriousness of the offence, or by 
describing personal difficulties which did not counter a 
prevailing impression of a persistent or deliberate offender.
"Outsider" status
In 4 cases the defendant was not a City resident, but had 
offended whilst passing through, visiting, or living there 
temporarily. In 4 cases also the defendant was represented by 
a solicitor unknown to City court. The impact of this 
"outsider" status of either or both the defendant or solicitor
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could not be assessed with clarity. In cases of destitute 
alcoholic vagrants, for example, magistrates may have regarded 
a short custodial sentence as the simplest, or even the most 
humane course. It also seemed possible that these offending 
visitors or unfamiliar solicitors failed to engage 
magistrates* sympathies, as if geographical and "affective" 
distance were linked. It was in 2 cases in which both 
defendants and defence solicitors were strangers to City that 
magistrates declined to consider SERs prior to sentence.
These situational factors may not individually have accounted 
for a significant impact on the sentencing decision. Certainly 
it could not be claimed that they were uniquely present in 
cases resulting in custody. However, among the 22 cases in 
which immediate custody was imposed, 18 involved several of 
these factors in combination. The remaining 4 cases concerned 
nominal one day sentences imposed on chronic alcoholics as an 
expedient means of dispensing with these defendants. Where 
combinations of these situational factors were present in the 
more complex cases, it seemed that the distractions to the 
main task which they provided became "collapsed" into the 
single judgement of "offence seriousness".
Example 7.11
The defendant, aged 41, admitted theft and deception, asking 
for 6 further offences of deception to be taken into 
consideration. He was in breach of a 6 month suspended 
sentence imposed 3 months earlier at a different court for 
offences of deception. He had 12 previous convictions, 
recorded in various parts of the region, involving for the 
most part offences of deception and attracting some custodial 
sentences. The defendant, having committed the offences whilst 
temporarily resident in the locality, had since moved to a 
different area, where he had engaged legal representation.
Following the taking of pleas, the prosecution solicitor, 
instead of furnishing the full details of the offences, merely
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proffered the lists of previous convictions and offences to be 
taken into consideration, remarking: "My friend has an
application for reports. The defendant is in breach of a 
suspended sentence for what appear to be similar offences". 
This move to pre-empt magisterial decision making met with 
resistance. The prosecuting solicitor was required to deliver 
the details of the case, in which it was alleged that the 
defendant obtained credit from various shops on the basis of 
"sob stories about his mother being very ill, his son being 
ill, he was changing jobs and was very short of money, etc.". 
On departure from the area he had taken a carpet and 
stepladder from the caravan he had been renting. There was no 
information available about the offences which had led to the 
suspended sentence.
The defence solicitor then applied for an adjournment to 
obtain SERs, arguing that some of the offences apparently pre­
dated the imposition of the suspended sentence, that the 
defendant was in "dire financial circumstances", and had 
committed the offences whilst living in a caravan with his 
family without the support of Social Services. His 
circumstances had since changed: "the Social Services are very 
closely involved and also the Education Welfare. He is 
endeavouring to make the accommodation more permanent... In 
addition, he is hoping to find employment". The solicitor also 
alluded to the lack of information about the offences relating 
to the suspended sentence.
Ms "We do know the date. It seems this offence took place 
just a month after it was imposed."
DS: "But we don't know what the offence involved. It's 
not the most serious offence of theft. When there are 
social workers involved, it's my submission that they 
should be asked for their views before reaching a 
decision."
The bench retired to consider this application.
M: "Considering what you have said, we are minded to deal 
with the matter to-day and not to ask for reports. Is 
there anything further you want to say?"
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DS: "I had not begun to mitigate. I would like 15 minutes 
to take further instructions.”
Ms ”A11 right."
On return, the solicitor enlarged on the defendant's family 
circumstances, stressing chronic housing problems, poverty and 
ill health:
"He told various... traders what have been described as 
"sob stories". The sad fact is that those stories have 
almost inevitably been true...He was at pains to say to 
the police 'the offences I have committed at least kept 
my family together'."
After retiring, the magistrate announced sentence in the 
following way:
"We've heard the details of your situation and we accept 
you've been going through a rough time for one reason or 
another. But we have to take into account other matters, 
that is your antecedents and the breach of a suspended 
sentence. With regard to the present matters, in relation 
to the theft we intend to impose one month imprisonment, 
and for the other matter one month imprisonment, but that 
will be concurrent. And because of your circumstances, 
we're going to activate the suspended sentence, but we're 
going to substitute a period of 3 months for the period 
of 6 months, consecutive. So we've taken into account all 
your circumstances. Do you understand?"
This show of firmness tempered with mercy appears to have 
arisen from a particular combination of factors. The
magistrates' insistence on due process exposed the inadequacy 
of the defence solicitor's preparation. It will be seen later 
that pre-emptive requests for SERs were common in City court 
and in this respect the behaviour of the prosecution and 
defence solicitors was not unusual. However, the attempt to
circumvent magisterial decision making, and the subsequent
revelation of the defence solicitor's inadequate preparation 
may have appeared to the magistrates particularly presumptuous 
coming from someone unfamiliar to City court. Although the 
magistrates demonstrated a sympathy with the defendant's 
personal difficulties which was customary in City court, these 
offences nevertheless had connotations of an "outsider"
preying on the kindness of local folk, aggravated by the
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implication from his previous convictions that such behaviour 
was not unusual.
Example 7.12
The defendants, aged 18 and 21, were jointly charged with 
possessing cannabis with intent to supply, and also with 
supplying it. The 18 year old had a previous conviction for a 
minor offence.
Following the recital of the details of their arrest and 
admissions to supplying cannabis, the defence solicitor 
addressed the magistrates on their powers of punishment. It 
was explained that the magistrates at the previous hearing had 
assumed jurisdiction, rather than commit the case to the Crown 
court, after receiving representations that the defendants 
were of good character, involved only in small time dealing, 
and admitted to dealing during questioning about the fact of 
possession. The defendants had not been observed dealing in 
drugs, nor was there any evidence of profit. The solicitor 
quoted extracts from the police interviews in which the police 
themselves assured the defendants that they were not assumed 
to be big time dealers.
"These are young men who got way outside what their real 
life and background was. They were experimenters with the 
drug. These were the arguments put forward when you 
assumed jurisdiction. Even so custody must be in your 
minds."
The magistrates at this point retired to read the SERs. In 
their absence, the defence solicitor angrily complained to the 
clerk that the reports were "totally unrealistic", and that 
community service, as an alternative to custody, had not been 
canvassed by the writer.
On the magistrates' return, the defence solicitor corrected "a 
few minor errors of detail" in the report concerning the 
younger defendant. In particular, it was pointed out that "his 
mother was in fact a registered drug addict, not a minor
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abuser at all”. In contrast to the earlier denunciation of the 
reports, however, the solicitor proceeded to attempt to 
explain the curious logic of the recommendations for financial 
penalties.
"These reports disregard the alternatives normally 
associated with alternatives to custody. The reasoning 
seems to be that this was a youthful flirtation over a 
limited period of time, without profit. The probation 
officer therefore seems to accept this and not to deal 
with the options which you have to look at if you are 
thinking of custody, because they are young 
offenders...Here (are people) who don't immediately seem 
to be able to benefit from the probation service. (They 
have) no employment problems, no accommodation problems."
The solicitor then submitted employers* references and 
addressed the criteria for custody for young offenders, 
usefully ignoring the adulthood of one defendant.
"You need to disqualify all other forms of sentence. You 
can*t suspend a custodial sentence. Neither are in a 
situation where other forms of sentence have been tried, 
so you would need to say custody is necessary because of 
the seriousness of the offence. I suggest this is not so. 
But they are under no illusions and never have expected 
to avoid custody."
After a lengthy retirement, the magistrates announced 
sentences of 21 days for both defendants.
"We feel a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified, 
having regard to the seriousness of the offence. 
Supplying drugs to anybody places their lives in 
jeopardy, however small a quantity."
During a post-sentence interview, several issues emerged. The 
view was expressed that
"We had to make the point that these crimes will be 
stamped on. We couldn*t give fines because it doesn't 
mean anything to them. Community service wasn't assessed. 
We thought about 5 days, but the minimum sentence for a 
young offender is 21 days, so we knew with remission they 
would do 10, and we wanted to treat them both the same, 
so that's what we did."
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Such reasoning concerning the length of an allegedly deterrent 
sentence ("I regret the absence of the press.") was curious, 
although the magistrate explained it in exactly the same terms 
twice. The assertion of the need for exemplary sentencing 
itself was also of interest in this case, since one of these 
magistrates had participated some weeks previously in the 
imposition of a community service order on a defendant whose 
involvement in cannabis dealing had been more substantial than 
that perpetrated by these two. Later, when asked directly 
about the seriousness of the offence, the magistrate said: "We 
talked a lot about this". One of their number "felt very 
strongly" about drugs offences. It is worthy of note in this 
respect, that the SER observed of one defendant: "His offence 
does not appear to have endangered the general public if what 
(he) says is to be believed".
The magistrate remarked: "It was an odd report - took the
defence solicitor by surprise I think". Subsequently, it was 
observed of one defendant: "He*s quoted in the report as
saying he thinks he ought to give it up for the time being - 
or words to that effect!" Indeed, the SER did contain the 
ambiguous assertion: "(The defendant) has stated he has no
wish to continue to supply drugs and at the present time his 
wish is sincere. He is, however, into the drug culture, 
knowing the venues, language and people who are involved".
In this case, an otherwise strong mitigation eschewed overt 
confrontation with the probation service over the inadequacies 
of the reports. Ambiguities in the SERs were interpreted by 
the magistrates to the detriment of the defendants. Some of 
the writer*s remarks may have been inflammatory to a 
magistrate with strong objections to the offences under 
consideration. Whilst the magistrates were in general 
agreement that this was a serious type of offence, the 
participation of a strongly opinionated person probably 
significantly influenced the final outcome.
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Example 7.13
The defendant, aged 29, was charged with driving with excess 
alcohol and whilst disqualified. He was also charged, with a 
co-defendant, with a separate offence of ABH. He had several 
previous convictions, some of which had resulted in custody. 
He had been disqualified from driving for 3 years after a 
prior excess alcohol offence.
The assault arose while the defendants were standing in the 
street. A resident complained to them about the noise 
emanating from a nearby house. This defendant, aggrieved at 
being wrongly blamed, became aggressive. After an exchange of 
blows, the victim went back inside his house, but was pursued 
by the defendant, who assaulted him. His co-defendant, arming 
himself with a baseball bat, followed and struck the victim 
with it.
The defendants were both represented by counsel, who 
acknowledged that little mitigation was available for the 
offences. However, on the defendant's behalf, it was stated 
that he had not originally intended to drive after drinking, 
but rather "events overtook him", that he too had suffered 
bruises during the fight, and that after the violence had 
ceased all 3 men shook hands: "to all intents and purposes the 
incident was over". The recommendation for probation in the 
SER was endorsed:
"It is right to say he feels rejected by society. Perhaps 
a probation order would help to restore his trust. His 
last violent offence occurred in 1987, and prior to that, 
no violence for some time. I note that probation has 
never been tried with this defendant. He has some goals 
and aspirations and a probation officer may help with 
this. He has a family with young children who would 
suffer if he was imprisoned."
The magistrates were in retirement for a full hour before 
announcing concurrent sentences of 3 months imprisonment and 
ordering compensation to the victim of the assault of £200, to 
be paid after release. It later emerged that the lengthy
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retirement was due, not to ambivalence about the decision to 
impose custody on this defendant, but to difficulties in 
fixing the financial penalties for the co-defendant's numerous 
road traffic offences. This co-defendant, despite having 
wielded the weapon, was sentenced to community service for the 
assault, leniency being extended to him as a first offender.
In a post-sentence interview involving all 3 magistrates, it 
became clear that they unanimously endorsed the seriousness of 
these offences. In effect, there had been no dissenting, or 
cautionary perspective, the magistrates being in full 
agreement that "[y]ou can't feel satisfied if you've sent 
someone down, but it was a necessary sentence”. Drink-driving 
should be dealt with severely: ''We've got to play a part in 
shifting social attitudes”. This vehement view was of 
particular interest because I had observed 2 of these 
magistrates, sitting in different combinations with others, 
participate in non-custodial decisions in respect of similar 
offences.
The magistrates had taken note of the information in the SER 
about the defendant's "childhood in which he was rejected, 
humiliated, and subjected to violence". The probation officer 
recounted that "due to his disturbed upbringing he feels that 
he has been on his own all his life". Furthermore, as a black 
person, the defendant claimed that he was harassed by police 
because of his previous convictions, and had been told that he 
was on a "hit list". The magistrates inclined to the view that 
he protested too much.
"He feels the world's against him. From the report, he 
had an unfortunate early life. We were all concerned he's 
the product of a rotten childhood and as a result he 
feels the world's against him. But lots of people have 
rotten experiences and don't turn out that way. People 
take responsibility."
The writer of this report, disappointed with the result, 
subsequently asked my opinion whether a recommendation for 
community service would have swayed the magistrates. The
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probation officer was uncomfortably aware of ambiguities in 
the information which could convey the impression that 
childhood deprivation was being invoked as an excuse. In 
particular, the defendant's expressed wish that his claims of 
police harassment be included in the report led to a feeling 
of obligation to do so against the probation officer's better 
j udgement.
It is doubtful that the nature of the recommendation in itself 
had a great significance in this outcome. A coincidence of 
like-minded magistrates meant that the decision to imprison 
was not contentious in this case. The magistrates interpreted 
information in the SER in a manner supportive to their 
decision. The magistrates placed great emphasis on the SER in 
their explanation of their decision, ignoring the weak 
representations of an unfamiliar legal representative.
CONCLUSIONS
City court was neither unusually excessive nor unusually 
sparing in its use of custody, when compared with the picture 
for England and Wales as a whole. Among people at court there 
was an exaggerated belief in a stable tradition of non­
custodial sentencing, which was attributed to reluctance on 
the part of magistrates to use it. This was an intuitively 
more obvious reason for the comparatively rare experience of 
custodial sentences than the decline in the numbers of 
defendants being sentenced, or the reflection of a decline in 
the proportionate use of custody throughout England and Wales. 
Certain situational factors could be identified which 
encouraged this belief: the comparative rarity of individual 
experience of custodial sentencing due to the decline in 
absolute numbers so sentenced? the parsimony of magistrates in 
their utilisation of custody itself; the discounting of some 
custodial sentences as "not really custody"? and an 
overestimation of the extent to which high tariff alternatives 
were needed to divert defendants from custody.
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City court favoured a democratic style of conducting court 
business, involving problem solving by negotiation and 
requiring mutual respect in public interactions. City court 
personnel also favoured a low key, non-confrontational 
approach to the surveillance and control of behaviour of 
members of the public. This approach permitted a latitude to 
behaviour which could be exploited, particularly by defendants 
in establishing styles of impression management. Within this 
framework of relationships, certain situational factors could 
be identified which, in combination, seemed to be influential 
in the production of custodial sentencing. The composition of 
the bench of the day, weaknesses in mitigation or SERs and 
"outsider” status of defendants or defence solicitors, were 
situational factors in the sentencing process which could 
become "collapsed” into the single judgement of offence 
seriousness.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SENTENCING DECISION MAKING:
GOAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
This chapter examines two aspects of sentencing decision 
making in City court: its goal structure and its process.
These issues are not in themselves special to the treatment of 
alcohol-related cases, but provide a vital background to a 
full understanding of the role of mitigation and the 
utilisation of the intoxication excuse in City court.
GOAL STRUCTURE
This phrase, suggested by Furnham, Jaspers and Fincham (1983), 
is useful here because it implies the potential co-existence 
of multiple, disparate, but nevertheless interrelated goals. 
The goals which were weaved into the decision making process 
in City court originated in diverse sources and were not 
entirely mutually complementary.
There are three levels at which the goal structure of the 
courtroom may influence decision making: the prescriptive? the 
local; and the individual.
The prescriptive level
Variations in sentencing traditions should not obscure the 
universality of some rules in decision making, beyond the 
strictly legal, despite local differences in interpretation. 
A principle which guides the choices of all courtroom decision 
makers is that decisions should be defensible (Fitzmaurice and 
Pease 1986? Holstein 1985), although the favoured grounds for 
demonstrating defensibility may vary between courts. The 
principle that the defensibility of sentencing decisions 
should be subject to test is, of course, embodied in the 
institution of the Court of Appeal. Sentencers1 general 
recognition of a need to establish decision defensibility is 
suggested by observations of the frequency with which multiple 
and complex reasons are spontaneously advanced in support of
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sentencing decisions (Ashworth, Genders, Mansfield, Peay and 
Player 1984; Bankowski, Hutton and McManus 1987? Fitzmaurice 
and Pease 1986? Holstein 1985? Konecni and Ebbesen 1982? 
Lawrence 1984? Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989). Since these 
same studies often apparently expose these stated reasons as 
logically irrelevant to decisions made actually on simple 
"rules of thumb", they are frequently treated only as evidence 
of the general principle that decision makers do not know the 
"real" reasons for their behaviour (Fitzmaurice and Pease 
1986? LLoyd-Bostock 1988? Konecni and Ebbesen 1982? Nisbett 
and Wilson 1977). Nevertheless, in the context of decisions 
with significant consequential implications for those affected 
by them, defensibility appears to be a laudable principle. 
Sentencers might reasonably be expected to demonstrate the 
defensible bases of their decisions in such circumstances 
(Fitzmaurice and Pease 1986).
The manner in which a generally prescribed, ideological 
purpose may inform the activity of all courts in relation to 
particular aspects of sentencing has been most clearly 
observed in the work of the juvenile courts, where it has been 
possible to study the impact of the specific injunction upon 
sentencers to have regard for the welfare of the offender. For 
example, Horwitz and Wasserman argue that the sentencing 
practice of American juvenile courts is guided by "a model of 
substantive decision-making oriented toward the character and 
social environment of offenders" (1980, p.411). They suggest 
that this particular orientation explains why decisions in the 
juvenile courts in their study showed little relationship to 
the legal (e.g. offence seriousness, prior convictions), or to 
the extra-legal (e.g. race, class) factors commonly found to 
be influential in the adult courts. Instead, juvenile court 
decisions were significantly related to the identification of 
family or school problems in the personal circumstances of 
offenders.
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The sentencing of adults has not been the subject of specific 
injunctions of this nature, but has been required to address 
multiple aims, described in the classic principles of 
retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation (Hines 
1982) . Essentially, what is required of sentencers is that 
their decisions be defensible within the terms of these 
classical principles. City magistrates frequently remarked 
upon the difference they perceived between juvenile and adult 
sentencing.
"Juvenile work...That at the moment is what I find most 
interesting...Largely because you're dealing with people 
with their interests in mind...more with their interests 
and development, thinking of ways of developing them and 
changing their pattern of behaviour."
"Juvenile court... Because on the whole I think you have 
more constructive results. You can actually feel very 
often...that you're helping to sort somebody out into a 
different and possibly better way of life."
While many magistrates declared a personal preference for 
juvenile work because of the explicit interest in defendants' 
welfare, it was also evident that they did not simply carry 
this ideology into the adult court in undiluted fashion. 
Whatever their personal preference, such a "pure" approach to 
adult sentencing was not legitimised by any prescriptive 
ideology.
Magistrates were, however, notably conscious of increasing 
external pressures upon them to avoid the use of custody. But 
they perceived in this, not an ideological stance, but 
pragmatism. This was reflected in a degree of mild irony in 
their remarks.
"I think we're softer. I think that's been brought about 
by these strange intellectual exercises we have to go 
through if we ever want to send anybody to prison these 
days."
"Bending over even more backwards not to send people to 
prison, because the prisons are overcrowded. And I think 
there has been a change over the thoughts about the 
usefulness of prison for certain crimes, and we've been
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exhorted by the powers that be to really look very
carefully at this and I agree with them."
"We're much more encouraged from on high to cut out
prison wherever possible...much more emphasis now on 
trying to find non-custodial sentences."
Although magistrates were generally supportive of the
principle of using "alternatives to custody", they were also 
sceptical of its validity in reality. Their reservations were 
sometimes related to the availability of resources.
"I'm still pretty cynical about all that stuff...about 
keeping the 17 to 21s particularly out of prison. When 
asked a direct question (the officials) had no idea where 
the resources to fund the non-custodial alternatives were 
going to come from. We all thought: 'Oh, there we are
again'. You cannot create all these plans that they want 
to produce based on probation and all the rest of 
it...you can't do it without money. It will be dreadful 
and wasteful and thoroughly negative if the whole thing 
founders on that."
Other magistrates simply did not accept that the non-custodial 
disposals were capable of representing the severity of a 
custodial sanction.
"Community service is supposed to be an alternative to 
custody. But, to me, I would have thought it bore no 
comparison to being shut up in a prison.. .0.K., for some 
undisciplined people perhaps it is a hardship to get up 
at 8a.m. on Saturday morning and do a day's work for 
nothing, but I don't think it's as tough as prison."
Thus, while sentencing in adult courts is not constrained by 
specific prescriptive ideologies, City magistrates were 
conscious of pragmatic injunctions to avoid unnecessary use of 
custody. They were not opposed to this in principle, although 
they were sceptical of the reality of alternatives to custody.
The local level
Different courts establish their individual commitments to the 
different philosophies of sentencing. For example, the marked 
variation in the emphasis which different juvenile courts 
accord to the punishment or welfare of offenders leads to
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significant differences in approaches to information 
processing and decision making (Anderson 1978? Parker, Casburn 
and Turnbull 1981).
However, it is not always a simple matter to distinguish 
between a coherent philosophy and a collection of lesser 
principles, beliefs and practices, combining to produce a 
local sentencing tradition. Sentencing may be "deeply rooted 
in tradition, custom and practice and not easily open to 
examination or change" (Morris and Giller 1987, p.203). This 
point became clear in the attempt to determine whether a 
coherent, consensual philosophy existed among City 
magistrates, which influenced their use of custody. Three 
significant issues emerged: magistrates' personal philosophies 
of sentencing? their personal antipathy to prison? and their 
"working reality" of custody.
1. Personal philosophies of sentencing
A question about magistrates' "primary aim" of sentencing 
failed to elicit a consensual philosophy which could be 
identified in the classic academic principles.
Thirteen magistrates defined a primary aim of sentencing. 
Seven of these invoked classical terms: 5 mentioned
punishment, one deterrence, and one rehabilitation. However, 
when they explained their aims, they attributed meanings to 
these terms from which the definitional distinctions of the 
textbooks were notably absent. It appeared that magistrates 
conceptualised their aims in a flexible manner to embrace 
combinations of the classical principles.
"Rehabilitation. To stop it happening again."
"It's to deter the person from not doing it again (sic). 
That's got to be paramount. In other words, 
rehabilitation I suppose it comes down to."
"There is no doubt in my mind that sentencing is 
punishing. Initially. But then it goes beyond that. One 
doesn't mean by punishment that they go and sit in a cell
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and they have bread and water. There must be an element 
of rehabilitation."
"One has a mixture of reasons for imposing punishment. 
Mainly to deter this person and others."
"I do think that people if they do wrong should be 
punished for it, because in the long run that is the best 
thing for them. It's not because I get any satisfaction 
out of it. A child who does something wrong should be 
punished so that they actually learn from that. In the 
long run, hopefully, they won't do it again...I sadly 
think that society has allowed young people to do their 
own thing so much that punishment is a dirty word. People 
must be made to feel responsible for their own actions."
Six magistrates used lay language to describe their primary 
aim. No attempt is made here to translate these aims into 
academic equivalents. The flexible use of the academic terms 
themselves suggests the need for caution in such translation. 
Literal translations from lay to apparent academic equivalents 
would inaccurately represent magistrates' conceptualisations, 
by constraining them within closed text book definitions.
"To be fair. That's the primary aim."
"First of all, I think it's terribly important that one 
sentences in relation to the offence. That one sentences 
sensibly and impartially, without trying to put one's own 
feelings or opinions so much to the fore that one tries 
to impart a message to society or the community. I think 
that is wrong."
"To persuade the person not to do it again."
"They don't return to court. And that means that they're 
leading a straight and narrow life, perhaps. That is the 
aim."
"To draw the defendant up and make him think about what 
he's done and hope that he won't do it again."
"To have society kept in balance. . .the well being of 
society."
Seven magistrates declined to nominate a primary aim. Five 
mentioned 2, 3, or 4 aims as of equal merit: 3 mentioned
deterrence? 2 mentioned punishment; one mentioned retribution; 
3 mentioned the protection of society or the public? one
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mentioned rehabilitation; and 3 mentioned some means of 
influencing the defendant's future behaviour.
"There are a number of things of equal importance, 
really. One is to educate the defendant and hope to 
direct their energies in another direction. Secondly, it 
must be in the form of a deterrent.. .Thirdly must be the 
protection of the public. And fourthly, I believe in many 
cases the victim has a right to expect and to see that 
some punishment has been given to the defendant."
"Two in my book. One is in the eyes of the public such 
that they see somebody who has offended against - I know 
this sounds very pious - the law of the land, that there 
should be some form of retribution. And the other one is 
that you must make the offender realise that he has 
broken the law and he must in some way pay for that."
Two magistrates thought that sentencing was always a mixture 
of aims which could not be specified a p r io r i.
"I don't think there is a primary aim, because it's a 
combination of things and I think it depends on the 
offences. With some offences there is no doubt that you 
are trying to dissuade other people from doing it. With 
some your primary aim is definitely punishment because 
you're outraged by what the person has done. Then with 
others it's very much a mixture that you want to punish 
but you also want to try and set them on the right track 
for the future."
"I don't think I could say there's a primary aim. I think 
it's always a balance of aims. Something to mark the 
offence. A crime has been committed, it has to be marked 
in some way because that's the law. Protection of the 
public, or individual. Trying to ensure that whoever has 
done it doesn't do it again. I don't think I would have 
a particular order for those. Marking the offence may be 
a purely technical thing if it's a traffic offence. Or it 
might be that somebody has to be punished or make 
reparation."
The discussion in Chapter Two concerning the indeterminateness 
of the relationships between lay theories and behaviour would 
caution against any expectation of a straightforward link 
between responses to abstract questions about aims and 
responses in specific instances. Examination of magistrates' 
explanatory remarks suggest that there were in effect 2 
substantive aims in sentencing. Firstly, magistrates thought
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that they should represent the interests of society. Secondly, 
they thought that they should prevent future crime, by which 
was usually meant re-offending by the defendant, although it 
could extend to the deterrence of other potential offenders.
These findings complement the findings of other research 
(Hogarth 1971). Furthermore, City magistrates* personal 
philosophies were expressed in similar terms to those used by 
sentencers themselves who have written about the aims of 
sentencing.
"[I]n my view the main function of the magistrates' 
court is to absorb the anger and anxiety of 
society."
(Acres 1987, p.61)
"The aim of the criminal law, and hence the first 
concern of the sentencer, is to protect and preserve 
society, and to promote good order and discipline 
within it, that is, to protect the public by the 
prevention of crime."
(Cooke 1987, p.57)
Goals such as these, however, are in themselves non-directive 
as to the manner in which they should be achieved. In Chapter 
Two it was argued that abstract theories or attitudes guide 
and filter the processing of information, but do not determine 
decisions in specific instances. City magistrates perceived in 
their public office duties to represent the interests of 
society and to prevent future offending. The practical means 
to the achievement of these aims was not specified in their 
personal philosophies of sentencing.
2. Personal antipathy to prison
Magistrates' personal philosophies of sentencing did not 
reveal an unambiguous commitment to avoid the use of custody. 
Nevertheless, the attribution to magistrates of reluctance to 
imprison by court personnel, noted in Chapter Seven, was not 
inaccurate. This collective magisterial aversion to 
imprisonment emerged in the course of asking their views on
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City court*s use of custody. Most appeared complacent about 
the possibility that they were more parsimonious in their use 
of custody than some other courts.
"I'm pleased about that. That's a certain degree of 
enlightenment."
"We're always thought of as a soft bench. I remember 
going to a training exercise fairly early on and one of 
the stipendiaries was full of contempt for the soft 
approach of the (City) magistrates."
"That's interesting. Perhaps the nature of crimes in this 
area are slightly different from those in larger 
conurbations, or more deprived areas? That's news to me. 
I didn't know that. I can't believe that we as 
magistrates are any softer than any others."
Complacency, however, did not simply reflect the unconcern 
about the sentencing traditions of other courts which is 
remarked upon in the research literature (Parker, Sumner and 
Jarvis 1989; Tarling 1979). Almost all magistrates, during 
interview, spontaneously deplored imprisonment, although no 
question directly invited an expression of opinion on the 
prison system. Indeed, this was the one issue about which 
magistrates appeared confident of the representativeness of 
their views.
"I'm all for keeping them out of prison. Prison's going 
to do them nothing but harm."
"The more I know about prison, particularly the lack of 
rehabilitation, the less I want to send people to 
prison."
"The very vast majority of us feel that custody is the 
most negative thing of all from everybody's point of 
view. It achieves nothing other than taking somebody out 
of circulation for a bit."
"I would do anything rather then send somebody to prison, 
if there's a hope of something else being more effective. 
I can't speak for the bench as a whole but I think that 
would be shared by quite a number of people."
"(Our former clerk) was very strong on this, that we 
should never deprive a person of their liberty unless 
there just was no other way. To deprive a person of their 
liberty was the worst thing you could do to them. You
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mustn*t do it unless there just was nothing else to do. 
I was trained by him and so I suppose Ifve gone along 
with that view."
3. The "working reality" of custody
Given their comparatively inexcessive use of custody, and the 
extent of magistrates' personal antipathy to it, the frequency 
with which they referred to it in interview was puzzling. 
Magistrates frequently referred to imprisonment as a real, 
even regular, sentencing consideration.
One magistrate revealed some of the ambivalences which may 
underlie a superficially straightforward opinion:
M: (smiling) "We're too lenient aren't we!"
JR: "Are you saying that tongue in cheek, or because you 
think that?"
M: "I think we are too lenient sometimes. . .Yes, I do
think on occasions we're too lenient. Drinking and 
driving, anything that involves drinking and driving car 
accidents, I think we are too lenient. I think far more 
should go inside. And by doing that you're not only 
showing that person, but you're showing the wider public 
that that is unacceptable. Unless you (do that) you won't 
get them to change."
JR: "The thing you said you found rewarding about being 
a magistrate was pulling people back (from harsh 
sentences)
M: "I think I've done that as many times as I've sent 
people inside. I don't think there's any conflict there, 
not with me anyway. Certain offences, in my opinion, 
don't warrant going inside, even if they've got a list as 
long as your arm. Because it's obvious if you send them 
in they're going to be in again, so what are you 
gaining?"
One magistrate explained at length a problem in the law 
regulating juvenile custody:
"The law says that a male juvenile may be sent to a 
custodial sentence for any length of time, but a female 
may only be given a custodial sentence that is for more 
than 4 months. We consider that discriminatory. We 
consider that there should be the same option for male or 
female. And the local branch, county branch and the 
national Magistrates' Association approved the 
recommendation that there should be no discrimination 
whatever. The same rules should apply to male or female. 
The response from the Home Office was the whole object of
269
the exercise was to keep females out of custody. Our 
response to that is that it's a pointless operation in 
that any juvenile females that are sentenced will be 
sentenced for a longer period than males."
Another complained that the increase in juvenile cautioning 
rebounded on those finally reaching the courts:
"So we only now see very extreme juvenile cases. And I 
think the problem now with the juvenile panel is that 
because we think - this is our perception - that most 
kids have been cautioned at least 6 times before we see 
them, we now assume that we only get the hard types so we 
really treat them quite harshly."
City magistrates had not sent a female juvenile into custody 
at least since 1985, when sentencing statistics for Petty 
Sessional Divisions began to be published by the Home Office. 
City magistrates' use of custody for juvenile males over that 
period had in fact been rather unstable, with 16 (8 per cent 
of all juveniles) so sentenced in 1985, 14 (11 per cent) in 
1986, 5 (5 per cent) in 1987, 11 (12 per cent) in 1988, none 
in 1989, and 3 (5 per cent) in 1990 (Home Office Criminal
Statistics 1985b-1990b). These figures, however, do not 
obviously support the view that the sentencing of juveniles 
was becoming increasingly harsh.
Magistrates clearly believed, as it was earlier observed that 
many of the court staff appeared to believe, that many of the 
sentences they passed were direct alternatives to custody.
"I always make quite sure in my court that if somebody 
gets community service it is recorded that it is 
definitely an alternative to imprisonment. I don't make 
community service as a sentence in its own right. You're 
saying to the person: 'As far as we're concerned you
should be in prison, but we're prepared to give you 
community service if you behave yourself and do the 
work'."
"We've got a good probation service in this area and I 
think the probation service is now convincing us that 
their higher tariff ways of dealing with offenders are 
really punitive and not afraid to say so."
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One magistrate, during a post-sentence interview, remarked 
impatiently on the frequency of discussion about a sanction 
which was not willingly invoked:
"When we have meetings and we talk about custody, I say: 
'Well, when was the last time any of you sent someone to 
prison?' And they all look round and they can't remember. 
We don't do it. Then people come round and spend 45 
minutes telling us not to send people to prison and why 
we shouldn't do that and I'm thinking: 'We're already
doing this, what are they lecturing us for?"'
Magistrates' pre-occupation with custody begins to become 
explicable in the light of comments such as the following:
”1 think we're always going to put people inside, because 
that is the only alternative left. Even at juvenile level 
there are some that you say: 'No, it's got to stop, and 
it's going to stop now, and it's going to stop here. 
We've tried, we've leant over backwards with you, you're 
not listening, you've got to go'."
”1 do remember being upset on one occasion, but I really 
was able to accept that we had done everything to avoid 
this and that if we didn't do it then we were going to 
look very foolish.”
”1 don't think the bench is saying: 'Well, the prison
service has got a problem so we won't'. That is not my 
concern. If he or she needs to go then he goes.”
"Paperwork coming from everywhere saying do not send 
everybody to prison. But nevertheless, that must be the 
sanction at the end of the day, providing it's there as 
a punishment, in some cases. And if there are magistrates 
who refuse to consider imprisonment...then that is 
entirely wrong, because when you are appointed as a 
magistrate you have got to agree to be fair and open 
minded and to proceed with the law as it is. Imprisonment 
is one of the punishments available."
"In any bench of our size - about 100 - there will be 
perhaps 20 who take it seriously, in the sense that they 
take a deeper interest in it. It's not just in here once 
a week or fortnight, going home and forgetting all about 
it. They're genuinely interested in how the judicial 
system works at our level, and indeed at Crown Court 
level. People who read about it, people who follow it as 
I do...There's a number of other people - a big majority 
it may be said - who perhaps tend to see this as another 
contribution to their community, but don't look at it in 
that sort of depth. And I do think that because of that 
we don't grasp the nettle sometimes."
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Comments such as these are vital clues to City magistrates' 
utilisation of custody. They suggest that custody was a part 
of these magistrates' "working reality". The fact that 
imprisonment was a real option in their sentencing repertoire, 
the consequent potential for its use, and the belief that 
their public duty conferred certain obligations upon them 
created conditions in which custodial sentencing was an ever 
present hypothetical possibility. Therefore, they could not 
permit their personal antipathy to prison to alter its status 
as the most significant sanction in their working reality as 
magistrates.
The individual level
Decisions in individual cases may be influenced by specific 
goals which they themselves generate. Thus, for example, 
information about an offence or an offender may be interpreted 
as indicating the particular relevance of retribution or of 
rehabilitation to the attributes of the case (Hogarth 1971). 
Research suggests that the view that the goals of sentencing 
emerge from the facts of individual cases is endorsed by 
sentencers, who favour a case by case approach to decision 
making (Ashworth, Genders, Mansfield, Peay and Player 1984; 
Konecni and Ebbesen 1982; Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989). It 
has been seen that some City magistrates advocated this 
perspective in their discussion of their sentencing aims.
It was suggested in Chapter Two that lay theories are flexible 
belief systems, influenced by the perception of specific 
situations and actors. Because sentencing was guided neither 
by a unitary prescriptive ideology, nor by unambiguous 
personal philosophies, and because there was a tension between 
their personal antipathy to prison and their working reality 
of custody, magistrates' judgements in individual cases were 
vulnerable to the influences of situational factors (Burney 
1979), as was* seen in Chapter Seven. They were also 
susceptible to moral inferences which were powerfully conveyed 
in the information presented to them. This resulted in
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inconsistent decisions in cases involving objectively similar 
offences or offenders.
Example 8.1
The defendant, aged 19, admitted two offences of ABH and a 
public order offence. He had challenged an older youth, 
rightly as it transpired, for burgling his girlfriend*s house. 
A fight broke out, in which the male victim was punched in the 
face, as was also his sister, attempting to intervene. The two 
victims retreated, but the fight broke out again later, during 
which time the defendant wielded a brick and a lump of wood, 
claiming afterwards that he believed that his male adversary 
had armed himself with a knife in the interim. The defendant 
had no previous convictions.
The magistrates reproved the defence solicitor for failure to 
acknowledge the likelihood of custody. The defence solicitor 
further suggested that the defendant thought that a community 
service order would be burdensome in the event of his getting 
a job. The SER detailed the defendant's expulsion from school 
for poor attendance and work, and recent temporary eviction 
from home after giving up his latest job. It revealed that he 
considered that the male victim deserved the attack (thus 
identifying the defendant with the high risk strategy of 
victim denial noted in Chapter Five). The defendant was not 
considered a suitable candidate for probation, and a community 
service order or fines were suggested. The community service 
officer, in a separate report, agreed that the defendant was 
suitable for an order, but suggested that he had been 
sarcastic in interview and was likely to be unco-operative.
Sentencing the defendant to 28 days detention in a young 
offender institution, the magistrate said:
"These offences are appalling...[T]he offences are so 
serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified 
and the reason for that is that you went about these 
offences in such a way that we have to make it clear to
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you and to other people that such behaviour will not be 
tolerated.”
Example 8.2
The defendant, aged 21, admitted three offences of ABH which 
had arisen on the return trip of a coach outing to a brewery. 
During a stop at a pub, the defendant was questioned by police 
about a theft, of which he was innocent. Blaming another male 
in the party for falsely incriminating him, he challenged him 
later on the coach. He was, by this time, very drunk and 
aggressive, and eventually his opponent got off the coach with 
his girlfriend. The defendant pursued them and assaulted them 
both. A third male, intervening, was struck to the ground and 
kicked in the stomach. The defendant had two previous 
convictions for dishonesty.
The defence solicitor pointed to the irresponsibility of the 
organisers of putting two separate parties of young people 
together on a trip involving considerable alcohol consumption. 
The defendant had lost control and committed "reckless", 
rather than intentional, assaults. He had, since the offences, 
been reconciled with his girlfriend and baby, was working, and 
had saved £300 towards compensation. Custody would be a 
"purely negative punishment at a time when he has tried hard 
to make amends".
The SER described a disrupted and violent family background, 
as a result of which the defendant was very insecure, found it 
hard to trust his girlfriend and had no friends. He now 
accepted a need for counselling and had approached a voluntary 
agency. Probation therefore seemed unnecessary and community 
service was recommended.
The defendant was sentenced to 28 day's imprisonment, 
suspended for a year for the attack on the male who was kicked 
on the ground. He was fined £100 for the other two assaults, 
and ordered to pay compensation to each victim totalling £200.
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The magistrate concluded:
"[I]t appears that you are making some effort to sort 
yourself out and we hope you take the advice of (the 
counselling agency) or wherever it is to get yourself on 
an even keel.”
These two cases show a striking similarity in the basic facts 
of the offences: the assaults were prompted by a grudge; they 
extended to those who attempted to intervene? they involved 
both male and female victims. In the second case, however, 
there were more victims, including one who was further 
attacked when already defenceless. It was particularly 
remarkable that these cases were dealt with, one immediately 
after the other, in the order in which they are described 
here, on the same day, by the same magistrates, involving the 
same prosecution and defence solicitors. The magistrate's 
remarks to the first defendant were contradicted by the 
decision in the case immediately following.
The second defendant may have benefitted from the magistrates' 
disapproval of the pitch of the mitigation address in the 
first case, providing a cue to an improved performance on his 
behalf by the defence solicitor. It may also be possible that, 
given the comparative rarity of individual magistrates' 
participation in custodial sentencing, these had little 
stomach for 2 in a row. Such a possibility is not altogether 
remote. It was hardly likely that these magistrates were 
entirely unaware of the implications of their decision in a 
case immediately preceding for the treatment of this one. It 
was noted in Chapter Two that lay judgments of responsibility 
are influenced by anticipation of their consequences, and by 
the motivation of the perceiver. In this case, the magistrates 
may have been influenced by the immediate motivation to avoid 
a second custodial sentence, and were therefore particularly 
susceptible to the moral inferences conveyed in the 
information presented to them to justify a non-custodial 
sentence. Whether or not this process occurred, however, in 
these cases it seems that the magistrates responded more
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strongly to the imputations of character contained in the 
mitigation addresses and SERs than to the objective facts of 
the offences.
Example 8.3
The defendant, aged 45, admitted three thefts. In one case, he 
had stolen the wallet of a man who had bought him a drink in 
a pub. The other two offences involved shoplifting of a few 
foodstuffs and a bottle of vodka. The defendants previous 
convictions dated back nearly 30 years, involving, for the 
most part, offences of shoplifting and drunkenness. He was in 
breach of a probation order imposed two months earlier.
The SER detailed a disrupted background, noting in particular 
the breakdown of a long standing relationship and the 
subsequent loss of contact with his children. The defendant's 
history since that time had been characterised by 
homelessness, alcoholism and periodic imprisonment. His 
offending was "inextricably linked with his use of alcohol". 
Requesting the revocation of the current probation order, the 
writer concluded:
"His alcohol abuse contributes to a chaotic lifestyle in 
which he is unable to follow through appointments or 
sustain often good intentions and this in the past has 
led to further frustration and disappointment in himself 
and a tendency to blame others for his problems, in 
particular helping agencies."
The defence solicitor found "nothing to gainsay the probation 
officer's comment about revoking that order":
"The offences are part of a long standing cycle. The 
current offences ought to be looked at, not as offences 
committed to fuel a drinking problem, but out of 
desperation because of social security problems. Why does 
he offend? He finds himself in a state of crisis, that 
leads him to drink and that leads to his committing 
offences. I invite you to make the inevitable prison 
sentence as short as possible so that he can get out and 
start to try to sort his problems out."
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The defendant was sentenced to a month's imprisonment 
concurrently for each of the thefts, and a further consecutive 
month as a consequence of revocation of the probation order.
Example 8.4
The defendant, aged 40, admitted the theft of a book from a 
bookshop. His previous convictions, dating back nearly 20 
years, almost entirely concerned shoplifting. He was in breach 
of a conditional discharge, a suspended sentence and a 
probation order, all imposed for similar offences.
The SER described a successful educational and academic 
career, disrupted through the defendant's drug addiction. It 
detailed the loss, after long illnesses, of both parents, and 
the breakdown of a relationship, with subsequent, and 
continuing, problems in sustaining contact with the children. 
The offence was committed after his mother's death, which had 
been followed by acrimonious family arguments. Recommending a 
community service order, the writer pointed to the defendant's 
shame and remorse, his use of supervision "to discuss his 
difficulties with frankness and insight", and "his determined 
efforts to address his difficulties and rebuild his future". 
The defence solicitor endorsed and enlarged upon these 
comments, claiming to know the defendant better than the 
probation officer. The defendant was made the subject of a 
community service order.
The histories of these defendants were essentially similar, at 
least in the details presented as significant: the disruption 
of long term relationships, with consequent unhappiness and 
unsettlement; and long offence histories attributed to chronic 
substance abuse. The difference between them lay in their 
apparent responses to these personal problems. The first 
defendant stole "items he thinks he needs and cannot afford" 
(SER); the second defendant's offending was an irrational 
expression of drunken despair. The first blamed external 
problems for his predicament; the second was ashamed and
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remorseful. The first defendant was unreliable and demanding 
on probation? the second was co-operative. These 
characterisations were conveyed to the court through the 
mitigation addresses and SERs, reinforced by the unanimous 
defeat of the defence solicitor and probation officer in the 
first case, and their equally unanimous optimism in the 
second. In particular, this optimism led to the discovery of 
an alternative to custody for a defendant who was, in fact, 
already in breach of more "alternatives to custody" than his 
imprisoned counterpart.
Sentencing research suggests that case information serves a 
vital function in facilitating a judgement of "moral quality" 
(Hogarth 1971). This implies the generation of a wholistic 
image of the offender*s culpability, rather than the 
mathematical balancing of separate items of information which 
many judges apparently believe themselves to perform 
(Ashworth, Genders, Mansfield, Peay, and Player 1984; 
Fitzmaurice and Pease 1986). Hogarth found that
"most magistrates consider the 'moral quality' of 
the criminal act to be more important than the 
actual harm incurred by the victim. Nearly two out 
of three magistrates considered information about 
planning and premeditation or culpability in other 
respects, to be essential. In contrast, only about 
one in four considered the degree of personal injury 
or violence or the damage or loss to property to be 
essential."
(Hogarth 1971, p.233)
Hogarth also argues:
"With respect to the offender, the majority of 
magistrates considered family background, criminal 
record and employment record as 'essential'. It is 
interesting that family background was picked more 
often than any other factor. It is a very broad 
category and one that is difficult to assess. 
Moreover, it is very difficult to know what to do 
with this information once it is received. Factors 
related to the family life of the offender are not 
generally good predictors of whether the offender 
will commit a further offence. Perhaps this
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information is not used for prediction, but rather 
as an assessment of the offender as a person. 
Information of this type can be used to determine 
whether the offender 'needs' treatment or it can be 
used to determine whether the offender 'deserves' 
punishment."
(Hogarth 1971, p.232)
Other research has also found that sentencers' decisions are 
influenced by a moral characterisation of the offender 
(Ashworth, Genders, Mansfield, Peay and Player 1984; Parker, 
Sumner and Jarvis 1989). Indeed, sentencers appear to take 
some pride in themselves as intuitive judges of character 
(Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989). Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 
(1989) place considerable emphasis on the role of such moral 
characterisations in their analysis of magistrates' sentencing 
decisions. They argue that magistrates, suspecting bias in the 
information of third parties, construct their moral 
characterisations of defendants by selectively re-interpreting 
the information provided by solicitors and probation officers.
These case comparisons illustrate the potential for markedly 
different responses to essentially similar information. In 
each case, a central judgement about the offender's character 
infused the perception of his offending and of the available 
or appropriate sentencing options. In the context of this 
study, however, Parker, Sumner and Jarvis' analysis appears 
insufficient. Firstly, it overlooks the point, established in 
Chapter Two, that economy through selectivity is a vital 
aspect of the otherwise impossible task of information 
processing. In this respect, magistrates are behaving no 
differently from any other human decision maker. Secondly, 
these examples reveal the dependence of City magistrates on 
the cues to the "moral flavour" of individual cases provided 
in the presentation of information by third parties. The 
outcomes in each of these cases accorded with the moral 
inferences conveyed in mitigation and SERs. It seemed that the 
magistrates, far from performing an active re-interpretation
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of information borne out of suspicion of its reliability, were 
highly susceptible to the "moral flavour" of that information. 
Again, in the time available to process and respond to a mass 
of complex information, such susceptibility might be an 
unsurprising discovery.
Qualitative judgements of objective fact are not a unique 
phenomenon in courtroom decision making. Whilst, in the 
courtroom context, such judgements are primarily moralistic in 
nature, the tendency to generate qualitative, impressionistic, 
rather than objective, factual judgements about events may be 
a general feature of information processing. As Carroll and 
Payne point out,
"[i]t is a general principle of person perception 
that behavior is not simply judged by its objective 
components. Instead, behavior is always an 
interpretation on the part of the observer, a set of 
inferences that partly ignore and partly go beyond 
whatever 'act1 has been performed."
(Carroll and Payne 1976, p.16)
In this sense, courtroom judgements of responsibility, like 
all moral attributions, are qualitative, and indeed emotional, 
interpretations of the available information. Forgas argues:
"[I]t strongly appears that in thinking about 
interaction episodes, and particularly, in comparing 
episodes with each other, we tend to think nearly 
exclusively about how we feel about an episode in 
relation to other episodes, and not about what that 
episode is really like in terms of setting, actors, 
props, goals, etc. Of course, this finding 
reinforces numerous other findings in social 
perception research where it turned out that 
affective reactions dominate impressions."
(Forgas 1981, p.171)
Summary
In Chapter Two, lay theories were seen to be mutually 
contradictory and indeterminate of responses in specific 
instances. Here, it begins to become possible to disentangle 
the contradictory assertions of magistrates in discussing
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their theories about sentencing, and to understand how the 
resultant tensions contribute to inconsistent decisions in 
objectively similar cases.
The contradictions in magistrates' theories about, and 
attitudes towards sentencing, and in particular, imprisonment, 
are not logical inconsistencies. It is not logically 
impossible personally to abhor imprisonment, while 
simultaneously doubting official sincerity in promulgating the 
non-custodial sanctions and believing that a public office 
confers an obligation on the holder to set aside personal 
feeling. The problems for City magistrates' sentencing 
practice did not derive from illogicality, but from the 
tensions between these different beliefs.
City magistrates perceived the absence of a unitary, 
prescriptive ideology directing their approach to sentencing. 
Pragmatic official exhortations to save prison spaces do not 
carry the emotive force of ideology, even when they coincide 
with the personal preferences of sentencers. Moreover, since 
personal preferences were inappropriate bases for the 
enactment of public duty, City magistrates were obliged to 
work with the reality of custodial sanctions as the most 
powerful tools in their sentencing repertoire.
Accordingly, magistrates' abstract personal sentencing 
philosophies embraced 2 substantive aims which were non­
directive as to the manner in which they should be achieved in 
specific cases: the representation of public interest and the 
prevention of offending. The tensions between magistrates' 
beliefs and attitudes concerning sentencing, and the non­
directiveness of their sentencing philosophies, rendered their 
judgements in specific cases vulnerable to the influence of 
situational factors and powerful moral characterisations 
implied in the case information. The "appropriate" sentencing 
goal emerged from the strength of emotional responses to the 
"moral flavour" of case presentations, possibly aggravated by
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the distractions of situational factors unrelated to the case 
information per se. There was little time available for 
pondering logical consistencies or disparities between cases.
PROCESS
Although this study could not attempt an exhaustive
examination of all decision making processes, certain general 
features emerged which are of relevance to a full
understanding of the role of mitigation in sentencing at City 
court. These features concern the emphasis on structured 
decision making, magistrates' pursuit of the fullest
information, the expression of opinion, and magistrates' 
sentencing rationales.
Structured decision making
The response of the justices' clerk, whose views I sought on 
City magistrates' apparently reluctant use of custody was 
forthright:
"It isn't a matter of being inclined or disinclined to 
use custody, it's a simple fact that they are currently 
being told to use it as a last resort. That's the current 
state of the law and that's what they're here to carry 
out. They have to leave their prejudices outside the door 
- whatever their prejudices are."
The vehemence with which this assertion was made was striking. 
Whatever this justices' clerk's personal "prejudice" about 
imprisonment might have been, the intention to ensure that 
magistrates followed the prescribed decision making procedures 
was clear.
If the level of awareness among magistrates of these 
procedures is an indication of success, then the clerk seemed 
to be enjoying some measure. In interview, magistrates 
frequently referred in general to the increasing training 
provided for them, and in particular to the structured 
decision making procedures they were required to follow in 
individual cases.
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"We have structured decision making here - ho-ho, I don't 
think we do really - but you are supposed to think of the 
offence first, how serious is it on 0 to 10, and having 
made that decision, are there mitigating factors that can 
be taken into account from the point of view of the 
offender. And do it in a structured way."
"We're required to think very much more than we were in 
my early days. To think constructively, to think 
logically, and perhaps sequentially, which I find good. 
One sees the sentencing process as a series of steps and 
having reached one conclusion you then progress to the 
next. This is what I mean by thinking sequentially. 
There's no room for intuitive process. It's not to say 
that you may not have a very strong feeling one way or 
another, but that reflects a personal view. And I think 
one has too be very careful that doesn't become the 
dominant thing. Sentencing process, to me, ought to be a 
gradual progression from point A to the objective."
"We've had this extra training where we must look at the 
offence. I think we've had a series of training where we 
mustn't make a quick judgement, we must always look at 
the offence first...and now there's the question of being 
asked not to take their previous record into account."
"There's guidelines for magistrates called structured 
decision making...First of all you look at the offence 
and then you look at the offender. There are certain 
questions you ask yourself. Whether the offence is 
particularly serious of its kind, whether it's one that 
is particularly prevalent in the area, or something this 
particular individual has done before, what's the 
mitigation. And then you've got to look at the offender 
and ask how many times he's done it before, what his home 
circumstances are, his income, whether he shows any 
contrition. Everything relating to the offence and 
offender...We're encouraged to think about it all."
This awareness, and endorsement, of the structured approach to 
sentencing decisions among City magistrates contrasts strongly 
with some other observations of sentencers' behaviour 
(Ashworth 1987? Burney 1985? Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989). 
Parker, Sumner and Jarvis remark:
"Rather than determining the sentencing process, the 
legal framework operates as a resource for the 
achievement of other objectives...and thus, 
conversely, on occasion as a handicap which has to 
be overcome in order for those objectives to be 
met."
(Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989, p.84)
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It would be naive to suggest that City magistrates did not 
consider the application of law in the light of their own 
preferences in individual cases. Nor is it claimed here that 
City magistrates diligently followed the procedural rules in 
all cases. Indeed, it has already been argued that 
magistrates' decisions were vulnerable to situational factors 
and to the moral flavour of case presentations. Nevertheless, 
the inference in Parker, Sumner and Jarvis' comment that 
magistrates in the pursuit of their own objectives were 
antagonistic towards the proper application of sentencing law 
does not appear to apply to City court.
The pursuit of the fullest information
It was noted in Chapter Two that decision makers' confidence 
increases with greater quantities of information, despite its 
redundancy and its possibly deleterious effects on the quality 
of the outcome. Carroll and Payne remark that
"decision makers need to feel confidence or validity 
in their decisions and tend to search for 
information that is likely to increase perceived 
validity. In terms of interrelationships among cues, 
this implies that highly redundant or correlated 
sources of information are preferred."
(Carroll and Payne 1976, p.25)
City magistrates' enthusiasm for information was most evident 
in their remarks about SERs.
"I always like to have SERs. We're very often very much 
discouraged from asking for them because it delays 
matters and people would rather get things dealt with and 
I can quite see that. But having done most of my early 
work on the juvenile bench where we used to have SERs as 
a matter of course - though that stopped - I just feel 
very hamstrung if there aren't reports and I don't know 
anything about the person and I'm just having to guess 
whether he is somebody who's really inadequate or whether 
he's somebody who is never going to appear again. It's 
very difficult sometimes to deduce that from what you 
hear."
"If possible we need to have reports so that we are able 
to deal with it in the right way and not find out 
afterwards what was the cause of the problem."
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"They're our right hand, the probation service. They do 
the ground work, we read the report. They get closer to 
the client than we do. It would be silly just to throw it 
out."
Such remarks help to explain a notable discrepancy between an 
apparent passivity in aspects of magistrates' courtroom 
behaviour and their emergence in interviews as confident, 
opinionated people. The ready acquiescence of magistrates to 
solicitors' applications for SERs at an early stage in 
hearings was striking. It was common practice for defence 
solicitors to agree the desirability of reports with the 
probation officer and to communicate their intention to the 
prosecution solicitor and clerk before a case was called. This 
frequently led, after a guilty plea was entered, to an 
announcement by the prosecution that an application for 
reports was to be made, and a disclaimer of necessity to 
enlarge on the minimal facts provided at the stage of deciding 
mode of trial. There then followed a brief application by the 
defence solicitor.
The brevity of these prosecution and defence addresses stemmed 
from the expectation, usually justified, of the ready 
compliance of magistrates who had no opportunity to form an 
independent view of the case. Indeed, challenges by 
magistrates to solicitors' opinions of the relevance of 
reports seemed to be received with surprise and even 
annoyance. This annoyance stemmed in part from impatience at 
magistrates' apparent inability to perceive the "obvious" 
relevance of reports to the case. For magistrates, however, 
relevance may well not have been obvious, because they had not 
been provided with information in a form which would expose 
that obviousness readily to them. Occasionally, the inadequacy 
of magistrates' preparation for the decision they were taking 
became unfortunately apparent.
Example 8.5
At the start of proceedings against two youths charged with 
several offences of taking cars without consent, the
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prosecuting solicitor alerted the magistrates to the expected 
application for reports, gave approval to this course and 
suggested no further information was necessary at that stage. 
The magistrates were invited to adjourn to a sentencing court 
and order SERs.
Ms "Why?”
CPS: (surprised) "I know my friends are applying for
reports, and I think that would be a sensible course. 
These are complicated matters, a number of charges and 
several thousand pounds worth of compensation is being 
claimed. These defendants had virtually clean records 
previously and these offences arose very suddenly and so 
there* s a big change there, which will need to be 
examined. So I think it would be a sensible course to 
hear the matters in a sentencing court when there is 
sufficient time to go through them and reports 
available."
The defence solicitors then intervened. They were primarily 
concerned about the compensation being claimed. One admitted 
to having had no strong intention to apply for reports, but 
felt it would be useful to avoid further delays to have them 
ready at the adjourned hearing. The other had agreed the 
suitability of the case for reports with the probation 
officer.
Ms "Yes, I don*t think we would like to sentence without 
reports in this case, so we*11 adjourn to a sentencing 
court and ask for reports. In the meantime, perhaps 
something could be agreed about compensation?"
CPS: (perplexed) "I hardly think we'll agree. The claim runs 
into thousands."
Ms "But I don't see that we're particularly involved in 
that."
CPS: (impatiently) "Well, that's why I thought it should go 
to a sentencing court because there will have to be 
decisions made about the awards of compensation and it 
will take a long time to go through it."
At this point the magistrate acquiesced.
POs "Would you also want community service assessments, 
in view of the nature of the charges?"
Ms "Well, we won't be the sentencing bench, but of course 
it would give that bench another option, so yes."
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Surprise at the query about a presumed uncontentious 
application for reports resulted in the prosecuting solicitor 
essentially making the application on behalf of the defence 
solicitors. The magistrates had not grasped the difficulties 
surrounding the compensation claim. Although community service 
was intended as an alternative to custody, the magistrates 
response to the probation officer's interjection indicated 
that no thought had yet been given to the sentencing 
possibilities.
For prosecution and defence solicitors, the practice of asking 
for reports at an early stage in proceedings was almost 
certainly prompted by the incentive to save time. It would be 
naive to suggest that magistrates did not experience a similar 
motivation, at least on occasion.
Example 8.6
The court was running very late into the early evening. The 
magistrates were presented with a report on a defendant and 
invited by the defence solicitor to read the final paragraph, 
in which recommendation was made for assessment in a probation 
hostel, confirming that a place was immediately available. The 
magistrates acted upon this recommendation, despite having 
heard neither the prosecution case, nor mitigation. Nor had 
they read the full SER, which was in fact very ambivalent in 
its assessment and recommendation.
Nevertheless, as will be seen, all magistrates in interview 
clearly spelled out their reasons for obtaining reports, 
apparently confident of the independence of these decisions, 
since not one referred to the practice of circumventing strict 
procedure. The general explanation for magistrates' 
acquiescence appears to lie in their pursuit of the fullest 
information. The advantages conferred on defendants by this 
will be illustrated in subsequent chapters. Nevertheless, it 
is also to be noted that the pursuit of the fullest 
information could result in adjournments for reports which
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were incapable of contributing significantly or constructively 
to the ultimate sentencing decision.
Example 8.7
The defendant, aged 23, admitted offences of driving a stolen 
vehicle with excess alcohol, whilst disqualified and without 
insurance. His criminal history included offences of taking a 
vehicle without authority, drunk driving, drugs possession and 
criminal damage. Reports were requested from services in an 
adjacent county, where the defendant had moved to be near his 
parents. A SER and a report from a drug counselling agency 
described abuse of cannabis, amphetamines and hallucinogens. 
At the suggestion of the writers of these reports that the 
defendant should seek treatment at a therapeutic community for 
drug dependent people, magistrates deferred sentence to review 
his progress. The defendant, however, was asked to leave the 
community after 6 weeks, for persistently breaking the rules, 
although he did abstain from drugs. He was returned to court, 
where the defence solicitor asked the magistrates to order 
SERs again, with a view to making a probation order. The clerk 
asked the magistrates to consider how much further forward 
this would take them. Initially, the magistrates declined to 
order SERs, but after hearing from a mature relation of the 
defendant that he did not cope well when he did not feel safe 
and that he needed support, possibly psychiatric, to deal with 
his problems, they changed their minds.
There was some confusion about the defendant's whereabouts, 
since he was constantly moving between City and his parents' 
locality. Eventually, a new SER was prepared by a City 
probation officer who had known the defendant over several 
years. This officer professed to be "shocked at his 
deterioration": "he behaved in a bizarre and uncommunicative 
fashion, making meaningful discussion impossible". Unable to 
determine whether this behaviour reflected drug intoxication 
or psychosis, the probation officer suggested psychiatric 
assessment. However, the officer cautioned: "a fresh Probation
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Order would serve very little purpose, since he seems unaware 
of the necessity for change, or of the commitment that such an 
Order would demand”. The magistrates requested a psychiatric 
assessment.
An outpatient psychiatric assessment was inconclusive, but 
indicated possible schizophrenia. The magistrates followed the 
suggestion to use their powers under mental health legislation 
to order inpatient assessment. The subsequent report indicated 
that the defendant had behaved normally throughout the 4 weeks 
in hospital. The defence solicitor continued to favour a 
probation order, in the face of resistance from the probation 
service on the grounds that the defendant was constantly on 
the move, making supervision impossible. The magistrates 
imposed fines totalling £500 and disqualified the defendant 
from driving for 3 years.
This case took a total of 8 months to process, with a final 
result which was hardly different from that which would have 
been dictated by a just deserts approach in the first 
instance. The magistrates repeatedly pursued information 
relating to the defendant's drug abuse and mental condition, 
although such information could not alter the issues which 
determined sentence and which were known from an early stage: 
the defendant was rootless, was not amenable to supervision in 
the community, and could not be coerced into treatment. 
Notably, among the volume of information amassed over these 
months there was no attention paid to the real nature of this 
defendant's offences, which were neither drug induced nor the 
product of a psychosis, but alcohol-related driving matters 
similar to those of previous convictions.
The expression of opinion
Individual magistrates bring a variety of background 
experiences, attitudes and common sense theories of crime and 
justice to the sentencing exercise (Lawrence and Homel 1986). 
However, since sentencing in the British lay magistrates'
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courts requires consensus between several decision makers, 
strongly divergent perspectives would seriously impair the 
necessary speed of the proceedings. Candidates for the lay 
magistracy tend to be gregarious people, widely involved in 
their community, and thereby experienced in the skills of 
negotiating group consensus, with perspectives and attitudes 
reflecting those prevailing among members of the particular 
bench to which they are elected (Bankowski, Hutton and McManus 
1987; Burney 1979? Bond and Lemon 1979; Hogarth 1971). This 
occurs despite an apparently sincere pre-occupation with 
establishing cross-representation of public opinion among the 
magistracy (Burney 1979). In the background to courtroom 
practice, therefore, there is a process of selection which 
reduces the potential range and diversity of the lay theories 
and attitudes of the key decision makers.
However, the presence of broad homogeneity should not obscure 
the important point that, among the lay magistracy, collective 
decisions are negotiated after the presentation of information 
in individual cases, allowing for divergent individual 
interpretations to occur in the first instance. The extent to 
which diversity is permitted to manifest itself in the 
retiring room seems to vary between courts (Burney 1979).
Among City magistrates there was a high regard for the 
expression of opinion in the retiring room, which was 
exemplified in the practice of seeking the view of the least 
experienced magistrate first. This practice has been found in 
other magistrates' courts (Burney 1979), but its potential 
significance has not been fully explored. In empirical terms, 
such exploration is problematic, because of the 
inaccessibility to researchers of retiring room discussions. 
Nevertheless, some hypotheses about its consequences may be 
drawn.
Magistrates remembered vividly the discomfort of their 
initiation into magisterial decision making by being asked
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directly for an opinion in the absence of any clues to the 
views of their seniors. None, however, disapproved of the 
practice, which appeared to serve two purposes. Firstly, it 
confirmed the importance attached to the expression of 
opinion.
"(The clerk) said this: 'You are appointed because you're 
opinionated people'. And therefore there's no point in 
being a magistrate and being a shrinking violet...I've 
always been encouraged to tell what I honestly think, and 
I have to accept that I can be wrong sometimes and have 
it explained to me by a senior magistrate who's got that 
much more experience."
"When I did my original training I deliberately went and 
did Part 2 (elsewhere), just in order to come across 
another group of people and attitudes. And I was appalled 
how much less enlightened (it) was. A lot of new 
magistrates there complained that new magistrates were 
meant to be seen and not heard. I found it dreadful. 
(Here) we're expected - and encouraged - to express your 
view from the start. In the retiring room we start off 
always by asking the least experienced magistrate first 
for his or her views. Some of the more irrepressible ones 
try and burst in straight away with what they think, but 
that is the way we approach things. So that people 
shouldn't be overawed by what more experienced people 
feel. '•
Secondly, it may be hypothesised that the practice provided a 
platform for the socialisation of new magistrates through 
teaching them to think about cases in the manner of their 
colleagues. Magistrates described a process by which their 
naive opinions might be modified through a series of questions 
and suggestions.
"I was a bit worried about it at first, but then when you 
realise that there are the 3 of you, and they're only 
trying to help you, as well as the 3, to get an opinion - 
a new opinion perhaps. You can be in a situation 
sometimes when the people have been on the bench so long 
that they take it automatically that that's the decision. 
They always give you the opportunity and say: 'OK, you're 
a new (person), have a go, and then we'll explain why'.
'Do you think this?' And then you come round and think 
well, yes."
This process of persuading new magistrates to attend to those 
cues to which significance was customarily attached and to
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consider them in the manner of their experienced colleagues 
might thus provide a highly effective means of transmitting 
and reinforcing the traditions of the bench.
However, a potential drawback of the encouragement of 
diversity lies in the hindrance to decision making which it 
may pose, highlighting the importance of recruitment as a 
strategy for simplifying courtroom decisions. Frequent 
divergence in the interpretations of case information by 
individuals required to reach a consensus would introduce a 
significant obstacle to a task constrained by pressure of 
time. Such differences may be particularly difficult to 
resolve, since "a perceiver who has combined all of the[se] 
elements in an idiosyncratic fashion has not so obviously made 
a mistake" (Shaver 1985, p.173). Holstein (1985), studying 
juror discussions, demonstrated the considerable impediment to 
consensus decision making posed by highly discrepant 
interpretations among the participants. Furthermore, the 
quality of decision making in these circumstances was not 
improved, and even appeared to deteriorate, with protracted 
deliberation. Certainly, it appeared that City magistrates 
could spend a great deal of time in retirement over cases for 
which, in reality, the sentencing options were limited. One 
probation officer remarked, in interview: "Sometimes Ifve got 
to say I do wonder what they go and deliberate about for (so 
long). I'd have locked them up within 5 minutes quite often!"
However, one magistrate eloquently described some of the 
concerns which could encourage this heavy investment in 
discussion:
Ms "It gives me a lot of pain, sometimes."
JR: "Why do you say pain?"
Ms "You get people in court - and I think this is the one 
thing Joe Public doesn't realise - the bench only hear 
the facts that they hear in court...You only can make a 
judgement on what is presented to you, and there*s some 
times when it's (difficult). It gives me cause for 
concern at times, great concern...The power that 3 people 
have got, the greatest power you've got these days, 
because there's no capital punishment, is to take
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somebodyfs liberty away. You can't really get any higher 
than that, can you? That's a tremendous power. And if 
you're a strong chair(person) you can influence your 2 
sides people, there's no doubt about that. So one single 
person has tremendous power. Now if he or she don't (sic) 
exercise that power correctly - and when you have to come 
to a conclusion about sentencing people to a custodial 
sentence you really do think about it...I always put 
myself through the hoop on that one."
Sentencing rationales
Sentencers' tendencies to justify their decisions as 
constructive responses to the needs of individual cases, and 
in particular those of the defendants, are remarked upon 
throughout the sentencing research (Ashworth, Genders, 
Mansfield, Peay and Player 1984; Bankowski, Hutton and McManus 
1987; Fitzmaurice and Pease 1986; Hogarth 1971; Konecni and 
Ebbesen 1982) . Hogarth, more sympathetically than most, points 
out that sentencers, required to make vital decisions rapidly 
and to announce them with conviction, "are under enormous 
psychological pressure to believe in the efficacy of the penal 
measures they apply" (1971, p.75).
It is not the intention here to add to this body of literature 
by a general examination of the sentencing rationales of City 
magistrates, but to identify one aspect in which they appeared 
to be distinctive. It has been observed in the afore-mentioned 
research that sentencers' rationales extend to the 
justification of incarceration as a constructive approach to 
meeting offenders' needs for rehabilitation. The personal 
antipathy which many City magistrates felt for imprisonment 
conflicted with their working reality of custody as the most 
important element in their sentencing repertoire. This might 
suggest that they would resolve the "dissonance" (Festinger 
1957) between their feelings and behaviour, when imposing 
custody, in the manner suggested in Chapter Four, by shifting 
their perspective to accord with their action. Hogarth found 
evidence to suggest that this process occurred among Canadian 
magistrates.
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MA magistrate who believes in reformation is caught 
in a classical dissonance situation. He has a 
concept of self as a treatment-oriented magistrate. 
...[H]e also sees offenders as needing treatment.
But he is faced with a prison system that many 
people claim to be basically harsh and punitive, and 
the constraints of the situation demand that he send 
at least some offenders to prison. He could change 
his image of offenders, seeing them as •evil* people 
deserving punishment, but he would have to change 
his concept of self to that of a punitive 
magistrate. The easiest way out of the dilemma is to 
see prisons as therapeutic institutions."
(Hogarth 1971, p.77)
City magistrates, however, seemed to have little or no access 
to such comforting rationales for incarceration. When 
discussing their theories of sentencing in general terms, 
magistrates usually portrayed imprisonment as a negative 
option. Imprisonment seemed rarely to be envisaged as 
fulfilling either of their substantive aims: it was not
generally in the public interest and it did not prevent 
offending.
"There's nothing in prison to keep them from re­
offending, except the sheer squalor of living in those 
conditions."
"We all know that sending someone inside doesn't do any 
good. All it does is to contain and take them out of 
society for so many months. That's all it does. Prison 
governors will tell you that."
"It also comes from a conviction that I hold that prison 
is very unlikely to reform anybody. Although I accept 
that in certain circumstances society demands, and I 
think I as part of society would demand that certain 
people have to be sent to prison, I would do anything 
rather than send somebody to prison if there's a hope of 
something else being more effective."
"Having been round the prisons, nobody could think they 
were doing anybody any good. They're undermanned. If you 
thought somebody was going there to learn something 
useful it would be a different matter, but if they're 
going there to learn new tricks and be exposed to the 
dangers of AIDS with needles being passed round...And 
also the workshops aren't manned."
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There were 3 cases in which a custodial sentence was followed 
by a post-sentence interview. In none of these cases did 
magistrates suggest that the experience of custody would in 
itself be helpful to the defendant. Rather, they appeared to 
appeal to some form of "damage limitation". The curious 
reasoning by which an allegedly deterrent sentence of only 21 
days was calculated (Example 7.12) has already been remarked 
upon. In the case of a defendant imprisoned for offences of 
drunk driving, disqualified driving and ABH (Example 7.13), 
the magistrates repeatedly stressed to me their (almost 
certainly unrealistic) hope that the probation service would 
help him with his problems during and after the custodial 
term. The third case concerned a defendant sentenced to 3 
months imprisonment for a total of 16 offences, including 
shoplifting, theft of drugs from a doctor's surgery and GBH. 
The most important consideration for the magistrates was "to 
try and get him off his addictions". This, however, was not to 
be achieved by imprisonment, but by the prospect of the 
defendant's admission to a therapeutic community after 
release.
"We deliberately tailored the sentence to make it as 
short as we possibly could, given the more serious ones, 
to enable him to go to the clinic. Basically the public's 
protection came first, and so the clinic came first and 
we tried to ensure that he could go there as soon as 
possible."
During post-sentence interviews concerning defendants given 
non-custodial sentences, magistrates frequently related 
reasons for rejecting the custodial option. These reasons fell 
into 3 general categories, with some cases attracting more 
than one categorisation:-
1. Custody unwarranted
In 6 cases, custody was rejected because the offence was not 
regarded as sufficiently serious, the defendant was a first 
offender, a young offender, or had helped the police and could 
pay a heavy fine.
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2. Custody pointless
In 7 cases, magistrates thought that a custodial sentence 
would have no impact on the defendant. In 2 cases, this 
observation took the form of a straightforward observation 
about custody.
"We're not going to make any progress with fines or with 
custody."
"There's no point putting him inside because he would 
just carry on back to square one."
In the remainder, custody was compared to the more influential 
non-custodial options.
"He's been in custody once before. We thought he was the 
type to find going inside once again a soft option. This 
groupwork programme is going to be far more tiresome."
"The point was made in mitigation that he had had 
everything and it did no good, and the 4B attachment at 
least made an opportunity. The one road which hadn't yet 
been taken...and we were told that the 4B has a good 
record for non-reoffending as opposed to custody."
"He rather shelved his responsibilities and had a 
breathing space in prison, it's almost a way out. Whereas 
with probation and its conditions he's got something to 
face up to."
3. Custody harmful
In 4 cases, it was thought that the imposition of a custodial
sentence would harm the defendant's prospects for reform.
"If we'd looked at any sort of prohibitive sentence like 
custody, we might have torn him apart mentally."
"He ought to have been punished more severely I suppose, 
but as a drug abuser it would have destroyed him."
"Everything said we had to activate the suspended 
sentence unless it was unjust...the SER said he had got 
on top of the problem, these were not drink-related and 
he had a job. If we did send him to prison everything he 
had been building up would be dismantled, he would lose 
everything and probably go back on the drink. We're 
taught to regard community service as an alternative to
custody - what does that mean if it's not equivalent to
prison?"
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Such arguments in specific cases accord with the personal 
antipathy to prison which magistrates expressed in general 
terms, and explains the parsimonious use of their powers of 
imprisonment noted in Chapter Seven.
Summary
These features of decision making are crucial to an 
understanding of the role of mitigation in the sentencing 
process. They suggest a general approach to sentencing in 
which rapid, intuitive judgements were discouraged, details of 
individual cases received attention and the range of 
potentially constructive responses to their needs did not 
include incarceration. It is not claimed here that each case 
was subject to rigorous examination leading to independent 
decisions? indeed, the susceptibility of magistrates to the 
influence of situational factors and to implied moral 
characterisations has been observed. Nevertheless, as general 
features of the approach to decision making, these elements 
suggest a receptiveness to the influence of mitigation, which, 
it was argued in Chapter Five, would succeed through an appeal 
to the individuality of a case. Hogarth observes:
"[P]unitiveness in attitudes and beliefs is 
associated with a fairly simple (concrete) way of 
organizing information in the process of judgement.
The thought processes of punitive magistrates appear 
to be characterized by stereotyped or 
compartmentalized thinking. Individual bits of 
information are organized in a relatively fixed way 
with little or no integration. In contrast, non- 
punitive magistrates appear to use information in a 
more complex and subtle way. Their thought processes 
are characterised by flexibility, autonomy and 
creativity. Their tolerance for conflict and 
ambiguity are higher, and their capacity for 
abstract thought or conceptualisation is enhanced.
They appear to be much more involved in the 
sentencing process and find it a more difficult and 
demanding task."
(Hogarth 1971, p.319)
In Chapter Five, it was suggested that attitude change, in the 
direction of leniency, would be achieved by increasing
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attention to the circumstances of individual offences and 
offenders. The features of decision making noted in City court 
discourage responses based on general, or stereotypical 
beliefs about, or attitudes towards, particular kinds of crime 
or criminal. The structured, discursive approach, favouring 
personalised information about defendants, permits the 
sympathetic identification with the plight of individual 
offenders. Furthermore, City magistrates would find the non­
custodial options more attractive as constructive responses to 
defendants' needs, since they had little access to such 
justifications for the use of custody.
These general features of decision making could lead to 
unnecessarily laboured decision making in some cases. 
Certainly court personnel often complained about superfluous 
requests for reports or lengthy retirements in what, to them, 
appeared straightforward cases. In other cases, however, these 
aspects of the decision making process could permit successful 
mitigation through a personalised focus upon individual 
defendants.
CONCLUSIONS
City magistrates' personal philosophies of sentencing embraced 
2 substantive aims: the representation of the public interest 
and the prevention of offending. These aims are in themselves 
non-directive as to the manner in which they should be 
achieved in specific cases. Magistrates perceived the absence 
of a unitary, prescriptive ideology directing their approach 
to adult sentencing, and were sceptical of pragmatic official 
advice to avoid unnecessary use of custody, although this 
complemented their own antipathy to imprisonment. They 
recognised in their public office a duty to work with the 
reality of custody as the most powerful sanction in their 
sentencing repertoire. The tensions between magistrates' 
beliefs and attitudes concerning sentencing, and the non­
directiveness of their sentencing philosophies, rendered their 
judgements in specific cases vulnerable to the influence of
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immediate situational factors and to moral inferences in the 
presentation of information.
Four features of the sentencing decision making process in 
City court have been identified: the structured approach; the 
pursuit of the fullest information? the encouragement of the 
expression of opinion? and the lack of constructive rationales 
for imprisonment. These general features of decision making 
could result in unnecessarily protracted deliberation in some 
cases. However, they also provide a basis for successful 
mitigation, by encouraging receptivity to personalised 
information about individual offenders.
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CHAPTER NINE 
SENTENCING DECISION MAKING:
SIMPLE SCHEMATA, OFFENDER CHARACTERISATIONS
AND
THE INTOXICATION EXCUSE
This chapter examines strategies for simplifying the 
information processing task in the courtroom. Some simplifying 
strategies which played a vital part in sentencing decision 
making in City court are identified: simple schemata and
offender characterisations. The use of information about the 
involvement of alcohol in an offence to enhance these 
simplifying strategies is demonstrated. The utility of 
offender characterisations, not only for explaining offences, 
but for formulating and justifying responses is also shown.
THE RESORT TO SIMPLIFICATION
Fitzmaurice and Pease (1986) identify four considerations in 
the judgement of responsibility: the act; the actor? the
target or victim? and the environment in which the act occurs. 
However, the potential quantity of information which these 
four elements may yield is vast. The difficulty of processing 
this mass of information is exacerbated by features of 
courtroom procedure. For example, the quality of the 
information itself may be poor (Hogarth 1971)? the formal 
sequence of its presentation disrupts efficient processing 
(Hogarth 1971? Shapland 1987)? and there is pressure of time 
(Pennington and Lloyd-Bostock 1987). In this context, decision 
makers develop "simplifying choice heuristics in an effort to 
reduce cognitive strain” (Carroll and Payne 1976, p.24; also 
Eiser and Van Der Pligt 1988? Van Duyne 1987? Lawrence and 
Homel 1986).
This is not a random process. It is guided by the requirements 
of the information processing task. Formal judgements of 
responsibility are influenced, not only by the elements of the 
situations in which the acts under judgement are committed,
300
but also by the situations in which those judgements 
themselves are made (Lloyd-Bostock 1983) . These situations 
define the purposes, consequences, and thereby the form of 
those judgements (Lloyd-Bostock 1983).
The need for decision defensibility, identified in Chapter 
Eight, requires sentencers to furnish generally understood and 
acceptable reasons for their choice of sanction in individual 
cases. Defensibility, therefore, appeals both to general 
principles and to case specific information. In these 
circumstances, sentencers' decisions appear to be guided both 
by "general frames of reference or perspectives" (Lawrence 
1984, p.321? also Asquith 1977), providing an orientation to 
the task, and by specific strategies for processing 
information in individual cases (Lawrence 1984; also Carroll 
and Payne 1977, and Hawkins 1983 on parole decisions). This 
analysis of the information processing techniques of 
sentencers is highly reminiscent of the relationship between 
general lay theories and concrete cognitive scripts or 
schemata suggested in Chapter Two.
Important aspects of City magistrates1 "general frames of 
reference" were considered in Chapter Eight. The difficulty of 
the information processing task confronting them in individual 
cases when cues to rapid interpretation were slight or absent 
may be illustrated.
Example 9.1
Two defendants, aged 17 and 18, were jointly charged with 
theft of a motorcycle.
CPS: "The loser of the motorcycle, at 7.30p.m. on 29th 
April, put it in his shed at his home, but didn't lock 
it. He noticed it missing at 10.45a.m. the next day. The 
cycle had already been spotted by an observant passer-by, 
driving along, when he saw 2 youths near a cycle, lying 
down in the grass. He stopped and saw them go back to it 
and start taking parts off it. He took the number of one 
of the cycles they were riding. Next day he again passed 
the lay-by and noticed that someone was continuing to 
strip the cycle. He contacted the police, who located the
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owner, to identify it. The owner estimated the value of 
the cycle at about £900, but the insurance company have 
paid him and there is no claim for compensation to-day. 
The defendants were traced through the number taken of 
the cycle. (The first defendant's) immediate reaction was 
"I didn't do it", and (the second defendant's) reaction 
was very much the same. They were interviewed by the 
police and ultimately there were admissions. (One 
defendant) wanted some bits for his motorcycle and (the 
other) entered into this scheme to steal a motorcycle, 
secrete it away and appropriate the bits wanted by one of 
them."
This oblique approach to describing the offence commission, 
through a discussion of the behaviour of non-offending parties 
rather than that of the defendants, was quite common in more 
serious, and complex cases. Magistrates exposed to information 
in such a manner would have to work hard to form a judgement 
of defendants' culpability.
In this context, an observation may be made about the use of 
SERs in complex cases. Not infrequently, magistrates were 
given SERs to read prior to the formal commencement of the 
sentencing court. Occasionally this also happened during a 
normal court session, when there were interruptions and delays 
in the processing of cases. The intention behind this 
practice, innocently enough, was to save time. The manner in 
which this purpose was achieved, however, might have surprised 
probation officers, or given court personnel cause for concern 
about the protection of due process, had they considered it. 
In a post-sentence interview, following the imprisonment of a 
defendant, I was told:
"The report told us about the background, but also about 
the incident. It's a good thing that reports do that more 
these days. We had the reports before the court and this 
saved everyone a lot of time. It makes for more 
efficiency with such complicated information. We didn't 
have to rely on a recital of facts and it wasn't slanted 
in any way. It was a straightforward account of what 
happened."
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In the absence of clear guidance from solicitors or probation 
officers, magistrates had to find their own explanations for 
criminal conduct.
Example 9.2
The defendant, aged 28, admitted causing an affray. The 
prosecution solicitor told the magistrates that the incident 
escalated out of "a rather ludicrous row", over the allegation 
that a coin had been stolen from the defendant's son by a 
neighbour's child. This defendant had some prior convictions, 
which did not include serious violence, and of which the most 
recent had occurred 8 years previously. While recounting in 
detail somewhat conflicting versions of the offence, neither 
the prosecution nor the defence solicitor offered a persuasive 
explanation as to why the defendant had armed himself with an 
axe for the conduct of this neighbourly dispute, and had lost 
his temper in an unnerving manner out of all proportion to his 
grievance.
The defendant was black, wore his hair in dreadlocks, and, 
being legally represented, did not speak during the 
proceedings. It appeared that the magistrate had found an 
explanation for his disproportionate aggression, when imposing 
a fine of £100 with the unwarranted advice: "There is no need 
in this country to go round armed with an axe and deal with 
situations in this way".
SIMPLE SCHEMATA
In Chapter Two, concrete "cognitive schemata" in lay 
theorising were identified as means of information processing 
and decision making about new situations in terms of everyday 
events. Decision making research suggests that "schemata" 
(Holstein 1985; Mandler 1984), are established early, as 
information emerges, providing "initial characterisation" 
(Fiske and Neuberg 1989), or "preliminary" (Scheff 1966) or 
"working hypotheses" (Lloyd-Bostock 1988), to guide the
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selection and organisation of subsequent data (similarly 
Carroll and Payne 1976? Hawkins 1983).
In City court, in cases which were relatively non-serious and 
unproblematic for sentencing, the prosecution solicitor 
sometimes opened with the reassurance that "[t]his is a 
straightforward case", or "[t]he defendant has no previous 
convictions". Alternatively, magistrates could be offered cues 
to suitable schemata by the prosecution solicitor's opening 
remarks. These cues suggested obvious explanations of the 
offence under consideration which simplified the information 
processing task for magistrates. No other item of information 
could rival the success of intoxication in the provision of 
simple schemata. Indeed, in a search of 50 sober cases, only 
2 simple schemata could be identified. In a case involving 4 
shamefaced youths who had climbed up flagpoles to appropriate 
the flags while out for a drive, the prosecution solicitor 
announced: "This appears to be a jaunt". This diagnosis was 
confirmed by the defence solicitor's reference to "a jolly 
night out". Of criminal damage to a car perpetrated by a 43 
year old first offender, the prosecution solicitor remarked 
that it was "a revenge attack" aimed at his ex-wife's new 
boyfriend.
These simple schemata are derived from information specific to 
the offences and offenders. Although readily understood as 
explanations for these particular offences, they are not 
applicable to a generality of cases. Intoxication, however, is 
widely available as a simple, intuitively obvious explanation 
for offending because of the range of behaviours and moods 
with which it is associated in lay theory. Moreover, this 
information rapidly conjures a vivid picture, conveying the 
moral flavour of the case in question. These illustrations of 
opening remarks by prosecution solicitors quite literally 
"speak for themselves":
"At about midnight, the defendants were going in a group
to a party, already having been drinking. They were high-
304
spirited, and they decided to run across the roofs of 
cars for some reason."
"This arose from an argument between the landlord at the 
(pub) and the defendant, who didn't want to give up his 
drink at closing time."
"The defendant was walking past the window of (a 
department store) at 5 to 1a.m., with friends. They had 
been drinking and the defendant described himself as 
"merry". For some reason he picked up a bin and threw it 
through the window."
"This case can be dealt with very simply by using the 
defendant's own words: 'I was in a pub and bought them. 
They were nicked'."
"At mid-day the defendant was found asleep beside an 
empty beer can by a police constable."
"The defendant is charged with theft of handbags. He was 
seen by a shop manager in the shopping centre, who saw a 
drunk sitting there. He opened his coat to a female 
drunk, showing her 4 handbags."
Occasionally the prosecution solicitor would open with oblique 
references to intoxication, which were nonetheless intuitively 
obvious to the listener. A brief indication of the moral 
flavour of the offence would suffice to prepare for the 
emergent picture of intoxicated disinhibition.
"At 9p.m., in the city centre, a police officer saw the 
defendant lying propped against a pillar. He heard him 
say to 2 young ladies: 'What are you fucking looking
at?'"
"It seems appropriate to start with the comments of (one 
defendant), who said to the police after the event: 'I
was walking down (the) street with my mum and there were 
insults shouted at us and things got out of hand' . It 
11.30p.m. on a Friday night. Things got so out of hand 
that 8 police officers and a dog handler were called to 
the scene."
"To begin by an explanation, really an apology, that I am 
going to have to use certain abusive language, which is 
really what brought this to court. At a quarter to one in 
the morning..."
In cases such as these, the defence solicitor often confirmed 
the simple schema suggested by the prosecution.
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"This was 2 young men, the worse for drink, swearing 
themselves into arrest. They were warned and they 
continued, because of the drink."
An opening announcement by the defence solicitor of the fact 
of intoxication could immediately impose a vivid schema upon 
information blandly recited in the prosecution address, even 
for such relatively serious offences as burglary.
"My client describes this offence as 'plain stupidity1, 
and his 2 co-defendants agree wholeheartedly with that 
view. All had been out that night drinking - and drinking 
heavily."
The utility of statements about intoxication for constructing 
simple schemata becomes even more evident when compared with 
mental disorder as an explanation for offences. References to 
defendants' psychiatric problems were severely constrained by 
the delicacy of the subject, which demanded a tact and 
diplomacy quite unnecessary in the treatment of intoxicated 
offenders.
Example 9.3
The defendant, aged 22, admitted 2 thefts from a bookshop and 
asked for a similar offence to be taken into consideration. He 
had no previous convictions.
CPS. "This is not quite the typical theft of books...What 
happened was that he went into (the shop) with some books 
and swopped them for books on the shelves. In interview 
he explained he had come to (City) to go to the library 
and also to exchange some books he had with him for books 
of a similar value in (the bookshop). He was effectively 
using (the shop) as a library. He also admitted to a 
theft from another bookshop that day and 2 books from 
(the same shop) previously, which is the offence to be 
taken into consideration."
The prosecuting solicitor's opening remark alerted magistrates 
to unusual features of a common offence without providing an 
explanation. The defence solicitor explained that the 
defendant, finding that he had earlier bought study books 
which he did not need, "could not bring himself to go into the 
shop and approach an assistant and actually barter for the
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exchange". Letters from the defendant's doctor and 
psychiatrist, however, revealed a chronic physical complaint 
which had provoked severe depression, now being treated 
through psychotherapy. The defendant was conditionally 
discharged with an expression of magisterial sympathy.
References to a defendant's mental disorder, notwithstanding 
the potential vastly to simplify a case, could be politely 
oblique to the point of virtual obscurity.
Example 9.4
The defendant, aged 38, was charged with 3 shoplifting 
offences, with 3 more to be taken into consideration. Guilty 
pleas were taken with some difficulty, with many interruptions 
by the defendant, who eventually threw up his hands and cried: 
"Oh! I've just had so much!". He bowed to the bench: "I'm
sorry, it's your court, there'll be no more". He then sat 
quietly through most of the hearing.
CPS: "The defendant is a noticeable man. He was seen in 
(a chemist's shop), and next day he was approached by a 
police officer, who said he believed he had taken some 
pills. The defendant gave him some pills, saying: 'I took 
them for experimenting on myself'. He also said: 'I've
taken some books too'. The books were found at his house
_ ii
D: (interrupting) "I showed them where they were."
CPS: (resumingpatiently) "I think you all know this defendant 
has a habit of stealing books, and has had that habit for 
years..."
The defence solicitor similarly appealed to magistrates' long 
familiarity with the defendant.
"His problems are well known to the bench. Because of his 
problems he is a persistent offender, but they are more 
nuisance offences, at the lower end of the scale. He did 
co-operate with the police. You know his problems. He has 
his ups and downs..."
The magistrates decided upon financial penalties while the 
defendant held up his hands in a prayer-like attitude.
307
This defendant liked the more outrageous fashions. He was 
missing an eye as a result of self-mutilation during an 
extreme psychosis some years earlier. His recurrent mania was 
exacerbated by chronic substance abuse. His interest in the 
occult informed his choice of misappropriated literature. Yet, 
had these magistrates been unfamiliar with the defendant, 
these veiled references to his "noticeability" and "ups and 
downs" might have been unintelligible. They glanced frequently 
in his direction as they listened, as if to confirm the 
implications of some of the solicitors' remarks. To-day 
however, the defendant was soberly dressed in a grey jersey 
and jeans. His dark glasses, though inappropriate to the 
occasion, concealed his disfigurement. His demeanour during 
most of the hearing was submissive. Only his early 
interruptions, his prayer-like posture as sentence was 
considered and later protestations about the size of his 
unpaid fines provided clues to his capacity for bizarre 
behaviour. These actions, however, were ambiguous: they could 
have been taken for mockery of the court.
The unrivalled power of intoxication schemata, by contrast, 
derived from free and explicit use, unrestricted by the rules 
of decency and social restraint which constrained references 
to tragic facts about defendants' mental disorder.
OFFENDER CHARACTERISATIONS
"Processes of characterisation are central to human 
judgements about the world, and are at the heart of 
decisions made in the criminal process from the 
policeman on the street onwards. Characterisation is 
a means of endowing individuals with attributes to 
make sense of them and to place them; it creates and 
organises expectations since it embodies a 
description and a prediction."
(Hawkins 1983, p.119)
Tajfel and Forgas explain that individuals "tend to judge 
other individuals in terms of their pre-existing category 
system of the 'types' of people known to them" (1981, p.126).
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Lloyd-Bostock (1988), however, describes sentencing as a 
"skill-based" decision, involving learning to classify novel 
information as belonging to a certain type of phenomenon, 
meriting particular responses. This analysis suggests a 
similarity between sentencing and professional decision 
making, as described in Chapter Two. Perhaps, then, sentencers 
develop an implicit typology of cases through their 
combination of lay wisdom and direct courtroom experience.
Thus, sentencers may utilise lay conceptualisations of 
deviance in ways which simplify the processing of cases. While 
these lay conceptualisations will involve common sense notions 
with wide familiarity, different courts may rely more heavily 
on different lay theories. For example, Parker, Casburn and 
Turnbull (1981) found that magistrates in a punitive juvenile 
court appealed frequently to the concept of "criminal 
families" in their explanations of juvenile delinquency. Such 
a theory of deviance is widely understood in everyday life, 
and, indeed, has received a measure of academic attention. It 
is unlikely that City magistrates were unaware of this common 
sense theory, but it was not one upon which they appeared to 
be reliant in their case characterisations.
Similarly, the basic offender characterisations which enabled 
City court to process complex cases appeal to recognisable 
common sense notions of deviance. Four characterisations which 
had particular relevance to the use of information about 
intoxication or alcoholism could be identified: those
concerning young adult offenders aged 17 to 20; those 
concerning young men aged between 21 and 25? the category of 
"tragic" offenders; and the category of "sick" offenders.
Young adult offenders: the vulnerable and the undisciplined
The widespread ambivalence in conceptualisations of, and 
attitudes towards, youthful crime is reflected in criminal 
justice policy itself (Rumgay 1990). For example, the co­
existence of rehabilitative borstal training and punitive
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detention centre regimes characterised British responses to 
young offenders for more than 30 years. While there may be 
general agreement that young offenders "may be at a turning 
point which decides whether they will become recidivists or 
responsible citizens" (Home Office 1980), opinion fluctuates 
as to the means to achieving the latter outcome.
At the heart of this dilemma lies the question whether 
youthful crime is a symptom of maturational vulnerability or 
of indiscipline. In City court, however, both of these 
explanations were true. There was no need for a choice in the 
theoretical abstract between the competing explanations for 
youthful crime. The choice between them was made at the level 
of assessments of individual offenders.
Example 9.5
The defendant, aged 18, admitted offences of burglary, taking 
a vehicle without consent, theft of petrol, and allowing 
himself to be carried in a stolen vehicle. He had been hitch­
hiking from Scotland to London with a friend. They were 
offered a lift by 2 youths who, it transpired, were juvenile 
runaways driving a stolen car. This gradually dawned upon the 
defendant, as the prosecution solicitor observed, "yet his 
wish to get to London over-rode his scruples". Indeed, after 
a while, " [i]t seems his wish to get to London had rather 
faded", as he became involved in further offences. He had one 
previous conviction for assault.
The defence solicitor produced the conviction records of the 
juveniles, "as it is part of my mitigation that one of them is 
a sophisticated car thief". The offences were portrayed as the 
response of a naive youth to the persuasions of a unique set 
of circumstances.
"The defendant was unsophisticated, in a situation where 
they couldn't get lifts, and were picked up by 2 
sophisticated car thieves, albeit young ones. He has 
hitch-hiked regularly, but only in these circumstances 
was he encouraged on this path."
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The defendant was "a sensitive, articulate young man, with a 
bad start". His potential strength of character was suggested 
by his conscientious compliance with the court proceedings.
"He has had to appear in court on 4 or 5 occasions and, 
coming from Edinburgh, has always been here punctually. 
That says a lot about him when you know some young people 
in (City) find difficulty in getting to court on time."
The SER substantiated this characterisation of a youth without 
criminal intentions falling prey to the vicissitudes of an 
unstable life-style. The defendant's adolescence had been 
disrupted by the death of his mother, rejection by his step­
father, and educational failure. Poor accommodation and 
employment opportunities encouraged repeated, but always 
unsuccessful, forays to England to try to improve his 
prospects. In this context, his acquaintance with his co­
defendants "was the result of ill-luck and even worse 
judgement".
"His unsettled, rootless background has obviously 
developed considerable self-reliance, but he is aware of 
a need for adult advice and guidance to help him settle 
into a more responsible life-style. Despite his chequered 
career, he is clearly not an habitual offender and is 
extremely anxious to make a new start."
Example 9.6
The defendant, aged 18, admitted wounding, theft and failure 
to surrender to his bail. He had 3 previous convictions for 
dishonesty. The assault was the result of a grievance against 
the male victim, who had stolen and damaged his bicycle. 
Encountering the victim by chance, the defendant demanded 
money in compensation and punched him, breaking his nose. The 
thefts involved the persuasion of a female shop assistant by 
the defendant and another male to pass them some clothing.
The defence solicitor argued that the suggestion to the shop 
assistant had initially been intended as a joke: "They were in 
fact quite taken aback when she complied". For the assault, 
however, it was acknowledged that little mitigation was
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possible, although "[i]t was a culmination of the frustration 
he felt as to how he had been robbed”. The breach of bail had 
arisen because the defendant had been ordered to appear on 
different, but consecutive days for the different offences. He 
missed the first appearance while looking for employment, 
volunteered this information to the court next day and was 
told a warrant had been issued for his arrest. The defence 
solicitor countered a complaint in the SER that the defendant 
had missed an appointment with the probation officer with the 
claim that he had informed the probation service of a prior 
arrangement to play football in Holland.
The writer of the SER recounted that the defendant had been
expelled from school, and cautioned by police, for striking
another pupil. This appeared to be the basis for the
subsequent observation that "he has a history of violent acts 
when he perceives he has been wronged”. The defendant had left 
various jobs through stealing, boredom and disputes with
supervisors. The probation officer remarked:
"(The defendant) presents as a casual young man. This is 
reflected in his failure to surrender to bail and perhaps 
in his first missed appointment with me. His attitude is 
further reflected by his opening a bank account... after 
leaving school and issued (sic) cheques which could not be 
honoured...[T]he bank recovered the money from his 
mother...It is perhaps this attitude which led (him) to 
act in such an ill considered way on these occasions, 
with little thought for the consequences."
Compensation to the victim of the assault was recommended, 
because, since the defendant considered "he had some 
justification in his actions such an award would have a 
salutary effect". In addition, a probation order, with a 
condition of attendance at a groupwork programme, would 
"address the issues central to (his) offending". The 
magistrates followed the recommendation on the grounds, 
explained in a post-sentence interview, that this would be "a 
greater punishment" for "this horrible young man" than 
custody.
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Both of these defendants were placed on probation. This may 
owe much, in the latter case, to City magistrates' preference 
for the non-custodial options and to a mitigation address 
which succeeded in moderating some of the moral inferences in 
the SER without undermining the credibility of the 
recommendation.
These 2 cases illustrate the kinds of information upon which 
the assessment of young adult offenders was based. Notably, 
the ambivalence between views of this group as either 
vulnerable or undisciplined is reflected in the ambiguity of 
the information deemed pertinent to the assessment. The 
characterisation of young adults as vulnerable or 
undisciplined relied upon essentially similar information in 
each case. The information itself appealed to 3 common sense 
beliefs about the causes and nature of youthful crime:-
1. Impulsivity
The notion of the impulsivity of youth, to which, as was seen 
in Chapter Three, academics and offenders may subscribe, is 
most strongly invoked in Example 9.6, in which the defendant 
acted upon feelings of grievance evoked by a chance encounter. 
Mitigation addresses frequently appealed to this theme.
"This seems to have been a flash of temper, the over­
reaction of an immature young man."
"We are under a duty to co-operate with the police, 
however unreasonable their behaviour may be. But you can 
understand that you are a young man, perhaps not as 
imbued with law-abiding instincts as others, you are 
stopped in what you think is an unreasonable manner and 
you react."
SERs also invoked this notion.
"(Probation) will aim to promote the defendant into 
thinking more carefully about his behaviour and to try 
and act in a more responsible and mature fashion."
One magistrate graphically described the impulsivity of youth 
in a post-sentence interview:
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"None of this was done with any criminal intent. He acted 
out of impulse, not planning to bash her face or drive 
the car at her."
2. Contamination
The notion that young people are susceptible to the evil 
influences of others is heavily invoked in Example 9.5. 
Defence solicitors used this theme as a means of imputing 
blame to others without the connotations of evasion of 
personal responsibility by the offender himself which such a 
strategy could have.
"The defendant has no previous convictions...[C]ertain 
items...were deposited in his room by others and he was 
told not to touch them."
"During the early part of this year, my client appeared 
to get into a bad lot. He was in a group of youths who 
were in trouble, and may still be. He has since left that 
group..."
SERs, as in Example 9.5, could contextualise offending within 
a problematic period in the defendant's life which rendered 
him especially susceptible to the promptings of others.
"(The defendant) had argued with his girlfriend, and 
feels he was in such a state of mind that he was easily 
led astray."
"Since coming to (City) he has not been particularly 
selective about the company he has kept and recognises 
that he needs to choose his friends more carefully."
Magistrates, in post-sentence interviews, expressed their 
views on contamination in the following ways:
"He seemed to be easily led, but on the other hand he 
must have known something about crime because he had a 
cousin who had all those other offences...He1s from a 
culture where taking cars is a way of life. To him it 
probably isn't a terrible thing to do at all."
"Our thoughts were directed at whether he was involved in 
the drugs scene, because people of that age wouldn't need 
to arm themselves (with a carving knife)."
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3. Turbulence
The investigation of heavy drinking and offending in young 
adulthood, noted in Chapter Three, are aspects of a wider 
academic interest in adolescent turbulence. This was an 
extraordinarily useful concept in the explanation of youthful 
crime.
Firstly, young adults were still sufficiently close to their 
childhood for the effects of early trauma to be perceived in 
their present plight. Example 9.5 illustrates this approach. 
One magistrate, in a post-sentence interview, expressed the 
theory in the following remarks:
"He'd had a most unfortunate early life...I think 
immaturity is an important word here...His age and lack 
of guidance. He's lacked that most of his life. Very 
immature, due in part to a very disrupted life from the 
age of 2."
Secondly, a turbulent phase in a defendant's personal 
circumstances could explain his susceptibility to criminal 
temptation or contamination. This was a common theme in 
mitigation addresses.
"The offences were committed at a time when he had had to 
leave his parents and was living rough."
"[H]e was short of money. Perhaps, at a deeper level, the 
offences were committed at a phase when he was leading an 
unsettled life. Particularly, he was in difficulties with 
his family and particularly his step-father, which 
persuaded him to leave home and adopt this unsettled way 
of life in (City)."
In an SER, a probation officer identified turbulence in a 
manner which reflected well on the defendant's sense of 
personal responsibility:
"He offered no excuses nor (sic) reason for his behaviour, 
and only when I pushed the point did he say that all the 
offences had occurred after he had been asked to leave 
his mother's home."
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These concepts of impulsivity, contamination and turbulence, 
often in combination, richly informed the characterisation of 
young adult offenders. It was noted in Chapter Eight that 
objectively similar information could evoke different 
responses and moral judgements in individual cases. In respect 
of young adult offenders, the moral ambiguity of even well- 
developed and complex theories of criminality was striking.
The age-related patterns of heavy drinking and offending, 
considered in Chapter Three, might encourage expectation of 
very frequent invocation of the intoxication excuse in this 
age group. However, about half of the young adult defendants 
in the study were classified as "sober" offenders: there was 
no reference to alcohol in the proceedings. This even balance 
could reflect the complex and well-developed theories of 
youthful criminality on which characterisations were founded, 
reducing potential reliance on explanatory information about 
defendants' use of alcohol. Certainly, it seemed that in many 
of the alcohol-related cases, this information was less 
important than social information pertinent to the 
identification of impulsivity, contamination and turbulence. 
Direct reference to intoxication thus often took the form of 
a minimal statement which, by implication, illuminated the 
claim that an offence was impulsive, a response to peer 
influence, or part of a turbulent phase. Thus, SERs contained 
information such as the following:
"[F]ollowing an argument with his father he left home and 
whilst in a distraught state committed an offence of 
criminal damage. I understand that (he) had consumed a 
considerable amount of alcohol."
"[H]e advised me that he met his co-accused through a 
friend of a friend. He suggested that they had been 
drinking and simply went around car parks in (City), 
breaking into cars and stealing the contents...There are 
two particular areas of concern - being offending 
behaviour and family and relationships, that (he) could 
well do with looking at in some depth. I am also 
concerned for one so young to be rootless and without any 
guidance."
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Information about defendants* alcohol use could on occasion 
contribute heavily to characterisation. However, the 
contradictory lay beliefs about motivations for drinking and 
alcohol's effects, examined in Chapter Four could exacerbate 
the ambiguities inherent in the characterisations themselves.
Example 9.7
The defendant, aged 19, was sentenced for offences of theft, 
handling, breach of the peace and 2 offences of criminal 
damage. He had served a custodial sentence for his first, 
sexual, offence, and had been twice subsequently convicted for 
less serious offences.
The SER noted the onset of heavy drinking following the 
defendant's release from custody, when "he was shunned by the 
local community and all of his friends bar one". Later, a long 
relationship with a girlfriend broke down, after which "his 
alcohol consumption rose again and he committed the offences 
currently before the court". Against this background, the SER 
detailed the offences.
One offence of criminal damage was committed while the 
defendant was "light headed" after drinking, and was "rather 
bored and still angry about his recent breakup with his 
girlfriend". The defendant fell asleep in his car beside the 
wall on which he had spray painted graffiti: "He did not own 
up to the offence as he thought that he could get away with 
it." The second criminal damage offence involved throwing a 
beer mug through a car windscreen. This followed a drinking 
session with other youths during which "conversation 
deteriorated and eventually verbal abuse was exchanged", 
culminating in the driving of a car into the defendant's path 
by another of the group. The public order offence also 
followed a drinking session, when the defendant slapped his 
drunken sister "to bring her to her senses", and punched a man 
who remonstrated. Dishonesty offences involved stage passes 
and a crate of beer stolen at a music festival.
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These detailed accounts of drunken loutishness overwhelmed the 
original suggestion that drinking reflected unhappiness and 
rejection. The writer concluded that the defendant was easily 
influenced by peers and "lacked the self control and the sound 
judgement to deal with situations more appropriately 
especially having consumed a lot of alcohol". Despite the 
lengthy attention to the detail of the offences, including the 
number of pints consumed on each occasion, the writer thought 
the defendant had not been "entirely honest" with him. 
Accordingly, it was argued that "he would neither respond to 
the exacting supervised structure of a Probation Order, nor 
would he positively address his previous offending behaviour 
individually or in a group setting".
This conclusion as to the defendant's unreliability was 
curiously at odds with the information that he had held stable 
employment for 2 years, had nearly paid off a £400 fine, had 
become almost teetotal in deference to a new girlfriend, and 
"expressed feelings of guilt and embarrassment about his 
offending". He was fined £750, and told: "You really are in 
deep trouble".
Skilful use of information about a young defendant's drinking 
could enhance a clear characterisation.
Example 9.8
The defendant, aged 20, was jointly charged with an older man 
with telephoning police with a hoax warning of a bomb at a 
local factory. His only previous conviction, for burglary, had 
occurred 4 years earlier.
The writer of the SER reported that the defendant was "at a 
complete loss" to explain the offence, the more so since he 
had spoiled a chance of employment at the factory. Having been 
drinking beforehand, the defendant had little recall of the 
offence. This observation led to an examination of his 
drinking habits, which raised "the possibility that he may
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already be doing himself some permanent health damage". The 
probation officer then contextualised this drinking pattern in 
the lifestyle of "a young man who has somewhat lost his way in 
the world", who "appears rather aimless and depressed" and who 
"regards the regular and excessive consumption of alcohol as 
a means of identifying with his friends". Recommending a 
probation order to give the defendant "a much needed 'push' in 
the right direction", the probation officer explained:
"(The defendant), like many of his contemporaries, has 
come to view the time spent in a public house as being 
the only interesting or enjoyable part of his day. 
Motivation towards finding employment or stretching 
himself in any more constructive way would appear 
lacking. In such circumstances a loss of self-respect and 
a deterministic view of one's fate becomes something of 
an inevitability."
21-25 year olds: the independent and the needy
There was no ambiguity in the deep personal problems or 
serious offending histories, sometimes in combination, of this 
older group of young men. It was quite common for defence 
solicitors representing such young men to juxtapose their age 
and criminal record. This technique stressed their alarming 
predicament and the urgent necessity for action to halt the 
slide into chronic recidivism.
"The defendant is 22 and now on his third page of 
previous convictions...There is a frightening pattern of 
offending now emerging."
"He is aged 24, with an appalling record. ..Sentences 
passed have spanned the whole range of options including 
a 13 month custodial sentence."
"The defendant is just 21 and has chalked up a number of 
convictions, some quite serious for his age."
Age was also connected with the intensity of personal problems 
to heighten the sense of urgency.
"My client has an appalling record...All of the offences 
arose when he was not only heavily drunk. He was very 
drunk indeed. He was associating with the alcoholics in 
(the city centre). I repeat: he is 21."
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” [H]e is 23. There you have the real problems and the 
stark reality of his age...The relationship (with his 
girlfriend) will go if he is imprisoned, there is no 
doubt about that and that raises the possibility of him 
being itinerant at about 24 years of age."
Against such a background, the court could be urged to seize 
a last opportunity to avert irretrievable deterioration.
"[Y]ou might look at the past failure. But all I can say 
is that it is a positive sentence, not a negative one. 
This would obviously be the last chance to him of the 
devotion of such funds to treatment."
"I ask you to say you will give him a chance and defer 
sentence...This would enable him to continue, as he is 
now desperately trying to do, to take the right steps."
"The 4B option is perhaps the only choice open to you. 
Custody, or probation with a 4B order. That may at least 
give him some real direction to pursue for the rest of 
his life."
In this context, "the turning point" was often a key concept 
in the argument.
"But he does realise, perhaps for the first time, that it 
is up to him to change. And he has been making an effort 
with help from others to take the first steps along the 
road."
"The ingredients of stability - a home, a relationship - 
which were previously lacking, are now present. I invite 
you to defer sentence to see if what he promises is true. 
By sending him to prison you may be destroying the only 
chance he has for the future, because, for once, it's all 
there waiting for him."
Within these general parameters for mitigation, complex cases 
in this age range were understood in terms of 2 broad 
categories: the independent and the needy. Because of the
preponderance of alcohol-related cases any attempt to 
distinguish these characterisations in terms of sober 
offenders would be misleading.
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Example 9.9
The defendant, aged 22, admitted burglary, 3 shoplifting 
offences and breach of bail. He had 3 previous convictions, 
the last being 3 years earlier.
The burglary involved smashing the window of a leather goods 
shop to take a jacket. On arrest, the defendant disclosed 
earlier thefts of clothes. It was explained that he was a 
Glaswegian, who had come to City to live with relations, 
attracted by the prospect of work. Whilst he was unemployed, 
his girlfriend became pregnant and he committed the offences 
to raise money to support her. After his arrest, his 
girlfriend returned to her parents in a distant city, and he 
went back to Glasgow to help with a crisis in his own family. 
Thus pre-occupied, he lost track of the court proceedings.
The SER outlined a history of parental alcoholism, cruelty, 
and institutional care. His recent offending, in a state of 
panic, "was not rational behaviour, but the product of an 
unstable young man the worse for drink". The probation officer 
offered the following assessment:
"The present offences seem to represent an isolated 
episode of madness in a young man whose unstable history 
suggests he could have turned out much worse. (The 
defendant) impresses as a likeable and otherwise 
intelligent individual of considerable energy. He talks 
so much and so fast that it is at times hard to keep 
track of him. He seemed very determined, and I had the 
impression that if he set his mind to something, he would 
either succeed one thousand per cent or fail utterly."
With this in mind, the probation officer recommended financial 
penalties, observing:
"Whilst I could see some benefit in the Probation Service 
monitoring and encouraging his progress, I would not 
consider him an ideal candidate for Probation as he 
stated his determination not to reoffend and I consider 
he may well manage this.."
The defendant was ordered to pay compensation totalling £775, 
and placed on community service, although the probation
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officer had questioned the realism of such an order given his 
geographically scattered commitments.
The probation officer's remarks in this case illustrate the 
point at issue. Independence, in these judgements, did not 
necessarily entail either the absence of personal problems or 
the ability to solve them in a laudable manner. Rather, it 
concerned a defendant's will to deal with his problems in his 
own way, for better or worse. Thus, SERs contained the 
following assessments:
'' (The defendant) is an independent young man who has 
encountered some problems in his use of alcohol and its 
effects. He appears to have recognised this and states 
that he has consciously reduced his drinking 
considerably. (He) does not, however, wish for specific 
help with this. Whilst (his) circumstances have clearly 
been chaotic in the past he has recently made efforts to 
find secure employment and independent accommodation 
reflecting a more responsible attitude to his situation 
than the Court maybe (sic) aware of, given his failure to 
appear in Court."
"(The defendant) is a young man who appears to have the 
potential and the ability to make something of his life 
rather than to continue committing offences. In the past 
he has been unable to capitalise on his assets and the 
serious current offences appear to arise from him taking 
a fairly easy option in obtaining money without regard to 
the consequences."
This capacity for self-determination could evoke some 
annoyance with offenders who chose the less respectable routes 
through life. One magistrate in a post-sentence interview 
remarked: "He's an irritating young man, with qualifications 
but going nowhere".
Example 9.10
The defendant, aged 25, was charged with assaulting a police 
officer, criminal damage and a public order offence, all 
arising from a single incident when police intervened in a 
domestic dispute. The defendant, "unsteady on his feet and 
smelling of drink", kneed an officer in the groin and tore
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another*s jacket. He had 14 previous convictions, mostly for 
burglary, but including arson and assault.
Exploiting the scope professional influence noted in Chapter 
Seven, the defendant*s probation officer attended court, 
explaining: "I realise this report is lengthy, but, having 
known the defendant for 7 years, I have tried to point out the 
circumstances behind his offending and the influence of the 
various sentences he has had passed on him". The detailed 
account of a miserable life was summarised in the SER in the 
following way:
" (The defendant) is a reasonable young man who 
desperately wishes to avoid further trouble. He grew up 
in a home where excessive drinking occurred and there was 
little opportunity to develop secure relationships, hence 
his inability to do now. He had no particular skills at 
school either academic or sporting which would have 
provided some self-esteem and he has developed into an 
anxious man. When his anxiety levels became high he 
turned to drink and drugs as the quickest way of 
alleviating these anxieties. Unfortunately it served 
merely to compound his difficulties...(He) has served 
four lengthy periods of imprisonment and it holds neither 
fear nor confrontation for him as the regular routine of 
prison life shelters him from anxieties. Indeed it has 
only been in institutions that he has been able to 
sustain any growth."
The magistrates dispensed with the defence solicitor*s 
services by signalling their intention to follow the 
recommendation for a probation order including requirements 
that the defendant attend a groupwork programme and "undertake 
whatever treatment the probation service should direct for 
(his) alcohol problem".
Despite the persistence, and often unpleasantness, of these 
defendants* offending, their plight was frequently illustrated 
by the intractability of their problems and a pathetic 
reliance on other individuals or institutions. SERs contained 
observations to this effect:
"(The defendant) is a man of considerable, but not 
necessarily disabling, intellectual and social
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limitations. He has been well, possibly too well, 
supported in the past by his mother, and probably lacks 
the capacity to exercise much self-discipline. His life 
lacks structure, and has become increasingly focused on 
the consumption of alcoholic drink, probably limited only 
by his lack of means. Drinking is the root of his 
offending.11
11 In such cases results cannot hope to be achieved 
instantaneously but will require instead sustained 
intervention over time. The major task until now has been 
to attempt to minimise the seriousness of the defendants 
offending? thus avoiding the damaging effects of custody; 
whilst awaiting the level of his emotional maturity to 
catch up with his chronological age.1
"[D]uring his first period on remand...he looked visibly 
ill through worry about the experience. Now he seems 
relaxed and confident in the cells which have regrettably 
become like a second home for him...When in custody, he 
is always full of regret for his actions and of good 
intentions for the future, and I believe these are all 
genuine at the time.. .The question remains.. .how long can 
he maintain this progress?"
Defence solicitors and probation officers thus appealed 
directly to magistrates' humanitarian instincts and antipathy 
to imprisonment as unconstructive. As one defence solicitor 
despondently concluded: "It's an uphill struggle, I don't
pretend that it's much more than a case of one step forward 
and 6 back". Magistrates' remarks in post-sentence interviews 
expressed their sympathetic despair.
"I somehow didn't want to be fierce to him. I just looked 
at him and wondered: 'Why are you offending like this?
Why can't you pull yourself together?1 It stuck in my 
mind that he's a good worker. I felt he would like to 
overcome this and become a good member of society. At his 
age he's either going to do it or not."
"He's thoroughly inadequate. He doesn't work, he doesn't 
do anything, he was at (special school). No-one's managed 
to make anything of him. In the old days he would have 
been in what we used to call 'colonies', but nowadays 
it's all community care...He needs someone to organise 
his activities, take him out, see he is occupied."
"Tragic" cases
This was a group of 11 cases involving 3 defendants in their 
30s and 8 in their 40s. They had usually been successful
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earlier in life; they had lost all close relationships? in 
several cases their criminal histories began relatively late? 
and they were addicted, 2 to drugs and 9 to alcohol. 
Essentially, the picture in each case was of a life ruined by 
drink or drugs? a downward spiral of disappointment, followed 
by substance abuse, precipitating further disappointment. The 
incomprehensibility of this apparently inexorable progress 
into physical and material ruin was identified in Chapter Two. 
No "right thinking" person, equipped with the capacity to do 
otherwise, could conceivably elect for this life of decay.
Example 9.11
The defendant, aged 42, had admitted 6 shoplifting offences, 
extraction of electricity, 2 breaches of bail and breach of a 
community service order. These offences dated back 11 months. 
Sentence had been deferred 6 months earlier in the expectation 
that the defendant would get treatment for his alcoholism, 
"make efforts to work" and pay his extensive fines.
Before relating the individual offences, the prosecution 
solicitor eased the information processing burden for 
magistrates with the comments: "All (stolen) items were
either bottles of alcohol or foodstuffs...It1s right to say 
that in respect of every matter before the court the defendant 
was under the influence of alcohol...".
The defendant had pursued a successful naval career, followed 
by skilled work in the Middle East. Then his wife and children 
left him, his career ended and his substantial criminal record 
began. The SER concluded:
"(The defendant) has been unable to fulfil the objectives 
set by the Court during the period of deferment and 
appears to be someone who is on a course of self- 
destruction. He has talked of suicide...[H]e would find 
any financial penalty almost impossible to pay...He is 
considered unsuitable for Community Service because of 
his poor health and his performance on a previous work 
placement. (He) has been placed on Probation a number of 
times...However, he remains a vulnerable individual and 
if the Court feels able to make a non-custodial disposal
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today, I would ask the Justices to consider imposing a 
six month Probation Order on (him) .1
After reading this, the magistrate addressed the defence 
solicitor: "We've got to approach this realistically and my 
colleagues and I really think that the recommendation. . .is the 
way we ought to deal with this, unless you have other 
representations”.
The alacrity with which these magistrates reached their 
decision was striking. It illustrates the power of compassion 
to obscure considerations of offence seriousness and 
persistence. The clerk, who encouraged the magistrates to make 
a probation order for 12 instead of 6 months, subsequently 
commented:
"Six months is really too short. Even (City) probation 
service can't cure someone like that in only 6 
months! ... [W] ith someone like that, even if he seems 
better in 6 months, problems recur, don't they? He was 
very lucky not to go down today, or even upstairs (to 
Crown court), with a record like that. OK, he's a sick 
man, but look at his record".
The drug addict of Example 8.4, who was placed on community 
service whilst in breach of a conditional discharge, a 
probation order and a suspended sentence, provides a further 
illustration of this phenomenon. Another concerns a 45 year 
old alcoholic charged with drunk and disqualified driving. He 
had numerous previous convictions and was in breach both of a 
suspended sentence imposed at crown court for serious assaults 
and of a probation order made subsequently. The magistrates 
adjourned the case for enquiries into placement at a 
therapeutic community: "No-one wants to put anyone
particularly an intelligent man - away if there's another way 
out".
One magistrate, in a post-sentence interview in one such case, 
remarked:
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"It's very hard to put yourself apart from the social 
aspects of things and not be swayed by the emotion of it, 
but it's nice when you can take a more benevolent view."
"Sick" offenders
The ubiquity of "sickness" as a metaphor in lay life for 
alien, frightening or distasteful phenomena was considered in 
Chapter Two. During the course of the study, I heard the word 
"sick" applied to certain offenders by magistrates in 
interviews, and by clerks and solicitors in informal 
exchanges. The category of sick offenders cut across age 
distinctions among defendants over 21, although most were 
middle aged and alcoholic. Notably, no young adults fell into 
this category. Since there was no logical impossibility 
preventing a young adult from being "sick", their absence from 
the category possibly reflects the less entrenched appearance 
of their problems. Turbulence and vulnerability to 
contamination, for example, were qualities of a transient 
maturational phase. Sickness, by contrast, was an intractable 
condition.
There was more to sickness, however, than intractability. The 
superficially gross notion of sickness involved a nuance which 
underpinned a serious sentencing dilemma. Something in the 
inner experience of sick offenders defied both comprehension 
and rational response. Although they were capable of criminal 
responsibility, they appeared incapable of exercising 
responsibility on their own behalves. Their behaviour was not 
only socially inappropriate; it was self-destructive. They 
seemed to lack the basic self-interest which should inform 
rational behaviour and upon which the available responses of 
the court relied. This characteristic went deeper than 
defiance or excessive neediness. Sick offenders simply did not 
appear to grasp the advantages to be had from co-operating 
with the courtroom process. It was this absence of, in a quite 
literal sense; "personal responsibility", which lay at the 
core of the concept of sickness. The responses of City
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magistrates to sick offenders must be understood in terms of 
the acute difficulty this posed them in sentencing.
Two basic groups of sick offenders could be identified: sick 
young men and hopeless cases.
1. Sick young men
As has been seen, the categories of independent and needy 
young men were capable of embracing deep personal and social 
problems and relatively serious offending. They therefore 
sufficed for the vast majority of offenders aged 21 to 25. A 
few defendants, however, could not be accommodated within 
these categories. These defendants differed from the majority 
in that some aspect or aspects of their behaviour appeared 
bizarre. However, although they appeared to need psychiatric 
treatment, they thwarted all attempts to provide it.
The defendant described in Example 8.7 was one of these sick 
young men, and magistrates' fruitless pursuit of the fullest 
information over a period of several months in that case was 
symptomatic of the manner in which these defendants paralysed 
sentencing decision making. This was not the fault of the 
magistrates alone. Another case took 9 months to process, 
impeded partly by the defendant's failure to respond to bail 
on several occasions, partly by his changes of address and 
partly by the quest for medical, psychiatric and social 
information. Even at the final hearing, the defence solicitor 
urged the magistrates to seek a new psychiatric report, 
despite the fact that "[t]he SER recommends community service 
and that will be my submission at the end of the day". This 
curious advice illustrates the dilemma. It seemed doubtful 
that anyone really believed that the sentencing options would 
alter in consequence of yet more information in these cases. 
The problem was the unease aroused by the prospect of imposing 
any "real world" sentence on a defendant, when, as one 
magistrate remarked in a post-sentence interview, "you wonder 
if he's in touch with the same world as us".
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The result, in each case, was procrastination, in which all 
court personnel, to some degree, conspired, although it was 
the magistrates who were ultimately held responsible for these 
delays. The following exchanges occurred in one already 
protracted case, as the defence solicitor pre-empted the 
prosecution address in the manner described in Chapter Eight:
DSs (hesitantly) "I'm wondering whether I should make an 
application here. Just after he appeared last, he was 
committed to custody for breaking a (civil court) 
injunction. He spent his time in custody in the hospital. 
There is a SER which outlines a poor response to 
supervision. I wouldn't normally ask for a further 
report, but...his circumstances have changed...Because 
there isn't a favourable report you will be considering 
custody and should have all the information. He has an 
appointment with (a forensic psychiatrist)."
Ms (to PO) "Anything to add?"
POs "He's in breach of his probation order by these 
further offences, failing to notify change of address and 
he consistently fails to keep appointments. In my view he 
finds supervision more of a burden than a help and his 
problems are not amenable to probation supervision. 
Possibly (the psychiatrist) may have something to offer, 
but it's a matter for you whether you want that 
information or not."
Clerk: "A SER might assist you in your sentencing, to 
give you the up-to-date circumstances."
M: "Psychiatric reports?"
DSs "I asked (the psychiatrist) if he was willing, but I 
can't order reports...It's for you if you feel it would 
be helpful."
Ms "Well, we feel it would be helpful. Yes."
Afterwards I spoke to these magistrates, who were not 
optimistic that the psychiatric report would have much to 
suggest, "unless he's very sick, but that might make sentencing 
even more of a problem".
"He's a sick man, obviously, although some of his 
behaviour may have been for our benefit. We need as much 
information as we can get, but then what can we do at the 
end of the day?"
These sick young men were all alcohol-related offenders, but 
the significance attached to this fact varied. It was ignored 
in Example 8.7. In another case, the "chronic alcohol abuse"
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identified by the probation officer was thought by a 
magistrate to reflect the defendant's escape into fantasy.
"Is it a dependency, a prop because he can't cope with 
life, or is it an escape route for someone who likes a 
binge? It's not the same when someone is trying to blot 
out problems...We would take a different view of someone 
who j ust enj oyed it."
In a third case the defence solicitor laid great emphasis on 
alcoholism, combined with epilepsy, as the key to 
understanding the bizarre offences which included accompanying 
firemen to a blaze started by the defendant himself, and 
demanding money on the pretence of being a detective: "He was 
driven by an insatiable urge to consume alcohol".
2• Hopeless cases
The numbers of destitute alcoholics appearing before City 
magistrates for drunkenness offences had fallen in recent 
years, since the introduction of a cautioning scheme. Their 
petty thefts and public order offences, however, still brought 
them into court, where their appearances were viewed with some 
foreboding by the clerks, upon whom fell the burden of dealing 
with the unpredictable behaviour observed in Chapter Seven.
The compassionate treatment of tragic defendants was inspired 
by recognition of their fall from respectability. The hopeless 
cases, however, appealed to no such tragic history. Indeed, 
they had shed their histories, living and being judged 
entirely in the present. They seemed never to have been 
otherwise than they were now: vagrant, dirty, physically
ruined and temperamentally uncertain. It was rarely necessary 
to enquire into the backgrounds of these men to establish 
their hopelessness. It was simply obvious.
This alien condition inspired a mixture of distaste, 
impatience, embarrassment, humour and patronisation, in 
concentrations which varied according to the behaviour of the 
defendant in the courtroom. Patronisation sprang from the same
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belief that these sick men were incapable of self-regulation 
which justified the swift removal of disruptive defendants 
into custody observed in Chapter Seven.
Example 9.12
It was nearly Christmas. The obese 41 year old defendant was 
apparently sweating, despite the season. He clutched a 
handkerchief, with which he mopped his face.
Clerk: "You're charged with theft of a bottle of alcohol
— it
D: "I didn't mean to 
DS: (raising hand) "Shhh."
• • •
Clerk: "Do you plead guilty or not guilty?"
D: "Guilty. I'm sorry I did it -"
Clerk: "Yes, your solicitor will explain for you later." 
CPS: "The proprietor (of a guest house) heard someone
walking out, went to investigate and found the defendant 
with a bottle of whisky... [H]e said that he had often 
walked past and saw it was a cosy place with plenty of 
drinks available and he thought he would go in and get 
himself a nightcap."
The defendant's previous convictions spanned 9 pages and 25 
years. He was in breach of a suspended sentence, and had 
already been reconvicted once since its imposition, for 
similar "walk-in" burglaries.
DS: "Each time he comes to court he says this will be the 
last time, and looking at his previous convictions I 
think I can say he has been trying very hard. I have 
counted up his previous convictions and they have been 
lessening...due very much to the help and support of the 
(homeless person's hostel), where he has been living 
after many years of living rough."
The defendant wrung his handkerchief while the magistrates and 
clerk conferred.
M: "We've got quite a difficult problem, because you've 
got a suspended sentence for burglary almost a year ago, 
you've been to court during the period of suspension but 
it wasn't activated, and here you are again. We're going 
to impose one day's imprisonment for the suspended 
sentence and we're going to impose one day for this
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offence, concurrent. So you'll be kept in custody till 
the close of business today."
Ds (puzzled) "Till the close of business?"
Ms "Yes."
Ds (holding up one finger) "One day?"
Ms "Yes."
Ds (beaming) "Oh, thank you very much. Merry Christmas!" 
Ms "Yes, we hope you have a merry Christmas, and an 
honourable one. Now go with the officer."
Ds (cheerfully to waiting police officer) "How are you? All right?" 
(Smiles exchanged among those left in court.)
Summary
Simplification by characterisation is not necessarily 
dysfunctional or unjust. Decision makers may learn over time 
that, in the context of the situation within which they 
operate, certain gross cues constitute fairly reliable guides 
to more complex distinctions. Characterisation thus provides 
usable information at relatively little cost in cognitive 
effort or time (Fiske and Neuberg 1989) . For example, Mileski 
(1969), studying a minor American court, found that black and 
white defendants in intoxication cases differed in several key 
respects: white defendants tended to be skid row drunks, in 
late middle age, destitute, and arrested in states of 
intoxicated incapability? black defendants were generally 
younger, reasonably solvent, and arrested for causing a 
disturbance. Although the occasional "misclassification" 
revealed the extent of sentencers' reliance on colour cues, 
this gross characterisation nevertheless usually served to 
distinguish appropriately between cases. Characterisation 
techniques, therefore, can provide
"a way of maintaining smooth-running operation of 
the court, without gross violation of either the 
court's concepts of punishment, on the one hand, or 
the defendant's rights, on the other."
(Scheff 1966, p.140)
The basic offender characterisations identified in this 
chapter do not cover the entire range of defendants. Most 
notably, defendants aged between 26 and 3 0 are absent. One 
reason for this may be that these apparently uncategorisable
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offenders could have been accommodated under the broad 
headings of independent and needy on the basis of SER 
assessments. They are not, however, included here in those 
categories because of a striking change in mitigation 
addresses. The emotive juxtaposition of age, criminal record 
and personal problems, and the concept of the turning point 
abruptly disappeared from defence solicitors* speeches on 
behalf of defendants older than 25. Perhaps, as one magistrate 
remarked, "[o]nce you get into your mid-late 20s, hopes are 
beginning to fade". Nevertheless, in complex cases, the 
independent and needy characterisations were perhaps 
sufficiently flexible to embrace these few defendants.
It is perhaps unsurprising if City court's basic 
characterisations did not cover the entire range of 
defendants. The majority group was that of the young adult 
offenders. Hence, for this group, concepts of the nature of 
their criminality, and characterisation, were richly 
developed. Defendants in the age range 26 to 3 0 years were 
comparatively scarce. There is no need for well articulated 
"simplifying choice heuristics" for comparatively rare events, 
particularly when there is a serviceable alternative.
Thus, much of City court's sentencing decision making could be 
understood in terms of a few gross characterisations. This 
should perhaps not be surprising. Decisions in lay 
magistrates' courts are a collective exercise. Categories, 
therefore, must be such that most people can subscribe to 
them. Numerous categories, categories involving crucial fine 
distinctions, or esoteric categories not generally intuitively 
accessible, would incapacitate collective decision making.
This point extends the observation in Chapter Eight of the 
importance of "like-mindedness" in recruitment to a bench, 
particularly bearing in mind City magistrates' penchant for 
debate. Discussion of individually idiosyncratic
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characterisations, or of fine distinctions, could have 
protracted decision making almost interminably.
However, magistrates do not function in isolation, 
constructing idiosyncratic interpretations inaccessible to 
other courtroom personnel, as is rather suggested by Parker, 
Sumner and Jarvis (1989). All contributors to the decision 
making process must be able to participate in the 
characterisation process for most of the time. They could not 
otherwise contribute effectively. This is perhaps particularly 
important in the operation of a democratic court such as City. 
Indeed, the observations of this chapter reinforce those 
earlier which showed the susceptibility of magistrates to the 
inferences of information givers. In this respect, as will be 
argued later, the non-participation of probation officers in 
the concept of "sickness" could be significant.
A further extension of this issue concerns the flexibility of 
characterisations, enabling individuals with differing 
perspectives nevertheless to agree as to outcome. This 
analysis has taken a parsimonious approach to the concept of 
sickness. However, as the clerk's remarks in Example 9.11 
suggest, some people may have utilised this conceptualisation 
when others perceived neediness or tragedy. Nevertheless, this 
is not to suggest that characterisations did not matter. An 
inappropriate characterisation by one party would be 
discernible to others. Thus, to a defendant of whom the 
defence solicitor said that he was "terribly unhappy" as a 
child, was "too frightened to refuse" to commit the offences, 
and had not had "the right person to turn to up to now to 
confide in", the magistrate caustically remarked: "You're 27, 
and there's no problem about sending you to prison if we're so 
minded. Understand?"
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter examined the necessity for simplifying strategies 
for information processing in the courtroom. In relatively
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non-serious cases, magistrates were often provided with cues 
to understanding early in the prosecution address. The most 
powerful such cue was reference to defendants' intoxication, 
which provided a simple schema portraying the nature and moral 
flavour of the case. In complex cases, decision making was 
assisted by the utilisation of offender characterisations: 
vulnerable and undisciplined youth; independent and needy 
young men? tragic cases? and sick offenders. Defendants' 
alcohol use was portrayed in ways which substantiated these 
characterisations.
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CHAPTER TEN 
MITIGATION:
MAKING THE MOST OF THE INTOXICATION EXCUSE
This chapter examines firstly the styles of impression 
management adopted by alcohol-related offenders at court. It 
then considers variations in mitigation based on intoxication 
or alcoholism according to types of offence and offender.
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT
Offenders who drew the court*s attention to their alcohol 
problems could successfully enhance the process of 
characterisation described in Chapter Nine. For some 
defendants, however, the potential attractions of this 
technique for reducing punishment were counterbalanced by 
their ambivalence about the deviant identity which it 
conferred on them.
Enhancement of identity
Occasionally, defendants appeared to contribute to their 
characterisation more by accident than by design.
Example 10.1
A 24 year old defendant in a sober case was recommended for a 
"last chance” on probation with a 4B condition of day centre 
attendance. He was an "independent” young man, whose sustained 
offending prompted the defence solicitor to observe: "No-one 
could criticise you for imposing a custodial sentence today, 
but nevertheless I ask what it would achieve. Nothing, save tc 
get him out of everyone*s hair for a while".
The hearing took place in one of the juvenile courts, in which 
the defendant sat directly in front of the bench at a few feet 
distant, in the arrangement described in Chapter Seven. The 
magistrates thus had an unimpeded close-up view of his 
remarkable looks: angelic features in a cloud of red curls. In 
a post-sentence interview, explaining their decision to accept
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the recommendation, the magistrates commented with 
satisfaction:
"His demeanour influenced me and the thought he would 
respond to the sentence...I'm fairly optimistic...His 
reception of the sentence seemed appropriate - relief - 
positive - he was taking it seriously. That confirmed the 
idea that custody was wrong at this point, because he 
wouldn't have responded in that way. It seemed as if it 
was the right sentence at the right time."
Example 10.2
A 22 year old defendant was charged with further offences 
whilst already the subject of a probation order, a suspended 
sentence and a community service order. This defendant's 
neediness was summed up in the SER: "[T]his is a disturbed, 
vulnerable and physically sick young man who does seem to be 
making a supreme effort at the present time".
The colourful portrayal in the SER and mitigation address of
a pathetic young man in need of long term support was rather
at odds with his large, square, burly physique, with close-
cropped hair, which conveyed an appearance of thuggishness. As 
the hearing progressed, however, the defendant grew 
increasingly blotchy faced, and he produced a handkerchief 
with which surreptitiously to wipe his reddening eyes. He was 
openly weeping by the time the magistrates announced a further 
community service order.
Other defendants played a more obviously active part in their 
characterisation. In Chapter Seven it was noted that 
defendants in City court enjoyed a degree of latitude which 
permitted them some self-expression. Of particular interest, 
here, is the enhancement of identity through drunkenness at 
court. If young defendants had been drinking before their 
appearance, they did not advertise the fact in the courtroom. 
To do so would probably have been received as defiance; 
certainly, the boisterousness of young adults was likely to be 
regarded in the courtroom as evidence of their indiscipline. 
For older defendants, however, drunkenness could be an
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advantage. These defendants often advertised their alcoholic 
status by referring to themselves as "registered" (or in one 
case "qualified") alcoholics. This claim invoked medical 
authority on their condition by borrowing from the 
bureaucratic terminology of drug addiction.
Tragic defendants were frequently drunk in court. In this 
condition they were miserable and repentant. They were 
sometimes also voluble, in an apparent attempt at explanation. 
Magistrates showed considerable patience with the rambling 
interruptions of these defendants.
Example 10.3
DS: "I would point out that he is in work and also has 
come to the realisation that he is an alcoholic. He has 
joined Alcoholics Anonymous and been with them for the 
past month."
M: "The indication from the probation service is that
they think there is something positive here."
Def: ( b e la te d ly ) "There*s a meeting tonight."
M: "Do you think you*re getting help?"
Def: (s w a y in g  t o  f e e t ) "I missed probation that I had
previously, and (my new probation officer) seems a good 
person. I used to go to see (my other probation officer) 
at the drop-in."
M: "Well, you'll get as much help from (this probation 
officer) as (the other one) ♦ Now, we want to make a 
probation order... and you know what means. You've got to 
stay out of trouble."
Def: "Well, that shop across the road, I used to go and 
buy drink - they won't let me in."
Example 10.4
DS: "...He attends a weekly group where he takes a
central role and he feels optimistic, despite the 
setbacks, that he can overcome his difficulties 
Def: "Can I say something?"
The defendant leaned confidentially towards the defence 
solicitor and began speaking incoherently but loudly.
DS: ( d e s p e r a te ly ) "Perhaps he'd like to tell you 
himself."
Def: "I went to the consultant at the drugs clinic and he 
said: 'We've got to come to an agreement, you've got to
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cut down on drink or we'll cut your script'. I said: 
'That's blackmail! ' - But - we both took it in - you know 
- so I accept that's what I've got to do, but it's 
difficult with (my lodger) being there because he drinks 
more than I do. But I've just got to try harder 
M: ( e n c o u r a g in g ly ) "That's quite right."
The behaviour of hopeless defendants, drunk or sober, was 
quite different. The degree of self-expression permitted in 
City court was often increased for these defendants by virtue 
of their lack of legal representation. These men belonged 
squarely in the realm of "ineligibility" (Macandrew and 
Edgerton 1969), noted in Chapter Five. "Sick" beyond all hope 
of repair, they enjoyed a state of "non-responsibility" in 
which there were no real boundaries to their behaviour except 
in the negative sense that they were not expected to observe 
the normal rules of courtroom propriety.
The hopeless defendants, particularly well known "regulars", 
rarely disappointed this expectation. The resultant theatre of 
their appearances, foiled by the discomfiture of struggling 
clerks and magistrates, inspired overt amusement among 
spectators. Observing these performances, it was increasingly 
difficult to believe that these men were, as they seemed, 
oblivious of this ridicule. Rather, one began to suspect that 
they were pleased to share what, for them, was a perpetual 
experience of their lives, with people who usually enjoyed 
immunity from it.
Alcoholic defendants commonly became increasingly impatient as 
the morning drily wore on. They were, however, low on the 
court's list of priorities, particularly since their time 
spent waiting did not add to the legal aid bill for the day's 
work. There was always a possibility, as a result, that they 
would not return to the afternoon hearing, or would arrive 
drunk. Whatever their condition, it was usually impossible to 
record more than a sample of their generous contributions to 
the proceedings.
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Example 10.5
The 2 defendants, in their 50s, were jointly charged with a 
public order offence. Several times during the morning, onq 
poked his head round the courtroom door and was sent away by 
the police officer. Eventually he entered and sat down. When 
the police officer remonstrated, he announced loudly: "I want 
to be tried now". The clerk granted his wish.
Clerk: "Do you plead guilty or not guilty?"
1st Def: "Guilty."
2nd Def: "Guilty. I was drunk."
CPS: (s p e a k in g  o v e r  i n d i s t i n c t  m u m b lin g s  f ro m  d o c k ) "The 
2 defendants were in the (shopping centre). A police 
constable saw them on the seats. One was grabbing food 
from another person. The constable warned him. The other 
defendant intervened, he protested and used abusive 
language. His friend became involved. Both defendants 
were extremely drunk at the time."
2nd Def: "This man wouldn't harm anybody. I'm sure I
wouldn't either."
Clerk: "Well, what would you like to say?"
1st Def: "Someone gave me drink. I'm ever so sorry for 
causing all this trouble to the court."
2nd Def: "I'm sorry from the bottom of my heart. I was 
drunk and I was in a bad mood."
M: "You will each be fined £20. I'm just going to tell 
you, you've apologised to the court, but you should 
apologise to the people of (City) whom you have caused 
distress. Just you remember that, next time you go out 
and get drunk."
2nd Def: ( in f la m e d ) "You've no heart. You've no
understanding."
The defendants were ushered, grumbling, from the court.
Example 10.6
When all other business was completed, the 53 year old 
defendant was brought up from the cells, to which he had been 
removed as he and his supporters grew steadily more noisy in 
the waiting area. The clerk began putting the 2 charges of 
public order offences to him.
Def: ( i n t e r r u p t i n g ) "I want to tell you, I think it's a 
bit wrong. I take tablets, I've lost half my lung, I 
don't use words like that. I've been in the war, I lost 
my brother in the war, but I've never insulted a woman in 
my life
M: "Is that a not guilty plea?"
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Def: "If you say so. I've paid my fines
The defendant continued talking as the magistrates and clerk 
conferred.
M: "We don't want this to go on unnecessarily.”
Clerk: "I'll try, but if he says he didn't, then it's a 
not guilty plea."
The clerk began again to put the charge.
Def: "If y o u ’ d done 2 years in the hospital and took
tablets you wouldn't remember. I  don't remember, but I've 
studied the law
Clerk: ( r a i s i n g  a hand) "In that case, if you've studied 
the law, you won't have any trouble grasping this. If you 
say you don't remember 
Def: "I don't."
Clerk: "But still you accept that you did do it 
Def: "Well, yes."
Clerk: "Then a guilty plea is acceptable."
The clerk put the second charge.
Def: "Well, I don't agree there. There's a lot of people 
use my name. Someone's been using my name."
Clerk: "That has to be a not guilty plea."
The magistrates and clerk conferred, leaving the defendant to 
resume his declamation. He took his glasses on and off and 
waved his arms expansively as he addressed the whole court.
Def: "Who broke into my house and stole all my things? 
Did you catch h im ? He took my cooker, my money - I knew 
who it was actually, but J don't go to the police. I'm 
homeless, I've been in hospital, my rent is £15 a week 
Clerk: "This will be adjourned to 6th April, when you're 
already due for trial on another charge."
Def: "Will you give me a piece of paper? I might not 
remember."
Conflict of identity
The academic discussion of "deviance avowal" was considered in 
Chapter Five. Some of this literature tends to portray the 
embracement of a "sick" or alcoholic identity in order to 
reduce criminal culpability as an "easy option", in the same 
way that, as seen in Chapter Three, the criminal or alcoholic
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lifestyle is simplistically seen as an easy alternative to the 
rigours of respectability for the undersocialised. That the 
issue is more complex, however, was suggested by the 
discussions of the relationships between rationalisation, 
mitigation and self-image.
Observation of defendants in City court who grappled with the 
choice between sick or alcoholic, and criminal identities 
revealed the difficulty of deviance avowal. The ambivalence of 
these men was abundantly clear. The immediate attractions of 
reduced punishment were offset, and in many cases outweighed, 
by the prospect of having a purported pathology professionally 
confirmed and treated.
Example 10.7
The defendant, aged 24, was charged with theft and criminal 
damage. He had a number of previous convictions, had appeared 
in court already several times during the observation period, 
and had been placed on probation 2 months previously. At that 
time, the SER writer had despondently concluded:
"I am not convinced that a Probation Order would have 
much impact on (the defendant's) offending behaviour 
however ( s i c ) if the Court were to consider such a course 
appropriate, the supervision would focus on his drinking 
habits and employment prospects. If the Court considers 
that a Probation Order is an appropriate disposal today, 
a period of six months would allow for some focused work 
and is in my opinion this is ( s i c ) the maximum length 
that (he) could realistically sustain."
On this occasion, I got into conversation with the defendant 
in the waiting area. He looked seedier and shabbier than when 
I had last seen him, and was nursing a recently disabled arm. 
He rehearsed his problems with an apparent unconcern for 
privacy which often seemed to characterise those who had 
become accustomed to living out their lives in public.
"I'm getting it adjourned. I'm going to see a 
psychiatrist. My brain box has gone. I went to ask my 
doctor for valium, but he wouldn't give me any. He said 
I'd never get off them. That's what this is all about -
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I've been very depressed. I've lost the use of my hand as 
well - I put my arm through a window when I was drunk and 
cut the artery. It doesn't hurt so much now it's warmer, 
they've given me exercises to do. I can't work. I've been 
sleeping rough for 4 days - my brother's just moved into 
a new house with his wife and baby and they say they want 
their privacy. I've lost my wife as well, but I'm glad 
now. She kept on at me and didn't give me time to think. 
She was taking drugs in front of my son - that's why we 
split up because I objected to that. But I've been very 
depressed and I suffer with my nerves."
This defendant may genuinely have feared for his sanity. With 
so many problems piling up, this might be an understandable 
anxiety. It is, however, one thing to wonder whether one is 
going out of one's mind, but quite another to have it 
confirmed by a psychiatrist. This was the first of several 
occasions on which this defendant arrived at court having made 
an appointment with a psychiatrist which he subsequently 
failed to keep. Meanwhile, his condition apparently 
deteriorated. A month later, while a further adjournment for 
psychiatric assessment was debated, he sat in court hunched 
over himself with an odd, faintly smiling expression, as if 
puzzling over the situation. This "sick young man's" 
ambivalence about his condition in turn helped to stifle the 
sentencing process for a considerable period.
Example 10.8
The defendant, aged 45, had committed offences of drunk and 
disqualified driving. He had several previous convictions, was 
in breach of a suspended sentence and a probation order, and 
in his probation officer's view, would "never be free from 
further offending or fulful ( s i c ) his potential even in part, 
until such time as he seeks effective treatment for his 
alcohol and underlying psychological problems".
The probation officer described this defendant's ambivalence 
about treatment in the following way:
" (The defendant) is an intelligent man who shows some 
insight into his situation. He yearns stability and the 
intimacy of a close relationship but has proved quite
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unable to sustain one; fearing as he does that people 
will get too close and begin making demands of him that 
he is unable or unwilling to meet. Such a fundamental 
area of difficulty underlies his drink problem and has 
not, thus far, been addressed by the various contacts 
that (he) has had over the years with the (drinking 
problem service). He is clearly resentful of any 
intervention that might seek to explore this side of his 
personality too deeply and as a consequence such 
professional treatment has only ever been of limited 
value.11
The defence solicitor challenged this aspersion on the 
defendants integrity:
"He felt at that time that he could not face what was in 
his background. He was not resentful but scared of facing 
up to things...He realises now that he must delve into 
his background, but feels that he needs the support of a 
therapeutic community to do that."
While the magistrates were in retirement, the defendant spoke 
to the defence solicitor: "I'm not really sure about this
idea, I think I might rather get a prison sentence over with 
than keep this hanging on". On the magistrates' return, the 
defence solicitor again pressed for an adjournment for 
enquiries into therapeutic community opportunities. The 
magistrates complied.
In a subsequent application to the court for the discharge of 
the probation order as being of no further advantage, the 
probation officer explained:
" (The defendant) struggled with the notion of spending 
twelve months or so in rehabilitation and ( s i c ) when he 
could, as he saw it, simply choose to go to prison for 
six months - a sentence which he did not regard as 
onerous...In the event (he) chose the 'safer' of the two 
options; appearing in court on his adjourned date drunk, 
thereby disqualifying himself from eligibility at the 
rehabilitation unit where he was due the next day, and 
giving the Magistrates little alternative but to activate 
the suspended sentence."
VARIATION BY TYPE OF OFFENCE
Certain systematic differences in the appeal to intoxication 
were related to the type of offence in question. Essentially,
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these differences turned on the issue of self-control. The 
intoxicated loss of control was advanced as mitigation for 
some types of offences, but was apparently deemed inapplicable 
to others. The differences may be examined under the broad 
headings of excess alcohol, violence and dishonesty.
Excess alcohol
This heading is used generically to include offences of 
drinking and driving, being drunk in charge of a vehicle and 
failing to provide specimens for alcohol testing. Mitigation 
speeches in these cases were starkly contrary to those in all 
other types of alcohol-related offences, which relied in 
varying degrees on an appeal to intoxicated loss of control. 
Such a condition would be acknowledged only in extreme cases 
of drunken driving, in which only an appeal to mercy was 
realistically available to the defendant. Defence solicitors 
went to considerable lengths to demonstrate that the technical 
intoxication of their clients did not reflect upon their 
competence as drivers. There were several basic techniques, 
often utilised in combinations, for making this point.
Firstly, it could be pointed out that the police had initially 
approached the defendant engaged in an innocuous activity such 
as tending a broken down vehicle or sitting in a parked one. 
Occasionally it was claimed that the defendant, while driving 
safely, was the victim of a malicious report to the police by 
someone with a grudge against him.
Secondly, it could be observed that the discovery of the 
excess alcohol offence was a by-product of apprehension for a 
minor transgression such as having a defective light or 
failing to display a tax disc. Even for a defendant stopped 
after speeding or driving through traffic lights at amber, it 
could be claimed that "there is no suggestion that his driving 
caused danger at any time".
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Thirdly, it could be argued that the defendant was a careful 
drinker who had unwittingly exceeded the alcohol limit despite 
his best efforts to avoid it. This was apparently achieved by 
surprising numbers of defendants, who had drunk a responsibly 
small quantity, forgetting that they had not eaten all day, 
believing that the effects of last night*s binge or lunch 
time*s sherry had worn off, or unaware of the now obvious 
inadvisability of mixing alcohol with their medication.
Fourthly, it could be claimed that the defendant had no 
intention of driving at the time of his drinking, but some 
unforeseen necessity, such as the wife going into labour, 
arose. In some of these cases, driving was portrayed as the 
responsible act of a comparatively sober defendant, taking 
over the wheel from his intended chauffeur who had become 
irresponsibly drunk.
As long as scope for such arguments remained, affirmations of 
defendants' competence as drivers would persist even in the 
face of extraordinarily high alcohol readings or chronic 
alcoholism.
Example 10.9
The defendant, aged 45, admitted driving with excess alcohol, 
whilst disqualified and without insurance. The circumstances 
were unusual in that he had driven to the police station, 
announced that he been drinking and driving, handed in his car 
keys and asked to locked up for safety. He was four times over 
the permitted level of breath alcohol. This was his second 
excess alcohol conviction. He had a history of alcoholism 
which was fully documented in the SER.
In the face of this defendant's evident disbelief in his own 
fitness as a driver, the defence solicitor advised the 
magistrates:
"He knows he is an alcoholic in some ways. A man who
drinks a lot is able to cope a little better in some
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ways. On the last occasion of drinking and driving he was 
actually parked on the side of the road looking under the 
bonnet to investigate a funny noise. He was not stopped 
for anything he did driving.”
Loss of self-control, in excess alcohol cases, was rarely, if 
ever, attributed to intoxication. For example, a defendant who 
drove erratically at high speed through a housing estate when 
signalled to stop by the police, and who assaulted one of the 
arresting officers, had panicked because, in the words of the 
SER, he "felt some vulnerability as an Irishman". In several 
cases, the decision to drive was portrayed as the impulsive 
reaction to stress, such as a family argument provoking a 
desire to escape. Such impulsivity, however, was never 
causally linked to the defendants intoxication.
Example 10.10
The defendant, aged 23, admitted failing to provide specimens 
of breath and criminal damage. Police, encountering him 
staggering at the roadside with a motorcycle, had asked him to 
take a breath test.
CPS: "[A]t (this) the defendant became extremely abusive 
and went into a complete rage. At the police station he 
became verbally abusive and wouldn't quieten down. At one 
point, sitting in a room being spoken to by the sergeant, 
his rage was such that he began to punch the wall boards, 
apparently unaware of the damage he would do to himself 
as he kept punching and punching the wall."
The defence solicitor explained that the defendant had lost 
his licence for driving with excess alcohol several years 
previously.
"On this occasion, he was at a party, and remembering 
well the consequences for his licence of drinking and 
driving, he pushed his bike down (the) road...believing 
there was nothing wrong with this...He honestly and 
sincerely thought that as long as he was pushing his bike 
he was within the law. You may take it as an indication 
of the firmness with which he held that view that he 
behaved with such vehemence afterwards, to the extent of 
not noticing the injury he may have done to his own 
hand."
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This appeal to the disinhibition of violence through 
intoxication against a background of provocation was quite 
common in cases of assaults on female partners.
"The ABH relates to a long standing relationship. The 
victim is also a heavy drinker and during drinking 
sessions tempers became frayed and violence occurred on 
both sides. On this occasion he perhaps went a little 
beyond what was reasonable in self-defence.”
"The assault happened in a nightclub on the night after 
they broke up. The defendant was in the club, and who 
turns up but his girlfriend with 2 friends? Why was she 
there? It wasn't her usual stomping ground. The defendant 
took the view that she was provoking him. Words passed. 
He went to throw a drink in her face and the glass 
unfortunately touched her."
Anticipation of this line of argument apparently prompted the 
prosecution solicitor in one case to remark pointedly:
"It might be said that striking is an appropriate way to 
deal with a hysterical woman, but the prosecution say 
that the defendant punched her whilst she was on the 
floor."
In cases in which no provocation was discernible at all, 
mitigation might then appeal to extreme intoxication to the 
point of irrationality or the indiscriminate discharge of 
emotions usually constrained by sobriety.
"It was because they were Irish. He was substantially in 
drink and wasn't behaving himself."
"This particular behaviour is out of all character to him 
and we must go back into his history to understand 
them.. .On this occasion, he went to the fair and consumed 
a very large quantity of alcohol. These offences 
represent the release of long pent-up emotions."
In one case, even this resort was ruled out by the probation 
officer's observation:
"He realises now that what he did was totally wrong and 
that to hit somebody because he perceives that they are 
'eyeing him' is totally unacceptable behaviour. It was 
pointed out very strongly to him that his victim did not, 
in any way retaliate and therefore not only was his 
reasoning no excuse for his actions but it also appears
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to have no validity. From his own admission he had only 
drunk some 2 pints of alcohol that evening so it seems 
unlikely that that was a strong factor."
The defence solicitor remarked sourly: "It is unfortunate that 
the report should refer to the events surrounding the assault 
in quite the way it does".
2. Appeal to misjudgement
The term "misjudgement" is preferred here to "accident" or 
"mistake", in order to identify more clearly the issue at 
stake: confused intoxicated reasoning, leading to an
unfortunate outcome.
"The defendant had quite a bit to drink. He went over to 
a house where an old friend lived. What he didn't know 
was that his friend had died. The new occupant didn't 
know him at all. There followed an altercation and the 
window was broken in recklessness as he was quite 
distressed."
Intoxicated misjudgement could explain why a defendant would 
attack an unprovocative third party. It was a popular 
mitigation for assaults on females against whom provocation 
could not be alleged. Such females were less likely to be 
involved in relationships with the defendant. Quite often they 
were intervening in a confrontation between the defendant and 
another victim or potential victim.
"The offences were committed under the influence of drink 
and at a time when he was emotionally very upset. It's 
not an intentional, direct assault, but took place when 
he was on the floor being restrained...[T]he blow was one 
which unfortunately caught the woman police constable on 
the nose."
The faulty reasoning of the intoxicated offender could result 
in the inappropriate use of force as a means to problem 
solving.
"This criminal damage was again committed in drink. He 
had gone to get his belongings back from where he had 
been staying with a friend. Had he not been clouded with 
drink he would have gone away when he realised his friend 
was not there."
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"[H]e was sitting (in the car) when the police came. He 
said he was messing about with the lock. I think in my 
own mind he was looking for a place to sleep, but he was 
drunk."
Paradoxically, sobriety was strongly pressed in mitigation in 
a case involving a disastrous misjudgement in a crucially 
heated moment against a background of stress.
"It seems that each of these problems, none of them that 
important in itself, came to a head together. I wish to 
stress on his behalf that the defendant was not under the 
influence of drink. This is not a case of a young man 
getting drunk and behaving violently as a result. The 
defendant himself says: * There’s no point in hitting your 
own brother. I wouldn't have had the bat if I hadn't been 
kicked out (of home) '. He was not under the influence of 
drink and it was a background of family difficulties 
which erupted into the street. Firstly, then, I ask you 
to bear in mind that he has no previous convictions. 
Secondly, it was not a question of drink and senseless 
violence. Thirdly, it was not a direct attack on the 
police officer, but invective directed at his brother, 
not at the police. Fourthly, also, these offences 
occurred against a background of family difficulties, 
which don't excuse his behaviour but do explain it."
Dishonesty
The intoxication of a burglar or thief was advanced as a cause 
of impulsive, and often incompetent, crime. Thus denying 
premeditation or professionalism, this technique relied on the 
assumption that the precursors to dishonest crime were 
directly reflected in its disappointing outcome. Failure to 
recall the offence was frequently advanced in support of this 
argument, although memory dysfunction appears to be unrelated 
to intentionality (Mitchell 1988). Indeed, during their 
intoxicated bouts of amnesic activity, alcoholics showed a 
remarkable sense of purpose in their misappropriation of 
alcohol from the array of available goods. Motivelessness was 
also a useful claim, although "common sense", applied to the 
data, would suggest that in many cases the most mundane 
motivations lay behind intoxicated offending. Of an offender 
with a university education and a career in academic research, 
a defence solicitor observed in all seriousness: "Most of the 
time he steals books. He doesn't know why". A number of
351
examples from mitigation addresses are given, to illustrate 
the sometimes complex nature of these impulsive intoxicate^ 
aberrations.
"My client would describe this as a drunken escapade.. .He 
told the police: 'I knew we were pratting around, I knew 
it was wrong, but I wasn't in a straight state of mind, 
I had drunk so much'...None of the 4 co-defendants had 
any need or plans to use the items taken. They were 
simply taking items during the drunken time they were on 
the premises."
"The defendant was deeply hurt about his dismissal ancl 
whilst in drink he decided to teach his employer a lesson 
by showing that he could circumvent the security system."
"My client says: 'I was pissed out of my mind'...He got 
drunk and, as he says in his statement: 'I just picked it 
up, walked out with it. No reason, just drunk. I said to 
my friend: "I'll give it back tomorrow"'. So even though 
he was drunk he did realise he had done wrong. He is 
extremely angry with himself to have taken something of 
no use to him and which he would have to take back."
"This was a lapse by the defendant, who had met friends 
who had just got their giro cheques and offered him 
drink. He can't remember much about the offence and was 
very vague when I questioned him, because of the amount 
he had had to drink."
"This offence was committed while the defendant was much 
the worse for wear for drink and out with a friend. He 
was armed with a screwdriver and determined to take the 
bike, and, I emphasise again, because of the drink, when 
they couldn't start it they threw it in the river."
In this context, thefts by employees provide a useful 
illustration of the boundaries to the availability of the 
intoxication excuse. In 6 of the 8 cases involving thefts by 
employees which arose during the observation period, it might 
have been possible to generate an explanation invoking an 
alcohol problem. This did not happen. Indeed, defence 
solicitors made no reference to their clients' use of alcohol. 
SERs, however, provided information of 2 kinds, sometimes ir> 
combination: the defendant spent part of the proceeds of his 
thefts on alcohol; or the defendant had a history of alcohol 
abuse. Evidence supporting the possibility of a drinking 
problem could usually be found in these cases in the form of
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factors associated with alcohol-related harm, such as were 
noted in Chapter Three: for example, severe debt, absenteeism 
from employment, employment in the licensing trade or prior 
alcohol-related convictions. These offences were more often 
than not described as impulsive, at least in their origin, 
incompetent, and lacking a satisfactory motivational 
explanation. Nevertheless, alcohol addiction was not 
postulated in any of these cases.
"It appears that particularly heavy drinking was a factor 
in (the defendants) previous offending. His parents were 
pub landlords and this may have led to an alarmingly high 
alcohol consumption at an early age. He told me, however, 
that he has cut his drinking right down, mainly due to 
the long hours he works (as a barman)...The present 
offence has a rather odd and devious quality...(The 
defendant), however, claims that he is experiencing no 
real difficulties at present...(He) has a tendency to 
minimise his guilt in that he sought to justify his 
actions as to some extent reasonable given the 
circumstances."
"(The defendant) has told me that he enjoyed a 
comfortable lifestyle as a child and that he enjoyed 
spending money and having an ambundance ( s i c ) of clothes 
and material items. It appears that mainly through the 
use of credit cards he accrued considerable debts and 
when he was faced with the opportunity at work of 
obtaining cash he took it. The defendant saysthat ( s i c )  
it was his intention to use the money to pay off debts 
but instead he used it for leisure purposes...[T]his 
offence clearly represents the serious lack of self- 
discipline and greed."
" (The defendant) committed this offence knowing he was 
certain to be caught. He was under financial strain and 
although he had approached his father for help had 
received none. Thus he took the money as what he 
perceived to be an easy way out of his financial 
difficulties in the short term, paid £180 rent arrears 
and frittered £170 away in four days in what he describes 
as a binge, buying drinks for himself and friends... [H]e 
has a chronic problem managing finances.. .Also of concern 
is his dismissal for absenteeism on two occasions, which 
may be a reflection of the attitude which led to the 
current offence."
"(The defendant) was in the Merchant Navy...[T]here 
followed a series of seven catering jobs...His 
relationship with his father...broke down because of a 
drink problem for which he has received treatment... in 
the past. He tells me he is now a controlled drinker,
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although he admits to drinking between ten and twenty 
pints of beer per week... (He) cannot give an exact 
account of what he spent the money on except to say it 
was on drunk ( s i c ), rent and food, nor can he offer an 
adequate explanation as to why he should commit his first 
offence at this stage of life."
In these cases, it appeared that neither defence solicitors 
nor probation officers conceived of the possible utility of 
motivational explanations based on alcohol addiction, even in 
the absence of identifiable alternatives. While systematic 
dishonesty may commonly be regarded as symptomatic of drug 
dependency (Miller and Welte 1986), such notions of "feeding 
an addiction” were not applied to alcohol use. Alcohol-related 
dishonesty generally concerned impulsive crime committed in a 
state of acute intoxication. Thefts by employees were thus a 
form of "sober" crime.
VARIATION BY TYPE OF OFFENDER
Systematic differences in the use of information about 
defendants' alcohol consumption derived from the selective 
advancement of the most persuasive representation of their 
characters or problems.
The character reference
It was noted in Chapter Four that social and moral judgements 
about individuals and groups are often conveyed in assertions 
about their drinking habits. In Chapter Nine, the process of 
characterisation described the portrayal of wholistic case 
typologies. Some observations about defendants' use of 
alcohol, however, were apparently intended to make specific 
points about their characters and offending. These points may 
be described as "character references": the sober character; 
the lapse; the reformed character; and the new leaf.
1. The sober character
As in mitigation addresses the assertion of sobriety could 
establish a point about the nature of an offence, so, in SERs,
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comments about a defendants abstemiousness could form part of 
a complimentary character reference.
"An apparently fit young man, the defendant doesn*t smoke 
and drinks little. He sees his girlfriend pretty well 
every evening, including those on which he attends karate 
classes. He is on good terms with his mother and brother, 
and says he has no problems outside of his unemployment 
and the present matter."
"(The defendant) enjoys good health. His interests are 
fishing, sailing, and listening to music. He says that he 
does not abuse alcohol or drugs and the offence relating 
to the possession of cannabis reflects an infrequent 
indulgence in this drug."
" (The defendant) has a regular girlfriend who he has 
known for 2 years. He spends every weekend at her 
parent*s home, and one night during the week. He rarely 
goes out with friends, and he and his girlfriend visit 
pubs or discos for entertainment. He does not appear to 
be a heavy drinker."
In one case, involving damage totalling £15,500 caused by 
squirting a fire extinguisher onto computer equipment, the 
defence solicitor sought to distinguish between the 
defendant*s lamentable behaviour and real loutishness.
"You have heard there was drinking - that is a slightly 
emotive expression - it is both quantitative and 
qualitative in its interpretation. Yes, they had been 
drinking, but the defendant had only had one lager and 
was not in any sense intoxicated. This was a very 
pleasant evening for 6 or 7 young men before Christmas, 
which unfortunately due to the defendant*s exuberance 
became very unpleasant."
2. The lapse
For first offenders, or those without recent convictions, an 
offence could be portrayed as an isolated, regrettable lapse 
from customary good conduct inspired by intoxication. 
Defendants in such cases were often said to be aghast at the 
sober discovery of their intoxicated transgressions.
"These offences were clearly committed under the 
influence of drink and my client can remember very little 
of the events. He has been shown statements and evidence 
to the effect that it was he who did these things and no- 
one else and therefore he accepts that this must be so.
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This particular behaviour is out of all character to 
him..."
"My client had gone to the pub for a social drink. He is 
a respectable married man with children. The incident 
happened after closing time, when he had had too much to 
drink and his recollection is clouded as to what 
happened.”
3. The reformed character
SERs often offered comparisons between defendants' previous 
and current offences. A switch from alcohol-related to sober 
crime, particularly after a gap between earlier and present 
convictions, was generally seen as a change for the better, 
reflecting greater maturity.
"(The defendant) says that much of his offending in the 
past was related to his heavy drinking and his 
involvement with other young men who were committing 
offences. He tells me that since his marriage he has 
stopped drinking and now occupies his time by working 
during the week and dirt-track racing at weekends."
"The defendant's offending was clearly related to alcohol 
abuse on that occasion and (he) says that he had 
developed an increasing dependence on alcohol during the 
preceding years. (He) acknowledges that he had a drink 
problem that he has since overcome."
4. The new leaf
Recent changes in a defendant's drinking pattern could be 
advanced as evidence that he had been brought to his senses, 
often by the fact of the offence and conviction, sparking a 
new resolve. Influential relationships featured largely in 
this kind of argument. In particular, female partners, who 
earlier were said to provoke offences, were seen in this 
context to control defendants' excesses.
"He feels his alcohol problem is now under control and is 
aware that this must continue if his relationship is to 
survive. Drinking and offending are not acceptable to his 
partner. He has a strong incentive to prevent the problem 
from re-emerging."
"Quite recently he has formed a relationship with a young 
lady and... they are now living together. This will 
curtail his drinking activities and be a support to him
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in trying to overcome this problem and avoid this kind of 
drinking binge with other young men."
"[T]hings seem to have improved substantially, with the 
support of his family and a new relationship with a 
girlfriend, and in particular the alcohol abuse has 
ceased and he is able to look forward to employment and 
a stable relationship."
"Alcohol and bad company all played its part. Since the 
offence he has formed a long standing relationship with 
a girlfriend, who is in court taking an interest in these 
proceedings and in him, and keeps a grip on his 
activities."
SERs also offered these appraisals.
"(The defendant), thankfully, does now appear to be 
making efforts to tackle the serious drink problem that 
he has had for many years and which underlies the present 
offences and all his previous convictions. He has sought 
help of his own initiative and I gained the impression he 
was sincere in his desire to stop drinking."
"(The defendant) impresses as a likeable man of apparent 
satisfactory upbringing and probable good ability, to 
whom independence in early adulthood led to him forming 
apparently undesirable associations and to his becoming 
involved in damagingly heavy drinking, leading to his 
offending. With the onset of possible greater maturity,
he may now be freeing himself from his destructive
dependence on alcohol, and to be on course once more for 
the achievement of conventional goals, in terms of 
employment, home and marriage."
Persuasive Problems
A major attraction of the intoxication excuse, indicated in 
the foregoing section, is that it readily establishes a means 
by which an offender can demonstrate repentance and reform: to 
reduce his alcohol consumption. This act of contrition appeals 
to the "malevolence assumption", noted in Chapter Two, in 
which the involvement of alcohol in an offence is equated with 
causality. A drinking problem, in this respect, could be 
something of an asset for an offender prepared to participate
in some form of treatment, notwithstanding the real
ambivalence experienced by defendants about such an 
undertaking. It offers both an explanation of his offending 
and a solution to the problem of demonstrating remorse and
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reform (Shapland 1981). It did not, however, follow from this 
that alcohol-related offenders' drinking habits would receive 
attention in all cases. In particular, there were 2 types of 
offender whose drinking problems were routinely disregarded on 
discovery of another difficulty: the mentally disordered and 
the drug addicted.
1. The mentally disordered offender
On one occasion, surveying the court list, I noted the name of 
a defendant whose case had already been adjourned several 
times for different psychiatric assessments and whose numerous 
problems had given rise to considerable debate. I remarked to 
the probation officer that drinking at least appeared to be 
absent from this defendant's list of troubles. I was told, 
with surprise, that the defendant drank "like a fish".
Mental disorder was much more powerful than intoxication in 
attracting the court's attention and concern. Unfortunately, 
it was a problem for which the court had no readily 
identifiable solution, although it appeared to be willing to 
devote weeks or months to the search.
At a simplistic level, in alcohol-related cases, the
relationship of defendants' drinking to their offending was 
far more direct and obvious than that of their mental
disorder. They offended while intoxicated, they stole alcohol, 
or they were self-confessed alcoholics, and they often
combined these qualities. Had the court processed these 
defendants on the basis of these cues, it might be 
hypothesised that it could have dealt with them rapidly as 
straightforward cases using simple schemata invoking 
intoxication, or as hopeless cases. Instead, the court's
attention focused on defendants' mental disorder, generating 
a search for the fullest information and for suitable 
treatment.
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There may have been some feeling that mundane motivations for 
criminality could not confidently be attributed to the 
mentally disordered. In a post-sentence interview concerning 
a schizophrenic who broke an off-licence window to take a 
bottle of alcohol, a magistrate said:
"He didn’t have an alcohol problem, he’s not a habitual 
drinker. He didn't have any number of drinking offences. 
I don't think he commits drink offences so much as mental 
lapse offences. Something triggers him off mentally.”
Perhaps, more strongly, basic humanity and concern were the 
motivating factors in these decisions. The well-intentioned 
quest for treatment, however, could result in remands, often 
lengthy and in custody, at the end of which it was established 
only that the psychiatric services either were already 
providing, or held little prospect of providing it. At this 
stage, any suggestion of a treatment provision offered a way 
out of an impasse for the court rather than real improvement 
in the defendant's situation. Thus, the suggestion that a 
manic-depressive defendant be placed on probation with a 
condition of psychiatric treatment was viewed without 
enthusiasm, but with resignation, by the reporting probation 
officer.
" (The psychiatrist) takes the view that a Probation Order 
with a condition to attend for treatment as an out­
patient and take his medication would give an added 
incentive to (the defendant) to co-operate in the 
administration of prescribed drugs. However, I am of the 
opinion that supervising (him) under the conditions of 
such an order would prove extremely difficult and I 
anticipate that there would be problems regarding 
reporting, keeping out-patient appointments and taking 
his medication. Should the Court consider that a 
Probation Order is an appropriate disposal today I would 
ask the Court to stress upon (him) the importance of 
complying with the condition, as outlined.. .Alternatively 
the Court may take the view that (his) period of remand, 
that was equivalent to four months imprisonment, was 
adequate for these offences.”
Example 10.11
The defendant of Example 9.4, who stole books about the 
occult, continued to appear in court at intervals during the
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study. Alarmed by his deepening slide into fantasy, the 
magistrates eventually remanded him in custody, apparently in 
the hope of precipitating his hospitalisation. There followed 
several weeks during which the probation officer experienced 
difficulties of access to him and there were delays and 
confusions over the production of reports by both prison and 
community psychiatric services. The eventual emergent 
professional opinion, however, was quite clear: the
defendants psychosis was increasingly resistant to medication 
and possibly irreversible; nevertheless, he probably still 
knew that it was wrong to steal; he was an unco-operative, 
disruptive patient, for whom no suggestions for bettering his 
condition presented themselves.
Astonished by this implied refusal of treatment to ar| 
unpopular, but admittedly mentally ill man, the magistrates 
again remanded the defendant in custody. The clerk wrote to 
the Health Authority requesting clarification of the position 
on the provision of care. The placatory response explained 
that there had been no intention to deny the defendant 
treatment, but only to acknowledge the difficulties and 
pessimistic prognosis.
Defeated, the magistrates discharged the defendant.
2. The drug addict
Probation officers occasionally appeared puzzled when I 
mentioned that I had an interest in one of their clients, and 
helpfully sought to correct me by explaining that the offender 
was a drug addict, not a drinker. This diagnosis routinely 
overlooked the obvious relationships between these drug 
addicted defendants1 drinking and offending: usually acute 
intoxication coinciding with criminal behaviour; sometimes 
theft of alcohol. Their drug addiction, by contrast, was often 
a chronic background condition. Indeed, the regular receipt of 
prescribed drugs was likely to be advanced as evidence of 
increased stability, reducing the likelihood of criminality.
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In this context, intoxication by alcohol was deemed to 
precipitate the occasional unfortunate lapse. Thus, defence 
solicitors observed:
"He is serving the life sentence of a drug addict. In 
times of stress he tends to abuse alcohol."
"He gets depressed and drinks on top of the drugs...On 
this occasion he had been to my office to discuss divorce 
proceedings and he became so depressed he drank a bottle 
of vodka and committed the (theft of whisky)."
" (This) is a hiccup along the long road to 
rehabilitation...[H]is drug problem is on the mend 
because he has managed to get a prescription. On this 
occasion he was drinking because he had mismanaged his 
methadone."
"He has been able to organise his drug intake through 
having a prescription so that he doesn't do any drinking 
whatsoever...He is very pleased he's not drinking any 
more and that's probably why he's not committing so many 
offences."
The argument that drug addiction represented a distinct 
improvement on defendants' former alcohol abuse appeared quite 
frequently in SERs. Indeed, it was so highly developed in some 
cases that drug abuse appeared to achieve the status of 
socially responsible behaviour, weighed against the evils 
unleashed by alcohol.
"I understand from (the defendant) that much of his 
offending in the past has been related to alcohol abuse. 
He tells me he no longer uses alcohol as when in drink he 
can be violent. He states he has replaced alcohol with 
drugs which enable him to survive without resorting to 
violence."
"Before he began to use heroin or its substitutes he 
drank heavily, up to a bottle and a half of spirits per 
day. This alcohol abuse decreased and he now rarely 
drinks...It is clear from this pattern that (he) has 
attempted to find the drug which proved most satisfactory 
for him, substituting and changing his use of various 
drugs until developing a regular reliance on 
opiates...(He) would seem to have made the assessment 
that the gains from drug use outweigh any disadvantages."
"He says that he used cannabis as an alternative to 
alcohol for recreational purposes, and that he prefers 
its effect in that it does not create the same
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undesirable after effects as alcohol and that as a drug 
it does not increase one's level of aggression or 
unpleasantness...(He) has said that he smoked cannabis 
despite the fact that it was illegal, but this would not 
seem to be an act of deliberate defiance. Rather (he) 
regards the use of cannabis as preferable to the use of 
alcohol and is prepared to accept the consequences that 
this may have on him should he be arrested."
Although probation officers did acknowledge in some reports 
that defendants liberally abused both drugs and alcohol, the 
former tended to command their greatest attention. At times, 
this focus appeared to obscure recognition of the involvement 
of alcohol in the offence. Thus, of a defendant who committed 
a "walk-in" burglary, taking a crate of beer, and who also 
stole from a friend while "quite drunk", according to his 
solicitor, the probation officer wrote:
"(His) offending history is inextricably linked with his 
use of drugs...The current offences are a continuation of 
a pattern of offending established since 1971. (The 
defendant) has entered premises when under the influence 
of drugs or to obtain money for drugs."
Of another chronically drug dependent offender, the probation 
officer reported, with no apparent irony:
" (He) maintains that he entered the shop intending to 
purchase a tin of cat food. Whilst there, he realised 
that he would be unable to feed his cat for the 
forthcoming week and decided to steal the bottle of 
whisky for resale in order to buy food for his pet."
This "alcohol blindness", reminiscent of that revealed in some 
academic research and noted in Chapter Three, cannot simply be 
explained as a deliberate ordering of priorities or argument, 
although these factors may have influenced presentation in 
some cases. So often did my interest in alcohol-related 
defendants meet with the confident assertion that these were 
"drugs, not drink" cases, that I returned to an examination of 
my notes to check whether I was mistaken. One probation 
officer, presenting a report on a defendant who had obtained 
tranquillisers by deception over a substantial period, 
ruefully told me the following tale:
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"When he came up to my office for the interview, when he 
came in, I thought I smelled alcohol on his breath. But, 
you know when you*re in a closed room, you get so you 
can't smell it so much. And I asked him about his use of 
alcohol and he denied it totally. He said he didn't like 
it. Well, I wasn't entirely convinced, but I let it go. 
And then after I saw him out - I went outside with him - 
I went back into my room and it s ta n k - it absolutely 
s ta n k  of stale alcohol!"
The phenomenon whereby multiple substance abuse is identified 
as e i t h e r  a drug problem or a drink problem has been noted in 
other studies of professional decision making in clinical 
(Plant 1976; Sokolow, Welte, Hynes and Lyons 1981) and 
criminal justice settings (Abram 1990; Miller and Welte 1986). 
This same research questions the real utility in professional 
practice of single addiction attributions in multiple abuse 
cases, finding differences in the nature and severity of the 
problems, including criminality, associated with multiple and 
single abuse. Nevertheless, this predominance of drug 
addiction in the perception of multiple substance abusers 
appeared to be more than a professional idiosyncrasy of 
probation officers. The relegation by defence solicitors of 
alcohol intoxication to secondary status as an episodic lapse 
within the chronic, "real" problem of drug addiction has 
already been noted. In post-sentence interviews, magistrates 
offered these observations of alcohol-related, drug addicted 
offenders:
"I had more the impression he was a drug addict who took 
to alcohol sometimes as well. But the occasions he said 
he couldn't remember seemed to be the ones when he was 
drunk. It seems as if drink was the adjunct, not the main 
thing. He didn't look as if he drank that much."
"I don't think any references to alcohol really 
influenced us. He took an occasional drink. In fact I 
imagine he didn't want alcohol as long as the drugs kept 
coming. He's not a great alcohol user or offender as far 
as we could see."
"Most drug addicts have alcohol as well. It's a general 
emotional instability."
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It is not clear, but might be hypothesised, that the focus on 
drug addiction is related to the alien experience of the drug 
user, in comparison with the familiar one of alcohol 
consumption. Common sense, however, prevailed over 
professional wisdom in the reaction to one case.
”1 didn't really swallow that story about stealing the 
bottle to sell to get cat food! Why didn't he steal more 
cat food? It must have been for himself."
SUMMARY
This discussion has vividly revealed the extraordinary 
flexibility of the appeal to intoxication in explaining and 
mitigating criminal behaviour. The theoretical discussions in 
Chapters Two and Four indicated that lay theories about the 
relationship between alcohol and criminality involved a 
network of inaccurate and mutually contradictory assumptions 
selectively applied to different situations. The analysis here 
demonstrates the practical reality of this phenomenon.
The process of analysis reveals the inaccuracies of and 
contradictions between the various assumptions about alcohol 
which underpinned mitigation. The result is that the arguments 
proffered in the courtroom appear somewhat ludicrous, 
impossible to take seriously. This effect, however, is the 
product of analysis. It does not reflect the impact of these 
arguments in the courtroom itself. Even to an observer paying 
concentrated attention to references to alcohol, these shifts 
in presentation of the relationship between alcohol and 
offending did not begin to emerge for some considerable time. 
The most probable reason for this is the readiness of the 
listener to suspend scepticism based on general, abstract 
"truths", and to focus on the concrete, situationally specific 
"script" constructed for each case. This is the seductiveness 
of lay theorising, noted as a pitfall for professionals in 
Chapter Two. Case by case, these explanations "made sense".
The key to an analysis freed from case specific, common sense 
reasoning was the recognition of the stark contrast between
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mitigation for excess alcohol offences and the broad thrust of 
arguments in respect of all others. Court personnel, to whom 
I mentioned this observation, usually appeared puzzled by my 
interest. When I drew magistrates* attention to the contrast 
during a talk about my research to a bench meeting, a senior 
magistrate remarked: "Well, I never noticed that before".
Another magistrate, to whom I mentioned it during an 
interview, demurred: "I don*t think defence solicitors would 
say that about drunk driving these days. I should go back to 
my notes on that one if I were you".
These responses reveal, not magisterial inattention, but the 
situationally specific "sense" which appeals to quite 
different assumptions about alcohol could make, rendering them 
unremarkable. Moreover, these appeals addressed themselves to 
the crucial question of culpability at the heart of the 
sentencing decision. Precisely because of their direct concern 
with defendants* capacities for self-control in particular 
situations, they could not be disregarded as extraneous pieces 
of information.
To speak of "the intoxication excuse" in mitigation is, 
therefore, misleading. There is no single intoxication excuse, 
crudely applied to all alcohol-related offences and offenders. 
Rather, there is a plurality of intoxication excuses, 
capitalising on the plurality of lay beliefs about alcohol, 
selectively and powerfully applied to explain and attribute 
responsibility for different kinds of criminality. The reach 
of these lay beliefs, and their moral connotations, is such 
that even the absence of alcohol from the circumstances of an 
offence is worthy of mention. This appears to be a unique 
adaptation of an excuse in mitigation; it is hard to find 
another single quality of an offence or offender the absence 
of which is so regularly and forcefully remarked upon.
Chapters Four and Five considered the availability of excuses 
in rationalisation and mitigation. Here, it can be seen that
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"availability” means more than presence. The presence of 
intoxication, or even alcoholism, in the "facts" of a case had 
little import if it was not available as an explanation to the 
perceiver. Thus, since intoxication and alcoholism were 
associated with impulsive dishonesty, they were not utilised 
in mitigation for the sustained and premeditated thefts in 
sober conditions, committed by employees, even when other 
motivational explanations were unidentifiable.
Availability was also related to an implicit hierarchy of 
social problems. Within this hierarchy, the persuasiveness of 
a problem related to its emotive appeal rather than to 
practical utility in the formation of a response. Mental 
disorder was more persuasive than either intoxication or 
alcoholism, even though sentencing was paralysed by the 
inaccessibility of treatment. Drug addiction was also more 
persuasive, possibly because of the seemingly alien nature of 
the condition when compared to the stockpile of "common 
knowledge" and everyday experience of alcohol.
CONCLUSIONS
Tragic and hopeless defendants could draw attention to their 
alcoholic status in ways which enhanced their 
characterisation. Typical drunken behaviour in court varied 
according to characterisation. Defendants attracted by the 
possibility of reducing punishment by the adoption of a sick, 
or alcoholic identity, might nevertheless experience 
considerable ambivalence about the embracement of such an 
identity, with its implications for professional diagnosis and 
treatment. Systematic differences could be identified in the 
representation of the involvement of alcohol in an offence. 
These differences were related to the types of offence or 
offender under consideration, and appealed to lay theories 
about alcohol, selectively applied in the context of specific 
situations.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
LAY AND PROFESSIONAL THEORIES:
MEETING OF MINDS OR MARRIAGE OF INCOMPATIBLES?
This chapter explores aspects of the theories held by 
magistrates and probation officers of intoxicated deviance, 
responsibility and the probation service*s professional role 
in provision of SERs and probation supervision. These issues 
are considered for their potential influence on sentencing 
decision making. The chapter also examines tensions in 
probation officers* professional theories and experience, and 
the implications of these tensions for their professional 
identity.
THEORIES OF INTOXICATED CRIME AND RESPONSIBILITY
Magistrates and probation officers were asked whether there 
were real or hypothetical cases in which they believed that an 
alcohol-related offender should not be held responsible for 
his crime, or in which they perceived alcohol to be a 
mitigating or aggravating factor. The examination in Chapter 
Two of the relationships between abstract theories and 
behaviour in specific situations suggests that these stated 
principles may be modified when applied to individual cases. 
Questions about hypothetical instances of alcohol-related 
crime exposed situationally specific shifts in the 
interpretation of intoxicated deviance.
Principles of intoxicated responsibility
Only 6 (30 per cent) of the 20 magistrates responded with an 
unequivocal negative to the question whether there were real 
or hypothetical cases in which they thought that an alcohol- 
related offender should not be held responsible for what he 
had done.
Six (30 per cent) identified the "spiked drink*', or 
involuntary intoxication, as an occasion for absolving an 
offender from criminal responsibility.
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"If it could be proved that he'd been spiked. But that's 
about it...That would be the only one because all the 
others are self-inflicted wounds. Whether it be one drink 
or whether it be 10, you should know what it can do. You 
should know what your reaction is.11
"Only if somebody else had doctored his drink. Sorry 
about that. People should be responsible for what they 
drink...In today's world, when we're trying to teach 
everybody about drink, people should know that their 
responsibility is not to drink so that they can't control 
whatever it is that they're doing."
These remarks illustrate the basic principle which magistrates 
applied to the judgement of responsibility for intoxicated 
crime: intoxication was a self-induced condition, in which the 
drinker courted loss of control. Nevertheless, 8 magistrates 
(40 per cent) acknowledged further occasions when these 
judgements were problematic. Notably, in some of these 
responses, magistrates did not distinguish clearly between the 
attribution of strict responsibility and the acceptance of 
mitigation.
One magistrate conceded that driving might become unexpectedly 
necessary after drinking. Two magistrates acknowledged a 
problem in general terms.
"I do find this a problem sometimes. I know it's no 
defence that they were drunk, but there have been times 
when I've thought: 'This person wouldn't have done it if 
they weren't drunk'. I really have thought that."
"My thoughts start from you cannot hold alcohol as an 
excuse. Now, OK, there are occasions when you know very 
well, had they not drunk the alcohol the case would not 
have been as serious, perhaps...Then you start getting 
emotional about it: 'Poor fellow, poor old lass, if she 
hadn't been drunk that wouldn't have happened'."
Three magistrates thought that alcoholism, as a disease or 
illness, diminished responsibility.
"Some people are much more culpably drunk than 
others...If it's got to the stage where it's an actual 
disease, that's a different kettle of fish altogether. 
And I certainly (wouldn't) regard (that) as culpably 
drunk, because I feel that it's just a disease."
368
"Somebody who is an alcoholic may well not be responsible 
for his actions. Not specifically. They may have a broad 
responsibility. They may know that this is the sort of 
thing they tend to do when they are (drunk) , but they are 
so fixed on a particular habit. It*s like a drug addict. 
It's an illness.”
Two magistrates thought that responsibility was diminished 
when drinking was a response to personal trauma.
"There are obviously times when somebody's gone through 
an enormous personal trauma.. .If somebody's wife had just 
died or something and maybe because of that the person 
had drunk too much and that had led perhaps to a(n) 
offence. Yes, personal tragedies of that sort, certainly 
would be taken into account."
"When people drink through despair and are at their wits 
end, and one hears about extremely distressing family 
circumstances, you think to yourself: 'Well, no wonder
they've been drinking! "'
Finally, one magistrate described a case in which alcohol 
consumption played a vital part in a defendant's livelihood.
"Easily. Yes. I'm not saying I agree with what he was 
doing, but I know why he did it. That was a chap who was 
a steel fitter, working up on massive places, sky 
high...He could not do his job unless he'd got a drink 
inside him. Every (body) on that site who was a steel 
fitter had alcohol - a lw a y s had alcohol...He said: 'You 
tell me somebody else who'd be 130 feet up in the sky 
with no safety harness, walking across a piece of 
steel'.. .It's a Catch 22 situation.. .You either lose your 
job or you lose your licence.”
Magistrates also equivocated on the subject of mitigation. Six 
(30 per cent) rejected the intoxication excuse here.
"I'm hard on that. I just feel that it's self-induced and 
no excuses. And as long as you're aware of what you're up 
to, well then you've no need to get into trouble with it. 
I can understand those who are weak and who like it. I 
know of those who are shy and can't do anything till 
they've got their sherry down. I can understand that. 
But.. .when it comes to criminality, I would give it very 
little weight in mitigation."
369
The remainder (70 per cent) offered a variety of instances in 
which intoxication was potentially mitigating. Four mentioned 
alcoholism.
"Somebody who doesn't know what they*re doing and is 
perpetually in an alcoholic state. I still say there was 
a responsibility, but they have become so debilitated 
that they are - not incapable of responsibility - but 
much less able to make a conscious decision."
Five observed that intoxication could mitigate when they 
sympathised with a person's motivations for drinking.
"Yes, I do have some sympathy that drink can help some 
people...It can give them a lift or a bit of courage. The 
thing I find most relaxing about having a glass of wine 
is the actual act of sitting down socially with somebody 
and drinking (it)...So I understand that after some sort 
of shock somebody might just sit down and perhaps drink 
too much...For some (families) it's the norm for dad tq 
be coming home from the pub with a bag of chips every 
night. He may not do anything to anybody e v e r , he just 
walks to the pub...and saunters back. If someone in those 
circumstances were involved in something (unexpected), 
you might see that as mitigation."
"There are times of crisis in a person's life when a 
resort to the bottle seems to be the only thing. Personal 
grief, personal sorrows, or a series of disasters. When 
drinking oneself into oblivion does seem to be the only 
way out, perhaps. But it's rather at variance with my 
former assertion that I do believe that one has a sense 
of personal responsibility which should take over-riding 
preference. I can well foresee that with some people this 
would be submerged into their own requirements at the 
time."
Some magistrates pointed to unusual features of an intoxicated 
offence, such as accident or emergency, and uncharacteristic 
or incompetent behaviour. Here, the issue seemed to be the 
absence of prior expectation of offending.
"If it's a very young person, yes. People have got to 
learn. If somebody has never come across alcohol before 
and ends up going to a party and therefore that leads to 
an offence."
"There are certain situations that...backfire on you. He 
was probably in the wrong place at the wrong time and 
drinking the wrong alcohol. If it had been somebody else
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he might have been able to cope with it and walk away and 
deal with it another way."
"Occasionally you get people who have acted totally 
uncharacteristically on a particular occasion having 
drunk too much."
Eighteen magistrates (90 per cent) identified circumstances in 
which alcohol was an aggravating factor. Seven mentioned 
driving offences involving alcohol. Here, the seriousness of 
such offences was linked to the risk of severe harm, and to a 
perceived element of deliberation in the offence. Magistrates 
voiced strong views on this topic.
"Drink-driving...Because there's so much publicity 
about...the dangers of drinking and driving. When you're 
in a car having drunk so much that you are actually going 
along with this weapon, you can cause people so much 
harm. And it's the fact that they do it knowingly. They 
actually m ust know."
"There was one very bad one where a chap...ended up 
driving into the front of somebody's house. He was well 
gone...His actions were irresponsible from beginning to 
end, because he went out, with the knowledge that he was 
going to drink and didn't take any steps to stop himself 
from driving...His whole attitude was wrong."
Six magistrates (30 per cent) mentioned violence, and one 
commented on the quality of "noise and terror". Alcohol was 
thought to unleash excessive savagery in an attack. In some of 
these responses, it was suggested that alcohol was used 
intentionally to engender aggression.
"Street violence...[I]f somebody has been drinking 
they're probably going to be far more violent towards the 
other person than they would be if they were sober."
"Attacks on publicans...[P]eople who habitually go to 
certain kinds of pubs which have a reputation for 
violence, or where nobody's particularly surprised when 
violence breaks out...There's a whole culture of 
aggressive drinking."
The notion that alcohol might be consumed intentionally to 
facilitate offending was taken up by 5 magistrates (25 per
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cent), for whom this quality of drinking was the aggravating 
factor rather than the type of offence.
\
"When you have deliberately got yourself into a drunk 
condition so that you will lose your inhibitions and then 
commit a crime. To me that makes it worse. If there's 
absolutely no question of disease, you know perfectly 
well what you're doing."
One magistrate considered the rejection of treatment while 
persistently offending to be an aggravating factor.
Thus, judgements of responsibility were problematic for 
magistrates because of their belief in loss of control through 
intoxication or alcoholism. The assessment of motivations for 
drinking weighed heavily in judgements of culpability for 
subsequent offending. Loss of control over drinking itself, 
drinking in response to personal trauma or drinking without 
prior expectation of offending reduced culpability. 
"Provocative" drinking, whereby offending was deliberately or 
recklessly facilitated through intoxication, increased 
culpability.
Probation officers were considerably more confident and 
uniform in their responses. Fourteen (93 per cent) out of the 
15 officers gave an abrupt negative to the question whether 
there were cases in which an alcohol-related offender should 
not be held responsible for his crime. In clarifying this 
unequivocal response, they became eloquent on the topic of 
personal responsibility. Their basic rule was similar to that 
of the magistrates.
"I do have a sense of people being responsible for their 
behaviour. And drinking is part of their behaviour. 
People excuse their offending on the basis that they 
didn't know what they were doing. They knew they were 
d r in k in g , and usually there's a history that they know 
what drinking can lead to. Therefore I do have a sense 
that they have to be responsible at least for the 
beginning of the sequence of events, even if they didn't 
know what was happening by the end of it."
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"It would be very dangerous to start making exceptions, 
saying because they were drunk therefore they had no 
knowledge or control. Thatfs a very slippery slope...I'd 
be very worried because ultimately people h a ve to be 
responsible for their own behaviour...If people don't 
take responsibility for themselves, we're into a very 
patronising way of viewing the world."
"For many people it's a lot easier to...blame the 
alcohol, instead of blaming themselves for drinking.. .But 
because people have always got the choice about their 
drinking they've got the choice of doing something about 
it. I don't think people are unaware of the effects of 
their drinking. They may choose not to see it that way. 
They may choose to ignore it."
The officer who said that "[t]he only exception would be it 
somebody had spiked a drink of somebody, who knew that they 
reacted to alcohol...and therefore deliberately avoided it", 
also subscribed to the fundamental principle.
Several officers explained their firmness by reference to 
their professional role.
"Part of my job is about saying to people that they do 
have self-determination and that they can control their 
own behaviour."
"I don't see myself being in the job anyway to excuse 
people. I respect clients for what they are. I care about 
what happens to them. But I'm not in the business of 
excusing them. That's a totally different thing."
"[T]he crux of what we do is about getting people to take 
responsibility for their actions. So I think that's a 
very negative way of going about it...A large part of 
substance abuse includes denial...We should be in the 
business of confronting rather than colluding."
Only 2 officers (13 per cent) identified circumstances in 
which they would consider intoxication to be a mitigating 
factor in an offence. Like magistrates, they were concerned 
with the motivational background to the drinking.
"Circumstances of considerable stress. Bereavement, for 
example. A break up of a relationship, loss of a job. 
Stress, I guess."
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"If it's a youngster who doesn't realise just how strong 
alcohol can be. And he's with a group...and he's perhaps 
encouraged or gets carried along."
Three probation officers (20 per cent) conceded the 
possibility of mitigation through intoxication, but with 
strong reservations.
"I don't know. I wouldn't like to rule that one out...The 
only difference it makes is that I might say this person 
has a drink problem, and therefore could do with some 
help to address it, rather than this person has no 
problems at all and is just thoroughly nasty. So I 
suppose we do accept it as mitigation. If somebody went 
around and in cold blood thumped people, whereas when 
they do it when absolutely drunk you think this person 
needs help, don't you? So I guess so."
"It's possible, but nothing comes to mind, to be quite 
honest. I'd like to think not, but I guess maybe there's 
been the odd case. Because I believe in personal 
responsibility. But in minor, trivial cases, where 
perhaps somebody had a very well established alcohol 
problem and was absolutely desperate and nicked a bottle 
of gin.. .you can understand very easily how it could have 
happened."
Seven probation officers (47 per cent) rejected mitigation 
through intoxication. These officers were often concerned to 
clarify their professional role. Indeed, some appeared quite 
affronted by their inference that they should concern 
themselves with questions of mitigation.
"But I'm not in the business of mitigating! Mitigation is 
for solicitors and barristers...I'm there to give an 
assessment of a person's situation and some understanding 
to that situation. Which is not to mitigate. Mitigation 
is providing excuses and I don't think I'm from the 
Ministry of Excuses."
"I don't see my role as mitigating at all. That's a 
solicitor's role. In the court setting I see my role as 
explaining the offence and saying this offence is 
inextricably linked with abuse of alcohol...And maybe 
using that to say rather than just look at the offence, 
what we've got to look at is the drinking, to stop 
further offending. That's not mitigation. That's 
explaining the offences. No, I'm quite clear about that."
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The hesitant concessions to mitigation were perhaps also 
linked to this distinction which probation officers drew 
between mitigation and explanation. Explanation was a 
legitimate role for probation officers. It was linked to the 
construction of sentencing recommendations and concern for 
of f enders1 problems.
"Where I come in, as a probation officer, is looking at 
how to avoid offending in future, which is where alcohol 
may well come in. In terms of whether it makes the 
offence more or less serious, I don't concern myself with 
that."
"If you get into that game of booze as an excuse, it then 
undermines any work that you're trying to do with 
somebody. You can show somebody that you care and that 
you understand. You do not excuse the offence."
Paradoxically, probation officers were much less 
professionally self-conscious on the subject of aggravation. 
Only one officer re-iterated the view that these issues were 
not legitimate professional concerns. Two officers inclined to 
the view that alcohol per se was essentially a neutral factor 
in an offence.
"If you beat somebody over the head with an iron bar, I 
don't really think that it should make it worse or better 
if you'd been drinking beforehand. The fact that you've 
done it should be the issue...Otherwise, one falls into 
the trap of making alcohol into some kind of a 
determinant of behaviour, and we should start from the 
assumption that it isn't."
Eleven probation officers (73 per cent) gave examples of 
aggravation through intoxication. Nine (60 per cent) cited 
driving offences. To some extent, as 4 officers observed, this 
was technical point: that excess alcohol constituted an
additional offence. Three officers pointed to the appearance 
of deliberation in such offences. Often, however, the tone of 
probation officers' remarks conveyed personal abhorrence of 
the offence.
"There h a s to be an aggravating factor, particularly in 
things like death through reckless driving...If 
somebody's deliberately putting other people's lives at
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risk and in fact takes somebody*s life...then that seems 
to have been, in a sense, planned, in that they didn't 
take the necessary precautions or didn*t think it was 
important enough to protect other people."
"Reckless driving combined with drinking. It's an
additional offence. I personally don't have much time for 
drink drivers. There's so much publicity about drinking 
and driving that even relatively irresponsible people 
ought to be sufficiently aware to control their drinking 
if they're going to drive."
Three probation officers (20 per cent) mentioned violent 
offences. For 2 officers this was linked to the belief that 
intoxicated disinhibition would increase the severity of an 
attack. The third combined personal antipathy with a 
sociological explanation of alcohol-related violence.
"I don't like violence. Violence with weapons in
particular...Those sorts of offences as a probation
officer and as a citizen make me uncomfortable...I don't 
like being in pubs when fights start, I don't like seeing 
fights...Inner cities in this country seem to me to have 
started to become the exclusive property, almost, of the 
18-30 year olds.. .My fear is that the more (other) people 
are excluded from the city centre, the more likely that 
sort of violence is on the bubble...People feeling afraid 
to go certain places. Drunken, loud, violent people."
One probation officer regarded the invocation of the
intoxication excuse itself as aggravating.
"I don't think drinking necessarily makes the offence 
worse...When you see somebody who's actually excusing 
their behaviour through drink, that makes it worse. It's 
almost as if they're licensing themselves to offend."
Probation officers were perhaps professionally inclined to 
judge the seriousness of offences by their objective 
consequences, rather than by the qualitative ingredient of 
intoxication. Certainly, they did not struggle with the notion 
of intoxicated responsibility as magistrates did, nor concern 
themselves greatly with prior motivations for drinking, except 
when considering aggravation. Personal abhorrence, 
particularly concerning intoxicated driving, intervened to 
disrupt the dispassionate professionalism upon which they had
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previously insisted. The topic of aggravation thus began to 
reveal the fusions and tensions between professional 
theorising and personal attitudes suggested in Chapter Two.
Theories of alcohol-related crime
The discrepancies between abstract principles and responses in 
real situations were considered in Chapter Two. Some 
exploration of the intervening factors in this gap between 
theory and action was attempted through questions about 
hypothetical instances of intoxicated deviance. Two questions 
produced markedly different responses from probation officers 
and magistrates: one concerning City's crime problems; and one 
concerning personal success in avoiding trouble through drink. 
Further questions explored explanations of types of alcohol- 
related crime.
l. City's crime problems
The choice of the question whether City experienced problems 
with particular kinds of alcohol-related crime was guided by 
research evidence that magistrates' sentencing practice may be 
influenced by the belief that their locality suffers from 
special crime problems (Burney 1985; Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 
1989). However, the more alarmist views on City's crime 
problems came from the probation officers.
Most magistrates took the question as an invitation to compare 
City with other places, as indeed it had been intended. Seven 
magistrates (35 per cent) did not think that City suffered 
from any particular problems with alcohol-related crime. One 
magistrate summed up this sanguine view.
"I wouldn't have thought any more than anywhere else. No. 
We've our drunks, same as every other city. We've got 
people who drive, so has every other city. We've got the 
lads who get into scraps, usually because they've had too 
much to dr ink... so does everybody else. No, I don't think 
there's any difference.”
Magistrates were also asked whether they thought that City 
experienced problems with particular kinds of crime
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irrespective of alcohol involvement. This additional question 
was posed in order to test whether magistrates* views were 
distorted by a concentration on alcohol-related crime. Six 
magistrates (30 per cent) responded negatively to this 
question. One observed cheerfully:
"When you come here and you sit in the court building and 
these people are ranged up and the lists are long, you 
think: *By Jove! (City) is a shocking place to be and
crime is rampant and the police have absolutely got it 
out of control!* But that isn*t the case at all...We're 
pretty law-abiding, by and large.”
Among magistrates who mentioned "sober" crimes which they 
thought were prevalent in City, there was no strong consensus 
about their nature.
On the topic of alcohol-related crime, 6 magistrates (30 per 
cent) mentioned City's alcoholics. Magistrates here were 
identifying a social problem rather than a crime problem.
"We've got the habitual drunks, but I imagine that 
probably every community has these days. In fact, I'm 
quite sad that they've taken away those seats in the 
(shopping precinct)...The more you isolate people with 
problems like drinking, it's not going to help."
"It seems to me that there are an enormous number of 
alcoholics...It's a very good Tom Tiddler's ground."
Four magistrates mentioned excess alcohol offences, although 
it was unclear whether they thought that this was a special 
problem for City, or only that it was widespread. Four 
magistrates considered violence to be a problem in City: 2 in 
relation to alcohol-related crime and 2 when considering crime 
generally.
"The violent crime in (City) on the streets is 
increasing, according to what the police tell us...It's 
grown in (City) over the years since I've been a 
magistrate. It's probably universal now."
"[I]t's purely and simply because they haven't got 
anywhere to go apart from pubs...It's a social problem 
that we haven't catered for the number of youngsters that 
we have here."
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"I'm very conscious of street crime, of the mugging or 
beating up variety...It's a very obvious element and 
one's conscious of it simply by walking about. You see 
it."
"I can't really speak on facts, but I get the impression 
that we are getting a little more violent."
Only 4 probation officers thought that there was nothing 
special about City's alcohol-related crime problems; a fifth, 
being recently appointed, had no view on the subject. Three 
probation officers (20 per cent) mentioned City's alcoholics. 
Nine probation officers (60 per cent) identified violence as 
a particular crime problem.
"From the time that I've spent in court it would be very 
difficult to ignore the alcohol-related affrays and 
general rucking in the street, and one-off assaults on 
taxi-drivers.. .Nasty offences because quite often weapons 
get used."
In comments such as this, it seemed that probation officers 
might have been responding to the question in terms of the 
alcohol-crime association, perceiving it to strongest in 
relation to violence. Some officers also wondered if their 
perception of the phenomenon was distorted by the type of work 
they predominantly undertook.
"Most of my impressions would be from people serving 
custodial sentences, in which case I've probably got a 
skewed view anyway, because they tend to be...more 
serious offences."
However, 5 officers compared City unfavourably with places in 
which they had previously worked. Notably, all these officers 
had prior experience in bigger metropolitan and inner city 
areas. Moreover, these officers in particular tended to remark 
on the viciousness of City's violence.
"One of the things I've been aware of since coming to 
(City) is the amount of crimes of violence...I have a gut 
feeling that alcohol's playing a major part in there 
somewhere...I am aware that we're getting quite a lot of 
people doing quite long sentences for serious GBH."
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"There seems to me to be not a great deal of really 
serious organised professional crime, as compared with my 
experience (elsewhere) . But there seems to me to be quite 
a lot of violent offences...Parts of (City) seem to have 
quite a reputation for fighting. Drinking and fighting, 
the Anglo-Saxon disease."
"The thing that surprised me coming to (City) was the 
amount of offenders we have on our books for violent 
crime... [T]hat struck me as soon as I came to (City) . And 
it's always seemed that way to me here. It seems to get 
a lot of gratuitous violence and unsuspecting victims.”
2. Personal success in avoiding trouble through drink
Fourteen magistrates (70 per cent) attributed their success in 
avoiding trouble through drink to the fact that they drank 
little or nothing. Their collective abstemiousness was 
impressive.
"I don't drink very much, simply because I'm a nervous 
sort of person.. .and I find drink just exaggerates it. . .1 
don't think I've ever even remotely approached being 
drunk i”
"I don't enjoy it much anyway, so it's no hardship. It's 
easy for me...For a person who really loves it, it must 
be difficult.”
"Easy! I just can't take drink. That's it. End of 
story...I've never ever been drunk. Never."
Nine magistrates (45 per cent) identified a sense of personal 
responsibility or self-discipline, which influenced their 
conduct in all areas of their lives, including, by 
implication, alcohol consumption.
"I'm very hard working.. .But I enjoy doing things because 
I don't want to sit around doing nothing and maybe that's 
just the type of personality that you are...I can't bear 
other people to take decisions for me. So I've got to be 
there at the decision to make sure they get it right!"
"A naturally cautious nature, I would think!"
"It's a frame of mind, isn't it?...My youth wasn't that 
easy. I had it quite difficult. Because I left home when 
I was barely 17...and I used to get drunk every night. 
But I got out of that... I had to make certain 
decisions.. .That's what people have to do for 
themselves."
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"Discipline, in a word, probably self-discipline. My 
discipline was that I wasn't going to struggle in the way 
I saw my mother struggle. And therefore I'd got to make 
something of my life.”
Perhaps to exemplify this conscious self-discipline, 7 
magistrates (35 per cent) pointed to a personal policy for 
drinking and driving.
"If I'm going to drive, I don't drink. Simple as that.”
”1 had a hell of an argument yesterday with a 
Dutchman... [He] said to me: 'Why are you not drinking?
You like a drink'. I said: 'Yes, I love a drink, but I'm 
going home today and I shall be driving home'. 'But, by 
God! ', he said, 'this is lunchtime and (you won't be home 
till midnight).' I said: 'No, but I have a rule. I don't 
drink in the 24 hours I'm going to drive...I'm sorry, but 
that is a principle I work to'."
Seven magistrates (35 per cent) identified their upbringing as 
a key ingredient in the development of decorum and 
abstemiousness in adulthood.
"I'm fairly puritanical about it...I was brought up in a 
teetotal household."
"It's a style of life and my upbringing, perhaps...OK, 
you go out on your own life after 18 or 20, and you make 
your own way. But you still think back: 'Well, that's the 
way it should be done'.”
"I always consider spending money on drink excessively a 
complete waste. Perhaps I'm a bit of a puritan! My 
tradition, my upbringing. Alcohol didn't feature very 
largely.”
Two magistrates considered the possible significance of the 
drinking environment.
"We would drink at home, but not outside...Maybe that's 
what it is. In certain types of family you drink at home, 
so if you're going to do anything obnoxious you do it in 
the house. Whereas the youngsters that drink in the pub, 
their opportunity for criminal damage is on the way 
home.. .So maybe that's what it is. It's where you do your 
drinking."
"When I was an undergraduate we went to our fair share of 
parties, and I've no doubt that we all occasionally
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overindulged, but in those days we didn't have cars at 
all. Colleges do mop up an awful lot of drink problems 
among students."
Only one magistrate, however, explicitly acknowledged personal 
fallibility.
"It's not planned. It's the unplanned set of 
circumstances which leads somebody to do something which 
they haven't thought about...I can think of all sorts of 
circumstances when I might, or no doubt have - however 
much I deplore or normally avoid it."
These lay theories of personal success in avoiding trouble 
through drink belong predominantly in the arena of 
dispositional theories, considered in their academic 
formulations in Chapter Three. The heavy reliance on 
abstention as a primary explanation implies a strong belief in 
the potential for pharmacologically induced loss of control. 
Nevertheless, magistrates' explanations of their 
abstemiousness itself drew predominantly on beliefs about 
personal responsibility and self-discipline, inculcated 
through upbringing.
Probation officers displayed a keen awareness of their own 
potential fallibility. Only 5 officers (33 per cent) 
explicitly said that they were moderate or non-drinkers. The 
remarks of a sixth officer are interesting in this context. 
This officer concentrated on the aversiveness of intoxication. 
Abstemiousness, although heavily implied, was not mentioned in 
itself.
"A. I think I know what it does to me. B. I don't like 
what it does to me. C. I don't like being that out of 
control of myself....So I'm aware of its effects at all 
levels: physically, emotionally and psychologically."
For other probation officers, it seemed that moderation was 
not the only available solution to potential trouble through 
drink.
"I'm a bit of a coward! When I've had a few beers, I'm 
still cautious enough not to pick a fight with a bloke in
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a T-shirt at the bar. I am very conscious about drinking 
and driving, which means that I nowadays very rarely 
drink in (City) , but I drink at home in the village and 
just walk backwards and forwards from the pub."
"I don't like getting out of control. I think it's partly 
a class thing, partly about setting limits, partly about 
staying in control of behaviour even when drunk."
"Being cagey, probably!.. .1 could never put my hand on my 
heart and say I've never drunk and driven. But I'm aware 
enough to know what the implications would be for me if 
I did get caught for drinking and driving. So quite often 
I'm aware of where the police traps are, and I wouldn't 
drink and drive if I know I'm going through those areas. 
I've got to say, over the last 5 years or so I've got 
more responsible in that way. Certainly, now, I wouldn't 
do it.. .Because the trouble with me is I do like a drink. 
And one pint is not enough!"
Only one probation officer mentioned upbringing, and none 
talked about personal responsibility or self-discipline in the 
manner of magistrates, as a stable disposition. Probation 
officers did not seem to see their drinking behaviour as 
originating in the same self-will which had brought them to 
their present status in life. Rather, as suggested in the last 
officer's comments, their present status provided the 
incentives to control their drinking or its effects.
"I have an awful lot to lose by getting into trouble."
"(When) people are in perfectly satisfactory 
relationships and good jobs, the incentives aren't there. 
Or the incentives are there for n o t offending. You have 
something to lose".
"It seems to me that most of the people I see who get 
into trouble through drink have got not a lot in the if 
lives other than drinking with their mates, having a good 
time. Very short term goals. Maybe it's the case that the 
longer term your goals are - the more you've got to lose 
- the less likely you are to get into trouble."
For 2 more officers, their professional experience in itself 
altered their drinking behaviour.
"If you're talking about drinking and driving, so often 
they're people my age and (with a) similar 
background...But it's having worked with people and
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learned more about its effects. That's the difference. 
It's so much a part of our everyday working life.”
These themes in probation officers' responses are related to 
the fundamental factor to which they predominantly attributed 
their success in avoiding trouble through drink: the context 
in which their drinking occurred. Ten officers (67 per cent) 
made this point. The social and environmental context of their 
drinking dominated most officers' responses.
Seven officers explained the point by contrasting current and 
previous drinking patterns. This recognition of change in 
their personal attitudes and behaviour distinguished probation 
officers from magistrates. Only 2 magistrates reported a shift 
in drinking pattern between youth and maturity. The candid 
acknowledgement of a change in their view of drinking and 
driving was one aspect of this for 2 probation officers.
"There was the odd time when I was younger when I drank 
and drove. I did not say that with pride because I'm very 
against drinking and driving. But when I was about 17 and 
I'd just passed my test, I was rather irresponsible in a 
lot of ways."
Recollections of studenthood prompted recognition of the 
merciful protectiveness of certain drinking environments, 
together with sociological observations of class and culture.
"I didn't really drink until I went to 
university...that's where I really discovered the 
delights! There was a lot of boozing going on there. But 
it was all student parties, and it didn't spill out into 
public view. If it had, I'm quite sure people would have 
been arrested."
"In some ways its a matter of chance. I know from my own 
experience that at university there are a fair amount of 
people who get into trouble through drink and are never 
prosecuted. They're dealt with informally. The higher up 
the social scale you go the more likely you are to be 
weeded out from the whole prosecution process."
"I was at university...where I used to drink a lot. That 
was partly about being in a culture where it's expected. 
One expects rugby players to be drunk on Saturday 
nights!I..A group of similarly aged people in the street
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are more likely to attract police attention. That would 
be a class thing."
For 2 officers, the environment and culture of drinking was 
also a matter of gender.
"Dare I say being a woman?...First of all, if there's a 
group of you in the street, the police will tend to go 
for the men.. .It tends to be the blokes who are prominent 
in any kind of disturbance. And if...in my domestic 
circumstances, I hit the bottle, I'd probably just lounge 
around the house and get depressed. Which is a typically 
female response...I'd just languish around the house, be 
a trouble to myself, but not society."
For the 6 magistrates who said that they did not visit pubs, 
this information appeared largely to be supportive evidence of 
their abstemiousness. Certainly, in 4 cases the 2 assertions 
followed in tandem. For probation officers, this was usually 
part of their explanations of the circumstances in which they 
did currently drink. Once again, the significant issue was the 
protective physical and social context of drinking.
"Luck, number 1, in my younger years. Number 2, rarely 
drinking, now, outside of the house. Number 3 - which is 
probably related to number 2 - domestic responsibilities. 
They keep me at home and make me generally exhausted and 
I (haven't) got the energy to go out drinking and 
breaching the peace. A bottle of wine with supper and I 
fall asleep."
"Most of the drinking I do will take place at home. It's 
to do with preparing meals for friends...I don't tend to 
drink a lot in pubs...It was about people who worked 
together and had interests in common...a drinking circle 
that was about providing entertainment for each other. 
Quite an introspective sort of thing."
Concerning their success in avoiding trouble through drink, 
therefore, most probation officers were situational theorists. 
Although they believed in pharmacological disinhibition, in 
this context the quantity of consumption was largely beside 
the point. Thus, some probation officers talked about "luck", 
referring to the happy coincidence of social situational 
factors which protected them from the potential risks 
engendered by alcohol consumption. Nevertheless, probation
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officers did not link their personal fallibility within 
situationally inspired temptation to an abdication of personal 
responsibility. In this respect, their professional belief in 
11 explanation, not mitigation" of offenders' behaviour was 
consistent with their personal moral standards.
3. Types of intoxicated crime
Theoretical perspectives shifted in response to a sequence of 
questions asking for explanations of types of intoxicated 
deviance. Of primary interest is the shifting reliance on 
intoxication itself. Disinhibition was invoked most often by 
both magistrates and probation officers in the explanation of 
pub violence. Sixteen magistrates (80 per cent) mentioned 
this.
"It must be alcohol! You're in a pub, you're going to 
drink, you're going to get excited, you're going to be
elated. The alcohol's going to make the adrenalin flow,
and you're in a different world...However, they react 
differently when they've got this alcohol inside them."
Eleven probation officers (73 per cent) also invoked
disinhibition.
"Too much drink! People drink too much, lose control, 
lose their faculties...They lose the inbuilt things they 
have that stop them doing things normally. Alcohol is a 
depressant, and depressed people may fight!"
More probation officers than magistrates cited disinhibition 
in the explanation of marital disputes. Only 3 magistrates (15 
per cent) , but 8 probation officers (53 per cent) did so. 
Officers here seemed to be trying to relate disinhibition to 
a more complex function of drinking within a close
relationship.
"Because the physical effect of alcohol is to suppress 
your inhibitions, and maybe all the feelings that you've 
had pent up...come bubbling up to the surface. It's a bit 
like why do (marital disputes) always happen at 
Christmas? Expectations that things should be nice and 
suddenly they're not...[W]hen the inhibitions are gone, 
people express the disappointments that they have in each 
other, which are probably perfectly healthy and normal -
386
to be disappointed in your partner - but it suddenly 
reaches tremendous proportions.1
"It's an easy way of exerting power... [I]t's a weapon 
which is used because it's very powerful. If one party's 
drinking that completely disarms the other, because you 
can't be rational, you can't attempt to address problems 
logically through discussion. You can only deal with the 
symptoms you're being presented with...That's why it's 
such a pernicious weapon."
Only one magistrate and 2 probation officers postulated
intoxication, through judgement impairment, as a cause of 
drinking and driving. As the magistrate put it:
"You've got to decide before you have a drink whether 
you're going to drive. It's too late once you've had a 
drink...Your brain's affected."
Intoxication p e r  se was not mentioned by magistrates at all in 
relation to chronic alcoholics. It was mentioned briefly by 3 
probation officers. Two remarked on its incapacitating
effects.
"One of the reasons that people with chronic drink
problems appear to commit a lot of crime or get caught
for a lot of crime is that when they're drunk they're not 
very good at it."
There was, in fact, a wide difference between magistrates and 
probation officers in their explanations of the offending of 
chronic alcoholics. Two themes dominated magistrates' 
responses. Firstly, chronic alcoholics could not help 
themselves.
"Because they're almost continually under the influence 
of alcohol and are not aware of their actions...They are 
just not aware. Their minds are never clear enough to 
reach any form of clear decisions about their actions."
"Because they can't do anything. They've got no control 
over their actions. They are so committed to alcohol that 
there is no way that they can be other than they are."
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Secondly, chronic alcoholics were sick.
"Because they're sick. That's very disturbing. I hate to 
see (them) being brought and brought into court.. .Because 
they are - they're s i c k . They're as sick as somebody 
who's got a mental illness.”
"The drink takes over from them. I guess they don't 
realise what they're doing. It's an illness and not a 
crime."
These 2 theories appeared in the responses of 15 magistrates 
(75 per cent), vividly demonstrating their belief in the power 
of alcoholism to strip individuals of their capacity for 
personal responsibility. Magistrates were fully aware of the 
structural problems in the lives of chronic alcoholics. 
However, they tended to remark on their tragedy and 
offensiveness, rather than their offending.
"They're d i r t y ,  they're a n u is a n c e , they f r i g h t e n  people 
- they're quite frightening! - they demand money. Most 
people try to avoid them. (But) when you see people so 
far down the road to oblivion and degradation, I do feel 
sorry for them...You can't just sweep offensive people 
out of sight."
Only 3 probation officers (20 per cent) unambiguously referred 
to loss of control through alcoholism.
"(Some of them) probably break the law because they lack 
control...I would suspect that some of them...are not 
responsible for their actions, once they get beyond a 
certain point."
The majority of probation officers took a sociological 
perspective on this question. Nine (60 per ,cent) offered 
theories of the alienated or anomic condition of the chronic 
alcoholic, or of social control.
"Because.. .they (don't) feel they are part of society, or 
the rules of society apply to them. But it goes deeper 
than that. They probably deep down feel such outsiders 
that the rest of the world has very little to do with 
them, and they have very little to do with the world."
"Chronic alcoholism is defined by a number of factors 
which are social, which would include unemployment,
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difficulties with accommodation, difficulty with finance, 
difficulty with relationships, that tend to push people 
towards the margins of their society. And the margins of 
society are controlled and patrolled by agents of social 
control, which is what brings them into conflict with the 
law, quite often."
In this context, loss of control was as much to do with social 
disempowerment as with physical and mental debility.
"They are in such an impossible situation, because they 
are in the grips of an addiction that is so overwhelming 
and resources are just not there to help them. (So) in 
some senses they would perceive themselves as having no 
choice about their actions. I  think they do have a 
choice, but the difficulty is that t h e y  don't believe 
(it). So life is a conspiracy, and it's very difficult 
for them to behave in a way which is within the law."
On other topics, the differences between magistrates and 
probation officers were more emphatic than theoretical. Both 
saw the involvement of alcohol in marital disputes in terms of 
the quality of a relationship, in which drinking might be a 
cause or a product of dissatisfaction. They commented equally 
on the exacerbating effects of deteriorating finances and the 
potential for violence. Magistrates, however, were more likely 
to assume that the drinker would be the male partner. One 
magistrate expressed the problem vividly.
"It's one of the saddest things if the person sees his or 
her marriage partner dwindle away into chronic 
alcoholism. It's terrible. Because it really means you've 
lost them, and they won't come back for your sake, 
either. They won't try to change their ways because it's 
impossible. So you've lost your influence. Therefore, 
they've lost your respect, yes, and you've lost your 
relationship."
Magistrates and probation officers largely agreed that pub 
violence was perpetrated by young males in groups. Magistrates 
were perhaps rather inclined to see this phenomenon from a 
dispositional perspective. Probation officers' theories of pub 
violence utilised rather more complex perspectives. Seven 
magistrates (35 per cent) and 4 probation officers (27 per 
cent) thought that the perpetrators were undisciplined or
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looking for trouble. Six officers (40 per cent) and one 
magistrate (5 per cent) invoked sociological theories of the 
alienation of working class youth. Seven officers (47 per 
cent) and 4 magistrates (20 per cent) referred to features of 
the drinking environment, and these officers tended to mention 
more situational factors than the magistrates who did so.
"With lots of milling around, violence is much more 
likely to be around because of people being in close 
proximity to each other, liable to bump into each other, 
to knock over each other*s drink. Also quite a lot of 
violence happens outside the pub, which to me is to do 
with how pubs are located near each other, where there 
aren't dispersal points or alternative things to draw 
people away. So...it's not just about individual choice. 
There are things which affect people's individual choice 
to get into violence."
The 3 probation officers who mentioned publicans did so 
unfavourably, while the references by 5 magistrates were 
sympathetic.
POs "Pubs probably don't take their responsibilities 
seriously enough. They're quite happy to go on serving 
people beyond any point which could be regarded as 
sensible."
M: "I admire publicans tremendously, because they have a 
very difficult job to do...The good ones deserve our 
support."
Drinking and driving was regarded as the personal fault of the 
offender by 15 magistrates (75 per cent) and 7 probation 
officers (47 per cent). Probation officers here compensated 
for their fewer numbers by the force of their remarks. 
Nevertheless, 8 officers (53 per cent) offered a sociological 
perspective on this topic, often in combination with 
individual condemnation.
"They're pig ignorant! It's true! People have this 
inflated idea of what civil liberties is all about. 'I 
must have my car, I will drive, I don't have 
responsibilities to other people.' They drink and drive 
because other people do, and because magistrates do, and 
because solicitors have done it. They think it's more 
socially respectable."
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Magistrates tended to comment on the challenge and machismo of 
drinking and driving. Seven (35 per cent) offered a 
sociological perspective.
"A far quicker route to sanity on the roads...is a 
complete bar to drinking and driving. So that one cannot 
be tempted to have this extra glass or 2 thinking that 
you are still below the limit...With parties and 
entertainments removed from housing, with public 
transport getting worse because society is running more 
cars, it's an ever increasing problem."
It was noted in Chapter Four that alcohol provides a key 
reference point for social observation. Here, both magistrates 
and probation officers were able to provide rapid explanations 
of instances of alcohol-related crime by associating them with 
particular types of offender, social situations and 
intoxicated behaviours. Within these hypothetical "schemata", 
particular motivations could be imputed to offenders, with 
consequential implications for judgements of their 
culpability.
SOCIAL ENQUIRY REPORTS
Magistrates rarely displayed awareness of the apparent 
passivity of their role in requests for SERs. A few stressed 
the importance of reaching an independent judgement of their 
necessity. One magistrate even questioned the ready 
acquiescence of probation officers to requests, betraying no 
suspicion of the degree of preparatory negotiation between 
court personnel.
Magistrates' pursuit of the fullest information was amply 
demonstrated in their stated reasons for requesting SERs. They 
sometimes seemed to attach significance to the lack of 
information per se.
"If there was something...about the defendant which was 
a bit of a puzzle, and they weren't prepared to say.. .The 
information that we really sought about background wasn't 
forthcoming. Therefore, in spite of them, we want to know 
more about them...It (may) not be fair, even though
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somebody is deliberately putting themselves in the 
position where we'd be quite justified in going ahead."
The need for information, cited by 9 magistrates, was closely 
linked to explanation, which was given as a reason by 10 
magistrates. In all, 15 magistrates mentioned either or both 
information and explanation.
"When you really don't understand why the person has done 
something and there isn't the information readily to 
hand...The exploration of the background can make 
something incomprehensible perfectly comprehensible."
Seven magistrates observed the necessity of SERs in cases in 
which custody was considered. Four observed that SERs expanded 
the sentencing options for community service and probation. 
Nine magistrates said that they requested SERs when the 
defendant needed help or had problems.
"If...the person has got a hopeless set of circumstances 
in which they're trying to develop. Home background, lack 
of stickability in employment, general hopelessness."
The popularity of information and explanation as reasons for 
requesting SERs, together with the pre-emptive requests for 
and presentation of reports by court personnel noted earlier, 
suggests that in many cases magistrates made no judgement at 
all prior to their receipt, not only by default, but 
purposefully. Magistrates expected their judgements to em erge  
from perusal of SERs.
This suggestion is supported by City magistrates' remarkable 
faith in the professional objectivity of the probation 
service. They did not appear to approach SERs with the 
suspicion noted in other research (Parker, Sumner and Jarvis
1989).
"I see (probation officers) as mediators, in a way that 
I don't see the solicitor, because I see them as honest 
brokers...There's no skin off the probation officer's 
nose...It doesn't matter to them if you don't follow 
their advice. But with a solicitor, it's his professional 
reputation."
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While magistrates regarded the information provided by 
probation officers as neutral, they saw their recommendations 
as heavily biased towards the defendants interests. 
Magistrates thought that by their recommendations probation 
officers were trying to keep defendants out of custody (4) , to 
achieve "the best possible solution in the interests of the 
defendant” (4) , or to rehabilitate or reform him (8) . 
Magistrates generally seemed to accept these motives as 
professionally appropriate.
"Most probation officers have a very strong aversion to 
penal institutions. A v e r y  strong aversion."
"Probation officers believe they can do a better job than 
prison. They h ave to believe that. That's why they're 
probation officers. You wouldn't want them n o t to feel 
that, really. They've got to believe in what they're 
doing"
Several, however, criticised probation officers for their 
refusal to recommend custody.
"I find very frustrating SERs which n e v e r recommend 
custodial sentences and therefore one always has to take 
a pinch of salt with (them)...Probation officers should 
have in the back of their mind the possibility of 
punishment... over the whole range of penalties."
"I've never in all my 15 years seen a SER (which) says: 
'In my opinion there is no alternative but imprisonment'. 
Never. Now that's the sort of decision I ’ m making all the 
time."
At one level, these criticisms were paradoxical, given the 
antipathy to prison of many magistrates themselves. 
Magistrates, however, were not concerned here with a 
coincidence of personal attitudes, but with the perceived 
failure of probation officers to accept the working reality of 
custody which was part of their own public duty.
Probation officers' statements of their goals in making 
recommendations lacked the personal passion which magistrates 
seemed to attribute to them. Two themes appeared most 
frequently: tariff and the reduction of offending. Six
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officers said that they were trying to divert offenders from 
custody, to keep them down tariff, or to preserve probation 
recommendations for high tariff cases.
"County policy would say diverting people from custodyI 
I would agree with that. Ensuring that those who aren't 
at risk of custody are kept as low down tariff as 
possible."
"If I think people are likely to reoffend one of the 
agendas for me is to keep them down tariff. So 1*11 use 
conditional discharge recommendations as long as I think 
I can get away with it... If I'm looking towards a 
probation recommendation I'm trying to make sure that 
they're fairly high tariff."
Eight officers answered in terms of preventing or reducing 
reoffending. However, explicit references to the 
rehabilitation, reform or welfare of offenders were entirely 
absent from probation officers' stated aims.
"To affect his offending. To offer the court my 
assessment of his offending and to use the lowest 
possible thing on the tariff to change that."
"I'm trying to provide the courts with credible 
alternatives to custody. I'm also trying to make them 
understand that those alternatives are not soft 
options...So the recommendations should positively 
address the issues that I've identified as underlying the 
offending."
One officer did mention help.
"Other options than custody. Trying to assess what 
disposal has the best chance of reducing the person's 
offending in the future. Or providing the person with 
help on some occasions within the guidelines of the 
service, in terms of how it wants to use its resources."
How was the reduction in offending to be achieved?
"[T]rying to come up with a recommendation that tries to 
address the person's individual situation as much as 
possible, bearing in mind the requirements by the courts 
and society."
"It's the personal needs of that offender, to stop doing 
it again. Not just saying this person's got lots of 
problems therefore let's give him a cheque for £500.
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But... looking at how you could meet those needs in order 
to prevent them doing it again...It*s the rigorous 
pursuit of that. Being imaginative about what it would 
mean, what you would do with that person to reduce the 
likelihood of him getting in trouble again.”
The alcohol factor in an offence was a useful tool in the 
construction of these concrete proposals for reducing 
offending, just as it was useful for offenders in 
demonstrating remorse and reform. In Chapter Two, the need for 
professional typologies to link rapidly to decisions for 
action was identified. The utility of an alcohol factor as an 
organising principle around which to construct offender 
characterisations and recommendations has already been 
demonstrated. Organising principles such as this were utilised 
in the interests of cognitive economy under pressure of time.
That SERs do not reflect the total sum of probation officers* 
professional knowledge and theory is illustrated by their 
responses to a question asking about the differences between 
drink and drug problems. This was asked in an attempt to 
clarify the apparent ”alcohol blindness” of report writers in 
cases concerning drug users, noted in Chapter Ten. However, 
not only were probation officers* responses considerably more 
varied than those of magistrates, but they sometimes appeared 
to assume that the question reflected my ignorance of 
alcohol*s toxicity. They seemed quite unaware of the 
discrepancy between their judgements in individual cases and 
the complexity of their more leisured abstract theorising.
Magistrates generally thought that drug problems were more 
serious, harder to overcome and arose from personality 
disturbances in the addicts. Their responses supported the 
hypothesis of Chapter Ten that concentration on drug rather 
than alcohol abuse stemmed from the alien experience of the 
user.
**[T]he destruction of the body... Somebody who*s got a 
healthy body who then pollutes it. That*s the thing about
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drugs I find very difficult to take.. .Alcohol also abuses 
the body, but you get away with it for much longer.”
"I've seen all these people on amphetamines and the 
cannabis business. They all look pretty sad sorts of 
people. But what it's all about internally I'm not 
aware...What effects they have, what they feel, what 
their cravings are I don't know."
"Drugs to me is a no-no from the word go. You're playing 
with somebody's life. Drugs lead to far worse things 
happening health-wise than a few drinks...If you're 
socialising in drug circles you're killing yourself."
"(Drug taking) implies a definite anger with society, 
because it implies a breaking of the bounds which is 
unacceptable... and would imply problems rather than just 
silliness."
Probation officers, however, disagreed among themselves about 
the comparative seriousness of drink and drug problems. Some 
felt strongly that drink problems were more dangerous, or 
harder to overcome. Only 2 thought that more disturbed 
personalities succumbed to drug addiction. Once again, 
probation officers utilised more sociological perspectives.
"The danger in drug use comes from the fact that it's 
illegal. Society creates the dangers with drugs. Drugs 
per se don't kill people, normally. You can get them on 
prescription, and provided you use clean stuff and 
everything is supervised you're going to be all 
right...The fact that drink is acceptable lulls people 
into a false sense of security."
"[D]rink is freely and legally available. So by drinking 
one isn't automatically entering into a 
subculture...[L]eisure activities, especially for the 
young, are inextricably linked with the use of 
alcohol...So not only is it freely available, it's 
expected that people will drink...There is a more direct 
link between drink and offending than between drug use 
and offending, apart from the fact that drug use is an 
offence in itself."
"Legal differences. I don't think much else. But the 
legal differences obviously lead on to subculture 
differences. So sometimes there is something about drug 
taking which is about self-image."
"Alcohol can have a very wide social ef feet... (With drug 
abuse), you've got it underground, you've got the 
suppliers of drugs and people being drawn into the
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net...[D]rugs seem more insidious. Whereas (with) the 
excessive use of alcohol, you get vast numbers, like in 
football or riots, it seems more open. Maybe alcohol is 
more visible. Maybe that's the only difference."
Thus, probation officers did not distinguish as clearly as 
magistrates between the information and recommendations in 
SERs. They saw their reports more wholistically in terms of 
their objectives. In the exercise of constructing concrete 
rationales for their recommendations, probation officers 
focused on an organising principle, of which alcohol was one 
of the most available and utilisable.
PROBATION
Relationships between City magistrates and the probation
f
service were generally considered to be good by both sides.
However, probation officers complained that magistrates did
not understand or accept their contemporary professional role.
"One of the big issues with the court is patrolling the 
welfare boundary. They want to assign us a welfare role 
which is increasingly incompatible with what we're trying 
to do."
"[T]he probation service has increasingly been wanting to 
define its own particular areas of activity. To focus ori 
certain areas of activity as being priority and go out 
and get those rather than simply being the recipient of 
work provided by the courts. So the probation service is 
wanting to challenge sentencers more and...has openly 
acknowledged that one of the aims of SERs is to influence 
sentencing...That's about moving away from providing 
welfare services for offenders and towards working with 
offenders on their offending and reducing custodial 
sentencing, which has got to be about the toughness of 
probation and its appeal to the courts."
"In (City) magistrates' court, there is a genuine concern 
for some of the people that appear before them, that they 
do have very difficult lives with lots of problems. They 
genuinely want them to be linked up with an agency that's 
going to help them sort those out. They've looked 
traditionally to the probation service to be that agency 
and have had some confidence in us to do so. Now they're 
facing us saying we are not the agency to work with these 
people. That would be OK if we could tell them who was. 
But it's leaving a gap in community provision to help 
people with myriad problems - debt, housing and so on -
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but we're saying they haven't got offending problems and 
therefore are not our target group.”
Magistrates, in fact, quite often expressed support for the 
notion of probation as an alternative to custody, which would 
be expected in the light of their personal antipathy to 
custody. However, they appeared to think that this was a 
policy for the f u t u r e , rather than one with which the 
probation service was already grappling. Furthermore, some 
magistrates expected the probation service itself to find such 
a policy problematic.
"As I understand it, a probation order was about 
befriending. If that's the ethos...then they've got to 
have a dramatic change of thinking in the probation 
service if they're now going to be an alternative to 
custody...There's no reason why they can't do that, but 
they've got to recognise that it is going to be a total 
change of their reason for being."
"Probation is something on its own. Community service is 
something we use instead of custody. I would hate to see 
us having a juggling act over the same thing. Because I 
remember probation officers telling us: 'We only like
people on community service instead of going inside, 
because if we have to breach them, we then know that they 
are going inside. Otherwise we find it very difficult to 
work the community service'. So if you put somebody on 
probation, what do you do if the probation doesn't work? 
Do they then go inside? No, I don't like that idea...It's 
not helping anybody...Probation should be used for its 
own sake. It shouldn't be weighed off against anything 
else."
Magistrates and probation officers conceptualised suitability 
for probation in very different terms. Magistrates invariably 
produced a concrete "schema" of a type of person they 
considered suitable. Also invariably, this schema invoked the 
classic "inadequate", or undersocialised personality, 
particularly the young, and often the first and petty 
offender.
"Those with few family ties, few friends, disorganised, 
unemployed, alcohol addicted...The drifter with few 
friends or family who becomes a drinker for some form of 
personal comfort. The weak-willed, the easily led."
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"The category of people who cannot cope and just need 
someone's shoulder to cry on, to have help organising 
their lives.”
"A young married man, perhaps, who's got a family and a 
drink problem. Because he has got responsibilities which 
he as yet is to immature to cope with."
Such a theory of suitability for probation was anathema to 
probation officers, and gave rise to some of their most overt 
courtroom conflicts with the magistrates.
Example 11.1
The defendant, aged 41, had stolen 4 cans of lager and a 
bicycle. He had numerous previous convictions, and was a 
chronic drug and alcohol abuser. During the initial hearing, 
the magistrates insisted on the production of SERs, despite 
resistance from the probation officer on the grounds that the 
offences were trivial. The magistrates were adamant that the 
defendant needed "help and support". The subsequent SER 
recommended nominal fines and compensation: "(The defendant) 
would have some difficulty paying these, but this would be 
likely to help remind him of the need to exercise greater care 
and restraint in his drinking in the future". On this 
occasion, the magistrates acquiesced, and the court duty 
probation officer complained to me about "the waste of time 
and resources preparing reports for an outcome such as this".
An irony in this case was the SER writer's observation that 
"[i]n interview (the defendant) tended to be rather dismissive 
of the offences". The probation service having been publicly 
dismissive of his offences, the defendant might have been 
forgiven for his tactical error. Instead, his defence 
solicitor was obliged to counter the aspersion on his 
character: "He is unhappy about the use of the word
"dismissive" of the offences. He is not dismissive. He is 
unhappy to be back before the court".
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Example 11.2
A 32 year old first offender had shoplifted alcohol on several 
occasions and admitted to a drinking problem. The magistrates 
consulted the clerk lengthily in the retiring room about this 
"tragic" case. The clerk, returning, appealed to the probation 
officer.
Clerk: "They wanted to make a probation order, but I told 
them: 'A. He's a first offender and B. he's not a custody 
risk. Whatever you may feel you're being told to reserve 
probation for more serious cases. Also he's already got 
the drinking problem service and a social worker, and 
with a drink problem there's not much you can do'. Is 
that right?"
PO: "That's right."
Clerk: "They want a caring service againi"
PO: ( j o c u l a r l y )  "That's not us!"
In the post-sentence interview, the magistrate declared:
"We felt he was ideal for probation, but the clerk 
dissuaded us, saying it wasn't appropriate because 
probation is now more an alternative to custody. I said 
that's just political, to empty the prisons, and he 
needed help...(The conditional discharge) will hang over 
him at least, so if he reoffends he'll be brought back, 
but even then we'll probably be told not to put him on 
probation."
Probation officers defined suitability for probation in more 
abstract terms. The offender's position on the tariff partly 
determined his suitability for probation.
"Seriousness moves me towards probation because of the 
likelihood of custody. Pattern of offending moves me 
towards probation because it can look at that in terms of 
reducing future offending."
"[T]he probation order has to be appropriate for a wide 
variety of offenders. We are a criminal justice service 
and it' s a mistake to start at the wrong end of the 
scale. We could say that there are people that one would 
not w a n t on probation, because probation isn't j u s t i f i e d , 
because it isn't a very serious offence...(But) we don't 
say to (Scrubs) : 'What sort of prisoners would you like 
next week?'...We have to be responding to the different 
sorts of offenders that are out there."
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The only personal attribute of the offender with which 
probation officers were concerned was his motivation.
" [M]otivation. That's a key determinant of when you go 
for a probation order. To talk about alcohol-related 
offenders as a whole group is not helpful, but with 
anyone with some alcohol dependency you've got to have a 
spark of motivation to do something about it...Having 
said that, sometimes a spark is enough, because as 
probation officers we*11 be able to work on peoplefs 
motivation and keep alongside them and seize the moment.”
"Those who have an awareness that their excessive use of 
alcohol is causing them a problem, or have some level of 
insight - it might not be that great - that it is 
something to do with their offence.”
This concern has been noted in other research into 
professional decision making (Paley and Leeves 1982; Shamblin
1990). Motivation, however, was a double edged virtue. One 
probation officer remarked, without a trace of irony:
”If I think that the drinking problem service can do the 
job better, then I'm looking to a conditional discharge 
with a suggestion that they go to that agency and I'll be 
telling the magistrates: 'If the will is there to work at 
it, then he'll work at it with a probation order or not. 
If the will isn't there, then a probation order's a waste 
of time'."
Even high tariff defendants could disqualify themselves from 
probation by their eagerness to resolve their drinking 
problem.
Example 11.3
The defendant, aged 21, admitted taking a vehicle without 
consent and drunken driving. He had 5 previous convictions, 
including one for excess alcohol. On this occasion he had 
drunkenly taken his employer's van, averredly in the fuddled 
belief that he was required to drive it back to (City) , but 
was delayed at more pubs en r o u t e . He was arrested after a 
near accident and a police chase.
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The SER writer concluded:
"(The defendant), thankfully, does now appear to be 
making efforts to tackle the serious drink problem that 
he has had for many years and which underlies the present 
offences and all his previous convictions. He has sought 
help of his own initiative and I gained the impression he 
was sincere in his desire to stop drinking...Since he is 
already attending the drinking problem service and is 
therefore getting the help he needs, there would seem 
little point in a Probation Order as well. The drinking 
problem service's policy is that people should attend of 
their own choice, and therefore attendance there should 
not be a condition of any order of the court.”
Thus, probation officers' theories were not invulnerable to 
contradiction. Their theories of probation supervision itself, 
their defining activity, involved considerable tensions. This 
was particularly illustrated in their views on groupwork 
programmes, instituted under Schedule 11(4A) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1982.
For magistrates, describing the difference between ordinary 
probation supervision and probation with a groupwork condition 
was easy. It was firstly a matter of counselling method.
"Groupwork conditions enable a defendant to not only hear 
others' problems and discuss them but also to voice his 
own problems. Hopefully receiving, after discussion, some 
help and guidance from others, as distinct from an 
occasional one-to-one, limited time visit to a probation 
officer."
"It's tough going on a lone journey, but if you're doing 
it with other people who've got similar problems then you 
realise that you're not alone."
Secondly, it was a matter of stringency.
"They've got to organise their lives to make time for 
(groupwork). With the ordinary probation order, do the 
probation officers go and visit them?...There's a bit 
more of the punishment element in the groupwork.. .It's an 
imposition, isn't it?"
"A probation order on its own is a bit meaningless, quite 
honestly. You hope that somebody is befriending the 
individual..., that they're going to visit them to find 
work, to find somewhere to live, those sorts of things.
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Find their feet, sort of thing. I never expect much more 
from a probation order. Whereas I do feel with the 
groupwork that they're being encouraged to talk about 
their offending behaviour.”
"There's a good possibility of a better response from the 
offender if they're on a group session rather than just 
straightforward counselling...You (take) the real 
(yob) ..., knocking on the door and sitting there 
listening to this bloke or young lady bending his ear for 
however long it is. He'll probably come away and say: 
'Yes, thank you very much'. And go ( d i s p l a y s  2
f i n g e r s )
Thus, most magistrates approved of a special project for 
drunken drivers which ran on an experimental basis for 2 
years.
"[I]t seemed a good idea. But what was slightly puzzling 
was that they would only recommend it for the really bad 
cases. That I never quite understood...I would have 
thought that the first offenders could have done with it 
just as much if not more. Because the second offender may 
be past curing."
Among probation officers, however, there was protracted debate 
about the status of their groupwork programme. Officers 
perceived conflict between social work method and tariff.
"Once you get into writing extra conditions, you're 
intruding more into people's lives. It's very important 
that if you have an extra condition in an order you've 
thought about it carefully. You haven't just tacked it on 
for the sake of it...I think it's a tariff issue, whereas 
(others) feel strongly it's about method...I can't see 
(that)."
"The groupwork has to be reserved as a tariff 
disposal...I never recommend groups for people's own 
good. Never. I retain it always as a tariff 
disposal...Because (groups) are quite difficult for 
people. Not an easy option."
"A (groupwork) order needn't be as intrusive at all as a 
standard order in terms of the number or frequency of 
contacts or what goes on. (Groupwork) seems to me to be 
about method, which is that it is more appropriate to 
discuss your drink problems with other drinkers or people 
than it is to talk about them separately. Why that should 
be seen as higher up the tariff, I can't fathom. [Y]ou 
have to link your method with what you want to achieve."
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" [I]f you* re going to look at it as tariff, you should be 
considering is it more of an intrusion into people*s 
time? Are they giving up more of their liberty? Well, I 
don't think with the groupwork programme necessarily they 
are.. .To me it's a method of work and what you feel would 
be more appropriate to that person."
As a result of this collective ambivalence, the programme for 
drunken drivers was a highly controversial topic, exacerbated 
at times by officers' personal abhorrence of the offence.
"Aiming it at third time (offenders) struck me as rather 
ridiculous...[S]hould we really be giving them an 
opportunity to do it a fourth time? Once I can 
understand, possibly. Twice is a dreadful mistake. Three 
times is almost unforgivable...But it's something that 
should have been out of the probation service's orbit 
altogether. Alcohol education for drivers should be a lot 
more basic. It should be incorporated into the driving 
test...It was also seen by a lot of the courts as a let 
off, because it was an alternative to a fine. If I was 
given a choice of 8 sessions or a £500 fine, that's a 
bargain."
"There was no tariff issue at all. It was set up to deal 
with the fact that quite a lot of people were coming 
through with that offence. In a different organisation 
that would have been called a crime prevention 
project.. .It just wasn't valid under the probation that's 
trying to get hardened offenders."
"We have had the luxury of getting people on probation 
who are more likely to succeed, which is very nice and 
rewarding. But perhaps we should be applying the same 
techniques to our mainstream probationers...[Hjaving got 
into it obviously you give it your best and it's paid off 
in that it's been a successful programme... But I am 
concerned about it, mainly from the resourcing point of 
view, and also because it's a group previously untapped 
by probation and I'm not sure we should be in there."
It was not only the particular offence of drunken driving 
which aroused strong feelings in probation officers. Working 
with alcohol-related offenders could be unpleasant, depressing 
and de-skilling. Frustration, failure and hopelessness were 
repeated themes in officers' experience, exacerbated by other 
unprofessional feelings.
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"[W]henever they attend the drinking problem service it 
always seems to go wrong. They always bugger it 
up...That's a depressing feeling."
"[T]he hopelessness of it all. The number of times people 
youfve worked hard with, were getting somewhere. Then 
suddenly they haven*t...It can be quite scary having 
drunken clients.. .I*ve had clients who I have been scared 
of when they*ve come into the office, when they've been 
drinking."
"They're so frustrating. Often nothing ever changes... 
Probably not (more than other groups), but more visibly 
so. If somebody's coming in pissed every week, then it's 
quite obvious that you've failed. It's brought home to 
you more closely. Yes, it's frustrating, because you 
think: 'Oh, for God's sake, just put the bottle away,
won't you? It's so easy'. Which of course, it isn't. And 
the deceit and the lying and the denial."
"Some of the drinkers I've worked with have frightened me 
sometimes...(For) a senior in a city centre office, who's 
supposed to be to handle everything, being brought 
downstairs to deal with (a drunk) , has on occasions been 
difficult... (And) all the lies and all the deceit and the 
self-deception. The covering up just (goes) on. Whenever 
you thought you were doing something, it's disappeared 
again."
"I can't work with chronic alcoholics. I find that very 
difficult. I never like them on office duty, can't bear 
having to talk to them in court...I can't cope with the 
filth and the aggression. It's not that I'm frightened of 
the aggression. It makes me aggressive."
These personal reactions could spill on to the pages of an 
SER.
Example 11.4
The defendant, aged 21, was charged with criminal damage, ABH 
and 5 offences of shoplifting. He was in breach of his 
probation order for the second time, and on each occasion 
numerous offences were involved. The probation officer wrote:
"All the offences he faces today are typical of the 
pattern he has established over the past 18 months; all 
committed when drunk and he has very little recollection 
of any of them... (The defendant) tells me now that 
throughout all this period he did not realise he was 
still on Probation. Certainly, his Probation Order 
probably seemed like an irrelevant detail at the
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time...[H]e has proved exasperating in that he has 
offended constantly and I am at a loss to suggest what 
might stop him. He has reported occasionally to our 
Office, however, most of his failures are understandable 
given the sheer amount of offending, arrests and
remands...A Community Service Order proved to be a 
complete waste of time.”
The officer's frustration was further vented on the
defendant's partner.
" (His girlfriend) is known to the Probation Service 
because of the many boyfriends...who have unfortunately 
gone on to serve lengthy custodial sentences...Now (he) 
tells me that he has found some stability and motivation 
to change through his relationship..., but this is a 
relationship which has proved disastrous for him in the 
past and disastrous for several other young men.”
Probation officers who did derive some satisfaction from
i
working with alcohol-related offenders usually identified its 
sources in the methods of work available, contact with
specialist agencies and intellectual stimulation.
"I enjoy helping to formulate policy. There's some vanity 
there. I think I' ve got ideas that I want to put
forward...It's about moving, changing and developing.”
"I enjoy working with other agencies. It gives me another 
viewpoint, I pick up more knowledge, and it gives me a 
feel of working in a network, rather than stuck in my own 
office."
"There's quite a lot of literature about. When you're 
rummaging about for things to learn about, there is
rather more about alcohol and offending than there is 
about what you do with people who take without consent,
say.. .The way our society uses a most powerful and
prevalent drug is of some interest."
"It provides an opportunity for doing a good piece of 
focused work...It's a well researched methodology for 
casework tools, so it means that you can implement a 
programme quite neatly."
"It was always nice working with people (on alcohol 
education programmes). It seemed very relevant to them 
and very relevant to them getting into trouble, very 
relevant to them being on probation. So much seems 
distant and far removed and cloud cuckoo land. Everybody 
wonders why they're on probation and nobody really knows, 
including the probation officer. That was something very
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tangible. They knew they got in trouble because they were 
drunk, and there we all were, talking about drink."
Thus, differences of opinion between probation officers and 
magistrates about suitability for probation were not simply a 
matter of degrees of seriousness. They were rooted in 
fundamentally different styles of conceptualisation. 
Magistrates invoked concrete cognitive schemata of "suitable 
people", and related them to concrete notions of "what 
probation officers do with them". Probation officers applied 
abstract notions of tariff and motivation to individual cases 
and to the appropriateness of methods of supervision. In 
contrast to the straightforward logic of magistrates* 
reasoning, probation officers struggled with ambiguities and 
conflicts in their theories. Those theoretical problems could 
be exacerbated in practice by strong personal responses in 
specific cases.
SUMMARY
This chapter reveals 4 issues of particular relevance to an 
understanding of City magistrates* sentencing practice. 
Firstly, the balanced perspectives of magistrates on their 
local crime problems may have been an important factor in 
their sentencing practice. The punitive results of magisterial 
"crusades" against perceived epidemics of particular types of 
crime have been observed elsewhere (Burney 1985; Parker, 
Sumner and Jarvis 1989). Furthermore, since magistrates were 
not collectively preoccupied with particular crimes, they may 
have been more open to invitations to focus on offenders 
themselves. This, it was argued in Chapter Five, is a key to 
successful mitigation.
The reasons for the apparent difference of opinion between 
magistrates and probation officers as to the dangerousness of 
City's streets are not clear. It should be stressed that there 
is no suggestion here that either the probation officers or 
the magistrates were "right". This study did not examine "the 
truth" about City's crime and cannot adjudicate on the issue.
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It may be admitted, nevertheless, that probation officers1 
opinions were surprising, and that I had anticipated that the 
more alarmist views would come from the magistrates. There may 
be some general validity in officers' notions of the 
distortions of their professional experience. Violent 
offenders might command a higher priority in their attention, 
given their greater chances of custodial sentences, and 
higher risk under supervision. This, however, does not explain 
the comparisons offered by probation officers with experience 
elsewhere. It would appear odd for magistrates to be entirely 
insensitive to an unusually high level of violence in their 
locality, if it existed, even without great knowledge of other 
areas. Furthermore, the strength of these officers' beliefs 
enhanced the milder observations others of the alcohol- 
violence association, lending apparent unity to their 
collective perceptions.
However, the discrepancy suggests a potential pitfall in the 
common sense assumption by one group that its perceptions, 
being "the truth", would be shared by another. It might not be 
in the overall professional interests of probation officers to 
air their views too loudly, thus making magistrates 
uncomfortably aware of a serious crime problem about which 
they had been apparently ignorant, and, by implication, 
dilatory. The professional goals of probation officers to 
promote non-custodial sentencing by individualising the 
circumstances of offenders would hardly be served by the 
potential, albeit unwitting, incitement to magistrates to 
"stamp on" violent crime. In this context, it is interesting 
to note that as this part of the research data was analysed, 
the probation service announced, amid some local publicity, 
its own research into City's serious problem of violent crime. 
Again, it should be stressed that these observations do not 
depend on the objective "truth" of City's crime problems. They 
arise from the b e l i e f s  about those problems held by 
magistrates and probation officers.
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Secondly, the dispositional perspective of magistrates in 
explaining their own success in avoiding trouble through drink 
could imply punitiveness, derived from the condemnation of 
indiscipline and the evasion of personal responsibility. 
However, it seemed that City magistrates generally thought 
that the deviant drinking and offending of others was due to 
personal misfortune rather than wilful fecklessness. Common 
sense versions of the academic "undersocialisation” theory 
were sympathetically invoked, as were notions of personal 
misery.
"If I were in the state that some of the people are who 
are here, I would drink alcohol too. Sort of oblivion 
seeking. Solace. Luckily I'm not in the position that I 
want to do it."
"Most of the people who are arrested for drink-related 
offences tend to be... inadequate people who have other 
problems. So they're drinking to fill a need in the way 
they might be taking drugs to fill a need."
One magistrate eloquently described the tension between the 
condemnation inspired by a strong personal morality and the 
recognition of personal advantage.
"People who drink out of bravado at my age, I despise 
them really.. .If they haven't learned to master it by now 
then they go down in my estimation. Sounds terribly prim, 
doesn't it?...It sounds cataclysmically goody-goody to 
say you despise them. Because when you think about human 
beings, people have got a good reason for 
drinking.. .usually. You know what they say: 'To
understand all is to forgive all'... .They've taken refuge 
in drink, quite a lot of the ones we see. And they've had 
no training. It's all to do with background, isn't it? 
Most people I see in court... haven' t had a chance! 
Because they've had no decent family upbringing. And if 
the family hasn't stood by you and given you a proper 
basis for your life, it's not surprising that you meet up 
with peer groups and start drinking."
This sympathetic distinction between themselves and others may 
be a key to understanding the generally humanitarian approach 
to defendants which has been noted throughout the 
observational material gathered in the courtroom. 
Nevertheless, the moral ambivalence described by the last
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magistrate might contribute to the vulnerability of this 
approach to situational influences and moral inferences. In 
Chapter Seven, it was seen that situational distractions, such 
as the composition of the bench of the day and weaknesses in 
mitigation or SERs, could enhance the judgement of offence 
seriousness. In Chapter Eight, the susceptibility of 
magistrates to moral inferences conveyed in the presentation 
of information was identified. Some of these influences, 
particularly when present in combination, might evoke more 
strongly condemnation borne out of personal morality by 
obscuring recognition of the greater misfortunes suffered by 
others.
Thirdly, magistrates* susceptibility to the moral inferences 
contained in SERs, noted in earlier chapters, is partly
explained by their unguarded approach to those documents.
Exceptions to this approach might occur, for example, in cases
involving offences about which individual magistrates felt 
strongly. Again, the potential influence on sentencing of a 
strongly opinionated magistrate was considered in Chapter 
Seven.
Fourthly, the strict application of their basic principle 
concerning responsibility was clearly problematic for 
magistrates, because of their belief in intoxicated and 
alcoholic loss of control. In resolving this dilemma,
magistrates appeared pre-occupied with the assessment of 
offenders* motivations for drinking prior to offending. This 
explains their interest in, and the power of SERs, which 
provided a characterisation from which to infer such 
motivations.
In particular, the strong belief of magistrates in the 
debility of the alcoholic offender contributed heavily to the 
paralysis in sentencing decision making which has been noted 
on several occasions. Here, the sociological and situational 
perspectives, and absence of appeals to sickness in probation
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officers' theories enabled them to take a more robust approach 
to addicted defendants. This, however, contributed further to 
the sentencing impasse, since magistrates frequently looked to 
the probation service for a resolution to the problem.
The theories of probation officers are of interest in 
themselves, given their relatively influential status in City 
court. It was suggested in Chapter Two that professional 
theories confer identity on the practitioner and agency. The 
firm stance on intoxicated responsibility adopted by probation 
officers was not only facilitated by their theories of 
deviance, but was an important aspect of their professional 
identity. Nevertheless, this claim to dispassionate 
professionalism could be disrupted by the intrusion of 
personal feelings. One officer candidly acknowledged the 
tension between professional responsibility and personal 
antagonism towards drunk drivers.
"Drinking and driving is such a horrendous offence. I 
have great difficulty recommending drink-driving courses 
to the court...I have a gut feeling that they really 
ought to get locked up. It all goes back to the deserving 
offender doesn't it? It's there, in the back of our 
minds, however much we try not to say it. Who deserves 
our help and who doesn't? Somehow, the white collar 
Sierra salesman bowling down the (road) after his 
business lunch doesn't evoke a lot of sympathy in me. I 
think: 'Why should I put my time aside for him? He
doesn't deserve it! Lock the bugger up! ' I recognise 
those feelings in me, and it ain't right, really, but 
that's my gut feeling that comes out occasionally. So 
I've got to combat that when I'm thinking about drinking 
and driving."
It would seem from some of the case examples, both in previous 
chapters and here, that probation officers were not always so 
aware of, or determined to control such tension. Working with 
alcohol-related offenders could enhance officers' sense of 
professional identity, through the acquisition of knowledge, 
skill and involvement in interdisciplinary expertise. However, 
it could also attack this identity. The intrusion of personal 
feeling into their responses did not stem only from the
411
abhorrence of some of their offences, but from the experience 
of professional failure.
This perspective contributes to understanding some of the 
puzzles of earlier case examples. For example, the discrepant 
treatment observed in Examples 8.3 and 8.4 can be linked to 
the differential experience of professional self-worth of the 
probation officers involved. The imprisoned alcoholic of 
Example 8.3 inspired tolerant amusement on the part of the 
police officer escorting him to the cells. When I commented on 
this to his exasperated probation officer, I was told:
"Yes, they might say he's fine when he's sober, but 
they're only containing him. He knows the system, how to 
get what he wants and not to get out of line. They're not 
challenging his lifestyle. He thinks because he's on 
social security he's entitled to take what he wants from 
shops. And I don't really hold that view."
The "tragic" defendant of Example 9.11 was also eventually 
imprisoned. His probation officer told me that after his 
release he went to the probation office several times in a 
drunken state and was "quite obnoxious". His offensiveness 
eventually resulted in a severance of relations.
"I swore at him in the end. I told him to fucking well 
get out and not come back if he was going to talk to me 
like that...He's a very unhappy man, with many problems. 
Like so many people who rely on alcohol, he tends to dump 
his unhappiness on you. Over a period of time, he 
certainly left me feeling de-skilled and demoralised and 
feeling I was spending so much time and effort and 
nothing was changing at all."
An irony of these probation officers' experiences is that it 
was cases such as these that gave rise in the courtroom to 
some of the most moving tributes to their endeavours. In 
Example 9.11, as was seen, this came from the defendant 
himself. In Example 9.4, the defence solicitor for the 
psychotic book thief remarked:
"Until recently he had the support of a probation 
officer, who he used to go to regularly, whenever he had 
a problem. Now (that officer) has left, and although he
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does have the opportunity to go to other probation 
officers, he feels very keenly the loss of this 
particular one, who was very patient with him.”
A further irony for probation officers is the discrepancy 
between the confidence with which they argued their 
professional ethos against the alleged misconceptions of 
magistrates and the extent of their internal confusion, 
ambivalence and disagreement. The professional identity which 
they publicly promoted was less easy to pursue rigorously in 
practice. One probation officer in interview remarked:
"It's quite difficult to see sometimes where change is 
ever going to come from, if somebody just goes round and 
around and around. Very often it's round and around, down 
and down. So it's just being with them and holding that, 
trying not to make the situation worse, rather than 
anything else."
Talking informally to probation officers about offenders I had 
witnessed in court, it seemed that the firm, explicit plans 
for reducing offending which they formulated for their SERs 
lost their thrust in the messy, real worlds of their clients' 
lives. Indeed, I was sometimes left wondering just how far the 
shift in public professional identity claimed by probation 
officers had left their involvements with offenders' welfare 
entirely privately intact. Whilst I was interviewing one 
senior probation officer, who was propounding the tariff and 
offence focus of the new philosophy with impressive vigour, 
the telephone rang. The request (granted) of an officer for 
permission to send a probation assistant daily to the home of 
an imprisoned offender to feed his cat was the cause of much 
embarrassed mirth: "Well, that's blown my cover!" Indeed it 
had, and to that extent, at least, p lu s  ca  c h a n g e , p l u s  c ' e s t  
l a  meme c h o s e .
The insistence by probation officers on a professional 
distinction between mitigation and explanation is notable. As 
a technical distinction, this may be tenable. Probation 
officers were bringing their comparatively varied and flexible 
range of theories of crime to bear on the explanation of
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individual offenders* predicaments. They did not assume that 
these explanations in themselves achieved particular 
sentencing outcomes, but rather that they expanded the range 
of constructive sentencing options. Nevertheless, in Chapter 
Five it was argued that explanation, by attracting attention 
to the individuality of a case, is a crucial part of the 
mitigation p r o c e s s . The influence of probation officers' 
explanations and their characterisations of offenders, for 
better or worse, has been repeatedly noted in the preceding 
chapters.
CONCLUSIONS
The attribution of responsibility to intoxicated offenders was 
problematic for magistrates because of their belief in loss of 
control through intoxication and alcoholism. In attempting to 
resolve this dilemma, magistrates appeared to focus on 
offenders' motivations for drinking. In relation to their 
personal success in avoiding trouble through drink, 
magistrates were dispositional theorists, regarding offenders 
as very often the victims of personal misfortune or 
inadequacy. Magistrates' susceptibility to the 
characterisations, explanations and inferences contained in 
SERs was partly explained by their belief in the professional 
objectivity of probation officers, and their distinction 
between information and recommendations in reports. They 
conceptualised suitability for probation in terms of types of 
offender, invoking notions of undersocialisation. They related 
these to concrete notions of what probation supervision 
entailed.
Probation officers held firm principles for the attribution of 
responsibility for intoxicated deviance. These principles were 
related to probation officers' theories of office: their
beliefs about their professional role and tasks. In describing 
their personal success in avoiding trouble through drink, 
probation officers were mostly situational theorists. They 
invoked more varied and complex theories of intoxicated
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deviance than did magistrates, and notably did not subscribe 
to the conceptualisation of alcoholism as "sickness”. 
Probation officers perceived SERs wholistically in terms of 
their endeavours to achieve certain aims related to tariff 
considerations and the reduction of offending. They 
conceptualised suitability for probation abstractly, in terms 
of tariff and offenders' motivation. Dispassionate 
professionalism, however, could be disrupted by personal 
abhorrence of particular offences, and reactions to the 
frustrations, failures and unpleasantness of working with 
alcohol-related offenders. Moreover, probation officers 
struggled with conflicts in their theories of their 
professional role and tasks, notably in relation to probation 
supervision, their defining activity.
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter considers some implications of this theoretical 
and empirical study of the intoxication excuse in mitigation.
INTOXICATION: OUR FAVOURITE EXCUSE
The impatience of many academics over the survival of the 
intoxication excuse in the face of accumulating research 
evidence of its inaccuracy was noted early in this study. The 
finger of blame for this phenomenon has been pointed at 
academics themselves, medical imperialists, conniving lawyers 
and an ignorant public. But the secret of the intoxication 
excuse's success lies in its own intrinsic attractions.
The apparent contrivance of the intoxication excuse is 
frequently mocked. Nevertheless, an offender might genuinely 
seize upon his intoxication as the explanation for his 
misdemeanour because of its intuitive accessibility. Some 
influences on our behaviour are simply not intuitively obvious 
to us as plausible causes of our actions. The presence of an 
audience has been noted as an example of this. Moreover, 
knowledge of "true" influences on our behaviour does not 
necessarily provide us with more persuasive mitigation for our 
misdeeds. "I hit him because I was drunk”, however suggestive 
of moral evasion, will always sound better than "I hit him 
because no-one stopped me”, or ”1 hit him because people were 
looking”.
Offenders continue to offer the intoxication excuse in 
mitigation, not because they are the last to hear of its 
inaccuracy, but because it works. From successful personal 
neutralisations and rationalisations for their offending, it 
is a short step to public mitigation. Furthermore, those 
personal neutralisations and rationalisations are not uniquely 
constructed by offenders, but are available to all who seek to 
excuse themselves for some departure from sober social
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convention. They are rooted in the stockpile of everyday 
knowledge about alcohol*s effects on mind, mood and behaviour. 
We all share in that "common knowledge”, and the vast majority 
of us are practised in the art of invoking the neutralisations 
and rationalisations which it offers. Even when we have no 
personal experience of certain effects described in common 
knowledge, we remain confident that they are the "real” 
results of intoxication for others. The intoxication excuse, 
therefore, is immediately accessible, widely available, 
readily intelligible, and, indeed, personally meaningful as an 
explanation for moral infractions.
Intoxication provides a platform for constructing moral 
judgements which might well be unrivalled for its scope, 
variety and power. Certainly, there was no hint of an equal in 
the empirical study described here. Public reference to an 
offender*s intoxication is not constrained by any delicacy of 
the subject, evokes vivid imagery of his conduct, provides the 
measure of his character, offers the opportunity to 
demonstrate remorse and reform, and justifies both punishment 
and rehabilitation. There is something for everyone here. All 
participants in the courtroom decision making process can
benefit from the mention of intoxication. Even sober offenders 
can exploit it. The continuing popularity of the intoxication 
excuse can hardly be in doubt.
SENTENCING: PROCESS AND PARALYSIS
Studies of courtroom processes can be remarkably reticent on 
the subject of the defendants themselves (e.g. Parker, Casburn 
and Turner 1981; Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989). Of 
alcoholics it is often claimed that they deliberately keep a
low profile in court (Cook 1975; Mileski 1969). It is
sometimes alleged that courtroom procedures embrace a 
conspiracy to mute the hapless defendant (Carlen 1976). 
Bottoms and McClean*s (1976) exploratory study of self-
presentational styles in the courtroom is a comparatively rare
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attempt to consider the active participation of defendants in 
the decision making process.
The comparative latitude for self-expression enjoyed by 
defendants in City magistrates' court facilitated, and even 
necessitated their inclusion as actors in the analysis. This 
study, then, extends our understanding of the styles of 
impression management available to defendants in pursuit of 
mitigation, and the extent to which these styles complement or 
conflict with their personal self-images. Of greatest interest 
here was the courtroom behaviour of alcoholics, who advertised 
their condition by overt drunkenness, but who differed in 
their ambivalence about or embracement of this public 
identity.
To observers, the extreme inappropriateness of the courtroom 
displays of the "hopeless” cases signified irrationality, 
thereby confirming their pathology, or "sickness". Such a 
perspective, however, assumes that the rewards on offer in the 
courtroom, which serve as incentives for decorum, apply 
equally to all defendants. These incentives are to do with the 
prospect of ameliorating the potential damage to be sustained 
from an appearance in court: material or financial loss, 
reduced social status, and public humiliation. But these 
incentives had no relevance to these destitute men. 
Materially, financially and socially they had already lost 
whatever advantages they had once possessed. They lived out 
their lives in a state of public humiliation. Physically, they 
could even gain from brief incarceration.
These defendants derived quite different rewards from their 
court appearances, amongst the most significant, it seemed to 
me, being the satisfaction of seeing the chaos and 
embarrassment of their world impinge upon the protected 
existence of others. At the end of the day, there was little 
court personnel could have done to prevent this. The limits of 
the court's sanctions for such behaviour were fairly narrow,
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and nothing within the courtroom could alter the perverted 
system of rewards and punishments of the alcoholic*s world. 
But these men were in fact behaving as they were expected to 
behave. It was part of their "sickness" to contradict the 
rules of propriety which governed courtroom activity.
The degree of latitude permitted to defendants was one factor 
in the processes through which mitigation exerted its 
influence in City court. It was an aspect of the democratic, 
mutually respectful style of problem solving by negotiation 
favoured by staff and magistrates.
The promotion of structured decision making and expression of 
opinion among magistrates was also suggested to enhance their 
susceptibility to mitigation by increasing their attention to 
the plights of individual defendants. In this respect, the 
success which has been claimed for the criteria for justifying 
custody for young offenders in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
in reducing rates of incarceration may be well founded. These 
criteria, by demanding justifications for custody derived fron? 
case detail, attract attention to the individuality of cases. 
Thus, by "provoking mindfulness" (Palmerino, Langer and 
McGillis 1984), mitigation achieves its purpose.
The pursuit of leniency in City court was assisted by 
magistrates* collective antipathy to custody. That this did 
not result in a more unusually low rate of imprisonment was 
partly because magistrates perceived that personal feeling was 
an inappropriate basis for the exercise of public office. 
Nevertheless, the parsimonious use of the custodial sanctions 
in City court deserves some further consideration.
Studies of magistrates* sentencing decisions have often sought 
to explain why courts utilise custody (e.g. Burney 1985; 
Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989). However, as Parker, Sumner 
and Jarvis (1989) observe, magistrates impose custody because 
hitherto, official restraints upon them have been
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comparatively few. Indeed, as was found in this study, 
magistrates see the recourse to custody as part of their 
public office, however personally unpleasant its imposition 
may be. It might be pertinent, therefore, to ask why some 
courts do n o t use custody as much as others.
Once the focus is shifted in this way, some of the conclusions 
of sentencing research seem to lose their apparent force. For 
example, Parker, Sumner and Jarvis (1989) suggest that a 
court's sentencing tradition is reinforced by the precedent of 
previous disposals: the visibility of a previous custodial 
sanction on a defendant's record, by demonstrating its failure 
to reform him thus far, encourages further incarceration. Such 
an analysis appears to offer a plausible explanation of the 
perpetuation of custodial sentencing. But it cannot tell us 
why some courts resist this "push" towards increasing use of 
imprisonment. It is rather less intuitively reasonable to 
argue that the visibility of previous non-custodial disposals 
promotes their continued use, since presumably by his 
reconviction the defendant who has not experienced custody is 
also demonstrating his failure to learn his lesson.
In seeking to explain the excessive use of custody, Parker, 
Sumner and Jarvis overlook some potentially useful insights 
into its parsimonious use. In particular, they fail to examine 
the unusually low rate of custody shown by one of the courts 
in their study, concluding merely: "The repetition of punitive 
decisions cannot, in the end, be disguised by the exceptions, 
even contradictions” (Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989, p.173).
Combing Parker, Sumner and Jarvis' study for possible 
influences on the sentencing practice of the court with a low 
custody rate, certain features were found which complemented 
the findings of this study. The courthouse was blessed with 
good facilities. Clerks were courteous and helpful to 
defendants and were influential in advising magistrates. 
Probation officers never recommended custody, rarely implied
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it, and offered persuasive alternative recommendations; their 
reports were strategic and coherent arguments; they engaged in 
a comparatively high level of dialogue with magistrates in the 
courtroom. Magistrates were not particularly alarmed about 
their local crime problems; they did not hold a simple 
ideology of sentencing; they took a paternalistic and 
consensual approach to sentencing; they were receptive to the 
notion of alternatives to custody.
These are observations about the decision making process. 
Those seeking to influence sentencing d e c is io n s  might 
therefore usefully turn their attention to the identification 
and enhancement of d e c is io n  m a k in g  p ro c e s s e s such as these, 
which in combination may powerfully influence outcomes.
This discussion of sentencing in City court should not end 
without acknowledging the irony of the experience of these 
magistrates, whose humanitarian concern for offenders was 
persistently thwarted by the sheer inaccessibility of 
treatment or help. The paralysis of the sentencing decision 
making process in cases of alcoholic or mentally disordered 
offenders has been repeatedly observed.
There is insufficient space here for a diversion into the 
philosophy of sentencing. Indeed, this study has been less 
concerned with what sentencing o u g h t t o  be than with what it 
in practice i s  in one court. The failure of City magistrates' 
persistent efforts to secure professional help for disturbed 
defendants is testimony to the criminal justice system's 
ineffectiveness as an instrument for the delivery of 
treatment. Nevertheless, it does not follow that defendants 
would have fared better under a "just deserts" (Von Hirsch 
1976) approach. City magistrates' paralysis in the face of 
profound individual distress or disturbance was an aspect of 
their susceptibility to mitigation. The accumulation of 
research into decision making processes in general and 
sentencing in particular which has been reviewed and
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complemented by this study indicates that tolerance of 
deviance is enhanced by the recognition and tolerance of 
complexity. To seek to attenuate their sometimes laboured 
styles of reasoning might have made life easier for City 
magistrates, but there is rather little evidence that a pure 
just deserts approach reduces the harshness of defendants1 
experience of punishment (Hudson 1987). Within what proved so 
often to be an intractable system, the display of magisterial 
humanity was something of a virtue in itself.
CALLING IN THE PROFESSIONALS
The professional influence of the probation service was an 
important aspect of sentencing in City court. In view of the 
extended role for the probation service envisaged in the 
implementation of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the nature 
of, and tensions in this influence merits further comment.
Probation officers in City magistrates' court were fortunate. 
They enjoyed a working environment in which their professional 
expertise was recognised and their participation was 
encouraged. No derogation of the quality of their work is 
intended by the observation that probation officers alone 
cannot produce this happy state of affairs. The research which 
informed this study, and which was noted particularly in 
Chapter Seven, indicates that probation officers find it 
difficult to thrive professionally in courts which are 
antagonistic to their endeavours. The inhibition of their 
skills in hostile environments has been observed in several 
courtroom studies (e.g. Ashworth, Genders, Mansfield, Peay and 
Player 1984; Darbyshire 1984; McWilliams 1986). It is probably 
not mere coincidence that the highest quality of SERs was 
produced in the court with the lowest custody rate in Parker, 
Sumner and Jarvis' (1989) study. Rather, those probation 
officers, like the ones in City court, were enabled to 
exercise their professional skills by the sympathetic 
environment in which they operated.
422
However, a receptive environment which facilitates the 
exercise of skill does not guarantee that professional 
influence will always be benign. The susceptibility of City 
magistrates to moral inferences contained in SERs, combined 
with their faith in professional objectivity, created a 
situation in which real or implied condemnation of defendants 
in reports could work powerfully to their detriment.
It does not seem to be useful here to allege malign intent, or 
professional incompetence against probation officers in 
relation to some of the reports noted in this study. Their 
capacities for tolerance of deviance and persuasive argument 
on defendants* behalves have been equally frequently observed. 
Rather, the question should be asked what inspired probation 
officers to vent intolerance in some cases, in contradiction 
to their professional standards of practice. In the case of 
alcoholic defendants, it seemed that an antagonistic SER was 
the culmination of unprofessional feelings of failure, fear, 
anger and distaste, which steadily eroded professional 
confidence and personal tolerance. To deny that these 
alcoholic offenders were exceptionally demanding and difficult 
people would be naive. Probation officers cannot be instructed 
simply not to feel the way they did in such trying 
circumstances. Rather, attention should be directed to the 
mechanisms by which they may be sustained in their efforts, or 
enabled to avoid cathartic purging in the pages of their 
reports.
The preliminary examination of professional theories in 
Chapter Two noted the allegations of expansionism against the 
professions, and suggested that this was a simplistic 
perspective. In this study, it was clear that probation 
officers were not pursuing expansion of their sphere of 
activity in crude terms of the numbers of offenders under 
their supervision. Indeed, they were deliberately rejecting 
such merely quantitative professional growth, at the cost of 
some friction with the magistrates. Probation officers*
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theories of their professional role in the production of SERs 
and probation supervision were reminiscent of McWilliams' 
(1986) conclusion that the probation service has moved from a 
personalised focus on individual offenders to a impersonal 
view of offenders as "units of policy". Probation officers 
sought expansion in terms of high risk, high tariff 
defendants. This pursuit was an explicit aspect of their 
contemporary professional identity.
The point about this pursuit which concerned me, as an 
observer of professional and lay interactions, was the yawning 
gap between the language of the probation service and that of 
the magistrates. Magistrates very rarely used the term 
"tariff" at all, let alone utilised the sophisticated abstract 
conceptualisation invoked by probation officers. Within 
magistrates' concrete, schematic styles of reasoning about 
types of offender and what probation officers do with them 
certain logic was obvious and inescapable: undisciplined
people need punishment; needy people need help; "sick" people 
need treatment. Magistrates' liking for the groupwork 
programmes and denigration of individual supervision, noted in 
Chapter Ten, stemmed from their difficulty in conceptualising 
what probation officers did with offenders in one-to-one 
supervision. Concrete problem solving, such as finding a job 
or accommodation, was the limit of their imagination in this 
respect. By contrast, magistrates thought they knew what 
happened to offenders on groupwork programmes because the term 
invoked schematic notions such as "sharing problems" and 
"helping each other".
The conclusions which probation officers reached through their 
abstract professional styles of reasoning about tariff and 
motivation simply made no sense within these theoretical 
constructs. The fact that conflict did not arise more 
frequently between probation officers and magistrates 
sometimes appeared to have less to do with theoretical 
agreement than with a fortunate coincidence of interests in
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many cases: for example, defendants who appeared to
magistrates to be in need of help, also often appeared to 
probation officers to be sufficiently high tariff and well 
motivated to warrant their professional intervention. 
Furthermore, probation officers exploited this kind of 
reasoning in their arguments and recommendations: probation 
supervision could challenge the undisciplined; guide the 
vulnerable; help the needy.
Probation officers* reports, couched in concrete, 
individualistic terms disguised the discrepancy between their 
theoretical orientation and that of magistrates. In Chapter 
Ten it was suggested that probation officers did not utilise 
the full extent of their theoretical repertoire in the 
preparation of SERs in the interests of cognitive economy. 
However, a further issue should be raised here. Probation 
officers* construction of SERs is an intrinsic aspect of the 
judgement of individual culpability with which the court is 
concerned. In this respect, probation officers* definitional 
distinction between mitigation and explanation ignored the 
process of judgement formation in which they were actively and 
powerfully involved. It was because of this inescapable 
involvement in judgements of and responses to individual 
culpability that probation officers* reports were constructed 
as they were, and did not reflect their broad theoretical 
understanding of the sociological and situational influences 
on offending more fully.
A final concern about SERs arises from the clear, explicit 
plans for probation supervision upon which officers prided 
themselves. These plans may certainly be persuasive to 
magistrates, particularly given their concrete, schematic 
styles of reasoning about probation. Nevertheless, it seemed 
to me that in the process of supervision, probation officers 
became absorbed in the day to day, messy real worlds of their 
clients* lives, in which these plans became obscured. 
Precisely this phenomenon has been observed in Willis' (1983)
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study of the process of probation supervision. To this extent, 
there was a danger that magistrates1 were being seriously, 
although unintentionally, misled. Indeed, it was a singular 
irony of probation officers* experience that they appeared to 
be drawn by their clients into precisely the tangle of 
"welfare” problems which they complained magistrates attempted 
to thrust upon them.
This study, therefore, raises questions about the evolving 
professional role of the contemporary probation service. The 
manner in which these issues will resolve themselves as the 
probation service seeks to move centre stage in the criminal 
justice system remains to be seen. This study may, however, 
have a message for probation officers pursuing this quest. Lay 
magistrates are precisely that: they are lay theorists,
constructing lay judgements of responsibility and culpability, 
and linking them to lay notions of justice by means of lay 
styles of reasoning. The outcome may not always be what 
professionals would want. But lay magistrates are not required 
to become professional theorists; they would not be lay 
magistrates if they did. To berate magistrates for having "the 
wrong idea" is to miss this point. There is probably little to 
be gained from trying to force professional conceptualisations 
upon them, therefore. Rather, the means may be explored 
through which those professional perspectives may be more 
successfully communicated through the medium of lay language, 
which demands, not abstract exhortations about the importance 
of tariff, but concrete accounts of offenders in their "real 
worlds" and what probation officers do with them.
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APPENDIX A:
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: MAGISTRATES
SECTION ONE: PERSONAL INFORMATION
First, I would like to ask you a little about yourself.
1. How long have you been a magistrate?
2. Can you tell me a little about what you do outside of
your duties as a magistrate?
3. Which parts of your magisterial duties do you find most 
interesting?
4. What are the rewards of being a magistrate?
5. What are the dissatisfactions of being a magistrate?
SECTION TWO: INTOXICATION AND DEVIANCE
I would like to ask some questions about how you see alcohol-
related offending. You may be a little surprised at some of
these questions, but I am just interested to hear your
immediate reactions.
6. Does (City) have problems with particular sorts of 
alcohol-related crime?
7. Considering how very many of us drink, alcohol-related 
crime is comparatively rare. How would you account for 
your own success in avoiding trouble through drink?
8. What circumstances can you think of when would it be 
wrong to hold an alcohol-related offender responsible for 
what he has done?
9. Can you think of circumstances when you have accepted, or 
would be prepared to accept, drinking as a mitigating 
factor in an offence?
10. Can you think of cases when you have thought, or when you 
would think, that drinking makes an offence more serious?
11. What are the differences between drink problems and drug 
problems?
12. Why do chronic alcoholics break the law?
13. What do you think are the reasons for pub violence?
427
14. Why is drinking so often a feature of marital disputes?
15. Why do people drink and drive?
SECTION THREE: SENTENCING
I would like to ask you some questions now about your views on
sentencing, Social Enquiry Reports and probation.
16. What, for you personally, is the primary aim of 
sentencing?
17. How do you try to achieve that?
18. (City) Magistrates Court seems to use custody less than 
some other courts. How would you explain this?
19. What are the circumstances in which you ask for Social 
Enquiry Reports?
20. What are probation officers trying to achieve by their 
recommendations in Social Enquiry Reports?
21. What kinds of alcohol-related offenders are suitable for 
probation?
22. How would you describe the differences between ordinary 
probation and probation with a groupwork condition?
23. What do you think about current moves to use probation as 
an alternative to custody?
428
APPENDIX B:
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: PROBATION OFFICERS
SECTION ONE: PERSONAL INFORMATION
First, I would like to ask you a little about yourself.
1. How long have you been a probation officer?
2. What are your present responsibilities in the team?
3. What are your particular interests? (e.g. client groups,
areas of responsibility, methods)
4. Has your work produced any particular involvement in work 
concerned with alcohol problems?
SECTION TWO: INTOXICATION AND DEVIANCE
I would like to ask some questions about how you see alcohol-
related offending. You may be a little surprised at some of
these questions, but I am just interested to hear your
immediate reactions.
5. Does (City) have problems with particular sorts of
alcohol-related crime?
6. Considering how very many of us drink, alcohol-related
crime is comparatively rare. How would you account for
your own success in avoiding trouble through drink?
7. What circumstances can you think of when would it be 
wrong to hold an alcohol-related offender responsible for 
what he has done?
8. Can you think of circumstances when you have accepted, or
would be prepared to accept, drinking as a mitigating
factor in an offence?
9. Can you think of cases when you have thought, or when you 
would think, that drinking makes an offence more serious?
10. What are the differences between drink problems and drug 
problems?
11. Why do chronic alcoholics break the law?
12. What do you think are the reasons for pub violence?
13. Why is drinking so often a feature of marital disputes?
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14. Why do people drink and drive?
SECTION THREE: SENTENCING AND PROBATION
I would like to ask you about your views on Social Enquiry
Reports and probation.
15. What are you trying to achieve by your recommendations in 
Social Enquiry Reports?
16. What kinds of alcohol-related offenders are suitable for 
probation?
17. What are the differences between ordinary probation and
probation with a groupwork condition?
18. What do you think about current moves to use probation as 
an alternative to custody?
19. Tell me three things you like about working with alcohol- 
related offenders.
20. Tell me three things you don*t like about working with 
alcohol-related offenders.
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APPENDIX C 
POST-SENTENCE INTERVIEWS: MAGISTRATES.
Defendant:
Magistrate(s):
I am interested in the ways in which your sentencing decisions 
take into account issues about alcohol in particular cases. I 
have some specific questions to ask you, but first:
1. Perhaps you could tell me in your own way about your
thinking in this case?
2. What was the most important consideration of all in this
case for you?
3. How seriously did you view this matter?
4. What information especially helped you to reach your
decision?
5. What did the references to alcohol tell you about this
case?
6. What kind of person do you think this offender is?
What makes you think that?
7. What effect, if any, do you hope this sentence will have?
8. How optimistic are you that this effect will be achieved?
9. How satisfied do you feel with this outcome?
10. What made you decide that you agreed with the
recommendation/did not agree with the recommendation in 
the Social Enquiry Report?
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11.
12.
(If probation was not the outcome)
Did you consider probation at all?
Is there anything else you could tell me about your 
thinking in this case?
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